I think you've both highlighted the initial problem though, which is P1 here
↪Bob Ross
. It seems entirely possible that a belief could be related to the truth value of some proposition.

Do you think that a stance about the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of something?

I think we have to be very careful here, because I don’t disagree that a “belief could be related to the truth-value of a proposition” in the sense that I think you mean it. “I believe tacos taste good” is a proposition and part of what it references relates to a belief (in this case, a belief about tacos), but this is not the same thing as saying that a proposition’s truth-value is relative to a belief.

For example, “1 + 1 = 2” is a mathematical proposition of which its truth-value is clearly not relative to a belief; however, the same is the case for the non-mathematical proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”...it is just harder to spot. The truth-value of “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is not relative to any stance: either the subject believes it or they do not—irregardless of their stance on the proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”. The “truthity” of “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is stance-independent.

Why, then, do so many people, including yourself, say it is not? Because, of course, to evaluate the truth-value of the proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” one must evaluate the belief of some subject; and, in this sense, one wants to say “the ‘truthity’ of <...> is stance-dependent”.

It is imperative, then, to pinpoint what the proposition is: when someone, like yourself, says the above, they are thinking of the truth of whether or not what the belief references is true or false (e.g., “1 + 1 = 2”, “tacos taste good”, etc.) and not the actual proposition at-hand (e.g., “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”, “I believe tacos taste good”, etc.). They then conflate them, and say that the proposition at-hand is stance-dependent (in terms of its “truthity”) when, really, the part of the content, which may or may not itself be a proposition, has its “truthity” relative to a stance.

We have to dissect this with razor-sharp knives and as elegantly and precisely as a surgeon to avoid this conflation (which I think you are making).

Why is this a big deal, you may say? Because what was originally being accounted for as propositional by way of relativity to beliefs dissipates with this transformation—e.g., one that argues that “1 + 1 = 2” does not express something objective but is propositional because it is relative to a belief, will have to transform it into “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” which loses its original meaning (viz., it is no longer the same proposition, and the one which was denied as objective is not actually propositional: it is, rather, the indexical statement that is).

See what I mean?

When it comes the sort of self-reference at work in the OP though

What self-reference? A stance about something is independent of that something; which does not negate, to your point, that some statements reference subjective dispositions which, in turn, require one to evaluate to determine the truth-value of it (which, again, is not the same thing as the truth-value itself being relative to a subjective disposition: I am cutting ever-so precisely here, or at least trying to, in order to convey the point).

That I have to evaluate the subjective dispositions of a person to determine the truth of something, does not entail that the truth of that something is subjectively determined.

1. "Torturing babies is wrong," is propisitional. It has "truthity"; i.e. it is either true or false. (Do I understand your use of "truthity" correctly here?)

Yes, by “truthity” I just mean the trueness of falseness of something. “torturing babies is wrong” is truth-apt.

5. a) Is that I believe torturing babies is wrong dependent on torturing babies being wrong?
5. b) Is torturing babies being wrong dependent on me believing that torturing babies is wrong?

5A is about whether or not your belief was in any way constructed based off of the fact that torturing babies are wrong; whereas 5B is about whether it is fact, or even capable of being a fact, that torturing babies are wrong. It is in the 5B sense that my OP is addressing.

It is entirely possible that you arrived at the belief that torturing babies are wrong without ever even contemplating the possibility of it being morally factually wrong.

How do you arrive at that conclusion? You have shown that the belief is independent of the truth(ity). You have not shown that the truthity is independent of the belief.

Those are both the same. If a belief is independent of the trueness or falseness of a proposition; then the proposition’s trueness or falseness is independent of the belief: those are two ways of saying the same thing.

P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false.

However:

P3: "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist

This is just a re-iteration of your previous post, which does not address which premise you disagree with.

In terms of your “P3”, I responded here.

If A is distinct from B, then B is distinct from A. But if A is independent from B, it does not follow that B is independent from A.

This seems to be the crux of your argument, and I am not following this distinction you are making.

All I meant, was that the truth-value of something is completely independent of any stance taken on it.

There seems to be a desire to go from uncontroversial to "absolutely true" or "objectively true"?

This is a non-sequitur: although I agree that most people are inclined to do so.

If “torturing babies is wrong” is propositional, then it is true or false independently of what anyone believes about it. For a moral subjectivist, they would have to rephrase it to “I believe torturing babies is wrong” and evaluate that instead.

The issue is more that "truthity" is a word that quite literally doesn't exist.

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or falseness of something (and not necessarily that it is true).

I see you used “truth-value”, which is fine as well.

P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.

P1: A stance taken on the truth-value of something is independent of the truth-value of that something.

I interpret these to mean the same exact thing: am I missing something you are trying to convey? How have I changed it?

If the stance is distinct from what the stance is about, then the truth-value of ‘what its is about is independent of the stance itself—that’s what makes it a stance.

Of course, a moral subjectivist will disagree with this; but it is the root of the issue with their position.

The moral subjectivist will reject that.
A moral proposition is true if and only if I believe it is true.

If it is truly a proposition, then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinct from the belief.

