Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective?

No.

By “structure of a syllogism is [being] objective”, you are referring to the form of the syllogism being valid (i.e., that it is logically consistent, has a minor and major premise, and the conclusion is necessitated by the premises) but that the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., “this is green” as opposed to “I think this is green”).

An argument is objective if all of its premises express something objective.

1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.

1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).

2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotions—e.g., a state of indifference.

2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.

An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something objective (and thusly is objective itself):

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something subjective (and thusly is subjective itself):

P1: A thing that I desire to have intrinsic value has it.

P2: I desire that the state of pain has intrinsic value.

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.


An example of an argument that contains one premise that expresses something objective and one that expresses something subjective (and thusly is a subjective argument):

P1: If I believe that a unicorn exists, then it exists. [Expresses something objective]

P2: I believe that a unicorn exists. [Expresses something subjective]

C: Therefore, a unicorn exists.

Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one

That’s fine, as long as it is noted that the claim itself was objective (that he had not gotten cancer from smoking).

How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints?

One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens.

How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?

This would not be specifically a psychologist’s job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciences—such as sociology, biology, etc.

One would need to understand people’s general psychologies, sociology, and biology to better distinguish something which one is motivated towards due to their disposition vs. what is externally motivating. E.g., one person may have an extreme dispositional towards a thing, a society may view a thing as extremely important, etc.

Bob

Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.

So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities.

How is this not incoherent? You first say there exists a moral talk that is not culpability talk, and then say that all moral realities are culpability realities. Unless ‘reality’, as opposed to ‘talk’, is doing some heavy-lifting here that I am not following, this is incoherent.

I think what you are trying to note, which I agree with, is merely that only actions, out of all possible actions, which are deliberate or derivable back to an action that is deliberate are within the sphere of culpability talk—but this does not mean that actions which do not meet those requirements are outside of the sphere of moral talk.

You seem to use ‘moral’ as synonymous with ‘culpable’ in some sentences, and then use them as distinct in others.

If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.
…
That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?

That something is a moral agent, is not relevant to if something can be predicated as doing something wrong or right. By being a moral agent, you are referring to the agent being culpable for their actions, which is clearly not the case for a tornado, but by ‘moral predicate’ you are referring to anything within the sphere of moral discourse—not discourse about culpability.

I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things.

In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral

This is interesting, because I would say that natural evil is immoral, which is why it is called ‘evil’. I think, though, this is just a disagreement in semantics; because, here, you are referring by ‘moral’ to ‘culpable’ and not what you refer to as ‘moral’ before (when saying ‘moral’ in “Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk”).

When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.

I understand and agree with you, if I strip out the misuse of the adjectives, but it is worth mentioning that you should be saying “realities of culpability” (or something like that) and not “moral realities”. The adjective ‘moral’ refers to anything which can be validly denoted within the sphere of moral discourse, or something which agrees with what is (morally) good—not just what contains some degree of responsibility or duty.

Bob

I would also like to mention that even with the idea of 'objectivity' requiring publicity of the empirical content, it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. ... none of this is dependent on subjective experience, although it is entirely possible to acquire the same knowledge from the "subjective side" as you put it.

I think your use of the terms is incoherent with your definitions.

If:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

Then ‘objectivity’ is fundamentally about anything which is not relative to subjective dispositions—that’s the difference between reason, logic, “the real outside world”, etc. and desires, beliefs, etc.

Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other not—objectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity.

I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments.

An argument is about truth: you can’t separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about it—and this is what your definition entails (quoted above).

This is no way implies that objectivity or truth are platonic forms.

You actually (sort of) recognized this in your own counter-point:

Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument

If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition.

“Food tastes delicious” is a proposition which does NOT express something objective, because one has to evaluate the truth of this sentence relative to the given subject at hand (since how a thing tastes is directly dependent on who is tasting it).

“I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" IS expressing something objective, because the evaluation of its truth (or falsity) IS NOT dependent on any subjective disposition: either “I” really did smoke every day for 90 years and didn’t get cancer, or “I” didn’t—this is not dependent on how anyone feels or believes about it.


