That said, killing an innocent person isn't really right. Then again, saving humanity is a right thing to do on its own, and benefits people (at least under some opinions, because I think that the belief that humanity is bad and a creator of suffering is also kind of a reasonable view in some ways) so surely its fair to say there is both good and bad in the choice?

If killing an innocent person is wrong, then you can’t do: period. You can’t turnaround and permit yourself to do it in instances where you could avoid a bad outcome or create a better outcome—that would be akin to saying that some immoral acts are morally permissible, which is a manifest contradiction.

I would say it seems to be a similar case in your morality too where people can forfeit their right to life and its okay to kill them in self-defence or if they are not innocent.

The difference is that the trolley problem posits that all victims are innocent.

You permit bad things for an end.

I don’t. I will not permit anyone to kill an innocent human being for any end; because it is wrong.

Sure, you would say they are justified in a special way, but then there are probably some people who are even stricter than you are on when it is permissible to kill.

That’s true: some people believe killing any life form for whatever reason is wrong; but I disagree.

I am not a deontologist: I am a virtue ethicist. I just happen to think that rights are inherently deontological; and consequentialism utterly fails at accounting for them properly.

If the axe murderer comes looking for your friend, you're going to tell him the truth about where he's hiding?
If the Nazi's want to know where the Jews are hiding, we're supposed to tell them them the truth? Because we value the truth so much?

No in both cases, because both people that I would be lying to have forfeited their "right" (although I know there isn't a legal right to it) to be told the truth because they are actively trying to violate someone else's rights.

This is the same with self-defence: I am not advocating that it is always wrong to kill people. I am advocating that it is wrong to kill innocent people; and it is wrong to lie to innocent people. See what I mean?

No. When the chips are down, nobody acts like that.

Some people do and, although I disagree with them if they tell the truth to a Nazi or the axeman, I respect the courage, authenticity, and spine that it takes to stand by what one believes and not coward out.

Lol. I guess we will never know for certain......and I am surely not going to argue with you about what you think are my ethical commitments.

Fair enough. I am not looking for an actual philosopher (in an academic sense) nor do they need to be overly interested in the various branches of philosophy that I am; but I would like to be with someone that I can intellectually resonate with. I value people who have put in the intellectual work, even if I disagree with them, to hash out their worldview and be able to explicate it (adequately); and I value critical, genuine, and creative thinking.

I am not shocked that most people don't study philosophy on their own time; but I am kind of shocked how little these women (I have talked to) know about what they believe (in any substantive sense). Some of them even boast that they are "apolitical"......

:up:

I can appreciate what you are conveying insofar as it is morally counter-intuitive to the untrained mind; but I think one can appreciate my position more, even if they disagree (ultimately), when they have to build out their own consistent normative ethical theory.

I would let the whole world get destroyed; assuming hitler, notwithstanding his past egregious transgressions, is innocent in the actual trolly incident. You can substitute whoever you want in there, it will make no difference to me: it is wrong to kill an innocent human being (and by innocent I mean in the instance which they may be getting killed), no matter who they are.

Would I want to kill Hitler? Would it emotionally feel like a good choice? Yeah. Is it morally right? Absolutely not.

Assuming John Wayne Gacy was not moral responsible for anything bad which was occurring in that trolley situation (which is to say that he has not forfeited his right to not be killed in this situation); then, no I would not.

It is always wrong to kill an innocent person; and by 'innocent' I mean innocent in the specific situation---otherwise, it is irrelevant (even if there is other information that would emotionally move us). I would love to pull the lever in the case of John Wayne Gacy but that would still be immoral.

:up:

Very interesting. Even if it was the whole human race (including your self?)?

Correct.

There then comes the irony and absurdity of committing to your moral standards so strongly that you would allow the human race to die and, arguably in doing so, render your value system meaningless.

Essentially you are saying: “it can be absurd to do what is moral or/and not to do what is immoral”. Do you really believe that?

No: I was commenting on what a consequentialist would have to commit themselves to. They would have to claim that sometimes it is morally right (or at least permissible) to kill an innocent human being.

You're picking one of your most extremely exemplified traits and filtering on it

I am realizing more-and-more that you are right: I didn’t think it would be rare to find someone who at least has thought through their positions, but apparently that is a lot to ask…

Principle B) Asking philosophical questions can count as asking intrusive questions. Be careful.

Yeah, I figured that out the hard way.

Principle C) This place of enlightened intellectual hook up culture and romance doesn't exist,

I am not looking for an intellectual hook up culture: I want out of the hook up culture altogether.