You’ve stipulated conditions under moral subjectivism, but you haven’t stipulated moral subjectivism itself. What if moral subjectivism, as a self-consistent doctrine, has nothing to do with mere belief?

Correct. I was contending with the prominent understanding of moral subjectivism—of course there may be nuanced versions.

I would say, though, that there is no other foreseeable way that a moral judgment could express (1) something subjective AND (2) be cognitive if one is not grounding the moral judgment in beliefs. Humans don’t have any other aspect of cognition that is subjective (stance-dependent) that could make moral judgments true or false.

deontological moral doctrine predicated on necessity of law alone, which makes the contingency of mere belief irrelevant?

How is that not a form of moral realism?

What makes subjectivism “moral” anyway?

It merely denotes a metaethical position: that’s all.

What it is that makes subjectivism in general reducible to a particular instance of it?

Again, I can’t think of a single version of moral subjectivism that contends with the idea that beliefs make moral propositions true or false: that’s a core aspect of the theory. If not, then perhaps the view is a form of moral non-cognitivism or something...not sure but I would be interested to hear it.

Would any of that matter with respect to your thesis?

It is definitely relevant, but my focus in the OP is the contemporary, standard view called moral subjectivism; and I wholly concede that there may be a very nuanced version of it that escapes these issues...but I have never heard of it (yet) and it seems pretty conclusive that it will have to revolve around beliefs.

My example of "I believe that aliens exist" being true iff I believe that aliens exist is proof that a belief can make a proposition true or false.

I think it may be better if you elaborated on which premise you disagree with, because this is false and I demonstrated it in the proof.

“I believe that aliens exist” is NOT a proposition that has its “truthity” relative to a belief: irregardless of what you believe about your beliefs, if you have the belief then the proposition is true. The proposition itself is objective and absolute.

The conflation you are making is that the proposition containing a reference to a belief DOES NOT make the proposition true or false relative to a belief. I would challenge you to explicate what the “proposition” is in your claim “that a belief can make a proposition true or false”: I can guarantee you that you think it is “I believe that aliens exist” while implicitly assuming it is “aliens exist”.

In the more abstract, “I believe X” is a valid proposition and is NOT relative to a belief; whereas claiming “X” is true because I believe it is true is incoherent. See my section on the rejoinder to the moral subjectivist’s response for more details.

As such you are left with this:

You cannot just cross out a conclusion in a syllogism without crossing out a premise; unless you are noting something illogical with its form.

Unfortunately, I did not understand this at all: can you please try to elaborate in a manner that ties it to the OP's thesis?

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is NOT a moral proposition: the moral proposition is that "one ought not torture babies". All you have noted is that one can take a stance on the truthity of a proposition, while simultaneously rejecting that there actually is a proposition to take a stance on.

In your example, it would be like denying that "aliens exist" is propositional in its own right while claiming that "I believe aliens exist" somehow makes "aliens exist" true or false.

Initially, I would change truthity for just truth.

Truthity is whether or not something has truth, and not that it has truth.

So it seems to me the argument begs the question by rejecting the challenged view from the start.

P1 is not the claim that beliefs cannot make something true or false (which would beg the question): it is an uncontroversial claim that the stance taken on something is distinct from that something.

If I take a stance of how delicious pineapples are, then my stance about it is distinct from the deliciousness of the pineapples...that’s what makes it a stance about the deliciousness of pineapples. Otherwise, one is making no distinction between a stance about something and that something itself. Along the same lines, the truthity is separate.

Believing X makes it true (subjectivism strictly defined).

This is internally inconsistent, unless you deny the basic nature of a belief: to make it consistent, you would have to transform moral judgments from “one ought to X” to “I believe one ought to X”.

Then you end up in the rejoinder section (in terms of issues with that kind of transformation).

When it comes to the rejoinder, I am not sure, I haven't wrapped my hand around it yet. A rewording in simpler terms would be welcome.

A moral judgment is of the form “one ought to X”, “one should do X”, etc. and NOT “I believe one ought to X”, “I believe one should do X”, etc.; but this sort of transformation is required in order to avoid the original concern of the position being inconsistent: one has to say that the moral judgment is enveloped in an indexical statement. BUT THEN, the indexical statement is the proposition, and not the moral judgment.

I would agree with Lionino here, that this isn't capturing the position very well.

See above.

One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary.

Then, there are no moral judgments which are propositional: all you noted is that our beliefs about, according to you, NONEXISTENT moral propositions are made true by our beliefs...of course! That’s a tautology.

The original American Dream was not about becoming rich: it was about manifest destiny, second chances, and acquiring sufficient wealth to provide and protect one's family.

After all the land was conquered and inhabited, the American Dream died; and was replaced with a new 'American Dream': greed. Now, the capitalism found in the US is, inevitably, slowly moving the wealth into a minority few--fewer and fewer people are able to acquire that baseline wealth. I wonder how long until we sublimate it with a better system.

See:



:up:

My biggest complaint, is that your argument doesn't actually attempt to demonstrate that atheism is illogical...even if I were to grant everything you said.

