But if this is a problem of delimitation, so may be a rigid application of your thesis? — Baden

Hey that’s not fair!

But you’ve given me an idea for a discussion about wildlife nationalism, something I’ve always found weird.

Definitely sublimated xenophobia.

Send me a test message, I have it enabled — Wayfarer

The members who reported this problem are receiving email notifications for PMs sent by me, but not for those sent by others, so I can’t check if this is a general problem by sending a PM from my own account.

Oh, and by the way, I hate Indian Mynahs — Wayfarer

It’s weird how many Australians have said the same thing since I became a myna-enthusiast. Americans are the same with the European starling. They’re amazing birds, and your hatred is sublimated xenophobia. (I’m half joking, so don’t take offence. Only half though)

Blame the idiots who introduced them.

Thank you for your effort of fixing this bug. I am sure that the problem will be solved soon. — javi2541997

Your optimism is like wind beneath my administrative wings.

So far it's just you two I know about. I might start a thread to ask everyone.

I should point out that TPF runs on a hosted SaaS (software as a service) platform called PlushForums, which I signed up to when I started the site, so I don't have access to the code and I can't fix any bugs. What I'm doing right now is determining what I need to put in an email to PlushForums support, if indeed there is something wrong.

Maybe it's that you and I have a different approach to philosophy. Now that you've started actively participating in discussions again, it seems to me you focus more specific philosophers and works. In those cases, the context of the discussion can take care of a lot of the potential misunderstandings. I came to philosophy with my own understanding of how the world works, the nature of reality, how discussions should proceed. I also came from a profession where, given an audience which is often non-technical, defining terms was very important. — T Clark

On the one hand I somewhat disagree with your characterization of my approach. This discussion is a good example: in the OP I quote Kant, but not because I'm interested in how his position on definitions fits with his philosophy in general; it's just because I happened to be reading that passage in Kant and it made me think about the odd division on this forum between those who want definitions up front and those who don't. In my "Magical powers" discussion it was the same thing: reading something in Nietzsche made me think about the idea of the disenchantment of the Enlightenment, and I explored it in my own way while attempting to synthesize various thinkers.

On the other hand I somewhat agree. I am certainly more interested in approaching philosophical questions through the thinking of great thinkers than I am in formulating my own personal system. I do notice that you tend to personalize the issues, as you have done here, and that is indeed very different from my approach. I'm not saying it's bad or uninteresting; it's just very difficult for me to find a way of engaging with it (although I'm doing okay right now).

But the issue here for me is: how does my famous-philosopher-centric approach to philosophy lead me to think the problem with "fruitless discussions" that "never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues" is an excessive focus on definitions? Conversely, how does your own approach to philosophy, based on a rich personal history that has allowed you to develop your own unique and coherent philosophy, lead you to think that the problem is actually not enough definition at the start of these discussions? After all, what is right for engineering may be wrong for philosophy.

I think of it a bit like this: in software engineering it may be impossible to accurately estimate the duration of a project if that project is to build something brand new, whereas the construction of yet another e-commerce website or chat application, or in a different field, yet another fan-type cable-stayed bridge--these may be far easier to estimate, because there are standards and precedents and reasonably certain expectations. Where am I going with this? I think I want to say that the latter is the definition-centric one and the former is more like philosophy, where "planning is guessing". That is, in philosophy and innovation, things have to be kept open to a significant degree; or to put it differently, we have to realize that things just are open.

I think I use the writings of philosophers differently than some others on the forum do. I use them to test my understanding. If I find someone whose ideas resonate with mine, they can help me refine and extend my understanding. That's why Collingwood and Lao Tzu are so important to me. I've always disliked Kant, but more recently I've found that some of his ideas are similar to those of Lao Tzu. His somewhat different approach has been interesting. I think maybe the discussions I start, and often those I join, are more free form and are not tied down to specific works and philosophers. I often avoid those more specific discussions because I don't know enough to participate usefully. — T Clark

As I say, I don't think my discussions are tied down to the works of philosophers. In both of the examples I mentioned, nobody else needed to know anything more about the philosophers beyond the quotations, because I was not exploring the wider thought of those thinkers (not that there's anything wrong with that).

This is all very puzzling.

Thanks.

To be extra certain I've sent you both PMs. Check your email inboxes. Then we can progress to the next step if necessary.

