Well, for example, I typed "Is a transgender man a man?" into Google and got the result:

"Yes, a transgender man is considered a man. The term "transgender man" refers to an individual who was assigned female at birth but identifies as a man. Their gender identity is male, and they live as a man."

The reason I got this result is that the dominant current discourse of developed nations (social reality) does indeed go against biological reality. That doesn't preclude you arguing that it shouldn't be the case though.

My understanding of what you are doing is expressing a cultural value that was formerly implicit due to the absence of a trans discourse, but you would like to be explicitly accepted in opposition to this new discourse. It seems then that you and your interlocutors have different values that you would like to be discursively dominant. As it stands, the idea of gender being separate to biological sex is dominant in most developed countries. Everyone has a right to openly argue for their discursive preferences, but that dominance can be demonstrated as an institutional fact. E.g. Webster's and the Oxford dictionary recognize gender as having a legitimate meaning that can oppose biological sex.

All I am saying here is that a focus on arguing for your values would seem more productive than denying an institutional social reality. Social discourses can change but for now, it is what it is.

Deadline fast approaching if anyone needs a reminder...

Black Mass - John Gray

Strong critique of utopian thinking throughout post-enlightenment western political thought right up to recent American neocon foreign policy, especially re war on terror etc. Little in the way of solutions though.

Berardi is a cultural critic, particularly focused on technocapitalism. His best known book is "Uprising", but I haven't read that. Anyhow, he provides a useful framework that dovetails with authors like Mark Fisher, Byung Hul Chan, Bernard Stiegler etc. and I particularly like his emphasis on poetry.

Breathing: Chaos and Poetry---Franco "Bifo" Berardi

A bit uneven but where's it's good, it's very good.

Let's leave it there then. Thank you for the chat.

However, there are issues. — Malcolm Parry

There clearly are issues and it's up to you as a society to work them out to your preference. But any rational social policy should be logically consistent with itself at least. It's not logically consistent to base a policy of disbarring people from women's spaces on women being disturbed by the physical presence of men and then base entry to those spaces not on physical characteristics defining such presence but ultimately on something that can be entirely unseen like chromosomes.

However, if a trans man wishes to use the female restroom they would be allowed as they are female. — Malcolm Parry

That means your objection is not based on what someone looks like or what physical bits they have. And, if so, what does it matter whether trans women pass for women?

Well, it's culturally dependent. Where I live---Thailand---we are very much there. The idea of preventing trans women from using a woman's bathroom isn't at all on the radar. I don't think it's an issue in my home country of Ireland either.

I get you in terms of the U.S., but I'm trying to work out on what one could consistently base an objection when biological sex and gender have no necessary connection because they are based on different categories of reality and gender is technologically mutable. Does it mean that objectors want anyone regardless of their biological sex to get arrested if they look too masculine? That, as I said, is inconsistent with wanting to protect biological women from encroaches on their space by biological men because it discriminates on a level, the physical, that now has no necessary connection to the biological in practice and so the objection could be applied to biological women as well as biological men.

On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects: Gilbert Simondon

I very much like Bernard Stiegler's approach to technics and he was highly influenced by Simondon. So, back to the source here.

Challenged on what basis? Physically, a trans man---who you must want to be in women's bathrooms because you claim they are women due to their biological sex---can easily look more like a man than a trans woman, so it can't be a physical basis because that would contradict your exclusive focus on biological sex.

If it won't be policed then everyone effectively has a choice and what choice is taken might vary with time. So, we effectively agree.

I'm not interested in trying to brow-beat anyone into changing their definitions. But, seeing as who "passes" is not something that can be objectively policed---e.g. trans men, who, under your biological-sex-first definition, are women, but many of which wouldn't pass for women either in terms of their physical appearance, and so logically you would allow in women's bathrooms without passing physically---I don't see much of a practical difference here.

But regardless, technologies of body modification have reached the point where there need be no obvious physical way to determine who has what chromosomes. And even if there were and you were to enforce that, you would be putting trans men into women's bathrooms, many of whom look like the men you supposedly want to keep out of bathrooms because of their physical appearance. So, biological essence really recedes into irrelevancy as a consideration. Woman are not made uncomfortable (if they are made uncomfortable at all) by someone's chromosomes.

Let's call it recent to the public sphere of debate. But, yes, as far as I've heard, the general idea of gender not matching sex is not recent at all. It's just been differently culturally processed. So, yes, thanks for the correction.