Another complaint, is that you seem to believe that doing anything non-egoistically is irrational.

I see. So all you are claiming is "informative" about this science of morality is IF one has goals aligned with it (viz., IF one finds it instrumentally useful). This is just of no significant use for morality/ethics; and is no different, at its core, than what Sam Harris does with his "moral landscape": IF one finds well-being good, then there is lots we can scientifically investigate about it.

God has nothing to do with it: if one doesn't believe in any kind of free will, then the use of a concept such as responsibility is absurd and irrational: they might as well say "you aren't actually responsible, but we are going to treat it as if you were". Do you see the issue?

Shockingly, all one needs to remedy this issue, at worst, is to accept a form of compatibilistic free will (;

That one is determined, does not entail that they have no free will: determinism does not preclude free will.

However, if one does go the hard determinist route, then, yes, moral responsibility does go out the window: ought implies can. Imagine you are going for a walk and two people crash into each other in a fatal car accident; imagine the cops detain you, although you were not involved in the accident whatsoever, and hold you morally responsible: would that make sense? Of course not! You didn't make any choices which related meaningfully to the car accident. If you are a hard determinist, however, then making a choice isn't a choice at all: it is like this car example. If you don't choose to rape someone and rape them, how would this be different than you walking by a car accident? It wouldn't. If you abandon free will, you abandon moral responsibility.

Fatalism does seem like a suitable position for a hard determinist though, as they do not believe in free will (in any form).

The problem is that, on the one hand, you are claiming that this "science of morality" does not inform us what we ought to do, and then, on the other, you say that this science is a perfectly adequate informant of "moral guidence" (i.e., what one ought to do).

Please define what you mean by “morality”, because so far you are just using the term, which for you is distinct from ethics, without giving a clear definition.

First, the definition is for the science of morality, not morality itself. Is it circular? No.

Agreed.

Ask the most philosophically ignorant person you can find “what is right and wrong”. They will cheerfully tell you what is right and wrong by their moral sense and cultural moral norms. No more of a ‘definition’ of morality is required. My definition generates no “circularity” issues.

???

Nothing about this gives a viable definition of morality: all you described here is anthropological analysis of people’s moral convictions.

Further, defining morality beyond what is “right and wrong”

So, is your definition of morality ~”the study of what is right and wrong”?

for example as Kant’s categorical imperatives, would make the definition nonsense. You could have the scientific study of cultural Kantian norms or Kantian sense motivations - incoherent nonsense.

Whether or not there are categorical imperatives, has no bearing on what morality is; so I am not following your point here.

What is your basis for claiming that what descriptively moral behavior ‘is’ has zero relevance for what morality imperatively ‘ought’ to be?

Because what ought to be, in a moral sense, is derived from what is intrinsically good; and NOT in any way what people happen to believe is moral or immoral. You saying that, what is moral or immoral is itself contingent on what people believe it is; which makes this squarely a form of moral anti-realism.

Any proposed imperative moral system that is not harmonious with the principles encoded into our moral sense will be rejected as “not what morality is about”.

Even if this is true, it wouldn’t entail in the slightest anything about what is morally good or bad; nor what morality, the study, actually is about. That’s like saying physics as a study depends on our intuitional sense of it—not at all: it is a specific study.

Also, remember there is no agreement and there may never be agreement on what morality imperatively ought to be.

There’s been a consensus on what morality is, at least in the sense of a general account, for a long time; and it has nothing to do with anthropology.

Do you have a better suggestion for moral guidance?

I would suggest studying morality, and not how people behave.

Bob

I appreciate the elaboration!

I understand you separate ‘morality’ from ‘ethics’, but this is superficial and nonsensical. What you really conveyed in your response (here), was that the difference between a science of morality and morality itself: you are distinguishing a psychological, sociological, etc. analysis of moral dispositions from morality itself, and trying to claim that the former is “morality” and the latter is “ethics” when this distinction, in fact, affords no such distinction—rather it is a distinction between a science of morality as opposed to morality itself.

“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”.
…
No, it is not circular. What our “moral sense” is and “cultural moral norms” are is established in all societies independent of how anyone defines or does not define morality.

If you are attempting to define morality, which you seem to be still doing, then this is absolutely circular—although I understand what you are trying to convey, it is not being conveyed properly by defining this science as morality.

If you define morality with any terms that refers to morality, then you are have defined it circularly because one has to understand first what morality is to parse the definition of morality of which you have presented.

Instead, I think what you are defining is the “science of morality” and not morality, and this is certainly not circular; and makes sense with your definition. BUT, it makes no difference if you call it “science of ethics”, because this would just be, by your own definition, “the study of why our ethical sense and cultural ethical norms exist”. Your distinction between ethics and morality is superfluous, and confuses things.

Would saying “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist” help clarify why there is no consideration for what morally ought to be done?

Yes, but it is important to note that you are in no way engaging in morality, even with respect to your own definitions, with this “science of morality”. The science you describe, would be distinct from morality itself and would amount to a psychological and sociological account of morality—which is useless for the actual study of morality.

