Sure, nietzsche didn't have a degree in philosophy; but he was still very much a philosopher, and one of the most influential, just like plato, aristotle, etc.

I am inclined to agree that most people out-grow his view in a holistic sense; but so did everyone out-grow kantianism. There are still, in both views, some positions (that each took) that seem very true and accurate.

Likewise, I do think Nietzschien thought is found deeply rooted in post-modern thinking, and is the culprit for most of (what I would consider) radical political views. The core of his views have become the norm now, and it is disheartening.

Nietzschien thought is NOT an affirmation of nihilism, as you seem to suggest in your OP, but, rather, an (alleged) antidote to nihilism. Nietzsche hates nihilism, and associates it with pretty much every major philosophical movement ever created--e.g., he thought Christians are closeted nihilists.

If I had to summarize Nietzsche's works, then it would be that Nietzsche anticipated the slow, inevitable poisoning of society with nihilism due to the "death" of God; and his works are a wrestling with and overcome of that poison.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra is what Nietzsche considered to be the new bible: Zarathustra is supposed to be analogous to Jesus insofar as he has the ("divine") prophetic message (a gift) to give us. It's no coincidence that the story is riddled with religious, especially biblical, references and allusions (e.g., it is not a coincidence that Zarathustra descends down to earth's surface to give his gift to mankind).

The point of the book is to outline the Ubermensch, which is the ideal man in Nietzsche's thought that has completely overcome nihilism. The Ubermensch is the sublimation of slave and master that affirms life to such an extreme that they would live their life as an eternal reoccurrance. The Ubermensch is completely self-reliant, and is a law-maker and law-obeyer.

Your observation that Nietzsche's work has similarities to stoicism is understandable, but it is worth noting that stoicism is not compatible with his view; for Nietzsche considered the Ubermensch to be driven completely by passions, and not reason. Honestly, though, I drew the same kind of links to stoicism that you did, because Nietzsche often references principles of self-reliance that can be found (at least a little bit) in stoicism.

Although I disagree with Nietzsche on many things, I think his chief contribution is his work on self-development and self-reliance.

I apologize: I missed this response!

What will we take to be a sufficient and adequate explanation of a given phenomenon?

Exactly what is sufficient in order to explain something has a hint of subjectivity to it; but, generally, I would say that the explanation is sufficient if it has ample evidence supporting, and it explains the full range of questions that could be asked of it. Of course, we may bicker about what exactly constitutes ‘ample evidence’ and ‘evidence’, but generally I think that is what we mean.

I'll give an example: let's suppose there is a storm.

You are absolutely spot on with your anticipation of my responses: I would say that the explanation of why there even is a water cycle is going to be akin to the explanation of how a storm works.

Now this explanation either proceeds on infinitely, or it has a starting point. If it proceeds infinitely, I am inclined to regard that as a most unparsimonious account of reality

So, upon reading this, I am not so sure I am really a naturalist in the full, ontological sense of the term; but perhaps just a methodological naturalist. As I don’t find any good reasons to believe that causality is finite nor infinite; and I certainly don’t think that we understand exactly, even in terms of naturalism, what the most primitive, fundamental natural entities are.

I find that a lot of the metaphysics around it on both sides is just pure speculation—analysis deprived of empirical content.

The final and proper naturalism, which would have the answers you are seeking here, would only be the final result of the meticulous expedition and analysis of reality (if that is even possible for us to do).

My point with the OP is that it seems like naturalism is a better choice because it seems, so far, to explain everything more than adequately; and if there isn’t anything demanding the need to posit something supernatural, then why do it?

Okay, as in plants, animals, people, rocks, and so on and so on, these are the natural members correct? Tell me again how laws fit into that ontology?
…
I don't think laws can be derivative of natural things, otherwise they would be ordered by the natural things not the other way around, right?

By ‘things’, I would not referring to objects but, rather, just generic ‘entities’. Laws are ‘entities’ in this sense.

If I were to indulge myself by coming up with a complete (ontological) naturalism, then I would probably say that some Law is supreme, and all other laws derive from it, kind of like Platonism but without the supersensible abstract object realm, and so, you are absolutely right that, laws are more fundamental than objects.

The problem with indulging myself like that, is twofold: (1) as already noted, it is too speculative (since we do not have any sufficient empirical content to analysis it with) and (2) nature has proven, time and time again, to behave really weirdly (as a giant web of inter-relations) of which our mathematical and physical models only do just that...provide a map of the territory.

Bob

Although you have not responded yet to my question, I decided to just respond.

I will note that, if you are a moral particularist, then we will have to pause our discussion, discuss that, and then resume: it will remove the possibility of positing standard ethical thought experiments. I am assuming that we are both moral generalists for this response.

I also want to note that I try my best, although I know you claim I am straw manning your position, to use your terminology when I can; but I will not refrain from importing terms when I think your schema is lacking for purposes of conveying a point. For example, I refuse to use the term ‘identities’ to refer to what you clearly mean as ‘concrete entities’: you simply are using a more ambiguous word here than me (which is completely your prerogative to do so).

Firstly, is ‘one must sacrifice the one to save the five’ a general moral principle under your view? You say not, I say it is. Going back over the comments, I do have to concede that I was mistaken in thinking we were completely congruent on this point. in this comment, you partially accepted it; but disaffirmed it when one considers societal factors:

If we are not considering the complexities of human society, then yes. Let me clarify. Lets replace the human beings on the table with lizards. Lizards don't care about one another, and they don't form societies. No question-dissect the first lizard and save the others if there was no chance of failure or complications. Recall earlier when talking about moral issues that scope can go up or down by one. The next scope after individual human beings is society. While killing the one innocent person against their will to save five others might seem fine outside of society, how would that affect society?