Another Mark Fisher fan. :up:

Let's pretend unique musical forms aren't dead (nor history either) and 1000 years later, people are listening to Drock music. Why aren't we listening to Drock music now? Is that equivalent to the question of the OP?

@Quk

You seem to be on the right track. I'd condense your ideas into saying music has established itself as a form of cultural expression and so it goes on. I wonder though how much variation there is before we've kind of tried everything. Things feels Mark Fisherish, like we have and Drock music is just a vain dream. But maybe it's a musical unknown unknown, a kind of sonic black swan we can hope for but never truly anticipate. Drock on...

There is absolutely no comparison and men should be completely removed from the debate itself as they simply aren't biologically equipped to understand (and therefore participate in) said debate. — Outlander

That's not entirely unreasonable. But I think it's worth anyone of either sex pointing out in relation to my earlier comment that we're always dealing with layers of culture. There is nothing biologically natural about separating places to urinate and defecate. It's cultural, and we get to decide the cultural norm. The historically recent phenomenon of trans people (edit: as being a subject of public debate) is just another cultural layer that we need to deal with and we get to decide the norm. In fact, we're obligated to do so.

There are different ways to do that and, of course, we ought to be respectful of each other's sensibilities since no matter which way you work it, someone is going to have an ostensibly "reasonable" objection based on their feelings. However, it's disingenuous, I think, to conduct the debate as if layer 1 of contingent sociality (separated bathrooms) is somehow inextricable from our biology such that we can bypass it as an issue for debate. This falsely and covertly positions layer 1 as determined by some biological essence and therefore similarly falsely and covertly positions any compromise taking into account layer 2 (the nascent needs and desires of trans people) as inadmissible.

Layer 1 is culturally sedimented because at some point we made that choice based on the circumstances of the time, which were not a simple matter of biological essentialism as things have not always been that way. And now, a long time later, the circumstances have changed and therefore we need to make another choice, but again, based on social reality. Because that is all that is relevant here. Let's not distract from that.

Indeed, Harry's biological essentialism is a queer ideology.

:up: What strikes me is that there are certain presumptions built into saying this or that is or isn't art, which are easy to miss, and which often include knowledge of the artist's intention, and the apprehension or misapprehension of the artwork's viewers, and the validity or lack thereof of particular institutions of art. When it comes down to it, for anything beyond the obvious, only the hypothetical cultural "person", society personified, can and does validly make the judgement.

Why didn't Cleopatra play rugby? She didn't have the balls, I suppose.

@gadzooks


Art, I would say, exists in a relationship between the subject and the social whereby the art emerges from a subjective affective / intuitive salience (personal expression of meaning) in combination with a social salience that includes the feelings it provokes in others (personal resonance of meaning) and its social situatedness (social reception and consequence). So, to break it down using your example: whether or not Damien Hurst's cow is art has nothing to do with whether you, I or Vera Mont like it or consider people who go to see it, gullible etc. It comes down to whether a) the experience of creating it was artistically salient for the artist b) the experience of viewing it is artistically salient for the viewer in a way that reflects the intentions of the artist (so far we're with Tolstoy on this) and c) where the art ends up socioculturally situated, what its social effects are.

It's the strength of this total triadic relationship that determines whether something is art. No individual opinion matters outside that. What matters is the emergent social reality, which is, by definition, not something that one person can meaningfully confirm or deny---it's just there or not or to a degree whether there is debate about it or not. The Mona Lisa's artistic strength in terms of this triadic view is beyond question. The relationships have been established beyond debate. Damien Hurst's cow is the subject of some debate, but, for me, it comes down to a relationship I haven't established with the work but other's clearly have, as well as the artist's intentions which are beyond my knowledge, and so I'll maintain a modest neutrality.

As for violence, the best art is that which ruptures the social sphere in a positive way. I'm thinking Picasso, the impressionists, etc. That's a kind of positive symbolic violence. As for the literal or symbolic depiction of violence in a supposed artwork itself, it's no different than any other depiction of anything else as it comes down again to that triadic relationship. What was the intention? How do people relate to that intention? And what, if any, is the social effect?

Me too.

Introduction to Biosemiotics - Edited by Marcello Barbieri

I was recently persuing this thread by @Streetlight : https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/128485

Which involves a very high level debate between @fdrake and @apokrisis that made me very aware of my ignorance of the depths of certain concepts that relate to my research interests. This book is helping to fill that gap.