One could argue “The study of descriptively moral behaviors has nothing to do with ethics”. However, arguing that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms have nothing to do with morality” would require some truly tortured definitions.

It has nothing to do with morality, insofar as it isn’t relevant to the study of morality itself; but, obviously, it is related to morality insofar as you are trying to give a psychological account of it, as opposed to diving into the moral discourse about it.

Bob

:fire:

Bob, Thanks for taking the time to comment.

Absolutely! I appreciate you taking the time to respond (:

I see Sam Harris as an embarrassment to the Science of Morality field. His science is minimal...

:up:

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”?

I do not recognize any valid difference between morality and ethics.

My goal in this post is to argue for defining the Science of Morality as firmly within science’s domain. I have said nothing about what arguments should or should not be part of ethics. I advocate removing moral ought claims only from science, not from ethics. A clear boundary between the scientific and moral philosophy domains would benefit both.

Perhaps it would be helpful, if you defined what you mean by “morality”. I thought you meant:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

P.S.: this definition is circular (see underlined).

By including moral ought claims, Wikipedia’s definition of the Science of Morality either removes the field from the domain of science or proposes that moral ought claims are a part of science. Neither seems sensible. It is a poorly thought-out definition.

I don’t see how one can validly call it a study of ‘morality’ if there is no consideration of what ought to be: again, it sounds like you are falling into the same trap—in stripping out morality from morality.

Right, I have described how understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist can be culturally useful in terms of instrumental oughts for achieving goals. How is that a facade?

Is this all you mean by “morality”? Because this is just a study of the pyschology and sociology of a person—and has nothing to do with morality.

“Philosophers” like Sam Harris are not engaging in ethics whatsoever in their suggested strategies of cooperation (e.g., “moral landscapes” as he puts it). Sadly, you are right that the mainstream influencers (such as Sam Harris) view morality as (essentially) the study of behavior, but, in doing so, they have stripped out ethics and swapped it for a science (which already exists): psychology and sociology.

To remove “moral ought claims” is to remove the fundamental aspect of the study of ethics: an investigation of what is intrinsically valuable, and subsequently how to act in accordance with it. You have removed, in your definition, any study of what is good from ethics; and thereby are no longer in ethical discourse. A description of how people generally behave is not an ethical judgment, nor is such a study ethics.

All you have described, is how best people can pragmatically achieve goals; and not what goals actually align with what is (morally) good. Thusly, your “ethics” is a phantom, withered and malnourished, of the study—it is a facade.

If you think that what one ought to do is not related to anything which is intrinsically good, then you are talking about a form of moral anti-realism which is the negation of ethics proper (e.g., moral nihilism).

Science cannot tell us what is ethical: morality is supervenient on physical properties.

Hi Bob, sorry for the delay on this reply. I've started a new job and been much busier lately. Lets go ahead and wrap this one up as I think we're nearing the end. Feel free to take the last reply.

No worries and sounds good!

From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.

I don’t know what you mean by ‘argument’: it seems like you are just using it as a catch-all term for whatever a position entails.

I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas.

That you need more information to understand it, does not make it incomplete—that’s all I was noting before.

If there’s more from me that you require, then I am more than happy to give it: just ask!

But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.

That’s because, with all due respect, you don’t have a clear understanding of what an argument is. You have just been using it as a vague term for “what the position is expounding”.

Because you are using the term so vacuously, I cannot respond adequately to the critique. If there’s something specifically subjective about my “argument”, then please elaborate on it.

If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.

Do you now see how a study of the natures of emotion is objective, then?

The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation.

By “nature”, I mean the essence of a thing; and this is surely not outdated at all.

. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something.

Are you claiming this, or thinking I am claiming this?

Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.

Another issue I think you are having, is that you are not grasping the difference between a concept and its use. Determining whether or not something has value, and to what degree, has no relevance to whether or not we can verbally explicate the concept of value.

Moreover, that a concept is indefinable (in the sense of properly, verbally, explicating its meaning) does not entail it has no meaning; nor that that meaning is subjective. You are using “subjective” way too liberally (and vaguely) here.

True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it

Value is to have worth. Subjects assign value (worth) to things. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing in proportion to how intrinsically motivating it is. The state of flourishing is intrinsically valuable, because it motivates, as per its nature, towards its acquisition and preservation. We can determine this through (1) experience of the state (or similar ones) and (2) observance of other people in different states: we observe, based off of our knowledge of beings, how likely it is that the said ‘thing’ is motivational independently of any subjective disposition about it and which are not. Other than expounding more how to differentiate the two, I cannot be any clearer; because it cannot possibly be any clearer than this.

What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end

You are right insofar as there are always improvements to be made to any position, and wrong insofar as most of the most influential (and long-lastingly true) ideas were written long ago. It is a mistake to think that everything done in the past is a failure.

You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part.

True.

Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study.

I don’t think it is possible to turn most of philosophy into a science, because it is that which is predicated for science in the first place. Scientism never worked, nor will it ever work. Most of the fundamental studies are by necessity non-scientific.

Bob

I just wanted to note something that I don't see getting addressed in here.