What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. That is cannot be used validly to prove anything related to a proposition like "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective" has no relation to whether it is subjective or objective...by your own definitions. “I’ve smoked every day...” is a proposition based on reason, valid logic, and is independent of desires/beliefs which obviously meets the definition you gave (quoted above previously). That’s what it means to evaluate something “outside of oneself” (to take from your definition): on the contrary, “I’ve smoked every day and didn’t get cancer” is true because “I want it to be true” is subjective, by your definitions.

Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?

That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently; and that you think that an argument is only objective if it references some scientifically measurable ‘entity’...which is nonsense, even by your own definitions. If the argument’s premises expound propositions which can be evaluated “outside of oneself”, independently of desire/belief, with reason, with logic, etc. then it is ‘objective’. It isn’t valid to tack on “and it has to be about some sort of instrumentally measurable concrete entity”...nah.

An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'

I am glad you gave this example, so I can clarify how it is not analogous to my examples and is not an example of something which has intrinsic value.

If one removes the beliefs and desires they have about the Grand Canyon and views it, they will no longer feel any awe about it; thusly, the Grand Canyon itself is not innately motivating them. This is just extrinsic value, like when a person is motivated to workout or play basketball, because the thing itself is not, per its nature, a source of motivation.

Now, in colloquial speech, we may say things like “I was motivated to workout because of the documentary I saw about body-building”, but this is mistaken if taken literally: if the desires and beliefs that the person has about everything relevant to the documentary on body-building and then they watched it, then they would certainly not be motivated to workout (because of it). It is their interpretation of the documentary, of the Grand Canyon, that is the source of motivation; and so this is a form of extrinsic value, because the value one assigns the Grand Canyon is relative to some subjective purpose that the person has for it (e.g., one is motivated to value to the grand canyon because, for example, they like the feeling of being in awe).

Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it.

Bob

:up:

I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."
…
If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate.

Fair enough. I think your idea of “invincible negligence” clarified quite a bit of my contentions; and I am inclined to agree with you.

I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts.

I think I understand what you are going for, but it doesn’t seem correct to depict it as about “the breadth of the moral sphere”: that would imply that you are discussing and analyzing what can be constituted as ‘moral’ whatsoever, and not about particularly what set of [human] acts can be constituted as ‘moral’ (which is what I believe you are trying to discuss).

As long as it is acknowledged that the breadth of the moral sphere is not limited to acts; then I am content.

Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with?

I don’t buy objection 5, because it conflates “importance” with a high degree thereof. All human acts can be said, to some degree, to be important.

• K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
• K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
• K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong

I see what Aquinas means here, although I must admit I am not well-versed in Thomism (so I can’t substantively discuss about it), and partially agree. It seems likely moral discourse is being conflated with discourse about culpability (although perhaps I am reading too much in between the lines): for example, I think it is perfectly valid to analyze whether or not a tornado is inherently immoral or not, and I see that, although a reflex-kick would not render a person culpable, a reflex-kick that is to the detriment of an innocent person is still wrong—it seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, Acquinas is trying to limit the sphere of moral discourse to just "human acts".

If all that is being conveyed here is that only acts which a person performs that is deliberate, or traced back to some deliberation prior, can be validly called a ‘human act’ in the sense of an act that would bind the person with responsibility for it, then I agree.

The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition

This is the conflation I am talking about (between moral discourse and discourse about culpability): morality is not just the study of culpability and responsibility. We can say, just like when analyzing a tornado, that a foot + leg kicking another (innocent) person is bad, without conceding that the person that performed the action is culpable for it; which is an eliminated possibility if I take the above quote seriously. A tornado is inherently (morally) bad, but we wouldn't say it is culpable for its effects (or 'actions' in a loose sense of the word).

Bob

I commend you for the thoughtfulness which is exemplified in your OP, as it is well-written, succinct, and substantive. By-at-large, I agree with your assessments and agree with your two theses; and I also share in the suspicion that separating human acts into amoral vs. moral categories either (1) is confused (at best) or (2) downright manipulative (at worst). The classical example, in my mind, is the common idea in modern society that 'morality' is personal, and that one should not mix their morals with what they vote into law: it is all a load of nonsense that, at worst, is deployed as a moral deception to silence moral views.