Can you folks please confirm the following:

1. You do not receive email notifications for private messages, but you do receive them for other things (mentions etc.)

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Thanks

The difference between a definition and a stipulative definition is somewhat collapsible if you stipulate you are referring to X "in its common use" or "according to its dictionary definition" to avoid the impression that your argument rests on a particular interpretation that might be unfamiliar to the reader. And if, to the contrary it does, you stipulate that interpretation. — Baden

According to the way I've put things in the OP, the former is the type of definition necessitated by X's ambiguity, where X is what I referred to as an equivocal term--and I conceded that these definitions are often required to begin a debate--and the latter is stipulative definition proper, which I also admitted was a good thing, whether to define a technical usage or to restrict the discussion to a specific avenue (although I may not have made it so explicit).

The other kind of definition I said was just fine was the kind that we aim for in a discussion, what I called explicative definition. I'm not actually sure if my taxonomy stands up to scrutiny--e.g., maybe all beginning definitions are stipulations--but it was at least the stipulated usage I was trying to adhere to in the OP.

Both seem potentially helpful avenues towards discussion. In the process of explanation, is definition any more than a tool to increase clarity and discursive efficiency such that what and when you define need not be based on any general precept but simply what you want to do in the conversation? — Baden

I am coming round to regretting the clickbait title of this discussion. However, I still feel like defending the thesis: A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal [or a stipulative definition is required].

There is more to be said here but I need to think about it.

A conservative doesn't look back throughout history and try to turn back the clock after thousands of years, right? That's not conservatism — Tom Storm

I’m probably taking this out of context and I haven’t read your debate with schop, but…

The distinction that’s usually made is between conservatives and reactionaries, where the latter want to turn the clock back, or at least say they do, appealing to past glory. The interesting thing, and I think you were saying something similar, is that reactionaries can be radical. The Nazis are the best example. And the thing to notice about that is that the German conservatives went along with them, even though they thought them extreme and ridiculous. Disappointed leftists rightfully blame the German communists for ignoring the threat of the Nazis and persisting in their refusal to ally with the social democrats while the Nazis swept to power, but we shouldn’t let the conservatives off the hook either.

I see the basic driving idea in conservatism to be the preservation of the existing power and class structures, with which the economic status quo goes hand in hand. — Janus

Yes, only that's been labelled neoliberal.
There is - or there was - a brand of conservative who fits that image, but then adds anotherr dimension in the form of the obligations that go with privilege. — Vera Mont

I think the point is that the preservation of hierarchy and power is central in both versions of conservatism. I said the same thing as Janus earlier in the discussion:

For me, if there is a core of conservatism it’s a basic suspicion of Utopianism and of the idea of the “perfectibility of man”; a resultant pragmatic attitude to politics that aims to maintain a harmonious community in which change happens only slowly and organically on the basis of experience rather than on the basis of doctrines and principles. Of course, this is to represent it in its best light, according to its self-image, and I can also describe it differently: a pragmatic attitude to politics that aims to maintain traditional hierarchies and relations of power, which are regarded as natural. — Jamal

Here I am not describing two kinds of conservatism; I’m describing the same thing in two different ways. What Janus termed the “preservation of the existing power and class structures” not only characterizes neoliberal conservatism (if indeed this is even conservatism), but pretty much all conservatism. The function of social harmony, resistance to change, and the preservation of tradition is the maintenance of the status quo.

(By the way Vera, I’m not assuming you don’t agree with this or don’t understand it; I just think it’s interesting to explore)

The nice stuff like philanthropy, charity, a concern for the poor and unfortunate, and the idea that privilege entails responsibility (nobless oblige)—these are not separate from or in opposition to the preservation of hierarchy and power. Rather, they are the same thing. They are how traditional conservatism operates.

To care for the poor and unfortunate, to reduce conflicts between the classes, to reduce the abuse of servants and workers by their masters and managers—this is what a person wants if they care about people and about the stability of society while at the same time also believing that hierarchy is natural and that progress towards a more egalitarian society is potentially dangerous and destructive.

The way I think about it is in terms of the personal relationship between a benevolent aristocrat and his valet, his personal male servant. One example is the relationship between Frodo and Sam in The Lord of the Rings, which incidentally reveals better than anything just how very conservative, but also humane and warm-hearted, Tolkien was—and light-years away from anything like a neoliberal conservatism. The relationship is one of love and respect, but there is never any question of who is the senior partner: Sam’s role is to serve his master. The crux is that everyone should know their place, while this does not (according to the conservative) necessarily mean that the workers, servants, peasants and so on are abused and disrespected.

It seems to me that people want to make a distinction between nice conservatism and nasty conservatism. My view in a nutshell is that the nice version, precisely in its niceness, functions to curtail freedom and protect power.