Things don't pop up for no reason, in fact, that is an assertion that implies a cause(in this case, 'no reason')

That something does not have a cause is not itself a cause. You are saying here, that something which does not have a cause has a cause---which is patently false.

I think we have exhausted our conversation. There's only one last question I have (that won't circle us back to our pre-existing disagreements): am I right in thinking that, for you, that the study of intrinsic goodness (i.e., actual goodness) is outside of the sphere of morality? That is certainly NOT what the SEP is intending, nor does the commoner agree with that. If so, what is that study called to you?

Besides that, I want to say, again, I appreciated the conversation; and I look forward to ones in the future! (:

Bob

Sorry, the forum did not notify me of the @s.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra


I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.

I completely agree: I am not contending that we should praise or blame tornados for what they do, but, rather, to acknowledge that what they do is intrinsically bad (or related directly thereto in a relevant manner) which makes them morally bad.

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra


Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.

I completely agree. Again, I think my position is being confused, and it is (perhaps) myself that is to blame because I did not initially convey it with full clarity. I have no problem with the 'natural' vs. 'moral' evil distinction if one is merely denoting what is capable of moral responsibility with the adjective 'moral': HOWEVER, if one is attempting to make 'evil' merely a synonym for badness simpliciter (which is outside of the scope of morality), then they are gravely mistaken. Morality is not itself the study of behavior.

Hopefully that helps clarify my position.

Bob

I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:

I saw it, but it didn’t seem to address our issue (between us). Let me address some of it in ways that avoid reiteration to help further the conversation.

The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect.

You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. I cannot tell if your use of this sort of ‘amoral badness’ is equivalent to my ‘intrinsic badness’ (which I call likewise moral badness).

You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.

Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me.

A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops

I understand why you would say this, because you are holding a strictly act-centric theory of what ethics is about, but I think both of these are moral goods.

I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good (because it has no direct relation to deliberate acts, nor acts in general); whereas health, because of how it relates to flourishing (which is intrinsically good), is morally good to me.

There is another way one can say health, or rain nourishing plants is good, and it is, in fact, an amoral sense: extrinsic goodness. I can equally say that health is good for keeping a sane mind (or some other goal or [subjective] purpose): this kind of good is relative to a thing fulfilling a subjective purpose, and there is an infinite amount (subjective) purposes that a thing can be evaluated, as good or bad, relative to. This is the only kind of good which I concede is outside of the sphere of moral discourse.

For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.

Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”.

Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red

Yes we can: just like ‘to exist’. I can say “red is this particular color that everything is a shade of”. Do you think colorblind people that see only grey don’t understand what grey is?

What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean?

It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good.

Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave?
…
(As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)

For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good.

We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.

It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics.

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross

Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.

You never explained why; and I think it is a consequence of your view. From my perspective, you can’t have cake and eat it too (;

Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject).

Bob

It looks like you may be new here: welcome to the forum, Jasonm!

Unfortunately, you did not eliminate what you sought to: it is entirely coherent for someone to posit that this "human taste" (viz., "range of possibilities") for morality is a reflection of the range of "human emotion" towards morality.

All you succeeded, at best, at adding is that the subjective dispositions (whether that be an emotions, preferences, beliefs, etc.) which make moral judgments true or false should be evaluated in terms of the vast majority collective of humans.

This doesn't negate moral cognitivism, nor does it provide a "logical basis" for your version of moral anti-realism.

<The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">

Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness, and by ‘moral’ I am referring to the sense of “within the sphere of moral discourse” and NOT your #1 or #2 (that you explicated in your response, quoted at the end of this response).

"Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."

The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”.

Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous?

Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.

I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’).

For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral

I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here.

If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts.

Again, if you think there is a morally ideal possible world IF there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that “moral” can be used in this third sense.

EDIT:

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts.

By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good".

Bob

Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. Likewise, I think there are still examples of agents which are not capable of being held responsible for their actions; like ants.

Besides that clarification, I think we are only disagreeing now about semantics. Even if ‘moral’ does signifies—with respect to one of its meanings—traditionally ~“something related to an agent that is capable of being culpable for their actions” (and, in this regard, agents constitute “moral realities”), I clearly doesn’t fit my theory on ethics at all.

I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. I know you disagree, but I think you are heavily overlooking the fact that it is counter-intuitive to posit a sort of ‘evil’ which is not only natural (in the sense of being indeliberate) but also unrelated to what is morally bad; that means you are speaking about pragmatic goodness when discussing it, which isn’t what people are usually talking about with ‘natural evil’: evil is still always about something morally bad, in the sense that the “bad” being discussed is of moral constitution.

. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.

It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes).

It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.

Semantics, assuming it is syntactical and grammatical, doesn’t affect formal soundness; and, although you are right that unique theories are harder to convey to people, I don’t think it would be that hard to clarify my position with respect to the terminology. I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. The difficulty in our discussion was that I didn’t formulate it very well, initially.

Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.

I already explained why they would say yes/no; and I also would bet that the common person would find it nonsensical to say there is an evil which isn’t relevant to morality, as opposed to merely being natural. This is what you are committed to if you are saying that not all evil is a matter of moral discourse.

