Did you check absoluteaspiration’s post on his consciousness account? That’s what I commented on. Is it an accurate précis? — apokrisis

Ah, I thought you meant Zizek. Don’t know if it’s accurate.

Earlier I was thinking about people who'd say 'nothing is true.' I use to like this kind of radically open-minded aphorism. — plaque flag

Makes me think of Adorno's one: "only exaggeration is true".

Well, I agree dammit.

But what I don’t think I’ve seen from you (could be wrong) is when in philosophy you think definitions are good. Is it possible to be specific here, even, dare I say, to offer some sort of definition?

For example, I’ll quote myself again:

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here? — Jamal

Couldn’t we say that if the task is exegesis, it’s no good to reject the definition of Dasein given at the beginning, before we’ve explicated it?

EDIT: actually you did say that the definition of art I gave might be useful.

But overwhelmingly I agree that ".. it’s in the use of term that we can understand the meaning of concepts, not primarily by definitions", and indeed I've taken this further, suggesting elsewhere that the notion of a concept is a reification of the use of the term at issue; that all there is to a concept is the use of the associated words. — Banno

I realized you thought so and was worried it would come up, because I thought it wasn’t relevant, that I could conflate them without anyone noticing too much, and without affecting the debate.

But now it’s come up, it is interesting. Adorno and Hegel always complain about reification too, but for them it’s not the concepts as such that are to blame, but an overly rigid use of them. Maybe this amounts to the same thing.

Do we ever see productive discussions between those who don't share definitions and assumptions? — Janus

I think so, but maybe sometimes less for the primary interlocutors than for bystanders. Reading discussions over the years I’ve been happily struck by insights that amounted to rejections of the definitions.

In a discussion of phenomenology's relationship with post-structuralism, for example, would there be any value contributed by a participant who only wanted to argue that neither phenomenology nor post-structuralism can contribute anything of philosophical value? — Janus

Yeah, it might be a matter of degree or something. I was asking the same sort of question above:

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here? — Jamal

You and banno apparently don't like the fact I think definitions are important. — T Clark

This is not true. If you’d been paying attention to my posts (and that’s another thing) you’d see that I’m quite open to the idea that definitions are important, and I positively want people to disagree, including you. The thread’s title is just sensationalist.

You brought it up, not me. — T Clark

No, it was you. You first personalized things when you started talking about my approach to philosophy, implying that it was tied down to particular philosophers and their works. In contrast, you described your own approach. As I say, this could have been interesting if you had actually explained how these different approaches played out in our different attitudes to definition, but you didn’t want to pursue that. It was enough for you to state your opinions and tell me that you cherish them for important personal reasons. Why should I care?

And now, you have become somewhat aggressive towards Banno for no good reason that I can see, other than your epic personal feud.

I don't think that's true. Example please. — T Clark

Just in this discussion you’ve done it with me (described above), and you’ve done it again with @Banno:

Getting into arguments about the meaning of words is examining the substance and details of a particular position. — Banno

Sometimes yes. Often no. As I noted, and you ignored, sometimes I want to look at a particular view of an issue and not talk about how others might define the issue. You often don't respect that desire. It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical. The solution is always simple, if you don't want to address the issues as laid out in the OP, go somewhere else. You seem to be unable to do that. — T Clark

Here, instead of tackling his point you end up talking about Banno himself, doing the old ad hominem. It genuinely seems to me that you literally do not want to discuss the topic: you think the way you think and that’s that. It is not right on the money, because it doesn’t address the point in a philosophical way. Try imagining someone who agrees with Banno but who you like: what would you say to them if they made the same point? The principle of charity is key.

I’ve seen it in other discussions. I think you can be forgiven for sometimes expressing your exasperation or personal animus when you find Banno’s approach significantly, shall we say, divergent from your own. It’s just not philosophy though. No further questions. I rest my case.

I would call it amusing PoMo tosh — apokrisis

PoMo style deconstruction, employing the usual suspects of Marx and Freud. — apokrisis

Zizek is famously critical of postmodernism, which is why modernists such as Marx and Freud are important reference points for him (despite what you see as their Romantic reaction). Universalism and the political importance of the subject, two things Zizek seems to like, are eminently nonpostmodernist, don’t you think?

Political dissent once dealt with real world issues, like the disequilibrium between labour and capital. But again citing Fukuyama, the political focus has shifted to the distractions of identity politics. — apokrisis

This criticism of the Left is very much in line with Zizek’s.

Maybe it’s because postmodernism is his philosophical milieu that he comes across as postmodernist.

Again - it's very personal to me — T Clark

So what? I don't think it means that because it's personal to you, the very fact that it's personal to you is all you need to talk about. There are the philosophical issues too. You often seem to forget that.

Baloney. If you don't want to play by the rules I set up in my OP, there are other threads to go too. My OPs always leave plenty of room for disagreements, but they focus on the issue I am interested in discussing. I don't start discussions offhandedly. I have a specific purpose in mind. Generally, it's because I don't understand something and want to examine it closer and I want help from you guys. — T Clark

This is what we're exploring here. It certainly doesn't help when you put people in boxes and assume, well, that's the way you are and I'm the way I am because I was an engineer and there's nothing to be done. It's irrational, anti-philosophical, trivial and distracting. And now I'm doing it too.

On the other hand, what if someone wants to explore the meaning of Dasein and a hostile party butts in with, say, Adorno's excoriating analysis of Heidegger's abuse of language and celebration of irrationality? Would that be philosophical? I think the answer is at least sometimes no, so what's the difference here?

For example say someone starts a discussion proposing to deal with how semiotics or phenome nology helps us understand the nature of consciousness and the human relation to the world. There would be little point in someone asserting that semiotics and phenomenology don't do either of those things, because that would just signal that no discussion is possible between those two interlocutors, at least so it seems to me. — Janus

Whereas definitions, if respected, would shut them out from the start.

So...

That's true but doesn't augur well for discussion between those who do not share basic assumptions or definitions. — Janus

But with the definitions and assumptions in place and an expectation that others abide by them, those who don't share them are not involved at all. To put it mildly, that's not always good.

Excuse me for butting in folks...

It is inconsiderate and unphilosophical — T Clark

It might be inconsiderate, but it is not necessarily unphilosophical. Classically in philosophy, there is questioning the question. To do this might be to go against the wishes of the asker, who just wants a straight answer. It’s a refusal to abide by the terms of the debate as set out. But this is exactly what philosophy ought to do. The same goes for definitions.

You seem to be unable to do that. — T Clark

I see you’ve managed to personalize things again. This is a discussion about definitions, not the various personalities of TPF and how they behave. Some would say it’s inconsiderate of you to disrespect the topic in this way, in that you have failed to follow your own advice and “address the issues as laid out in the OP”. In this case I think it’s also unphilosophical. (I’m not asking you to stop it, by the way)

In one of your posts in reply to me a few pages ago, you appeared to interestingly combine this personalizing approach with something philosophical, or metaphilosophical. You suggested that the reason we saw the same situation differently was that we had different approaches to philosophy. I asked you how this played out, but you were not interested enough to answer, so that avenue fizzled out. Maybe this time it won’t (it’s the same issue).

I meant @Streetlight actually. I didn’t know Sheps was into Zizek. Whatever happened to Sheps eh. Never made it over here I don’t think.

Try this:

https://iep.utm.edu/zizek/

I have not yet read any of his hardcore philosophy books, but as far as I can tell his interest is in subjectivity, from a psychological and political point of view, rather than in consciousness, that which is explored by analytical philosophers in terms of the concepts you’ve mentioned (qualia, emergence). When the word comes up in his works it’s probably about “false consciousness,” the Marxian concept. So it could be that he doesn’t have anything like the theory you’re imagining.

I could be wrong though. We used to have a member who was familiar with Zizek, but he’s no longer here unfortunately.

Proudly declaring your ignorance. Not a good look.

Beliefs are truth-functional though, and art in the service of false beliefs is thereby a lie.

Adjourning a meeting was never involved in spiritual practices. — Jamal

That was hasty of me. Does this kill my point?

Not really. Adjourning a meeting was never the means by which the favour of benign spirits and the protection from malign ones was effected.

But:

Adjourning a meeting is magic delivered from the lie of being truth.

This doesn’t work. Adjourning a meeting was never involved in spiritual practices.

Teach me; how else can naming a ship be distinguished from magic, other than by their being seperate instances of the same thing? — Banno

Very well, Socrates, I’ll play along. I’m not saying it has sharper boundaries than the notion of a game, so I’m not saying that Adorno’s definition of art requires a definition of magic, but I can say that magic, unlike naming a ship, involves the belief in supernatural entities such as spirits and demons that inhabit the things of nature, and that magic spells are often effected by means of symbolic objects made to resemble or represent these things or their spirits and demons.

But…

I suspect Adorno wants to grant a special status to art that I might deny. — Banno

I suspect this is true, even though his definition does not rule out the idea that naming a ship is a kind of magic.

Good point, but it’s a bit like referring to communism or militant atheism as religions. Naming a ship and declaring a meeting adjourned can be distinguished from magic incantations and rituals, and not only by the fact that they’re separate instances of the same thing.

I could say that meaning is pointing if that would help?

Like that, for a start. Setting out a definition in order to ground an argument is already taking a stance, which may itself be brought into question.

Moreover, we might think in terms of Searle's status functions and institutional facts. Language builds on itself, so that saying it is so makes it so, or counts as its being so. — Banno

I'm afraid I'm going to have to entirely agree. Sorry.

Maybe I'll even agree — T Clark

Woah, steady on! No need to go that far.

But aye, I did think my post would be in sympathy with your pragmatic conception of knowledge.

No worries, feel free to follow it wherever it goes. It’s actually quite relevant to my previous discussion called “Magical powers”, so it’s not that I don’t find it interesting.

I’m not opposed to your sagacious and fascinating thoughts, but I wasn’t really endorsing Teddy’s definition so much as interpreting it to demonstrate how the right kind of definition can work philosophically.

:chin:

In the sense that the same practice carried on without that lie.

Adorno means it almost literally though, whereas the ideas of commodity fetishism and social practice as magic are metaphorical.

Good points though.

These all happen because we take recursive stipulation seriously. — Banno

That’s quite interesting. Recursive how?

Almost nobody reads anybody's posts charitably and thoroughly as far as I have been able to tell judging by the bulk of replies. For what it's worth, I think you are one of the more charitable and thorough readers of others' posts, as well as being one of the more reasonable and thoughtful posters. I often find myself admiring and envying your patience. I'm far too prone to impatience. — Janus

Thank you :smile:

Thanks for reading and understanding my post by the way.

I think something like the latter, yes.

My point was that the consciousness of others is impossible to doubt, and yet you seemed to take me to be arguing that other people except for me might not be conscious.

Your comment does not stand, because it takes me to be saying something I’m not saying, something I did not say in the post you responded to. You projected a position onto me that I do not hold.

And I want to read yours Frank. You’ve got it in you, I can tell.

In what plausible universe would I be the only one who has this characteristic, even though everything physical about me and other humans is the same; even though my biology and neurology and that of other people is the same; even though my behavior and that of other humans is the same; even though what I report as my experience and what other humans report is the same. It's an argument looking for a issue to argue about when there's none there. What value is there in having this argument? What do we learn from it beyond the fact that humans will argue about anything. — T Clark

Try reading my post again you pillock.

Since I started posting philosophy on TPF again recently it’s become disturbingly apparent to me that almost nobody reads my posts, even those who reply to them. I don’t think this is a problem with my posts, but if it is then please let me know.

Really? Do you not find the argument from analogy completely compelling? I know some don't, but I struggle to understand why not. — bert1

Maybe you didn't read all of my post. My point was that what cannot be doubted cannot be known. I'm happy enough to drop the stipulation that using "know" here is wrong. It's certain, more than any argument could be.

OK, science geeks, how do we determine whether an AI is conscious? What do we do? What tests do we give it? — bert1

How do we know other people are conscious? What standards do we use? — T Clark

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing.

But then, how do we know people are persons? Again, what is significant here isn't knowing or judging that they are persons but relating, communicating, giving and asking for reasons, and so on.

It follows that we don’t use standards to make that judgement, because there is no judgement--unless the question comes up. And now that the question has come up, we find it difficult to judge. This I suppose is why it's also a difficult philosophical question.

My last reply to you covers it.

And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself. — Michael

Well yeah, there’s an irreducible subject-object dualism for sure. I am not the apple.

Well, of course I’m showing that “extend beyond” is ambiguous here. You take it to be merely about physical substance, but if when we discuss consciousness and perception we mean experience, that is, phenomenology (loosely speaking), then intentionality extends to its objects. Intend literally means stretch towards and extend literally means stretch out. You can dismiss etymology, of course, but it is significantly suggestive.

consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain — Michael

Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for?