Whether this is a bad thing or not is the key ideological difference: conservatives do not believe it is possible, advisable, or ethical to attempt to wipe out hierarchy on the basis of principles of egalitarianism. Others, like me, do.

However, I still think we have a lot to learn from intelligent, “nice” conservatism, and its arguments might be seen to have gained a lot of power since the disastrous and violent attempts at radical change in the twentieth century. So I do think the concerns of traditional conservatism have to be faced up to rather than swept aside.

Interesting post, and maybe I’ll reply properly tomorrow, but for now I’ll just mention that thanks to the Aeon article that @Wayfarer linked to above, I’ve downloaded Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical Method. I’ve read bits of his work before and always liked him.

Sure.

They might be cases of equivocal terms, which I agreed often ought to be defined.

I don't think God is such a concept, but capitalism, yeah I see that.

democratic — universeness

:down:

monarchistic — universeness

:up:

Thanks!

Was it not possible to go for a 'suspension style' cooling off period? — universeness

It was possible, but that’s not what I chose to do. What I saw of his posts did not make me think a suspension would be the better choice.

I banned @Nickolasgaspar for refusing moderation following a request that he refrain from attacking people personally.

:up:

Damn, that’s what I was reaching for. Forgot it was Father Ted.

I hope you don't mind if I jump in here, even though I'm not a mathematician and haven't really done any mathematics for thirty years.

My view is that there might be such a thing as a non-math brain, but it's rarer than people think. It's a bit like music: lots of people say "I'm tone deaf" but in my experience with some coaxing and a little light training they can learn to sing in tune, identify intervals and so on. In both cases it goes back to a bad education.

I did mathematics in my engineering degree but haven't used it since, hence I can't do it any more. Like music, it demands constant practice to stay on the horse, and without that it becomes very difficult to get back on.

I guess these are common observations or even platitudes, but I think they're importantly true.

One thing I can't do well is games, like chess and poker. I don't think there's something about my brain that caused me to turn out like this, more like a psychological thing, a neurosis or whatever. Similarly, telling oneself and others that one is borderline innumerate might just reinforce a psychological block that stands in the way of your mathematical genius.

I also advocate for getting rid of old bad traditions and backwards cultural norms. — universeness

Hear hear! Down with bad things!

I think (?) inferentialism would say yes, but of course we have to think of all possible inferences involving 'define.' — plaque flag

Is that what inferentialism entails? That's a bummer.

You're in danger of forcing me to read Brandom.

How is deciding the meaning of a concept like define related to deciding such legitimacy ? — plaque flag

It's the same thing?

Note the lower textual location in B only, this in reference to understanding, whereas the other quotes with higher textual locations, refer to pure reason’s dogmatic use, and is found in both editions.

Of course definitions have a place, if only in justifications for a method. — Mww

To argue that Kant believes that definitions have a place it’s clearer to just stick with the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, where he makes an exception for defining “concepts thought by choice” (invention), which I take to be stipulative definitions. And he uses these definitions at the beginning of certain sections of the CPR, e.g., “By synthesis, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various presentations with one anotherl and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition.”

Kant and I are setting aside stipulation as something quite different from the central issue here (though I’m not saying that this stipulation cannot be called a kind of definition).

Well yes, I made that point in the OP, and not only by quoting Kant. I also admitted that the title overstated the case. However, you did alert me to the fact that my central thesis also contradicted Kant, so thanks for that. Here’s the new version:

A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal.

:up:

A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. The killing of an old man, if such killing had a name, would be just as significant.

So, in general, I think that we most of the time, have a decent idea or notion of what we want to communicate. The failure of communication has more to do with the ideas behind the words, than the words themselves. So, I'm inclined to agree that philosophy shouldn't be primarily about definitions, though these can help. — Manuel

I agree, but I’m putting it more strongly: they can help, but they can also positively hinder.