And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.

I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse.

It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad.

Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.

Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word.

Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."
• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.

That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness).

EDIT:

I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property.

The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral)

I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them.

Bob

Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?

I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.

To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.

However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.

In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.

Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.

A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.

Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it.

But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil)

The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean?

I would presume that a person with your response (here), would deny that moral goodness is intrinsic goodness; otherwise their position is incoherent.

You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (
↪Leontiskos
). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.

I agree, except that (1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) and (2) a very much am fine with the phrase ‘natural evil’...its ‘moral evil’ I have a problem with.

You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes

To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are.

To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense.

Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it.

The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions.

Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral

I disagree. Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross

If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!

No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses.

Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.

I deny this. Anything that is intrinsically good, is morally good; anything that is intrinsically bad, is morally bad. Period. Morality is not just the study of what one ought to do: it is about what ought to be. What ought to be, is not itself necessarily dependent on what one ought to be doing.

For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you?

Bob

The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil.

If the latter is true, then it may be, for intents and purposes hereon, better to portray it as 'natural vs deliberate evil' instead of 'natural vs. moral evil'; and if the former is true, then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto.

I reject the former, and accept the latter; whereas it seems like you accept the former and reject the latter.

But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?

By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral.

I am use ‘amoral’ here in the sense of denoting something about the sphere of moral discourse.

"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."

Is this “bad” state, morally bad? Or is it a sort of badness which is outside of the sphere of moral discourse—it is neither morally good nor bad?

Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs.

Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’?

I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. If this is true, then ‘natural evil’ is not an amoral consideration.

Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? If so, then what kind of “bad”? Is it just amoral badness (viz., “bad” that refers to something which is neither morally good or bad)?

Therefore this evil is natural.

Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); and not that some evil is amoral.

Bob

If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.

Fair enough: I will make my response more abrupt to make it less strainful (on the both of us).

With respect to your use of ‘moral agent’, the issue was really due to my accidental conveyance of ‘an moral agent is one which is capable of being held culpable for their actions’ with ‘an moral agent is one which is culpable for their actions’: I apologize, that was my mistake. The whole time I was thinking the former, but conveyed the latter. Your definition, in light of that, is fine and perfectly consistent.

"What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"

I honestly don’t know what a ‘moral reality’ is, at all (other than what I understand you to be meaning). I have never used that phrase, and don’t see any need to use it. Perhaps this is an indication of my ignorance...I don’t know.

Let’s talk about, as per your request, a tornado. To do that, I think we need to talk first about the concept of ‘evil’; because I think this is really the crux of our disagreement. I understand now better what you and the SEP article was conveying: it was conveying a concept of ‘evil’ which does not preclude amoral evil—this is a foreign and wholly implausible view to me.

‘Evil’, by my lights, is a morally-loaded term: there cannot be such a thing as amoral evil; and perhaps if you could elaborate on why you think that, then I may be able to account better for your position.

There is such a thing as amoral badness, by my lights, but not ‘evil’: the word itself implies moral relevance.

Bob

Hello Chet and Kizzy,

Although your intentions may be good, your responses are elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and I say this with all due respect, as a person that wants to see you both grow and develop into better philosophers :kiss: . Please try to see it from your reader's perspective: they are reading an essay which conveys a plethora of different ideas (all of which are unrelated to each other) in incredibly confusing, convoluted, and incoherent ways...all while hurling insulting comments at them. How do you expect them to react?

This forum is all about a congregation of people willing to learn from each other with genuineness, respectfulness, and intellectual rigor. It is completely fine and understandable to have different views than other people on this forum, but I would strongly suggest that you try to make your future comments more concise, respectful, and intellectually rigorous.

By 'intellectually rigorous', I do not mean that you need to have extensive knowledge of the topic-at-hand; but, rather, demonstrate in your responses that you took the time to reflect on the topic and the person's post you are responding to (as opposed to just ranting). It goes a long way, when the reader of your response can see that you took the time to genuinely reflect, dissect, and contend with their ideas.

I say none of this with any ill-will intentions nor disrespect in mind: as I said before, I want to see you both become great philosophers (:

Bob

We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might).

They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.

I understand, but the problem is you said:

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable

Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent capable of moral action but, rather, one that does right action. See what I mean?

If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible).

The interesting thing, is that I think you are using the adjective ‘moral’ in multiple senses, which is normal and fine, without realizing it. This would explain the seeming incongruence here.

There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. If this is the case, then it is perfectly coherent for you to posit the phrase ‘moral agent’ in both senses you noted, because one sense would be a ‘moral agent’ merely in the sense that the agent, qua agent, is within the sphere of moral discourse (viz., they are capable of being held, in action, accountable, as per the dictates of morality, for what they do) and the other sense would be a ‘moral agent’ in the more strict sense that the agent is not only ‘moral’ in the former sense but also doing the right actions (viz., doing what, as per the dictates of morality, is right). See what I mean?