There only two areas that I would disagree with you, and that is (1) the credence that you give to the idea that "morality is nothing more than justice" (which also implies, to me, that you are giving credence to the idea that ~"morality is nothing more than the study of good vs. bad human acts") and (2) what you qualify as within moral scrutiny.

With respect to #1, Morality is the study of intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good: both components are necessary to capture what ethics is about. If one simply analyzes what can be predicated as good, then they miss the important metaethical step of analyzing what the property of goodness even is; and if they only analyze the property (and things which relate thereto, such judgments), then they completely miss what actually can be said to be good.

This definition, that I have given here, of morality is broader than just acts (let alone deliberate human acts). Firstly, it includes metaethical questions that don't solely relate to actions---e.g., the nature of moral properties, judgments, etc. I don't think metaethics as a whole fits well into an ethical theory that defines ethics as solely about actions. Secondly, an analysis of what can be predicated as good, does not solely pertain to actions: it pertains to essences, effects, and intentions.

Before explaining that further, I must segue quickly into #2: an action is the synthesis, at least, of an intention, an effect, and an essence. One can validly scrutinize an effect independently of the intention of an action; and this is missing from your kind of viewpoint. I can say that a person is not morally culpable for a consequence of their action while simultaneously recognizing that the consequence (i.e., the effect) is immoral (i.e., morally bad). To take your "kicking the doctor" example, just because I am not morally culpable for kicking the doctor (because it was not deliberate) does not take away from the fact that we can moral scrutinize the effect, which in this case is wrong. We can say that kicking people is generally wrong, for example, because it produces consequences which violate our morals (whatever they may be); and so the act of kicking the doctor was still wrong, although we wouldn't hold the person, in this case, responsible for it. Moreover, an action can be analyzed not solely in terms of the intention (behind it) nor its effects, but, rather, its nature. The intention to rape someone is immoral, because the nature of rape is immoral; and the nature of rape is immoral not because of its particular effects in any given instance but, rather, because the very essence of the act is morally bad.

Likewise, sometimes we understand that the intention behind an act was good, but the effect was bad; and this demonstrates that both deliberate and accidental effects are within the sphere of moral discourse. A great example is the one you gave: negligence. I think that if you really hold that only deliberate, human acts are within moral scrutiny, then human negligence cannot be within the sphere of moral scrutiny. Your position, being that you hold sometimes negligence is wrong (and thusly within the sphere of moral scrutiny), seems internally incoherent on this point. I think that negligence (1) is within moral discourse (even if the instance of it does not contain any culpability on the person) and (2) some instances do legitimately contain culpability on the person; but this can only be so if not just deliberate acts are within the sphere of moral scrutiny.

Ok, back to #1. Actions which are not deliberate, can still be analyzed, to some extent, in terms of their effects and essences, being that it is a synthesis of intention and effect. For example, other species cannot, for the most part, be meaningfully considered deliberately acting (like humans) so we don't really consider their intentions within moral scrutiny, but we do still analyze the effects and natures of the acts that they perform. If morality is just about justice or, more generally, human acts, then we lose this valid aspect of the study.

Likewise, analyzing essences does not pertain solely to acts; for example, is the essence of a human (morally) good or bad? This is not something we merely look at the actions of humans to determine: we analyze their whole nature.

Bob

:roll:

"I" references "self", which makes no sense if there isn't "not self". You cannot identify what is you and what is not, if there isn't anything besides you. It can't be done. Distinctions can only be made with space and time.

I think I have identified one of the subtle issues with my theory, that may be causing you trouble (understanding it). That a thing demands or insists on being valued, does not mean it has value independently of a subject's determination or analysis of it (i.e., that it has value in-itself as I was referring). Either a thing has value in-itself, which I would have to explain how it is constituted into the being of the thing, or it is assigned value (by a subject).

Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.

Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.

Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1.

The intrinsic value a thing has, then, would be proportional to how motivational the thing is at demanding people to value it for its own sake (whether that be positively or negatively); and this is how we could compare them.

Obtaining pleasures, for example, would be less intrinsically valuable then a state of eudaimonia because the latter, when in that state, is more innately motivational towards valuing it for its own sake than the former (although it is not clear to a person who has not reached the latter state and is stuck in the former one).