The first is one I've expressed here often - many, I would say most, of the frustrating, fruitless discussions we have here on the forum start out with disagreements about the meaning of words and then never make any progress toward actually dealing with any interesting philosophical issues. — T Clark

It’s not clear to me whether this situation is the result of a lack of definitions, or an excessive focus on definitions. Perhaps you answer that when you go on to say…

I don't disagree that discussions where we work out among ourselves what particular terms mean are valuable. I have started a few discussions for that purpose - What does "mysticism" mean; What does "consciousness" mean; What does "real" mean. They were among the more satisfying discussions I've participated in. — T Clark

The unfolding of a concept in discussion :up:

On the other hand, I often start discussions about specific issues I want to examine, often something to do with metaphysics. In my OPs I often make it clear exactly what I intend the meaning of specific words are for the purposes of that particular discussion. Then I obnoxiously and legalistically defend that position, sometimes asking moderators to help. I do that because I want to talk about a specific concept or subject and I don't want to argue about what "metaphysics" really means. If I don't make those kinds of requirements, the thread will just turn into an argument about something I'm not interested in. — T Clark

I understand. This looks like stipulative definition, which I was mostly ignoring, treating it as something separate. Kant himself, though he says in those quoted passages that in philosophy you can’t start from definitions, clearly makes an exception in the case of stipulating how a term is to be used in his own work. E.g., “By synthesis, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various presentations with one anotherl and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition.” So the aim here is to be clear and open about a technical or provisionally restricted use of a term, because there is a particular argument you want to make.

Or maybe what you’re referring to is the exception in my main thesis, those times when a term is so ambiguous that you need to prevent confusion with a clear statement that this, not that, is what you mean.

Skill looks like the right focus here. Inspired by Brandom and others, I think of applying concepts as a skilled labor, mostly inarticulate cando knowhow, manifesting sensitivity to and respect for the discursive norms we are always already thrown into, which make asking for definitions or after their value possible to begin with.

In my view, it's helpful to emphasize the larger context in which definitions matter. We make and evaluate claims about the world, including what we should do within in it, as part of a community. I claim that it's only because they are used in claims that concepts matter. — plaque flag

Seems reasonable.

From a 'Hegelian' perspective, concepts are always in flux, slowly drifting. We change the object being clarified (language) as we use it to articulate its own character. — plaque flag

Yes, I suppose Hegel is the next step here for me. The thing that bothers me about Hegel, and sometimes Adorno too, is the reluctance not only to give definitions—which is justified—but also the reluctance to give examples. Examples are looked down upon by several philosophers, but they’re often what allow me to first get ahold of a concept, and relevantly here, they are part of how we get by without definitions.

Beautiful metaphor ! Making It Explicit. If we named global Geistware Shakespeare, we can name the philosophical module Hegel, in honor of someone who made making it explicit explicit to itself. 'Hegel' is that part of spirit (cultural software) which articulates the character of articulation itself. — plaque flag

Very nice :grin:

The reminds me of discussions of genesis versus structure. That concepts are open make genesis possible. As individuals we can get lucky with a new metaphor which gets adopted becomes relatively literal, hardens like cooling wax. Or we can add to the machinery of metacognition by seeing that maybe the inferential relationships of claims are what make concepts within such claims meaningful, etc. — plaque flag

Nicely put.

I just wanna provide pushback on this linear definition->theorem->proof characterisation of mathematics. As Lakatos highlights in Proofs and Refutations, the concept of "Eulerian polyhedron" was redefined repeatedly over mathematical history to avoid cases which obviously weren't Eulerian polygons. Even in mathematics, a definition is an attempt to explicate a concept, which can be revised if it is insufficient. — fdrake

That’s interesting. I hadn’t even thought to question Kant on that. I suppose then that when he says in the same section that “Mathematical definitions never err,” he’s wrong?

But here’s the full passage:

Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes–although only rarely–there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B759

I wonder if that covers it.

Otherwise I agree.

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with everything you wrote in your post. It is interesting that you used Kant, in today's terms an Indirect Realist, to support your case.

Kant discussed "Existence", in that there are things-in-themselves, "Humility", in that we know nothing of things-in-themselves and "Affectation", in that things -in-themselves causally affect us. Kant's concept of a thing-in-itself is not that of a Direct Realist. — RussellA

There is debate among modern interpreters over whether Kant is an indirect realist, but it is not concerned with the distinction of objects and things in themselves. The latter is a limit concept concerning artifacts of reason (noumena) that purport to refer to objects about which, in actual fact, nothing can be said. For Kant, the noumenal realm is not reality, since it is merely a product of reason. Rather, reality is that which we know about through experience and science. The clue to this is that reality for Kant is one of the categories of the understanding, thus it can only apply to phenomena.

So the question about Kant's direct or indirect realism is about how he regards spatiotemporal objects as being perceived and how he thinks we can gain knowledge about them, and in this realm--the only one in which direct and indirect realism have any meaning--I'd say he is a direct realist. He explicitly states that we perceive the external world "immediately," and what he calls representations constitute the perception and determination of objects, rather than standing in for them as images or constructions. We have awareness of objects not through anything like an inference from or construction of an internal image, but through an act of synthesis that puts the objects directly before us.