I would like you to know, although I am not quoting it (for the sake of brevity), that I did read the SEP article and am familiar with it. Although I prefer using adjectives uniformly, I have, upon further reflection, no problem with the distinction of ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil, as incoherent as that may sound to you (relative to my view), because I know that the adjective ‘moral’ is being used yet in another sense (than the other two I already expounded). Here’s a rundown of all three:

1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).

2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).

3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.).

These are all senses, I would argue, you are using; and they are divergent in meaning (and I see nothing wrong with this): I just need you to acknowledge and see these senses at work in your own theory.

By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’ in all three senses. The first because ‘moral evil’ is within the sphere of moral discourse; the second because ‘moral evil’ is NOT JUST what is in the sphere of moral discourse (such a statement like “whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter”) but also that it IS morally wrong; and the third because it is not just that it is morally wrong but also that it was deliberate (intentional).

So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example:

1. Dogs are not moral agents. ‘Moral’ is being used in the first (and consequently also in the third) sense. This is NOT to say that they are immoral agents, because ‘immoral’ here is being used in the second sense.

2. The act of rape is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense.

3. A dog raping another dog is immoral. ‘Immoral’ is being used in the second sense, and is not referencing whether or not the dog is itself a ‘moral agent’ in the first (and consequently third) sense.

I guess, I view the adjective ‘moral’ as, for intents and purposes hereon, plural in meaning; and I see clearly that you are using it the same way (and correct me if I am wrong).

If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.

Correct, because by ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ you are referring here to the first and third sense and not the second: you are mentioning that the agent is not capable of being held responsible, and, in this sense, their actions are not within the sphere of moral talk which pertains to talk about moral responsibility.

This doesn’t negate the fact that rape, being committed by the dog, is ‘immoral’ in the second sense—i.e., that it is morally wrong/bad.

Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.

I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.

Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now).

If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.

Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. The latter they use the adjective ‘moral’ to describe, and I don’t see how this negates the other traditional meanings of it. Do you think that the adjective ‘moral’ has one meaning?--and specifically that it refers only to the sense it is used in the SEP?

If so, then you have issues with your usages in the OP of the adjective. Just as some examples:

What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.

The underlined portion admits at least two of the senses I described.

In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act

“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse.

What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.

By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean?

Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.

I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant capable of being culpable for their actions. I see now how that was confusing. But I don’t see anything wrong with my use (so far) of ‘immoral’.

Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps.

Bob

Another way of thinking about it, that just crossed my mind, is that:

If natural evil is not moral evil, then some evil is not immoral.

My interpretation of your view, and correct me if I am still misunderstanding, is that you mean to denote a subtype of immorality (i.e., of evil) which is the realm of these 'moral realities' that you refer to; and in that sense I have no problem with it. The semantics just seem weird to me.

At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable.

That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts

Which one is that you mean to convey? These are incoherent taken together. Either a ‘moral agent’ is an agent capable of moral scrutiny (of moral acts) or an agent which does the right thing. I have been understanding you to mean the former, but now it seems like you may mean the latter.

This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.

I need a bit of clarification on this one: do you NOT think rape is wrong, if it is committed by a dog? I seriously doubt that is what you are trying to convey, but that seems (to me) to be the implication of the above quote.

All I think you mean to convey, is that the dog isn’t a moral agent; which wasn’t ever in contention in the first place. I am saying that the act of rape that the dog committed is wrong, and the dog is not a moral agent (in the sense that the dog is not capable of being held responsible for their acts).

1. Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
2. A tornado is a non-moral reality
3. Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.

What do you mean by “engage” here? I would say that a tornado does not “engage” in immoral or moral acts insofar as it is not culpable for the acts its commits but NOT that the tornado cannot perform what is an immoral or moral act (although it isn’t deliberate).

We may be at an impasse though, because I suspect you are going to find all of this unsatisfactory. You seem to distinguish between moral badness (like evil) and moral ‘moralness’ (like intentionally raping someone) that I don’t accept: evil is a description of something which is being emphasized as morally bad, and immoral acts refers, to me, to any action which itself is morally bad.

I am interested to hear if you do consider rape amoral IF a dog commits it—that will be a very interesting take. I see your point to a certain extent, that you distinguish natural and moral evil; but this use of ‘evil’ just seems circular: isn’t that just a reference to something that is immoral?

Just so we can find common ground, let’s forget semantics for a second. I agree with you that there is a difference between ‘evil’ (i.e., moral badness) which is done by indeliberate (i.e., natural) vs. deliberate (i.e., what you call “moral”) actions/events. I would merely add that the action/event is still ‘evil’ (i.e., morally bad: what I call ‘immoral’) if it is natural. I think, stripping the semantics out, you can agree with that.

I hate semantics just as much as the next guy (;

Bob

I would like to disclaim that, as always, I appreciate your feedback and critiques! It is rare on this forum to find a person that is willingly think about an idea in depth, and give thoughtful responses; and you are one them (:

I think that your use of the more colloquial meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is causing you to fall into a muddied trap; which is why you are incapable of understanding why an analysis of these sort of states (which only alive beings can have) is an objective analysis. I say that with all due respect, and assuming fully that you completely disagree (; , and hopefully I can help expound my thoughts on this.