With lizards, as well as everything else considered in isolation, it is true (and I think you agree with me on this) that ‘one must sacrifice the one to save the five’; for it plainly follows that saving the five contributes (total net) more potential and actual concrete entities than sparing the one at the cost of the five.

Where you begin to disagree, and correct me if I am wrong, is when it comes to humans specifically because they are a part of a society and that society cannot function properly if there is no reassurance of at least basic rights.

I would remark multiple things:

1. I don’t see how sacrificing one to save five, even if it were institutionalized, would result in overall less potential and actual concrete entities; and so I think you are miscalculating by your own theory’s standards.

2. If I were to grant that when one includes society into the calculations that it maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, then it does not (still) follow from that that people should be granted rights. An easy example is if we were to change the thought experiment from 1 vs. 5 to 1 vs. 1,000,000: sacrificing the one now, even when considering society, maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, and this would violate that person’s rights. So rights are not something you can adequately account for, as legitimate, in your ethical theory. Remember, rights are not privileges: they cannot be rightly refused or violated.

3. So, if #2 is right, then your justification only gets us to privileges; and the privilege of ‘being alive’ is, apparently, unless you deny the 1 vs. 1,000,000 example, only valid when the disparity between the number of people sacrificable and the number savable is small (enough). Then, we loop back to #1: it doesn’t seem to help maximize potential and actual concrete entities by having society have fake rights.

Secondly,

Its the consequence of having the intention that makes the intention valuable, not simply the fact of having the intention itself

I completely disagree. The intention is valuable if the intention is for doing good: it does not matter if the foreseeable or actual consequences when actualizing the intention turn out to be good.

An example may suffice to explain the difference between our views here: imagine I intent to help a person who is choking, and I end up, in actuality, contributing (on accident) to their suffocation (and death).

In your expounded view of intentions, the intention is only good IFF its consequences bring about maximal (or sufficient) good (which is, in your case, potential and actual concrete entities). This means that my intention here was bad.

On the other hand in my (and a deontologist’s) view of intentions, the intention is only good IFF it is about duty towards what is good; and this means that my intention in the example was good.

I think you may be thinking about deontology a bit wrong in this part:

And I currently don't see in any possible objective attempt at arguing for duties and principles that there would not be some objective consequence, or outcome, that is behind the objective reason for holding them

Consequences can inform intentions, but the intention is not good or bad, in deontology, due to the consequences its actualization brings about.

I am expecting, based off of that quote, for you to respond to my example (above) with something along the lines of: the intention is good because it is meaning to perform an action which would, if it actualized correctly, produce more potential and actual concrete entities. This kind of answer is false if you are a pure consequentialist, because the intention cannot be good if its consequences are bad and one is must analyze its worth relative to its consequences.

Thirdly:

I'm asking you what the person could do except torture Billy, and you tell me they have a choice. But then in the following you say its a question of whether they should or should not torture Billy.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing. If it is under your view, then you are conceding that it is not immoral, excluding all other factors, to torture someone for the sake of acquiring the skill of torture. Philosophim, you cannot have the cake and eat it too.

Also, there’s no contradiction in what I said: I did not, in what you quoted of me, say that Dave has no choice but to torture Billy and has a choice to. I simply never indicated that; instead, I indicated that you should exclude from consideration the other possible skill Dave could accomplish instead of the skill of torture.

Fourthly:

“Also, once again, you're claiming things I have never stated nor implied. I have never claimed the means justify the ends. This is once again a contextual existential evaluation theory of morality. My theory claims, "The means are part of the ends." You need to analyze everything.”

I apologize, that was supposed to say “the end justifies the means”, and you are certainly affirming that. It is not a straw man, but simply follows from what you have said. The end is ‘maximizing potential and actual concrete entities’ and the means is whatever is needed to achieve it. If it maximizes the good, then it is the right thing to do under your view; since it is consequentialist.

Fifthly:

There was an interesting question you asked of (essentially): why are these competing moral realist theories, of which I have been citing and using as a part of my critiques, objectively correct, as opposed to yours, pertaining to the various conclusions I have outsourced therefrom?

Two things. Firstly, I mention that most moral realists disagree fervently about some of your conclusions, and so does the vast majority of the west (at least), simply to demonstrate that it goes completely against the predominant moral intuitions. this does not mean that your conclusions are false. Secondly, I say, and many others, that some of your conclusions are objectively wrong because they are incoherent with the moral facts. However, I cannot substantiate this claim without importing my own ethical (moral realist) theory—so I refrain for now, unless you want me to.

Sixthly:

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral

It is not a desire, it is an intellectual seeming. — Bob Ross

Without a rationale, I don't see the difference.

A desire, a gut-feeling, an emotion, is conative and unreliable; whereas an intellectual seeming is cognitive and reliable.

I can feel very strongly that 1+3=1, but, upon intellectually grasping the proposition ‘1+3=1’ (which requires me to contemplate it as unbiased as possible), it does not (intellectually) seem right that 1+3=1; in fact, it seems perfectly right that 1+3 != 1. I can still feel, upon understanding it is false, as though it is right, because my emotions have not wavered, but that doesn’t make it right.

A gut-feeling, a desire, etc., is not reliable because it is emotion based—not rationality based.

Bob

So understand better your response, I would like to ask a quick question: are you a moral particularist?

I think it is best we agree to disagree at this point; as anything else I say will be a reiteration. Your very question is logically contradictory on a couple fronts (i.e., [1] you concede it is infinite in "what caused there to be an infinite set of all causes?" and then turn around and say it is finite; and [2] you are asking presupposing that a cause could exist which is not a member of a set of all causes).

If you are being logically consistent, you will need to ask "what caused there to be an infinite set of some causes?": that's all that can be afforded to your position without conceding the truth of a logical contradiction.

Seems contradictory to me to say that the same Nature is both orderly and disorderly

That's not what I claimed. Nature has elements of order and disorder.