Does that help?

That's fine and fair. An idiom, through repetition, can be ascertained by what it conveys and not the origin of how it came about to mean it. However, this does not negate that "it is beyond me", if understood properly in how it was developed as a phrase, has spatial references.

Also, "I don't understand it" also references space...just not as directly. There is no "I" without "other" in space, for example. The sentence still wouldn't make sense without the concept of space, but I get and agree with your point.

I cannot imagine anyone relating the idea of space with the word or concept "beyond". It is just an idiom of the linguistic expression which we use habitually to mean over the boundary of something.

You just unknowingly contradicted yourself. "Over the boundary" is the idea that there are two things in space (at least conceptually) and one is beyond the "boundary" of the other.

I always appreciate your thoughts!

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it.

Here's where I get a bit confused with Aristotle, because I agree that eudaimonia is the highest good because of its nature BUT I don't see how Aristotle is really arguing that; since his definition of intrinsic value is ~"that which is done for its own sake". It seems like something can be done for its own sake and be a matter of subjective disposition, no?

I think he would need to define intrinsic value not in terms of what is done for its own sake, but, rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued (e.g., pain is a great example, although not the ultimate good).

What am I missing?

I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding?

It seems obvious to me that the premises are not appealing to being true relative to mind-dependent dispositions, what would make you think otherwise?

Is intrinsic value objective or subjective?

The definition or the underlying meaning?

The definition is subjective, because all definitions are subjective. I don't know what it would mean to define something objectively. We choose what sets of symbols (i.e., words) to associate with what underlying meanings (i.e., ideas/concepts): I don't see how it could be otherwise.

The underlying meaning is objective, because it is the idea/concept of having value in-itself. If this is not understood, then one doesn't understand what 'in-itself' means. Again, just to sidestep your Kantian ties, what I mean by 'in-itself' is the nature, the essence, of the thing and not what it exists as independently of all experience of it.

Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective?

How could it possibly be subjective? I don't understand where you are coming from here, unfortunately. Either a thing motivates a mind or it doesn't: this isn't relative to what anyone believes or feels about it.

Bob

Yes, a word is a set of symbols which signifies a concept; and a concept is an idea.

:kiss:

No, an idea/concept is non-spatial--even if they are derived from processes of the brain. We are not analyzing the phenomenology or ontology of concepts but, rather, their meaning: the concept of space, which is non-spatial, is the idea of space itself.

The idiom "it is beyond me" cannot be made sense of, conceptually, without the idea of space. Think about it: to conceptualize it, one must represent to themselves, whether that be implicitly or explicitly, a 'something' which is outside of what is marked as 'themselves'. It is 'beyond' me, because it is cannot be placed within me...it is separate, which is another spatially-loaded term, from me. It is beyond me, in the sense that I do not understand it...it extends past my understanding. Although my understanding doesn't exist in space, I can represent something being outside of it by using space conceptually...hence 'it is beyond me'. These are all ideas expressing something which is not actually in space by means of using the idea of space.

It is easy enough to understand this, when one tries to describe "it is beyond me" without using spatially-loaded terms like "beyond": they can't. It loses meaning.

It absolutely does. You are literally saying that "it", whatever that is, cannot be placed within the sphere of "the imagination". You absolutely cannot make any sense of that without the concept of space, because you need to be able to conceptually mark out an area of space which represents "the imagination" to denote that something is outside of it.

That is all fair. I can see concepts which are primitive (in the sense I mean it) being explicable in the sense of being capable of physical or gestural expression; I was referring to a grasping of the concept via verbalization or explicated thinking (if that makes sense). I don't think we are in disagreement afterall.

That a word is spatially referent, DOES NOT mean that it refers to something in phenomenal or cosmic space. "Beyond" refers to a thing and another thing, the former of which is outside, at some distance, of the other.

When I say "imagine a red ball and another blue ball, and the blue ball is beyond the red ball by 3 meters north": "beyond" here is still spatially referent, even though neither the red nor blue ball exist.