The list was by a well-known organization as far as I remember, but it was awful. Everything in the top 20 was English literature.

I place that book among the most over-rated books of all time. — Hanover

I saw it at number one on a "greatest books of all time" list recently, which did puzzle me.

The Pedagogy of Freedom - Paulo Freire. A book of integrity and heart. If you are interested in education, you should read it.

The Plague - Albert Camus. Good so far. The sparse style works.

A Theory of Semiotics: Umberto Eco.

Very good, but predominantly technical. Reads mostly like a textbook with lots of taxonomy, working through definitions and logical relations among terms, often involving problematizing other such work like that of Peirce etc. Anyway, if you are interested in semiotics, you should read it.

Even if we generously grant the initial axiom "Life is Good" and set aside the naturalistic fallacy for a moment, the argument's structure, reasoning, and the way it applies this axiom are still riddled with significant flaws
— Baden

If we generously grant... LOL

Why don't you actually try to disprove it - on its own - then, when you're ready to admit that it's unassailable (without the pithy comments edited into your old posts) - we can then start to discuss axiom 2 - and if you can you disprove that - as part of the logical system I've constructed - using rational, logical discourse - I'll admit I'm wrong and should have listened to the very first keyboard warrior non argument, if not and you have to concede i'm right, then we'll be ready for axiom 3, etc etc.

Or, are you incapable of real discourse?

Axiom 1: Ready? Or are you scared? — James Dean Conroy

You are quoting the AI generated text above, not my words. (I thought we established that.)

My personal opinion, which I hinted at before, is that I am sympathetic to at least some of your general direction. You can consider my previous question as an attempt to tease out your reasoning concerning why you chose to state your first axiom in the form you chose to state it. I am aware of what it means. But, in any case, I was trying to initiate a discussion in that post rather than attack your argument. At this point though, it looks like we are not in a productive dialogue, so suffice to say I share a certain sentiment (if not the details) with you concerning how ethics might be oriented, and so I'll keep an eye on the discussion and see where it leads.

Maybe this question has been asked. But did you at any point consider making a distinction between life and human life (edit: in the first axiom)? I ask this as the latter can be considered paradigmatically different because "life" as "human life" is "life" as pure vitality overwritten by symbolization techniques (language, tool use, gestures) that are intergenerationally transmissible and in their accretions enable and manifest culture. That is, do you consider it relevant that we go from matter>>vitality (non-human life)>>subjectivity (human life) rather than just matter>>life?

OK, fair enough.

Oh, I didn't mean one should keep AI out of research. I meant it would better be kept out of the thread.

I've had many different AIs play devils advocate hundreds of times with it - hence it's logical robustness. — James Dean Conroy

If you appreciate Devil's advocate responses, Gemini 2.5's second commentary (edited addition) based on the initial axiom being true should be helpful to you, or not?

By the way, I personally see some value in your idea. It seemed an opportunity to make a point about AI though.

I haven't read the full conversation. I only wanted to point out that it's better to keep AI out of it. If we agree on that, great.

(It's a general issue with AI that it doesn't by default judge users' ideas neutrally. If it knows the user generated some set of ideas, it acts more like defence attorney for them. If it knows the user is sceptical of some set of ideas (the state I invoked above), it acts as prosecuting attorney against them. If you want something more realistic and neutral, the user should probably not reveal the idea is theirs and ask the AI to "critically assess it in relation to existing literature" or something along those lines.)

Conversation with Gemini - a real logical analysis - the correct way to analyse a framework - real discourse — James Dean Conroy

You can gerrymander Gemini to tell you what you want to hear both ways I plugged the argument into Gemini 2.5 pro. Here are the multitude of flaws it identified when asked to. (Below that is the version presuming your axiom).

