I'm afraid that far more scholarship would be required to carry the point in either direction. — Banno
Yep. Nevertheless, I can say a few things in support of the OP, even if they're far more vague and suggestive than is required to carry the point.
First, I'm not saying that Wittgenstein is a Kantian philosopher or that he is in a unique position in taking a transcendental approach. What I’m thinking is that there is a resemblance between Kant and (late) Wittgenstein, at least along a certain dimension. I think it’s something like a historical point. I'm saying that Kant prefigured Wittgenstein or laid the groundwork, in ways that might be under-appreciated. He was ahead of his time, and more than he knew; without the rationalist baggage, Kant is more contemporary than is often thought, not least because he was one of the first to push back against the Cartesian tradition (which is an important aspect of the transcendental in the hands of Kant).
This matters to me personally because I keep noticing that Kant and Wittgenstein, in similar ways, help me in thinking about things like appearance and reality, sceptical doubt, direct and indirect realism, perception, and related issues. I'm trying to identify why this is so.
I take the important and controversial question to be how Wittgenstein’s late philosophy can be transcendental given that it’s significantly anthropological and seemingly empirical, and given that he specifically cautions against the identification of, and the search for, necessity and universality (and by implication, the a priori).
I call transcendental all cognition that deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori. — Kant, CPR, B 25
For Kant this is about synthetic a priori knowledge via concepts, but I think it can be about other things while remaining transcendental.
There are other ways to put it. A transcendental investigation investigates ...
- The a priori conditions of experience
- The most general conditions of experience
- The conditions of the possibility of experience (or of knowledge, practices, etc.)
- What it is that "stands fast" for us
- The limits of reason.
Crucially too, the transcendental is anti-sceptical, and not just as a pleasant side-effect. This is seen at various points in the CPR (the Transcendental Deduction of the categories, the Refutation of Idealism, and the fourth Paralogism in the first edition). Generally what we get is the idea that it doesn't make sense to say that objects as we perceive and know them are such apart from those conditions (there is a sense in which Kant's transcendental idealism is almost a tautology: you cannot experience something except in the way you must experience it). Since I'm more familiar with OC than PI, I wouldn't mind pursuing this angle ("Here we see that the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear application.").
There is debate over whether late Wittgenstein identifies a priori conditions. Here's one way of looking at it:
Rather than being denied, the concept of the a priori is placed firmly on its feet in the later works. This concrete a priori no longer centers about a Kantian transcendental subjectivity. Here it defines a concrete form of life in a particular world rather than a transcendental consciousness. One must envision the a priori as arising in experience rather than being imposed upon experience. — G. D. Conway, Wittgenstein on Foundations
Whether or not that works (how is it a priori if it arises in experience?) Wittgenstein has this in common with other twentieth century thinkers, e.g., Foucault with his
historical a priori. Foucault himself is doing transcendental philosophy in that he is investigating intersubjective conditions of the possibility of our societal practices, even though these conditions are not to be seen as universal and fixed. But interestingly, he also argued that Kant had already done something similar. In his essay introducing Kant's
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Foucault argues (I think) that after the CPR Kant began to locate the transcendental in the empirical subject, thus bringing the two poles, empirical and transcendental, together. And the move to anthropology notably parallels the direction of Wittgenstein's thinking from the 1930s on.
So what is the transcendental argument Wittgenstein uses, Jamal? "Thus, from the fact that we are able to make such statements meaningfully, the existence of a community of others that ‘fix’ this rule can be inferred, as a necessary pre-condition for the former..."? — Banno
Sure. Or how about the following, which is Davidson's summary of the private language argument:
. . . unless a language is shared, there is no way to distinguish between using the language correctly and using it incorrectly; only communication with another can supply an objective check. — Davidson, Three Varieties of Knowledge
Which I take to be equivalent to:
distinguishing between using the language correctly and using it incorrectly is possible if and only if language is shared.
And thus we reach our social practices and the form of life that language is embedded within. What are you asking for when you ask how form(s) of life "cashes out"?
Similar to Wittgenstein (and Davidson's "triangulation"), Kant transcendentally flipped inner and outer experience to give primacy to the latter, i.e., to the experience of the "external world" as opposed to self-knowledge and self-consciousness. Descartes and his followers, both rationalist and empiricist, assumed that...
. . . our self-awareness is a given, that our sensory states are exactly what they appear to us to be, and that the philosophical task is to see what else, if anything, we can know on this basis by logical deduction from this presumed evidence base. — K. R. Westphal, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos
Notice that this is the basic rationale for epistemology as first philosophy. But with self-awareness demoted, that's called into question.
I think Kant and Wittgenstein demonstrate an anthropological tendency while retaining a transcendental motivation. Whether it carries the point, I hope all this does
something to support the view that late Wittgenstein is significantly transcendental, and that ...
the locus of his new kind of transcendental philosophy is ultimately taken out of the head and placed in social practices. — Jamal
(The unmentioned intermediary point being the Tractatus: the locus in language and/or logic.)
Of course, there's a lot of detail missing here.