"It is beyond me", "that is above my pay grade", "that went over my head", etc. are spatially referent idioms that mean that they didn't understand something: the idiom conveys it through spatial representation (e.g., "beyond", "above", "over", etc.). Without the concept of space, none of these idioms make any sense; so they are not separate senses of the words.

You have to provide an argument yourself instead of lazily linking a long article: I am not going to take the time to debate a Dialetheist's perspective from stanford. I reject the view, is all I will say for now until you provide your own view on it.

As written, the argument is incomplete.

It is not valid to argue that a syllogism is incomplete because each premise needs to be questioned and expounded—that is the nature of all syllogisms.

A valid and complete syllogism (i.e., formal argument) is one which has:

1. A major premise.
2. A minor premise.
3. A conclusion.
4. A logically sound form.

My syllogism meets these demands, and is thusly complete and valid.

What you move on to note, is exactly what I was asking you to refrain from noting: various issues you have with accepting the premises. A person not accepting the premises of a syllogism does not make the syllogism invalid.

On a similar note, your definition of an ‘objective’ argument was:

OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).

My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. So:

If the answer is, "
I believe in external motivation — Bob Ross
, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective.

This, even if it were true (which it is not), does not make the argument subjective, by your definition, because the premises I expounded are claims which are not dependent on beliefs.

You are questioning the justification for the premise itself, which would require another, separate syllogism. I am asking if this syllogism itself is objective—not whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~”Something has intrinsic value if I want it to”.

You asking for justification for external motivation theory, which is not provided in the syllogism itself; and wasn’t intended to. Even if a syllogism produced for such justification were based solely on beliefs, and thusly is subjective, it wouldn’t negate the fact that P1 is expressing something objective.

How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?
…
My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."

I am going to disregard all of these parts, because I am asking you a specific question: do you think that the premises + conclusion constitute an ‘objective argument’. I am not asking for an analysis of how plausibly true you find the premises.

The question is whether the syllogism is (1) valid (as per explicated above) and (2) meets your definition of ‘objective argument’ (which is to say it’s premises and conclusion can be said to be rationally constituted, logically sound, and independent of subjective dispositions).

Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.

If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You can’t prove ‘1+1=2’ with an ‘objective argument’ if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of ‘objective argument’.

As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value.

P1 is not a definition of intrinsic value: it is a claim about what has it.

"A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind

Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term ‘mind’ is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective.

In short, you are confusing an analysis of why the premises are true/false, with whether they are purporting something objective; and by your definition of an ‘objective argument’, this syllogism would suffice to meet that standard.

Bob

I appreciate your response! Since we have no common ground, I would like to take things step-by-step. First, I want to address your idea that my argument is not 'objective', in your sense of the word.

For now, I am going to use 'objective' and 'subjective' in your sense of the terms.

Consider the below argument:

P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.

P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).

C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.

Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'.

I think it does, because the premises and conclusion are formatted rationally and logically consistently; and none of it is true in virtue of my or someone else's subjective disposition towards the subject. Do you agree?

I don’t see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating).

You use the term ‘objective’ in really nonsensical ways—e.g., ‘objective knowledge’, ‘objective definition’, ‘objective wavelength’, ‘objective argument’, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying.

I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused.

Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition

An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. Likewise, experience is always used in arguments: there’s no such thing as an argument that is devoid of a posteriori content.

No, that's not proven objective knowledge.

“objective knowledge” is something you can say, but that doesn’t make it coherent. Knowledge is about information minds have, and has three main components: justification, belief, and truth. Refactor and create whatever epistemological theory you want (to accommodate for gettier cases and what not), but it will include these three (including yours that I remember from before). Truth is objective, the other two aren’t.

You are saying “mind-independently existent (or stance-independently true) [viz., objective] information that a mind has [viz., knowledge]”.

Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green.

You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like.

No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?

You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known.

Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain.

This doesn’t completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You can’t completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesn’t work.

A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it.

Sure. We can talk about that, but it doesn’t negate the idea that pain has intrinsic value. There are fine lines between pleasure and pain for sure.

Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob

I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and there’s no easy way to find common ground on that.

And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical. — Bob Ross

You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'.

???

Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer?

No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel.

Your “rationality” presupposes my use of objectivity; and that it is independent of desires is not enough: just because one believes something is the case, does not make it so.

Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more

No, it is based off of what seems more correct—which one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that.

Bob

@fdrake

I think I just figured out what we are seemingly in disagreement about, and that, upon clarification, we are not really in any disagreement at all.

My OP, I see now, is a bit ambiguous: I did not make any distinction between the meaning of a concept and its definition. I don't think that simple concepts are themselves circular and unknowable in meaning but, rather, what I was referring to by 'definable' is the explication of meaning.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you read the OP and thought that I was referring to 'meaning' by 'definition'; and therefrom arises the disagreement. Am I on the right track?

A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'.

The job of philosophy is no doubt to provide analytical explication of things, but it is not meant to incessantly attempt at explicating things. If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it (unless new evidence arises). Philosophy is not the study of delusionally trying to run through a concrete wall.

Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Not at all. There are good reasons to believe that some concepts are inexplicable, which is not to say we can’t know them.

Knowledge is not merely information which has been explicated: it is also the range of information implicated. You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t.

I think we can know just fine what ‘being’, ‘value’, etc. are even though we cannot explicate them properly.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term.

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is.

To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience.

1. You can’t verify independently of your experience any terms—that’s impossible.

2. That definition includes inter-subjectivity in it, which demonstrates it is false.

3. The meaning of words are inter-subjectively defined, and are thusly not objective.

4. Concepts are objective, not words.

5. Objectivity is that which exists mind-independently.

I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case

What has intrinsic value, is a matter of objective inquiry: the truth of the matter is stance-independent. If I feel or believe as though something is intriniscally valuable, that doesn’t make it so. Intrinsic value is objective. Even if you don’t agree that anything has intrinsic value, I think you can appreciate that the inquiry would be objective.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it.

For example, how do you properly explicate the color green to a blind person? You can’t. “It’s a particular wavelength in light that one’s eyes interpret a particular way”: how does that explain what the color green looks like? It doesn’t.

The (phenomenal) color of green is not explicable whatsoever: it is shared conceptual through experience. You cannot give a definition of green that will adequately convey what it looks like. Does that mean the concept of green doesn’t make sense, or that you can’t know what green looks like (just because you can’t explicate it)? I would say no.

For you, either you (1) explicate the phenomenal color of green, or (2) you have to reject that you know what the color green looks like. There’s no definite proof that the color green can’t be explicated, but for those who know (implicitly) what it is (in terms of what it looks like), they understand what I mean.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that.

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. You say “X”. Now, either X does define it (and I am wrong), X begs the question, or X doesn’t define what it looks like. Upon investigating and attempting to define what the color green looks like, coupled with my understanding of what it is (from experience), I eventually abductively conclude it cannot be properly defined (explicitly), and I am willing to bet that X is going to fall under one of the latter two options (and not the first).

Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

I have, with my pain example. That’s why I keep trying to get you to explain your take on the example. If we can’t converge on that, then there’s no hope.

Just like if we can’t converge on what the color green is, by way of our experience, then there’s no hope in coming to a conclusion on whether we can define it fully (explicitly).

"External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs.”

I don’t find this to be an accurate definition, but that’s a minor quibble at this point.

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/894861 .

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail.

Here’s the key question: can you see how pain an motivate someone to negate it despite them having any desire or belief to negate it? Or is that not something you can see happening?

They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself

To value avoiding pain, is to negatively value pain. Either way, I was talking about avoiding pain (if I have to choose).

Bob

Notwithstanding my critique of your "functional" definition, I wholly agree with your description: :up:

Thank you! I will take a look.

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good"
...
Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal)

It seems like you are anchoring your ethics in reducing harm, and not progressing towards flourishing.

Your keep parroting "You missed the point." in most messages you write wouldn't help you on understanding.

I have explained it multiple times, and am unsure what else to say. Concepts are not words.

"Beyond" can mean other things too depending on the context. For example, "It is beyond me." - it does't mean something in space.

“it is beyond me” refers to something which is spatially separate from yourself; so, no, this is not an example of a different meaning of ‘beyond’ that is aspatial.

If your reader didn't understand what you wrote, then it is likely that your writing was not grammatically correct or it was out of context.