Okay, let's break down this argument point by point. ....it contains several significant logical fallacies, oversimplifications, and questionable assumptions.
Here are the main flaws:
* Point 1: Life as the Fundamental Axiom of Good
* Flaw 1: Is-Ought Problem / Naturalistic Fallacy: This is the most fundamental flaw running through the entire argument. It moves from a descriptive statement ("Life is the condition for experiencing value") to a prescriptive one ("Life is good" or "Life is the basis of good"). Just because something is a certain way (life exists and enables evaluation) doesn't mean it ought to be considered the ultimate good or the sole source of value. This is a classic leap identified by philosopher David Hume.
* Flaw 2: Conflating Necessary Condition with Sufficiency/Source: While life might be a necessary condition for us to perceive or assign value, it doesn't automatically follow that life itself is the source or definition of value or goodness. Oxygen is necessary for human life, but we don't define "good" as "oxygen."
* Flaw 3: Mischaracterizing Opposition (Straw Man): The nihilist example is weak. A nihilist might argue life lacks inherent objective meaning or value, but this doesn't mean they deny biological imperatives or subjective preferences for survival. Breathing and eating are biological functions, not necessarily philosophical affirmations of life's objective "goodness." Their actions show they are alive, not that they philosophically endorse the argument's axiom.
* Point 2: Life’s Drive for Order and Propagation
* Flaw 1: Teleology and Anthropomorphism: The argument speaks of life having a "drive" and "striving" to build order and persist. This assigns intention and purpose (teleology) to a natural process (evolution). Evolution doesn't "strive"; it's a process of differential survival and reproduction based on random variation and environmental pressures. Attributing agency or intent to "Life" as a singular entity is anthropomorphic.
* Flaw 2: Oversimplification of Order/Entropy: While life creates local order, it does so by consuming energy and increasing overall entropy in the universe (consistent with the Second Law of Thermodynamics). It doesn't simply "resist entropy" in a universal sense; it creates pockets of complexity at the cost of greater disorder elsewhere.
* Flaw 3: Ignores Conflict and Destruction within Life: Life also involves competition, predation, parasitism, and destruction. These are also outcomes of evolutionary processes. Focusing only on "order" and "propagation" presents a sanitized and incomplete view.
* Point 3: The "Life = Good" Axiom
* Flaw 1: Naturalistic Fallacy Again: Stating that systems undermining their existence are selected against is a descriptive statement about natural selection. Concluding that therefore "Life = Good" is an "ontological necessity" jumps back to making survival equivalent to "good." Cancer cells are highly successful at surviving and propagating within their host, but we don't consider them "good."
* Flaw 2: Circular Reasoning/Tautology: If "good" is defined as "that which promotes life/survival" (as the argument implies), then "Life = Good" becomes true by definition (a tautology). But this doesn't prove that this definition of good is correct or meaningful; it merely assumes its own premise.
* Flaw 3: Oversimplified View of Ideological Survival: Attributing the persistence of major religions solely to their "life-affirming principles" ignores vastly complex historical, social, political, cultural, and psychological factors. Many ideologies might be "life-affirming" but fail for other reasons (e.g., lack of military power, poor timing, environmental catastrophe).
* Point 4: Humanity as Life’s Agent
* Flaw 1: Teleology: Again, portraying humans as "tools developed by life to enhance its reach" imposes purpose and intention onto evolution. Humans are an outcome of evolution, not tools designed by a conscious "Life" for a specific purpose.
* Flaw 2: Reductionism: Reducing all human creativity, intellect, knowledge pursuit, and social structures solely to mechanisms for "Life" to advance itself is overly simplistic. It ignores intrinsic motivations, curiosity, altruism, aesthetic desires, and complex cultural goals that may not directly map onto mere propagation or survival.
* Point 5: A Metric for Truth and Value
* Flaw 1: Conflating Truth with Utility (Pragmatism): This proposes a purely pragmatic definition of truth: truth is what works or enhances life. This conflicts with standard correspondence theories of truth (truth aligns with reality). A belief can be useful for survival but factually false (e.g., a superstition that prevents eating a nutritious but unfamiliar food). Conversely, a true understanding might be detrimental (e.g., knowing about an unavoidable extinction event).
* Flaw 2: Ambiguity of "Enhance Life": Whose life? Individual? Species? Ecosystem? All life? These can conflict. Technology enhancing human life might destroy other life forms. What timeframe? Short-term survival vs. long-term sustainability? The metric is ill-defined.
* Flaw 3: Gross Oversimplification of History/Economics: The capitalism/communism example is extremely reductionist. The success or failure of complex socio-economic systems cannot be boiled down simply to how well they align with a vague "Life = Good" axiom. Innumerable political, historical, cultural, technological, and geographical factors are involved.
* Point 6: Religion and Philosophy Reinterpreted
* Flaw 1: Extreme Functional Reductionism: Reducing entire religious and philosophical systems solely to "evolutionary tools" judged by their alignment with "Life = Good" ignores their profound roles in providing meaning, ethical frameworks (which often contradict simple survival), social cohesion (or division), existential answers, artistic inspiration, etc.
* Flaw 2: Selective Evidence: The examples are chosen to fit. It ignores aspects of these religions that have led to conflict, suppression, or practices detrimental to certain groups' "life enhancement." It also ignores philosophies that explicitly question the value of life or propagation (e.g., Schopenhauer, certain interpretations of Buddhism).
* Point 7: Beyond Dogma
* Flaw 1: Linking Adaptation Solely to the Axiom: While adaptability is crucial for the longevity of systems, framing failure only as resistance to the "Life = Good" axiom is again reductionist. Systems can fail for many reasons unrelated to this specific principle (e.g., internal contradictions, external pressures, resource depletion).
* Flaw 2: Questionable Interpretation of Examples: Interpreting Messianic concepts or the New Covenant as primarily acknowledgments of the need for evolution in service of the "Life = Good" principle is a forced reading, imposing the argument's framework onto complex theological ideas anachronistically.
* Point 8: A Universal Frame
* Flaw 1: Assertion Without Proof: It claims universality but has failed to establish the validity or coherence of its central axiom and metric.
* Flaw 2: Vagueness: "Life's advancement" remains undefined. Does it mean complexity, expansion, population size, technological power, sustainability? Without clarity, the "universal frame" is useless.
* Flaw 3: Reductionist View of Future Tech: Framing transhumanism/AI only as expressions of a basic biological drive overlooks the massive ethical, social, and existential questions they raise, many of which challenge simple notions of "life enhancement."
* Point 9: Conclusion
* Flaw 1: Unjustified Reductionism: The claim to reduce all philosophical, religious, and ethical inquiry to the single question "Does it enhance life's drive?" is an enormous oversimplification based on the previous flawed points.
* Flaw 2: Blurring Descriptive and Prescriptive: It insists it's a "descriptive reality," yet the entire argument is built on a value judgment ("Life = Good") and used to prescribe how systems should be judged.
In Summary:
The argument suffers primarily from:
* The Naturalistic Fallacy/Is-Ought Problem: Constantly deriving value ("good") from facts ("survival," "existence").
* Teleological Language: Ascribing purpose and intention to evolution and "Life."
* Extreme Reductionism: Oversimplifying complex systems (biology, society, history, philosophy, religion) to fit a single, poorly defined principle.
* Vagueness: Using key terms like "life," "good," and "advancement" without clear definitions.
* Circular Reasoning: Defining "good" in terms of life makes the central axiom true only by definition.
It attempts to create a grand, unifying theory but does so by ignoring philosophical rigor, scientific nuance, and historical complexity.

PRESUMING INITIAL AXIOM

Even if we generously grant the initial axiom "Life is Good" and set aside the naturalistic fallacy for a moment, the argument's structure, reasoning, and the way it applies this axiom are still riddled with significant flaws.
Here's a breakdown of the structural and logical weaknesses, assuming "Life is Good" is our starting point:
* Unjustified Reductionism: The argument repeatedly leaps from the general principle ("Life is Good") to extremely narrow and reductionist conclusions about complex subjects.
* Humanity (Point 4): Granting "Life is Good" doesn't logically compel the conclusion that humans are merely "tools" whose sole purpose is propagation. A "good life" might encompass creativity, knowledge, happiness, justice, etc., for their own sake, not just as means to reproduce. The argument fails to justify this severe reduction of human experience and motivation.
* Philosophy/Religion (Point 6): Similarly, accepting "Life is Good" doesn't mean the only valid way to evaluate philosophical or religious systems is their utility in propagation or creating order for survival. They might explore the nature of that good life, ethics within life, meaning, etc., which this argument dismisses if it doesn't fit the narrow "enhancement" metric.
* Conflation of Value with Truth (Point 5): This is a major structural flaw. The argument jumps from an axiological claim (about value: "Life is Good") to an epistemological claim (about truth: "Truth is measured by its ability to preserve/enhance life"). There is no logical bridge provided. Accepting that life is good doesn't necessitate redefining truth as mere survival utility. Truth is generally understood as correspondence to reality. A statement can be true but harmful to immediate survival, or false but beneficial. Granting the premise about value doesn't justify this radical and unsupported redefinition of truth.
* Vague and Arbitrary Metrics (Points 5, 8, 9): Even if "Life is Good," the argument fails to define how we measure its "enhancement" or "advancement."
* Does "enhancing life" mean quantity (population)? Quality? Complexity? Sustainability? Longevity? Power over nature?
* Whose life? Human life at the expense of other life? Collective vs. individual?
* Without clear, objective criteria derived logically from the axiom (which isn't done), the application of the principle becomes arbitrary and subjective, dressed up as objective reality. The examples (capitalism, communism) show this – they are judged based on a vague notion of "flourishing" that isn't rigorously defined.
* Teleological Misunderstanding of Processes (Points 2, 4): The description of how life operates (evolution, human development) relies on purposeful language ("drive," "strives," "tools developed by life"). Even if we accept "Life is Good," this description of the mechanism is flawed. Natural selection doesn't have foresight or intention. This flawed description is then used to improperly bolster the argument's conclusions about life's inherent directionality towards "good."
* Non-Sequiturs: Many conclusions simply don't follow logically from the premises, even the granted one.
* Why does life striving for order (Point 2, itself a questionable description) necessarily affirm that "Life = Good" in the way Point 3 implies? The connection is asserted, not demonstrated.
* Why does the existence of life-affirming principles in surviving religions (Point 3) prove the axiom rather than just showing that groups promoting self-preservation tend to last longer (a less profound observation)?
* Poor Analogies and Examples: The examples used often fail to convincingly support the point being made, even under the assumed axiom. The oversimplified takes on nihilism, capitalism/communism, and religious evolution undermine the argument's credibility rather than supporting its structure. They show a failure to apply the supposed principle in a nuanced or convincing way.
In Conclusion:
Even granting the controversial premise "Life is Good," the argument fails structurally. It makes unjustified logical leaps, engages in extreme reductionism, conflates distinct concepts like value and truth, relies on vague metrics, and uses flawed descriptions of natural and social processes. The connections between the initial axiom and the subsequent claims and conclusions are weak or non-existent. It's like having one solid (for argument's sake) foundation block, but then building upon it with crumbling bricks, missing mortar, and rooms that don't connect properly.


Better off just to debate it with members here rather than to try presenting an Al justification.

Good OP, thank you, and I agree with the sentiment. There are philosophers out there who bring neuroscience into philosophy---I'm thinking the Churchlands, Dennett, Metzinger etc, and there are those who bring technology in too in a very fundamental way, e.g. Simondon, Stiegler, Deleuze and Guattari etc., but I can't think of one who specifically focuses on both and yes, it's time for that. My current major interest is Philosophy of Technology as a juncture of semiotics, education, ethics, and cultural analysis, and I can definitely see the importance of working neuroscience in there. I have scanned the paper by the way and don't see referenced the names I mentioned (except the Churchlands), but will take a deeper look anyway.

Oh, it regurgitated my intended plot back to me. I was curious if the story was comprehensible or not. Apparently, it is. But the comparison was not exact as I had made, for clarity's sake, one or two minor changes from the version published here before I checked it. I also wanted to know if my comics were comprehensible and apparently they are too. Ironically, (maybe) my current research centres around critiques of technocapitalism, so I not only share your concerns, I'm actively engaging the literature concerning them.

GPT 4-o understands my obscure Lacanian-ish cartoons. Also, got "The Lark" right, which confused everyone here except maybe @Amity. I've warmed to having philosophical conversations with it.

Yes, definitely.

Extremely interesting. Having read them, I'd say a must for anyone interested in the intersection between art and philosophy (the real meat of the theory starts only at about letter XI though.)

Minima Moralia by Theodor Adorno — Jamal

Coincidentally, also been reading this. A lot of good stuff in there.

And:
Propaganda by Jacques Ellul
The Corrections by Jonathan Franzen
Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman
States of Shock by Bernard Stiegler
Faust Part 2 by Goethe

Recently finished:
The Sociological Imagination by C. Wright Mills 4/5
The Language Game by Morten H. Christiansen and Nick Chater 4/5
Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man by Friedrich Schiller 5/5
Scorched Earth by Jonathan Crary 4/5
Faust Part I by Goethe 5/5
Infocracy by Byung-Chul Han 4/5

I'm likely not going to finish anything I would give less than a 4 to. The one I love most of the above is the Schiller book.