Does naturalism explain the phenomena it purports to?

Yes, but so does all metaphysical theories per se. The question is whether or not it succeeds in explaining sufficiently phenomena in general. I would say so--obviously, that is a contentious claim.

what does naturalism say requires an explanation

All phenomena--i.e., appearances--of which we experience. Every metaphysical theory, if it is robust, will claim to have a good framework for explaining all phenomena (in general) or all explainable phenomena (in general).

and does naturalism succeed at explaining what it says requires explaining?

I think so.

Similarly, would you mind expounding the Naturalism Thesis?

I would say the thesis of naturalism is that everything in reality is natural. By 'natural', some mean 'capable of scientific investigation'; however, for me, I mean 'a member of nature'.

The idea is that the phenomena which we all experience is best explained by appeal to natural entities--i.e., entities that are members of nature--and nothing else. The Nature with which we are all well acquainted, can be extended to all of reality.

it seems to me that if we talk about laws, we must talk about a lawgiver, although you seem to disagree with this.

Correct. I don't see how a 'law' presupposes an agent which created it. It seems perfectly plausible that 'laws' are behavioral patterns of how things relate to one another, and perhaps they are fundamental or derivates of other natural things.

I don't see anything incoherent with positing that some of nature is orderly, and some may not be.

The toe is not a 'life' but composed of several cellular lives. Same with the foot. The consciousness of the brain is the combination of cellular lives that creates something more than just a mere coexistence of life, but a mind.

I was referring to a person by ‘life’, not something that is merely alive.

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral

It is not a desire, it is an intellectual seeming.

It would be helpful if you could explain why its immoral either within the theory, or somehow contradicts the theory.

As internal coherence goes, it is sound: no question there.

As external coherence goes, even within moral realist circles, it goes against common intuitions—and I mean that in the sense of an intellectual seeming, not a desire or gut-feeling. Most moral realists will completely disagree with you that it is morally good to, all else being equal, sacrifice the one for the many (even though it would increase the actual and potential concrete entities).

Since we have no objective means of morality to measure, any outside subjective opinion of its immorality can be considered, but ultimately boils down to an opinion.

That is irrelevant to my external critique: I am saying that it is objectively wrong to sacrifice one for the many, all else being equal. I am outsourcing (i.e., comparing with) another form of moral realism, as well as claiming most forms of moral realism agree with it (on this specific point).

But this is not a principle according to this theory.

You affirmed it in your justification: you said you should absolutely sacrifice the one to save the many because it increases, all else being equal, potential and actual concrete entities (e.g., cut of the arm to save the body); and I am absolutely inclined to agree with you that your theory would need to conclude this.

The outcome of the example is based on particular circumstances and context.

With all due respect, I don’t think you know what ‘all else being equal’ means. Here’s a link to a blog post about it.

In a theoretically objective morality, consequentialism is the only real conclusion.

Absolutely not. If you affirm this, then you are disregarding duty and principles—which are entirely deontological.

To have a good moral realist theory, or any ethical theory at that, one needs a little bit of both. Personally, I am a virtue ethicist: I don’t affirm consequentialism nor deontology.

Some actions are wrong merely because they violate an ethical principle, and not because the action’s consequences do not maximize what is good. That one should not, all else being equal, sacrifice one person to save 1000 people is wholly because one has a duty towards upholding a person’s rights, being an object of respect, and nothing to do with whether or not the action would or would not produce, as a consequent, more good.

According to deontology, the intention is what determines if the action is good, and not the consequences of the action; according to consequentialism, it is the contrary.

If true and reasoned through correctly, there should be a clear right or wrong answer.

This is perfectly correct within moral realism; but has nothing to do with consequentialism directly. That there is a right or wrong answer—independent of tastes, desires, preferences, dispositions, etc.—is because morality is objective and NOT because one should determine what is right or wrong relative to the consequences that an action (reasonably) would produce.

Can you imagine an objective morality that is not consequentialist?

Yes, many. Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mine, etc.

The problem with consequentialism is that it makes the evaluation of right and wrong solely a matter of analyzing the consequences of actions; which precludes intentions, duty, principles, etc.

Likewise, it has absurd results in some cases (e.g., utilitarianism’s enslavement of 1% of the population, sacrificing one for the many, etc.).

As a very clean example, take the 1 vs. 5 trolly problem (we discussed before). A consequentalist is usually inclined to say “sacrifice the one for the five”; and a deontoligist is inclined usually to say “do not pull the lever”.

The consequentialist only is thinking about the consequences of the action of pulling the lever in terms of maximizing what is good; the deontologist is thinking about their duties to moral principles, and how best to uphold them.

A conseqeuentalist will usually say something like “one should sacrifice the one for the five because it increases <well-being, concrete entities, etc.> overall”; whereas the deontologist will usually say something like “one should not pull the lever and let the five die, because they have a duty to respect persons and they would be violating the one person’s rights by sacrificing them for the five”.

Personally, I am neither: I am a virtue ethicist. I am inclined, in the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem to side with the deontologists.

Ok, this means that Dave could not have been doing anything else but torturing.

This is so irrelevant. The question is if Dave is right to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing. You are misunderstanding what ‘all else being equal’ is and constantly sidestepping the hypothetical by importing new variables that don’t matter.

By positing that Dave could have been doing something even better by acquiring a different skill is to completely sidestep the hypothetical; and is no different than adding into the 1 vs. 5 trolly problem that one should not pull the lever because the 1 is a convicted rapist: that wasn’t in the hypothetical when it was presented, and ‘all else being equal’ indicates you need to refrain from injecting new variables into it.

What is the choice the person has Bob?

The choice is whether or not to torture Billy to acquire a new skill (of torturing people aptly). Obviously, the hypothetical never postulates that Dave has to torture Billy; which is the conflation you have now made.