I greatly appreciate your elaboration on your idea of “incompleteness” with respect to arguments, because it allowed me to understand better where your head is it. There’s some things worth noting.

1. You must remember that by “argument” we are discussing a formal argument in the strictest sense of the word: a syllogism. We are not talking about informal arguments (or at least I wasn’t).

2. Formal arguments (i.e., syllogisms) are not subjective because they are “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean: that they are not a full account of exactly why a conclusion is true): they are subjective if a premise’s truthity is relative to subjective dispositions. I outlined this in my examples before, so please bring them up if you need clarification on what I mean here.

3. A formal argument (i.e., a syllogism) is not itself incomplete because it is “incomplete” (in the sense that you mean). This is a common mistake outside of philosophy that people make: it is not valid to claim a syllogism—which is logically sound, consists of a major and minor premise and a conclusion, and has its conclusion necessitated if the premises are true—is invalid because the reader, or recipient, requires further elaboration on a premise to understand it. A complete syllogism is comprised of a major premise, minor premise, and a conclusion that is necessitated therefrom.

4. There are good reasons philosophers stick to syllogisms, or pseudo-syllogism, and do not attempt an elaborate expounding of the position they are arguing for. Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. Secondly, to have a “complete” argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully “complete”. To take your math example, even if you added the implicit step of “2x + 1 – 1 = 3 – 1”, they can still ask for a proof of that as well (and are perfectly within their rights to)(but more on that example later, because I don’t think that is what you are trying to convey with that example).

Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1

I think what you are trying to convey is that there are implicit steps in this proof: but there aren’t any in my syllogism I gave you. Asking “what is intrinsic value?” in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; that’s how you know.

So, in short, I think you are confusing the need for further clarification (for a particular learner) with having implicit steps in an argument. An implicit step is in the logic, not the content, of the argument.

1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.

As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?"

Some things worth noting:

1. That argument, unlike mine, is not a valid syllogism; so I surprised you used it. What you said is:

P1: p.
P2: q.
C: z → t

The logic is incredibly unsound. Here’s an example of your example that is a valid syllogism:

P1: If an evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong, then “if a person does something wrong, then it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it”. [p → q]

P2: An evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong. [p]

C: Therefore, if a person does something wrong, it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it. [q]{ Modus Ponens }

2. What makes your example argument incomplete, is not that you don’t understand what an evil demon is: that’s just a limitation you happen to have in terms of your knowledge. It is not the arguers job, when explicating a general argument, to write out a book on everything that a person may not understand: there job is to provide a quick and dirty argument, that is logically sound, for a particular conclusion. Syllogisms are entry-arguments into discussions. That you don’t understand what an evil demon is, has no bearing on if the argument provided was objective nor complete itself.

The last thing I would like to note for now, is that an analysis of emotions is not subjective when one is analyzing their natures. The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. For example, I can strongly hate the idea of what hate is, but that doesn’t change what hate actually is. I don’t get to say: “I hate it, so now hate is really joy because I like joy”. Nope. So I hope you can see how the study of emotions is not subjective.

Secondly, not all states are emotions—not even the one’s I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion.

I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it (and of course many differences). If you are familiar with it, then it may make sense to you when I say that a state of eudamonia (1) is not a state of emotion and (2) is not subjective. If you aren’t familiar with Aristotle, then no worries...just thought you may be since you have such a background.

Bob

For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.

Agreed. So:

For example, morality and culpability go hand in hand. All things relevant to culpability rely on morality, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to morality is not to talk about culpability. Nevertheless, not all culpability talk is moral talk. We can talk about things like good/bad effects, natures, and intentions without talking about culpability.

All our disagreement boils down to, is that by ‘moral’ you are referring to moral talk that is culpability talk—you are discussing a subsector of moral talk—whereas I am referring to moral talk in general. A tornado is not culpable for its actions, and thusly is not ‘moral’ in the sense of being a moral agent, but is still the embodiment of something immoral (hence why it is called natural evil).

Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.

Neither is mine. I am NOT denying that only agents which can be held responsible for their actions are moral but, rather, that the actions, effects, and intentions of agents that CAN’T are still capable of moral evaluation insofar as one can determine whether or not the act is moral or immoral (irregardless of the fact the agent is not culpable for their actions). Please read that again, because you missed it in my response.

When a dog rapes another dog, we don’t say the dog can be held morally responsible and thusly, to your point, is not a moral agent; HOWEVER, we do still admit that the act of rape the dog committed is immoral.

No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.

I say this, based off of your responses and not the OP. By ‘moral agent’, you clearly mean an agent which is culpable for their actions (to the extent that their actions are deliberate); and by ‘moral talk’ you clearly don’t mean just culpability talk.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross

Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral

Your interpretation, being false, is the source of this contradiction. All you found, as far as contradictions go, is that amoral agents != moral agents—I was never denying this. Take the dog rape example: the dog is not moral agent, but the dog’s action was immoral. This is not controversial; so I am surprised you deny this, but perhaps I am missing something.