Why is panpsychism popular? Italic Quotes Taken From Wikipedia Article on Panpsychism
In philosophy of mind, panpsychism is the view that mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality.[1] It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe.
The role and place of mind in nature is at the heart of both neutral monism and panpsychism. I think it is a mistake to use the terms experience, mind and consciousness as though they were synonyms. It is non-conscious experience which is fundamental to nature. Consciousness is the highest form of unified, integrated, self-aware experience and may be limited to humans (with language and abstract thought). Mind on the other hand is also a lesser form of unified and integrated experience and may come in various forms (such as the hive mind of bees and ants) or the distributed but communicative neural networks of the octopus, or the awareness of higher animals with brains. It is non-conscious experience (proto mind or mental pole) which is the most fundamental type of mental property in nature. The intrinsic (not extrinsic or measurable or observable) property of even the most fundamental units of nature (relationships to other events, to the past and to future possibilities) that is the basis of panpsychism.
They therefore ascribe a primitive form of mentality to entities at the fundamental level of physics but do not ascribe mentality to most aggregate things, such as rocks or buildings.[1][9][10]
A frequent criticism of Panpsychism is the assertion that it must postulate that rocks and other such structures must be “conscious”. The taunt intending to make the concept seem ridiculous on its face. This is a misunderstanding. No serious proponent of panpsychism asserts the consciousness of rocks or other such simple aggregate structures. It is also a misunderstanding of the use of the word “consciousness” to mean the kind of high level, integrated, unified, self-aware experience such as we humans ourselves experience. To have such high level experience one must also have a physical structure which is complex, integrated and unified (such as a brain). I tend to avoid using the term “consciousness” for the type of fundamental mental property found ubiquitous in nature and instead prefer the term experience or proto mental. The term experience used in this way does not mean conscious experience but a more fundamental relationship and interaction between events and time.
Charles Hartshorne contrasted panpsychism and idealism, saying that while idealists rejected the existence of the world observed with the senses or understood it as ideas within the mind of God, panpsychists accepted the reality of the world but saw it as composed of minds.
Panpsychists do not reject the “reality” of the physical properties of nature. They merely postulate that the physical properties alone are incomplete explanations of the experiential aspects of nature.
Panpsychism is incompatible with emergentism.[8] In general, theories of consciousness fall under one or the other umbrella; they hold either that consciousness is present at a fundamental level of reality (panpsychism) or that it emerges higher up (emergentism).[8]
It is the notion that somehow inert, non-experiential, matter with only physical properties somehow in certain combinations gives rise to experience, mental activity, mind and consciousness that strikes the panpsychist as irrational and mysterious (more magical then logical). The notion that some form of experiential or proto mental property is intrinsic to matter, particularly if one has an event based (process) ontology where relationship and interaction to other events and to events of the past and possibilities of the future are fundamental seems more logical and rational.
Other forms or types of Panpsychism
Goff has argued that panpsychism avoids the disunity of dualism, under which mind and matter are ontologically separate, as well as dualism's problems explaining how mind and matter interact.
Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory-He believes consciousness is nothing but integrated information, so Φ measures consciousness.
Goff has used the term panexperientialism more generally to refer to forms of panpsychism in which experience rather than thought is ubiquitous.[1]
Though there some radical Platonists, such as Max Tegmark, who believe reality has no intrinsic properties. By Tegmark's account, the universe is made of math without anything to ground it.
Panpsychism has recently seen a resurgence in the philosophy of mind, set into motion by Thomas Nagel's 1979 article "Panpsychism"[22] and further spurred by Galen Strawson's 2006 realistic monist article "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism."[23][24][25] Other recent proponents include American philosophers David Ray Griffin[1] and David Skrbina,
These are all good reading for anyone interested in a more detailed exposition of the various notions and forms of panpsychism.
In the 20th century, panpsychism's most significant proponent is arguably Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947).[4] Whitehead's ontology saw the basic nature of the world as made up of events and the process of their creation and extinction. These elementary events (which he called occasions) are in part mental.[4] According to Whitehead, "we should conceive mental operations as among the factors which make up the constitution of nature."[8]
I am strongly influenced by Whiteheads variety of Process Philosophy. The fundamental units of nature are events, not physical particles. Events have physical aspects and duration but they also have experiential aspects to other events and to the past and to the future. I prefer David Ray Griffins use of the term panexperientialism (avoiding the usual connotations associated with the terms mind or consciousness) to refer to these proto mental aspects of events. Objects are merely repetitive events. These notions are more in keeping with our knowledge about the true nature of reality at its most fundamental level. Fundamental particles are really just quantum events and measured properties are really just relationship and interactions.
Panexperientialism is associated with the philosophies of, among others, Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead, although the term itself was invented by David Ray Griffin in order to distinguish the process philosophical view from other varieties of panpsychism.[8] Whitehead's process philosophy argues that the fundamental elements of the universe are "occasions of experience," which can together create something as complex as a human being.[4]
Complex, integrated, unified physical structure gives rise to complex unified integrated experience (mind and consciousness). It seems a very logical proposition and in keeping with our observations and experience of the world. Science measures only the physical, measurable and empirical properties of the world. The intrinsic nature of things (even our own mental experience) remains outside the realm of empirical measurement. So, while science is one of our most valuable tools for exploring and understanding nature, it always gives us only a partial and incomplete picture of “reality”.
From Neutral Monism Article in Wikipedia
Substance can have both extrinsic properties and intrinsic properties. Extrinsic properties are properties that are outwardly observable, such structures and form. Intrinsic properties are properties that are not outwardly observable and concern the intrinsic nature of a thing.[note 1] By its very nature physics deals with the extrinsic properties of matter As a consequence, most of the positive claims in these fields are related to the extrinsic properties of reality. When it comes to describing the intrinsic nature of matter physics "is silent". However, just because the intrinsic properties of matter are unknown does not mean they don't exist.[no
Perhaps this is the most important concept. Merely because we cannot measure something or detect it with our senses or instruments does not mean it does not exist. Our measurements and our senses give us only an incomplete and partial view of nature. Also on this note the “warmth of the sun” and “the redness of a rose” are just as much a part of nature and our experience as infrared and wavelengths of color. It is all part of nature: we cannot pick and choose; the distinction between primary and secondary properties is really at its heart an artificial distinction and the source of many of our philosophical problems.