Correct. My problem here is we can imagine alternative things the person could do to improve themselves besides torturing.

Please see the link I attached for more information on “all else being equal”. Asking what alternative things the person could be doing in this example, is the exact same thing as asking how else one could save the 5 other than by pulling the lever in the trolley example.

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

No (if I view it through the lens of your theory). — Bob Ross

You're going to have to explain this in more detail.

If only what is good is to maximize the number of concrete entities, then it will not always pan out such that societies which enact such policies (as you described) are morally better.

Like I already said, the optimal society for you is a totalitarian regime that forces people to contribute maximally to the creation of concrete entities.

s I'm quite sure we can imagine a scenario, or even find one in history, where a monarchy was overall more prosperous to its people, rights, and culture than a particular republic elsewhere in the world.

Not at all. My point was that there have been, and theoretically could be, monarchies that produce total net more concrete entities than republics: it is not apparent at all how a republic, all else being equal, would be the best society under your view.

The point is that you are just thinking about it in terms of “the means justifies the ends”; and you have too, since you have committed yourself to consequentialism. I reject it.

Happy Easter by the way! Whether you celebrate it or not, I hope the holiday treats you well. I may be slow in replies this week.

You too, my friend! I hope you enjoy the holiday!

:roll:

I am addressing the argument. Your OP has to demonstrate that every logical possibility, not actual possibility, leads to a first cause; and this means that if reality is an infinite set of all causes that that must also logically necessitate a first cause (still). However, it cannot have a first cause if one understands properly what an infinite set of all causes is. It is logically necessary that it does not have a first cause, ironically.

Thusly, it is not logically necessary that there is a first cause.

The second you say that C is not the entire end to the chain of causality, is the second you conflate C with something else. C is the series of causes in total, so, by definition, you cannot be correct in that there is a cause which is not a member of C.

The point is that cannot prove, in principle, that the dew which affected the fleece (and nothing else that day) was a direct result of a divine, ultimate creator.

Either way, yes, I would be inclined to say that there is a natural explanation for it; whatever it may be; for we there have been many examples similar to this that were explained naturalistically.

For example, on some steep hills a car will naturally roll up the hill. Now, just like the dew example, you could ask "do you really believe that the natural phenomena of gravity would cause the car to go up?". This line of questioning is just incredibly flawed: you are relying on an argument from ignorance.

I would view it as an intricate web of relations of things; so, yes, there are the relations and there are the things. I don't see what the puzzle is though: what about what I am saying leads to nature being its own negation?

I think what makes a miracle evidence for the supernatural would be that it displays a certain type of intentionality. If a new, bright star appeared in the sky out of nowhere, defying all our theories of star formation, we would not tend to think of this as necessarily miraculous. It would be a confusing new natural phenomena.

If several new stars appeared in the sky spelling out "Allah is the Greatest," we would almost certainly take this as miraculous. To me, the difference seems to be the intentionality and the fact that it seems directed towards us for some purpose.

This is a good thought; and, upon reflection, I agree. @Leontiskos, let me refurbish my earlier statement: a phenomena that consistently or demonstrably violates the laws of nature in a manner that indicates divine intentionality should be considered supernatural, all else being equal.

If some thing in the world can be fully explained in terms of some other things, then we are able to remove that thing as a sort of ontologically basic entity (making the system more parsimonious).

I see, and agree. So, it seems like epistemic parsimony is about concepts, and ontological parsimony is about (concrete) entities.

But current forms of naturalism have a great many "brute facts." The more brute facts you have, the more ontologically basic things you have.

I think I see where you are going. Theism, being that it posits one supreme entity, is the ultimate ontology, allegedly, because it is monistic; whereas, allegedly, naturalism is pluralistic. Correct?

I don’t think an ontology is more parsimonious all else NOT being equal just because it is a form of monism, would be my reply. Since we start out with natural entities, which both theists and atheists have to ontologically posit, it seems more ontologically parsimonious to go with naturalism IF it can all be sufficiently explained that way—even if it has more brute facts than theism.

For example, imagine, to take your example, there are five basic atoms which everything is ontologically reducible to. Imagine a theist says “this ‘atomic five theory’ doesn’t account for miracles”, and we need to posit God to explain them. IF the ‘atomic five’ naturalist can explain sufficiently such “miracles” under their theory, then it seems, to me, to be more ontologically parsimonious, even though God would provide a form of monism whereas ‘atomic five theory’ does not because the latter doesn’t have to posit a whole new category of entities.

It's just hard to take you seriously when you compare this rain example or your jumping jacks example to Gideon. It's like you're not even trying. The irony is that Gideon's grasp of "naturalism" is more keen than your own.

Testing whether something is a banana by doing jumping jacks is analogous to testing whether something is God by asking it to put/remove dew from a mat.

If you disagree, then please demonstrate why the analogy does not hold: hurling unsubstantive insults does not help further the conversation. I am after truth—and only truth.

If naturalism is true then there must be counterfactuals which would demonstrate the supernatural, else the thesis of naturalism is entirely vacuous and unfalsifiable

I already conceded with amendment to my position in my previous post. I already conceded I was using naturalism too liberally. In principle, if a phenomena is seemingly violating the laws of nature; then, prima facie, all else being equal, that counts in favor of supernaturalism.

however, if these laws are just nature or a part of nature, it is difficult to see how they could order nature

The problem with your assessment is that you have encapsulated nature into one entity, ‘nature’, which includes such laws, and then immediately denied that the laws are a part of that one entity.

For instance, if there is a shovel buried in the ground, and I was like, "I need that shovel to dig a hole here" and you said to me "well just use that shovel to dig it out" then I would be puzzled, it cannot be used for the task that we have appointed to it because it is embedded in that which we are trying to apply it to.

I am not sure I entirely followed this analogy, other than that nature cannot arrange herself. I would say nature can, but I am not saying that there is an entity which modifies itself (like a human organism can do to itself); rather, I mean that the laws are in the whole, which is nature; and they have some jurisdiction over some aspects of nature.

A part of nature: in the case of naturalism, it would have to be. The telos would have be a part of how nature functions, as a whole.

I think I may be being a bit too liberal in my assessment of naturalism: I am starting off, conceptually, too entrenched in naturalism to fully appreciate supernaturalism.

I think that if there were phenomena which reasonably could not be explained with our knowledge of the natural order, in the sense that it was consistently violating the laws of nature and there was no good naturalistic explanation, then that would, prima facie, all else being equal, count in favor of supernaturalism. I think I have to concede that, in order not to beg the question.

However, I think that the reason I am so inclined to view phenomena in the light of naturalistic events, and thusly say things like "violations of the laws of nature are really violations of our understanding of the laws of nature", is because there is (at least to me) overwhelming evidence that everything is a part of nature; and so I am inclined to stick with that hypothesis.

Take miracles, for example. I think most people, even theists, agree that the vast majority of them are nonsense: it is usually only a small minority of purported miracles that a theist believes are legit. That minority of miracles, I think are better explained like the rest: fallacious/misunderstandings. This seems more parsimonious, because I can not only fit the data nicely into the theory but I do not have to posit an extra entity (or entities) that are above nature.

Another noteworthy point on miracles, is that, given our understanding of nature (and how mystical it really is--e.g., quantum physics, general/special relativity, etc.), it isn't implausible that an extradimensional being (or one with representative faculties capable of representing not in time or space) may exist and still be a part of the natural processes of nature. It seems like one could still, even if one does not want to posit that minority of miracles as misunderstandings, more parsimoniously posit a natural, extra-dimensional being over a supernatural one. Making is supernatural just seems very extraneous.

@Leontiskos:

"Does Gideon possess rational justification for his conclusion that he is dealing with God?" That's not rhetorical. You need to actually answer it.

I already answered this in depth in my response: you just ignored it. No, I don't think Gideon possessed rational justification for believing God was helping him.

If you were Ahaz in Isaiah 7 (or Gideon), is there some sign you could think of, some test, that would prove to you that you are dealing with something other than natural occurrences?

With respect to having rational justification for believing in a supernatural entity in general, I would say no. Back then, we had very limited understanding of nature. Any test I would have been able to, plausibly, come up with, just like Gideon, would most likely be in vain: this is the same reasoning that every civilization has had for believing in their own gods (e.g., if <this-god> exists, then it will rain tomorrow and, what do you know, it rained!) and it is by-at-large very faulty reasoning indeed. However, iin principle, if there was some phenomena that could not be adequately explained naturalistically and has much positive support for it (viz., it is not enough to just posit, as a gap-like explanation, that it is supernatural because we have not explained it naturalistically; instead, the positing of something supernatural must be supported by sufficient evidence of the laws of nature and how the phenomena seemed to have truly violated those laws), then yes.

With respect to God, I already mentioned, which you ignored, the fact that there is absolutely no test that can demonstrate "God exists": not even in a non-scientific sense of the term "test". There is always a lesser being to God that would be more parsimonious for explanation of something else.

It depends on how you define parsimony. How many "brute facts," does naturalism require? The jury is out on that. Seemingly, it might be quite a lot.

I think it would be both epistemically and ontologically parsimonious to posit naturalism than supernaturalism, if there is no need to posit supernatural entities because we start out with nature.

I am not sure that I see the real difference between ontological and epistemic parsimony; because the explanation is what posits the ontology.

So you end up with a lot of things that have no reason for being, they just are, irreducibly. Just from the Fine Tuning Problem, you would seem to have quite a few.

An explanation where God creates the world to have life only has to posit one such fact that "is its own reason."

The idea is that one who posits God to explain life, has to posit all the same conceptual entities as a naturalist and add in an extra conceptual entity of God. So unless there is some need to posit God, it is less parsimonious.

If parsimony is considered from the point of view of explanation, it doesn't seem possible to beat theism. The answer "from whence comes..." always has one ultimate answer.

An explanation is not more parsimonious when it posits monism over pluralism IF it posits extraneous entities to get to monism.

But from the perspective of ontological entities, I would agree that the argument holds in favor of naturalism.

I think, perhaps, you hold a distinction between epistemic and ontological parsimony that I am not fully appreciating.

Because we have human society, and human society is a greater existence than the individual as I noted. Think analogously to your body. If we could destroy a toe to save a foot, that seems good on its own. But if a side effect of saving the foot by destroying the toe was that the person went into a life long coma, that wouldn't be the correct action. Yes, the foot survives, but the greater part of the body, the consciousness, dies.

If the toe had a mind of its own (and was a person), then, no, I don’t think it would be moral to cut it off to save the body. The problem with your analogy is that the toe is inert and lifeless; while the individual is a life.

I understand, however, that, according to your view, sacrificing one for the sake of saving the many, all else being equal, is good (because it leads to a maximal quantity of the “entities”); but, as an external critique, that seems immoral (to me).

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good"

All I meant, is that “one ought to sacrifice on to save five” as a principle is leads to a worse world (by my lights). Again, this is an external critique. Under your view, if it leads to maximal concrete entities, then it is good: period.

You are just too consequentialist for me (;

What could the person have been doing instead of torturing the victim?

Dave could not have been doing anything better: disregard it for the thought experiment.

All else being equal, learning a skill increases the potential for concrete entities; and I don’t think you are denying that.

That which creates better harmony, to use your terms, is going to be more existent that one which puts unnecessary stress on the body and lowers its health.

Yes, but how does it lower the potential or actual concrete entities? I don’t see a direct causal link between negative emotions and the decrease in potential/actual concrete entities.

Did they create more existence through those atrocities?

Yes.

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

No (if I view it through the lens of your theory).

We know that monarchies as a form of government do not create the kind of robust, wealthy, and happy societies like republics for example.

A monarchy could create, total net, more actual concrete entities than a republic. In fact, it would: if everyone was forced to work non-stop on creating more concrete entities in a sustaining manner, as opposed to doing what they want with their time, then that would be morally better (according to you). Authoritarian regimes would be the best bet at accomplishing that: not goverments that are predicated on providing maximal freedom to individuals, like republics.

Take napoleon, for example: his dictatorship inflicted much suffering onto people and unnecessary conquest; but he furthered the society in ways, which would not have been done otherwise, by use of force—e.g., higher education, public roads, public sewer systems, central banks, etc. The man was not a good person, but incidentally did good things that were very impactful on society. Total net, he was good for humanity IF one only thinks about it in terms of the consequences of his actual total net; I personally do not, and so I think he was wrong even though he did some good things (accidentally, and implemented them in immoral ways).

Here’s another scenario for you to digest:

There are two people: Daisy and John. Daisy is not using her time in an efficient manner (towards maximizing concrete entities in reality): John is. Daisy is not, however, harming anyone by being inefficient in this manner: she is just not taking the actions (out of the possible ones she could take) that would maximize concrete entities in reality. John notices Daisy’s inefficiencies (towards what is [morally] good [according to you]). John cannot convince Daisy to change her ways to be more efficient, and the only other option (by way of me stipulated it right now) is to force her to change her ways: is it moral for him to do so?

Seems like it would be under your view.

If God can only be thought of as a wholly unknowable entity, then how is it that billions and billions of people across the world think they know things about God? The things you are claiming are rather remarkable, and clearly false.

I agree. It is a straw man that Janus is arguing against (most of the time).

Now are you going to tell me that Gideon has no rational justification for his belief that he is dealing with God?

I appreciate you providing an example, and quite an interesting one at that!

The problem I have with this example, and most like it, is that I don’t think it demonstrates, even if the events were all granted as having occurred, justification for believing in God’s existence (even if just for that particular subject in the example) because the tests are wholly incapable of verifying the claim.

Let me give you a much easier example of what I mean (that I believe we can both agree on): let’s say I am holding something in my hand, and you say “that’s a banana”. Now, let’s say I do not know if it is a banana or not, and so I respond “if what you say is true, then do five jumping jacks...if you can do five jumping jacks, then I know what you say is the truth”. Lo and behold, you drop down and do five jumping jacks: am I justified in believing that the object in my hand is a banana? Of course not! Why?

It is because the test I deployed to verify the claim has no potential, even in principle, to actually verify it.

I know there is more to the story and there are many other similar cases Christian’s site, but, to keep this simple, I find Gideon’s test to be analogous to the jumping jack test example: at best, it demonstrates that there is a being that is more powerful than Gideon, who can remove or add dew to a fleece of wool.

How could such a test, in principle, ever verify that the more powerful being is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, etc. let alone the creator of the entire world? It can’t. It just demonstrates, at its very best, that there was at least one being, in that day and age, capable of doing things humans could not.

Adding God into the explanation for this phenomena (of experiencing the wool with dew vs. not in accordance with what was demanded preemptively) is extraneous. A person who says “yeah, if that really happened, then there must be some being capable of performing things humans did not seem to have the capabilities to perform back then” is giving a more parsimonious explanation than one who says “God, an all-supreme creator of everything (who is omnipotent, omnipresent, etc.), performed those things which the humans were not capable of doing”.

there is no X that would yield any form of rational justification for the claim that one is dealing with God

This is an interesting thought. With respect to there being supernatural entities (in general), I can envision scenarios where it would be perfectly rational to believe in them—e.g., positing numbers are Platonic Forms, if there were beings that were consistently violating our understanding of the laws of nature then that would lend support to the belief in something like an ‘angel’ or ‘demon’, etc.). In terms of God, I must profess I cannot envision any; and perhaps you can help me see some (if there are any). It seems like God’s attributes are so extravagant that positing even a slightly less extravagant being would be more parsimonious to explain a set of supernatural phenomena that positing God.

How do you think this affords naturalism an equal footing?

With respect to what you quoted of me, my point was that if a theist can appeal to ambiguity; then so can a naturalist.

If you say “God’s infinite”, I can say “Reality is infinite”. If you say “God is eternal”, I can say “reality is eternal”. If you say “God is so unique and supreme, that we cannot give a full explication of His nature”, I can “Nature (reality) is so unique and supreme, that we cannot give a full explication of “Her” nature”. Etc.

Obviously, and to your point, if one believes that there are certain phenomena which naturalism cannot afford an answer; then naturalism is no longer more parsimonious than supernaturalism.

Is a system which posits an infinite being on "equal footing" with a system that denies an infinite being, so far as the inexplicable goes?

Naturalism does not preclude the existence of an infinite being. It just doesn’t. Another great example is Arthur Schopenhauer, a staunch atheist (and naturalist), that was an idealist that believed reality is universal will; and that will is infinite...but it is not God because it has no mind and is impersonal (since it is not a person).

In a more mainstream sense, a naturalist that believes the universe, or multi-verse or something similar, is infinite also doesn’t fit well with your quote (above) here.

What is the proportion of naturalist incompatibilists to non-naturalist incompatibilists? Why?

In the literature, I would say most libertarians are non-naturalists, but not supernaturalists.

Among the masses, I would say most libertarians are supernaturalists—hands down.

It is because most people don’t believe that libertarianism is compatible with naturalism; but this doesn’t lend any support to your argument, because most people lack proper education on the subject. Most people use “naturalism”, “materialism”, and “physicalism” interchangeabley; and they still yet misrepresent all three with stereotypes. So, so what if most people think naturalism is incompatible with libertarian free will? That doesn’t settle the matter at all.

Generally we would say that someone who believes in a universal mind is a theist.

Nope. Theism is the view that there is a personal universal mind. If the mind is not a person, then it is not God. Schopenhauer is rolling over in his grave (:

I spoke of transcendent moral norms, not moral realism.

For a moral norm to be transcendent, it must be objective; and I am assuming moral cognitivism and non-nihilism here (to save wasting time). If there is some sort of nuanced distinction between the two, then please elaborate.

Again, what is the proportion of naturalists who believe in transcendent moral norms (or also moral realism) to non-naturalists who believe in such a thing? Why?

In the literature, the vast majority of atheists and naturalists are moral realists, hands down. So you are wrong there.

Among the masses, the vast majority of atheists and naturalists are moral anti-realists, hands down. Again, who cares? We are talking about the average, ignorant person. The question is whether there are any phenomena that require supernaturalistic explanation—not if people generally believe it does or doesn’t.

"Well, 90% of incompatibilists are non-naturalists, but incompatibilism is still way more parsimonious on naturalism," which is a prima facie irrational claim.

I don’t see how it is an irrational claim. I think that positing that a soul is perfectly natural, and analyzing it in terms of scientific investigation, would make more sense than going the supernaturalist route. Why are we assuming that one cannot have a soul (i.e., an immaterial mind) under naturalism (i.e., that everything is a part of the processes of nature)?

Beyond that you still haven't told us (and specifically @NotAristotle) what parsimony has to do with anything, much less truth.

I have said it many times, and will say it again: if naturalism is on equal footing with supernaturalism, then it is more parsimonious to go with the former over the latter. Now, if one doesn’t think they are on equal footing, then they have no reason to accept the consequent because they have rejected the antecedent.

miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself — Bob Ross

Then you've botched the definition of a miracle, and you are equivocating.

Implying that a ‘miracle’ cannot truly be one unless it is supernatural is merely begging the question. I am providing why a ‘miracle’ would be more parsimoniously explained naturalistically.

The very fact that so many people are and have been non-naturalists is itself strong evidence against the OP.

Not at all! The OP is not about “how many people believe that there are phenomena which require supernaturalistic explanation”.

If naturalism was such an obviously better explanation then everyone would be naturalist.

Who said it was obvious?

They do, and that's the point. For example, theists (tend to) believe in miracles; naturalists don't. The explanandum differs

Obviously, the “explanandum” differ insofar as theists posit some things are supernatural (which is all you just said here): the question is whether naturalism can account for the same phenomena, because then it is more parsimonious to be a naturalist than a supernaturalist. I don’t think you are fully appreciating the OP yet.

Each camp is attempting to account for a different set of existing things, because each camp believes different things exist.

Not at its core. People are trying to explain the same phenomena: the differing is in what people posit ontologically to account for them.

What is my purpose?

I am assuming you mean objective purpose, and I think a naturalist could just say there is a purpose embedded into the evolution of nature: a law, or set of laws, that provides Telos overtime. No need to add God into the equation.

Where do I ultimately come from?

Nature.

Why do bad things sometimes happen?

Because it is up to sufficiently intelligent beings to uphold the moral law.

What is justice, or love for that matter?

Justice is the act of providing a fairness which, in turn, is derived from what is (objectively) good.

I find “love” to be a bit too ambiguous: there’s a reason the greeks had like 9 words for it. There’s “love” in the sense of a sexual, primitive attraction; “love” in a maternal/fraternal sense; “love” in a selfless sense; “love” in a ‘soulmate’ sense; etc.

because accounts of Biblical miracles, and miraculous events described in other religious literature, might constitute the kinds of examples you're referring to, but as a rule these are not considered, because they're not replicable and generally not considered credible by any modern standards. So what examples are being referred to? Where to look for the data?

Oh, I think I understand now: you are saying that, because you don’t think the examples which you have readily available are legitimate sources (or are problematic), that you can’t give any example of a phenomena that requires supernaturalism to account for it, correct?

If so, then I totally agree.

As it happens, there is one large body of records collected concerning allegedly supernatural events, which are the investigations of miracles attributed to those being considered for canonization as saints by the Catholic Church. These alleged interventions are the subject of rigorous examination - see Pondering Miracles.

Are you saying that miracles require a form of supernaturalism to account sufficiently for them? I can’t tell if you are giving me a history lesson, or providing an answer.

Aside from those, I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake's research in telepathic cognition, which is considered supernatural by some, in that it seems to require that there is a non-physical medium through which perceptions and thoughts are transmitted.

Could you elaborate more on their research? I do not think we can transmit thoughts to each other with solely minds; but I am open to its consideration.

are natural laws part of nature?

Yes.

It seems obvious, but it is contested by philosophers, and it is a question that itself not scientific, but philosophical.

Yeah, I guess I don’t see why it is so contentious.

Furthermore, where in nature do your examples of inductive and deductive logic exist? As far as I can tell, they are purely internal to acts of reasoned inference, they're internal to thought. Science never tires of telling us that nature is blind and acts without reason, save material causation; so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'?

I am not here trying to claim that reality is inherently rational. I am convinced that we do afford reality some rationality in the phenomena which are representative faculties produce.

I responded to your only comment (that I see most recently in thread).

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

Can you elaborate?

I don’t see how any phenomena requires an appeal to something supernatural; so I don’t see why a theist has more justified recourse to lack an explanation.

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them

That is entirely fair; but that is the point of the OP! It is to get supernaturalists to name things that they think require supernatural explanation.

Let me go through your examples: let’s break it down.

1. Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. It is more parsimonious to hold an atheistic substance dualism or idealism. What’s incoherent with believing in a soul without believing in God? I don’t see why that couldn’t be a natural process. Bernardo Kastrup’s idealism is a great example: in that metaphysical view, one’s mind has supremacy over matter, because matter is weakly emergent from it. The minds which are derived from the universal mind are derived via a natural process of dissociation. The point is not that it is a correct theory, it is just that if a supernaturalist can posit a soul or incompatibilist free will, then so can a naturalist; but the latter will posit less entities.

2. Soul: already discussed in #1.

3. Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. Same goes for supernatural accounts that are atheistic, like neo-platonist accounts: they are less parsimonious than naturalist accounts.

4. Miracles: let’s just say, for the sake of the argument, that a ‘miracle’ can and has occurred in the sense of something fundamentally extraordinary happening which defies our understanding of the laws of physics. It seems, by my lights, to be a better and more parsimonious answer to say that miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself (and there are thousands of examples why this is the case).

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. I am sure you probably agree on that point, but disagree that naturalism affords us an equal footing on most of the examples you gave.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

I think they do tend to, but I may be mistaken on that.

:up:

I am talking about an infinite series of atemporal and temporal causes (i.e., the sum of all causes). In this series, there may be atemporal causes (as I am at least, in principle, allowing their existence)--i.e., there are things which exist contingently but are not subject to time.

If you don't like the idea of atemporal causes, then I am talking about an infinite series of temporal causes and there are no other causes that are not in that infinite series.

The series, conceptually, can be represented as a set which I will call C.

C itself has no cause, because it is the series of all causes.

You are claiming either the series C is not infinite, or that C itself leads to a first cause. Neither can be true, so I am not following your argument for this part.

I believe so. At least, I use them interchangeably.

I would go further and say that all explanations based on reason are naturalistic.

I would not go that far. Reason can easily overstep its bounds, while still maintaining its principles, and this is why some supernaturalist accounts are logically consistent but still should be rejected.

I think you would be better off just critiquing the, external and internal, coherency of supernaturalist views than its application of pure reason.

"God did it" is not really a cogent explanation. Even if it were accepted as an explanation, there is no detail, no step-by-step explication of just how God could have done it. None that can really make any rational or experiential sense at all to us in any case.

I agree that it can often be very nebulous, but this is a straw man. Sophisticated theists have very detailed metaphysical accounts of God.

I do agree, and to the point of this OP, that when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing. As Oppy put in (in the link I gave in the OP), anything theism can posit with God is equally available for the naturalist to posit about the universe (or nature). If God is necessarily existent, then nature is. If God involves an infinite regress, then nature does. Etc. The interesting thing is that, because the same explanations are afforded to the naturalist, naturalism becomes the better option because it is more parsimonious.

But how would you find out? In the absence of that kind of data, what criteria can be selected?

What do you mean?

It is not scientifically peer-reviewed that ‘a=a’, ‘1+1=2’, ‘every change has a cause’, ‘p → q, q, therefore p’, ‘truth is the correspondence of thought with reality’ (or whatever theory of truth you would like to insert here), ‘knowledge is a justified, true, belief’ (or whatever theory of knowledge you would like to insert here), etc.

It is nonsense to think that scientism, which is what you are arguing here for, is true.

We believe things based off of evidence-based reasoning; and science is not the only form of valid evidence (as clearly exemplified in my examples above).

As far as theism and atheism is concerned, the traditional divide formed between naturalistic science, which seeks explanations purely in terms of natural laws, and non-physicalist or metaphysical philosophies which are often but not always associated with religion (another very hard term to define!) But surely, in effect, naturalism leans towards explanations in terms of what have been known as natural laws - but then, there’s a whole other issue there, in philosophy of science, as to whether there are ‘natural laws’ and what that means (per Nancy Cartwright ‘How the Laws of Physics Lie’). And that debate, again, is not itself subject to a naturalist explanation, as it’s ’theory about theory’.

You seem to be trying to win by means of drowning your opponent in over-complicated, irrelevant information.

For intents of this OP, naturalism is the view that everything in reality is a part of the processes of nature; and supernaturalism is the view that some things transcend those processes of nature.

In terms of laws, it is commonly accepted that there are laws of physics; but it doesn’t matter either way for all intents and purposes of the OP. Even if you reject the existence of laws proper, if you believe everything in reality is a part of the processes of nature, whatever they may exactly be, then you are a naturalist.

This doesn't answer the question in the OP; and isn't necessarily true.

I just linked it at the top.

Interesting: I will have to check out their work!

However, I think the point in the OP still stands: what phenomena requires us to posit God's existence to explain? That is the million dollar question.

When Oppy speaks of the "theory" of theism he is clearly construing theism as a hypothesis.

Oppy is not speaking of the "theory" of theism as a scientific hypothesis; which is what Feser, in the link you gave, was complaining about. Oppy does not think that a metaphysical theory that posits God's existence is something verifiable via the scientific method: that's nonsense.

I don't think that one needs to limit themselves to what is scientifically peered reviewed or easily replicable. However, every example I have heard seems, to me, to be better explained naturalistically.

Unfortunately, I am not that familiar with the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists; but I do hope that naturalists and supernaturalists can engage in fruitful discussions herein!

As @Wayfarer rightly pointed out, the terms "naturalism" and "atheism" are not synonymous nor is "supernaturalism" and "theism"; and this OP revolves around the former of each, and not the latter.

In the case of supernaturalism, the obvious example is going to be (classical) theism; and for naturalism, it is going to be a form of physicalism (in conjunction, presumably, with other views compatible with it---e.g., a theory of truth, moral realism/anti-realism, etc.).

That quote you gave is dancing dangerously close between atheism and theism.

In a classical sense, God is absolutely separate from the nature that He created. Some of what you quoted, sounds an awful lot like pantheism; which, I would say, is really just a form of atheism.