Principle D) people still want to be approached and talked to.

This one is the area that I need to work the most on. I usually avoid women in public places (: It is time to get thrown to the wolves.

Lol.

That is definitely worth a shot.

I think the only way a consequentialist can consistently go is to deny that it is immoral to kill an innocent human being: they would have to say that sometimes that is true, and sometimes false.

:up:

Couldn’t you just as easily say “I would never sit still on that trolley, no matter how many people I would save by doing so. Killing an innocent person is always wrong; and one cannot commit an immoral act (sitting still in the knowledge that by doing so five people will die) to avoid a morally bad outcome.”

It would be immoral to avoid helping save people if there is a morally permissible way to go about it. Letting something bad happen isn’t always morally permissible. I think we can hold people accountable for what they didn’t do just as much as they what they did.

What’s the difference?

There is an avenue whereof one can save them without doing something immoral; unless you are stipulating that sitting still is immoral, is that it?

You are killing someone mo matter what you do.

ABSOLUTELY NOT!!!

This is the mistake of the consequentialists that makes it so appealing: they don’t understand the nature of moral responsibility, and how it relates to actions and intentions.

If I let something bad happen to someone else to avoid doing something bad, I am not morally responsible for the bad that happened to them; because my actions are not what is causing the bad to happen to them (it is someone else’s doing or nature’s doing) and I cannot intervene to save them without actually doing something wrong.

For example, imagine a someone walks up to you and says that they have 12 people that they are torturing in their basement; and that if you stab the innocent person that is about to walk passed you to death that they will let the 12 people go. Assuming you can trust what they are saying, would you do it? You shouldn’t. But your response would be: but either way, you are doing something bad (because either you let them continue to be tortured or you kill an innocent person). However, this is flawed thinking: the person morally responsible, in the event that you refuse to kill the innocent person, is the guy who kidnapped and is torturing 12 people in their basement---that burden of responsibility and culpability does not transfer to you just because you refuse to do something immoral. On the other hand, if you do something immoral, then you are morally culpable for it.

That doesn't make them guilty in the sense that they have forfeited there right to live in this trolley incident.

If I am a convicted felon, can you just walk up to me 5 years after my conviction, when I get out, and kill me for fun? Of course not. I was, in the instance that you do, innocent.

Lower 20s: how about you?

That's entirely fair: I do think I am more likely to find a partner in the world as I am merely doing what I normally do; but that may take some serious time, as I am introverted and do not go out much. I will have to start getting out more.

:heart:

I will keep trying then...

I must say this is surely a Lounge topic.

That is fair: I wasn't sure what to categorize it as.

Also, stop giving me lucrative business ideas. It stirs a very troublesome aspect of my persona I have yet to reign in proper.

Is it lucrative? Everyone on the other dates seemed perfectly happy chasing fleeting sensual and sexual pleasures...and that's the real problem. I guess my soul is much older than my body (;

Hm. Actually. It looks like "intellimeet.com" is available for the dirt cheap bargain price of only $5,799 USD. Perhaps @Jamal can organize a community fundraiser.

That's entirely too much money for a domain: there's way cheaper one's than that. If you go with an odd TLD, it can even sometimes be free (e.g., '.tk', etc.).

That or try either Barnes & Noble or your local library. Worth a shot, eh? :smirk:

I guess......

I would never pull the lever, no matter how many people I would save by doing so. Killing an innocent person is always wrong; and one cannot commit an immoral act to avoid a morally bad outcome.

It seems that if the subjectivist is a correspondence theorist, and they accept P2, then they have an inconsistency. But is that inconsistency fatal to the overall idea?

Yes, this OP presupposes correspondence theory of truth; which is widely accepted. A moral subjectivism could, prima facie, sidestep this (potentially) with another theory of truth; but I think, in the end, it will fall prey to this same issue.

Taking coherentism, for example, there isn't a really coherent way to account for the difference between a belief and a proposition; so sidestepping the issue by subscribing to that theory just creates a deeper issue.

:up:

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

Sorry, I thought there was a moral subjectivism section in there: it is actually here. It appears as though SEP has refurbished the term from ‘subjectivism’ to ‘non-objectivism’ in their newer articles. So let me address the quote you had:

This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.

Yes, this is accurate...but there’s no need to get this far into the weeds for the OP. If we must, then there is a couple things worth noting:

1. Moral subjectivism is a form of moral non-objectivism: the former is the three-pronged thesis I already explicated, and the latter is a broader term for any view that holds moral judgments express something non-objective.