I didn’t understand this part: what do you mean?

My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake:

Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that ‘flourishing/happiness’ [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic value—it cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subject’s evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that ‘intrinsic value’ = ‘something done for its own sake’. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.

I see. For me, I think that goodness is identical to 'having value'.

Great questions, Philosophim!

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; and even if I don’t manage to get the point across to you, then it will still be beneficial to this thread to answer your questions.

Like I stated in our previous conversation, the concept of ‘value’ to me is primitive and absolutely simple—like ‘being’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘false’, etc.—and, consequently, has most of its meaning through intuition, experience, and action: NOT explication. The best I can say is that ‘value’ is ‘worth’, wholly admitting this is circular.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. The only real way to convey either is through example, so let me use the clock one you used:

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock.

The problem is that I cannot ‘finish’ this example, by providing how the clock has intrinsic value, because it cannot have it. A clock simply does not have this kind of ability to ‘demand’ to be valued. A great example we have discussed before, is pain.

I think, upon closer examination, it seems as though only (metaphysically possible) states of a subject are capable of this sort of innate insistence; but I am open to the idea that there may be other things which possess it.

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand?

You are using a bad example for illustrating intrinsic value: that example only clearly demonstrates extrinsic value. A clock, just like a rock, cannot demand any sort of value.

The best example I can think of, of which none others will make sense if a person cannot grasp this one, is pain. Let me take one more jab at conveying it to you.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. Perhaps if I can break you out of that line of thinking, then you will catch at least a glimpse of what I am trying to convey (:

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person.

That’s the best I can do to help you see what I mean.

Bob

In terms of the invalidity of ‘in-itself’, I just don’t buy that we can’t understand what things are in-themselves conditionally: ‘phenomena’ as it was before Kant butchered it.

In terms of grounding “Good” in the Absolute, there’s quite a few things that grab my attention:

1. The Good is not the same thing as goodness. I think Aristotle didn’t even notice this, and that’s why the analysis is so muddy.

2. This would be tantamount to claiming that what can be predicated as (morally) ‘good’, is what exists; because ‘the absolute’ refers to what exists as it is beyond any change (or perhaps appearances, depending on the view): this says nothing about what ought to be. It transforms ethics into something it is not: a study of what is.

3. Saying the Absolute, God, “grounds The Good” is vague and unhelpful (without further elaboration). What is goodness? And why and how can God be predicated to have it? In virtue of what makes this predication valid?

Bob

The main point of disagreement (between us), then, would be that I don't think that the negatively, intrinsically valuable (such as 'harm' that you refer to) is more valuable, when comparing equal or unequal 'amounts', than the positively, intrinsically valuable; because the positive counter-part includes the absence of those which are negatively valuable and provide positive value itself.

The eradication of serious and significant pain or harm is implied in a state of persistent flourishing, for example.

I merely think that you stop too short with setting your ideal as the elimination of negatively valued 'things', when the ultimate goal should be to go beyond mere eradication thereof to positively valued 'things'.

You missed the point: my linguistic expression of 'beyond' space is incoherent. 'Beyond' refers to something in space.

I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.

Lol, I thought you were both expressing the same thing; but, apparently, I missed something important.

It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.

I thought you were going to say that (; and thereby confuse the ungrammatical expression of the concept with the concept itself.

Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.

Which can’t be the case if the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here.

Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.

A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.

:up:

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic.

A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim.

Principles in logic, as far I know, are absolute. When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example?

I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing.

I don’t completely disagree with this: I am not denying that we may use different “logical theories” for different purposes; however, they are built off of classical logic.

The only classical logic axiom one may be able to get away with, is not using the law of excluded middle.

Ternary logic, for example, is just a built-up, more-complex version of binary logic. These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic.

We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other.

So you think ‘being’ is a simple concept because you choose it to be?

If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it.

What is, according to Aristotle, goodness simpliciter, then? I guess I didn't grasp that when I read it.

Unless by this you mean that the property of goodness is not identical to 'being in a state of eudamonia', which I completely agree with.

Not all OP's are a question. I am just curious was people's thoughts are on my position. Do you have any thoughts? I am guessing a lot :wink: