Emotions Are Concepts Summarizing my understanding of this view: there's an interpretive conceptual layer not just through which emotions pass, but which in itself is a structuring element in the production of an emotion, such that emotions can't be considered primarily as biological effects absent of sociocultural context. In fact, sociocultural contexts expressed through individual brains shape the production of emotions (or more accurately, shape biological
affects, the precursors of emotions, making these recognizable as such) and, in doing so, draw landscapes of rationality, which we then ironically sequester as conceptual buttresses against emotional impulses. So the folk view of emotion is partly the result of a process in which emotion, as more accurately understood, is always active, and this undermines the folk dichotomy between reason and emotion, concepts and feelings. Evidence from neoroscience lends weight to this view by showing brain activity involved in emotion to be widely distributed across modules traditionally associated with other aspects of cognition.
One might say: the meaning of emotions are their use. — StreetlightX
Or, going on the above, that the meaning of emotions are the context in which they are experienced and there is no clear division possible between "subjective"/internal context and "objective"/external context because the packaging of the raw material of emotion is dependent on both and without it there is no emotional shape definable (with emotional shape being translatable into distinct emotion, anger, sadness etc).
(I see
@fdrake has just posted. Going to read that before writing more.)