2. Moral non-objectivism includes only one other family of positions other than moral subjectivism: moral inter-subjectivism. They don’t use the term ‘inter-subjectivity’, but it is clear that they are referring to this.

3. My OP addresses moral subjectivism, and technically NOT moral inter-subjectivism; but I think my line of reasoning plagues both.

4. None of this suggests that there are not generally understood definitions. All you are doing, is trying to explode the conversation into a “who shot john” situation: at this point, I think it may be a sophistical tactic you are trying to deploy. If it helps, just contend with the underlying meaning in the OP and not the semantics.

It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

What terms should be avoided? They avoided using the term moral subjectivism because they were not just discussing, in that section, moral cognitivist and moral non-nihilist views that claim moral judgments are expressing something subjective. The OP is not discussing moral non-objectivism.

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

Realism is generally understood a three pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. At least one moral judgment is true.

At this point I don’t really care if you agree with the semantics: that’s besides the point of the OP.

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem

There is absolutely nothing in my OP that hinges on semantics, nor have I had to go into this painful, semantically discussion with anyone else in this thread. Somehow, no one else was worried about the terms….

Do you have anything to say about the actually ideas expressed in the OP?

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

But, then, you are just muddying the waters in an attempt to clear them.

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

I am not following what you are trying to do…

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps.

Unfortunately, we are just talking past each other; and I would just be reiterating if I responded. So I will let it rest.

Take care, Philosophim! :kiss:

:kiss:

I think we by-at-large were talking passed each other. Take care, Janus!

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

It seems incomplete: independent...of what?

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

I can write it out in sentential form (if that helps):

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys.

P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's)

Agreed, and that is the point...that most of these moral subjectivists are missing in here (;

So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

Hmmmm...I would need a rebust exposition of what a ‘belief’ is then.

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

Did you read the moral subjectivism section?

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:
In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. Generally speaking, moral relativists are moral realists. Of course, since relativism vs. absolutism is a different debate than objectivism vs. non-objectivism, some moral relativists are moral subjectivists; but moral relativism IS NOT the same as moral subjectivism.

You are trying to hide behind some nuanced disagreements philosophers have, as if there is a gulf of disagreements about these terms.

It goes on to say that it is:
unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

Of course! This doesn’t help your point at all. Moral anti-realism is the negation of moral realism, and is defined as such: there’s no controversy to that definition.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

That the definition encompasses many positions in a broad fashion, does not mean its definition is contested. Moral relativism is any cognitivist view that holds that the truth of moral judgments have an indexical element. This is uncontroversial, and I suggest you read up on the literature more.

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism.

I never said that there aren’t various forms of moral subjectivism: that doesn’t negate the fact that there is an uncontroversial definition of moral subjectivism. Each form of moral subjectivism, meets the basic criteria of moral subjectivism. It is a family of theories, and not one particular theory.

I cannot remember a single time in Nietzsche's work where he references a pluralist idea or notion of truth. Not a single time; in fact, he thought it was nonsense (just like pretty much every other philosopher out there).

This argument seems to be: truth-apt propositions are stance-independent, the MS claims that moral propositions are stance-dependent, so — for the MS — moral propositions are not truth-apt, thus they are not propositions at all unless the MS rewrites it as "I believe X", which is not moral anymore. Is that right?

Not quite: that would beg the question and would be false. As painfully noted in this thread, a proposition can be true or false relative to a belief, but that is not what the OP is saying is inconsistent: instead, it is that a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

It is stance-independent, only insofar as the proposition-at-hand cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it.

Moral subjectivism is standardly, in the literature, a family of moral anti-realist theories that posit:

1. Moral judgements are propositional (i.e., moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgements express something subjective (i.e., moral non-objectivism).
3. At least one moral judgement is true (i.e., moral non-nihilism).

This is standard: I would suggest, as a good entry article, to look at SEP. No serious philosopher is going to disagree with this, although they may have more to add.

this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism).

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (:

But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read?

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:

1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P1 reads like a definition to me.
…
P2 also reads like a definition to me.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about.

@Philosophim

Actually, it is also circular logic (come to think of it). One would be saying E is morally good because of some relevant property of G, but also saying G is morally good because of some relevant property of E.

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. — Bob Ross

How? I don't understand. Please give an example of the issue in another way so I can understand then. You can use the grandfather, the grandson, and the explosion to demonstrate if you wish.

1. If X creates more existence than its absence, then it is good.
2. If Y creates more existence than its absence, then it is good.
3. X creates more existence than its absence.
4. Y creates more existence than its absence.
5. X is good. (1 & 3)
6. Y is good. (2 & 4)
7. X creates more existence than Y.
8. Only X or Y can exist (by way of actualizing it), but not both.
9. X should exist, and Y should not exist. (5 & 6 & 7 & 8)
10. Y should not exist, but is good. (6 & 9)
11. Good is ‘what should be’.
12. 10 is then incoherent: Y should not exist, but it should exist. (10 restated in light of 11)

Your response, was to sidestep the issue by denying 8 and commenting on if they both could co-exist. That’s blatantly not the point.

In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular. — Bob Ross

A logically necessary requirement for something is not a circular fallacy

I didn’t say it was circular logic: it is ontologically circular.

If what is morally good (let’s call it G) necessitates that existence is good, then existence (let's call it E) is not what is morally good—it is good insofar as it relates to what is morally good.
To say that existence is what is morally good, would, then, to be to claim that existence is actually what makes G morally good; while G is what makes existence morally good.

The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position; and is not merely the negation of moral objectivism. There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.).

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

Are you serious, Janus?!? Your whole position here has been moral (inter-)subjectivism from the start. You’ve admitted implicitly and explicitly to moral judgments being propositional countless times:

here you did:

If torturing babies is wrong because normal people think it is wrong then it is true that it is wrong for most people, I have not claimed anything beyond that

You cannot use an if conditional if “torturing babies is wrong” is non-propositional. This implies that “torturing babies is wrong” is a proposition; and you are claiming that it is true relative to beliefs people have about it.

here as well:

If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak.

You literally called it a proposition in this one, so…..

here as well:

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies".

:yawn: Need I go on?

Your position obviously has been holding that moral judgments are propositional but that they are true or false relative to beliefs about them...and that’s called moral subjectivism.

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

Whether or not you think that we can adequately account for moral propositions or not, is independent of whether your ad hoc fix is internally coherent. It isn’t. If you really believe this, then you should abandon the idea that there are moral propositions and, thusly, abandon moral subjectivism. Become a non-cognitivist or nihilist.

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality

The only reality there is, and we can absolutely investigate what is right and wrong naturalistically (and empirically). Like I said, I take a neo-aristotelian view that eudamonia is the highest moral good.

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding"

Thank you for finally admitting this. You need to take more care in the words you use to express your views. You’ve been speaking as if you do believe there is moral bindingness and it is essentially peer-pressure (in the form of laws):

The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them, think and/or feel them to be true.

The problem is not me failing to pay attention; its your failure to coherently explain your position.

Now you're starting to get it.

You keep flip-flopping as we go. One minute you argue against what I am saying and then, once you realize it doesn’t work, you switch while admitting no fault. You were literally arguing that moral statements have the form of a proposition but are not “proper” propositions (like mathematical ones). Now you just act like you were denying this all along.

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves"

If you don’t believe moral judgments are propositional, then this is incoherent; the only way it can be true for themselves is if it is propositional: propositions are the only kind of statements which can be true.

You should just abandon moral subjectivism and go for something like emotivism.

Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it:

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise.

"Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence

All I was claiming is the that the cognitive stance about something is independent of the truth about that something. This doesn’t require that all cognitive stances necessitate that they are about something...although I happen to believe that as a well. I think a belief always latches onto a proposition, and if there isn’t a proposition then one will pretend, implicitly, if there is and latch onto that. But this is not a required position for the OP.

The Liar's sentence, for instance: we can think "This sentence is false", meaning we can cognize it, but the truth, or falsity, of the Liar's sentence is wholly dependent upon how we interpret the sentence.

The liar’s sentence is non-cognitive: just because you can try to interpret what the sentence means does not mean you can evaluate it as true or false.

What if the MS was a coherentist on truth? In that case beliefs fit within an inferential web, and that web just is what truth is, so they'd claim to be a cognitivist while stating that they do believe that beliefs depend upon one another for their truth or falsity.

That’s an interesting point: I am not sure how that would work—my OP is directed as correspondance theorists. The problem with taking the coherentist theory of truth, is that truth is reduced to beliefs (which is convenient for a moral subjectivist) but just pushes the issue back further. If a moral subjectivist came around and objected to the theory of truth presupposed in the OP, then I would have to take a step back and demonstrate why their coherentist (or whatever) theory is nonsense (; before getting into the OP.