Now, what I'm saying might be seen as tendentiously pedantic (as if I'm desperate to get Kant on my side). And yes, the fact is that Kant does still split the world in two, or at least divide the world into two aspects (phenomena and noumena, appearance and thing-in-itself). And yes, he does use "realism" to refer to claims that we can know things in themselves (transcendental realism, as opposed to empirical realism). But the reason I think it's significant and the reason I tend to jump in and pounce on people about it is that, as in many other areas, I think he had correct intuitions (no pun intended) about perception. Also just because Kant is so much deeper and richer than the thing-in-itself stuff suggests (although I still think he's fundamentally wrong).

Kant is not really concerned about the question of appearance vs reality, because reality, as far as it could logically be open to us, is knowable through direct perception, experience, mathematics, and science.

It goes back to @plaque flag’s question, which I don’t think you answered (you simply denied the antecedent of the hypothetical). I’ll ask it again but I’ll put it differently: if evolution was a blind watchmaker, would that render the world meaningless for you? Would that remove all reasons for ethical and responsible behaviour or for enjoying life?

I think it’s an important question because it seems to me that setting life’s meaning on the foundation of something either external to/higher than life or else something in the actual workings of evolution itself, is an idea more harmful than the Dennett-Dawkins view of evolution.

I’m not saying that the gene-centred view of evolution is right or that teleology is merely a convenient fiction. I’m not saying that science isn’t significantly infected with Cartesian mechanism and dualism. These issues are interesting, but they’re not really germane to my point. I just wonder how strong one’s dedication to meaning in life can be if it depends either on biological theory or cosmic purpose. It also seems somewhat inconsistent to me to expect a determinate connection or mapping between biological theory (empirical reality) and cosmic purpose (transcendent truth). But my main criticism is of the idea that meaning depends on something transcendent. Why can’t it be immanent in our species—in our families, society, and history? What would be wrong with that?

Yes, but in the post I replied to you implied that it was the denial of cosmic purpose that was evil, or that the only alternative to cosmic purpose is the evil ideology of Dennett-Dawkins “scientific rationalism”.

You launched a provocative polemic so it deserved a response.

Maybe clearer for you like this:

However, the idea that if one doesn’t accept that this is somehow reflected in the cosmos at large and one doesn’t believe evolution has a purpose, then one is in thrall to an evil ideology--that is a profound untruth

I think what I said is a clear response to what I just quoted from your post:

I see enlightenment (not in the sense of the European enlightenment and scientific rationalism) as having cosmic significance, that the Cosmos comes to understand horizons of being that could never be revealed otherwise, through living beings such as ourselves, and that is what the higher religions reflect, although often poorly. So, no, I don't believe we are products of the Dawkins/Dennett dumb physical forces driven by the blind watchmaker. I believe it's an evil ideology masquerading as liberalism. — Wayfarer

However, the idea that if you don't accept that this is somehow reflected in the cosmos at large and you don't believe evolution has a purpose, then you're in thrall to an evil ideology--that is a profound untruth. — Jamal

Apart from the possibility that I misrepresented your view, I don’t know how to say it clearer.

It's just my rough summary of the views you expressed in the post I was referring to:

I see enlightenment (not in the sense of the European enlightenment and scientific rationalism) as having cosmic significance, that the Cosmos comes to understand horizons of being that could never be revealed otherwise, through living beings such as ourselves, and that is what the higher religions reflect, although often poorly. So, no, I don't believe we are products of the Dawkins/Dennett dumb physical forces driven by the blind watchmaker. I believe it's an evil ideology masquerading as liberalism. — Wayfarer

Since this is quite vague, it's possible I misrepresented you, but I think I wasn't far off.

I don't want to defend this or that religious institution but I'm not atheist - my view is that the falsehoods of religions arise from distortions of an originally profound truth — Wayfarer

I agree with this bit. I think the profound truth is that human beings are special and that some things are sacred.

However, the idea that if you don't accept that this is somehow reflected in the cosmos at large and you don't believe evolution has a purpose, then you're in thrall to an evil ideology--that is a profound untruth.

Sometimes it’s obvious. For example, @javi2541997 hardly needs to mention that he’s reading Fiscal Reform and its Firm-Level Effects in Eastern Europe and Central Asia for sheer pleasure.

But seriously, I quite like that people are free to post here however they like, though I guess it would be nice if they said a bit more. Some do. When they don’t it’s cool.