Hello chiknsld,

I have been waiting my entire life for a simple tool like chatgpt...my entire life.

(:

I believe that is what I was trying to tell you, but I know that you will probably understand it better if it comes from another source right? ...hehe

I appreciate you sharing this with me, and I will address it as adequately as I can in a moment; but I wanted to disclaim that appeals to authority do not matter to me (in this context at least): if you demonstrate your point and I find it correct then I will gladly concede. I trust your points just as much as ChatGPT (;

Firstly, your quote from ChatGPT clearly concedes that it is not invalid but, rather, adds confusion (which I agree with):

It first says this:

Applying double negation in the way described does not align with the standard form of modus tollens and, in fact, changes the logical rule being used. Modus tollens is a valid form of inference, but it should not involve double negation in the manner shown in the argument.

But…:

In conclusion, the original argument you presented without double negation was valid modus tollens, but the modified version with double negation deviates from the standard form and may cause confusion or misunderstandings.

The point that I got from ChatGPT, and correct me if I am wrong, is that one cannot say they are merely using modus tollens if they also used double negation; for some logicians accept one but not the other. If one accepts double negation, then my argument clearly results in modus tollens. If they don’t accept it, then it won’t be modus tollens they are disagreeing with but, rather, my use of double negation to get to modus tollens. If that is what you are noting, then you are absolutely right.

I am going to modify my OP -> P2 to simply not use double negation, and it is now in its traditional form.

Hello Pantagruel,

I think mind-dependence is misleading. Neither pure subjectivity nor pure objectivity can be conceived in isolation

Interesting: I am not quite following, but let me try to respond. What we know of immediatelly is subjectivity, and an ‘object’ in the sense of something tangible or mind-independent is only found from abstract reasoning about the subjectivity. So I would say, prima facie to your point here, that we can actually conceive of a world which is pure subjectivity in the sense that there are no mind-independent objects other than the universal mind itself.

"the unity of the I does not come before that of the object, but rather is constituted only through it."

I am not sure if I understood this correctly, but I would say that the ‘objects’ in the sense of something ‘without me’ is definitely necessary for conceiving of oneself as an ‘I’; but that is to use ‘object’ differently than previously mentioned.

The universe is dynamic, dynamism requires energy, and energy is the result of a tension between opposites.

Are you saying that the universe is fundamentally energy? Is universe synonymous, to you, with reality?

The quality of quantity; quantities of qualities.

What is a ‘quality of a quantity’? That doesn’t seem possible to me. The latter makes sense, as we could give a quantitative estimate of something fundamentally non-quantitative.

Hello Inyenzi,

I'm somewhat of an amateur fossil hunter.

That is awesome!

It would seem odd to me, that when I find fossils I am not holding the remnants of the bodies of animals that existed a long time ago, but am instead holding... ?

That, indeed, would be odd; thankfully, objective idealism makes no such postulation: when you examine dead organisms, under objective idealism, you are examining a representation of them, of a real ‘dead organism’. The question becomes: what is the thing-in-itself of which I am representing? Is it a tangible, organic organism like I perceive? Objective idealism postulates that your representation of the organism is of fundamentally mental process; just like how the word document on your monitor is a representation of 0s and 1s. The physical world within our conscious experience is just a survival-based dashboard of representations.

I suppose under the 'all is quality' view, I am holding nothing more than mind-dependent qualities - the way the fossil looks, feels, it's texture. It only signifies the past to the degree that I build an explanatory narrative around my perceptions (i.e. there is nothing more to the past than this narrative).

So, in objective idealism, they are mind-dependent but NOT dependent on your mind. Of course, your representations of them are dependent on you, but they actually exist—just as ideas in a universal mind. You are in a fundamental, universal mind (in this view) and so is the dead organism you are inspecting. Ideas, I would argue, are also ontologically qualitative: there’s no definite beginning or ending to them, nor are they completely separable from one another within our minds. This universal mind doesn’t have a definite amount of ideas: it is a stream of ideas: an ‘idea’ is just a unit of measure we use to estimate it for descriptive purposes.

But I think what's missing from this account that reduces our existence to 'quality only' is our pre-theoretical lived experience as being human bodies.

If by ‘pre-theoretical lived experience’ you are referring to before we were ‘conscious’, then I would say that species are all conscious (to some degree) and human beings, throughout evolution, have been conscious. By conscious, I mean qualitatively experiencing; and not some higher-order emergent property of a brain. The brain, under my view, is an extrinsic representation of a higher order organ that has evolved slowly over time with more and more higher order capabilities (i.e., deliberation, cognition, introspection, etc.).

When we speak of "quality" what we are really referring to is our bodies sensory perceptions - our visual field is predicated upon our eyes.

I would partially be meaning that; but more broadly anything which has no definite amount.

It would seem incoherent to think both my hand and its touch are 'in my mind' - my body would be 'in my mind' yet my sensory perceptions are dependent upon my body?

You hand, a physical object within your conscious experience, is a dashboard representation of the hand-in-itself, which is an idea in the universal mind. The hand-as-a-physical-object doesn’t fundamentally exist, no differently than the word document application doesn’t fundamentally exist in the computer in that manner: it is a bunch of 0s and 1s.

It appears nonsensical, especially considering my body will remain when I die, much like these creatures whose fossils I find. You have direct evidence of this every time you eat a chicken - a plate full of bones.

Under objective idealism, the world is independent of our minds, but not of every mind. The eternal, metaphysically mind is where all of the world exists in (as ideas therein). So, your body will indeed still exist after you stop experiencing, and if I were to see your corpse it would be a dashboard representation of a perished mind.

Surely this leads to solipsism - why posit minds beyond your own? But I think applying Occam's Razor to ontology is a misapplication. There is no requirement for the ontology of the world itself to be as parsimonious as possible.

Good question: I would say that solipsism is not parsimonious. Yes, it says “this all here is just in my mind”, but upon close inspection the justification for it explodes into completely unfalsifiable nonense. For example, if your mind is the only thing that exists, then your mind must be eternal; but what about the fact that everyone seems to die? Oh, you are the exception to that rule? (:

Hello Philosophim!

As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you.

That is fair.

What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

A quantity is ‘an definite amount’ (e.g., 3 m/s^2, 1 meter, 4 newtons, 80 volts, etc.); and a quality is ‘a non-quantity’ (i.e., an indefinite amount)(e.g., the bitterness of an apple, feeling of pain, the redness of an apple, etc.).

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidentally by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

True, please let me know if there are any other terms that need defining. I will also put those definitions in the OP. Thank you Philosophim!

Hello 180 Proof,

I don't grok your statement. Clarify what you mean by "objective reality" and/or "mind-at-large".

By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which is mind-independent’ and by ‘mind-at-large’ I mean that reality is fundamentally a mind. That mind, however, objectively exists; that is, it’s existence is mind-independent—i.e., it doesn’t manifest itself nor uphold its own existence.

Also, if "the world is mind-dependent", then "mind" is world-independent (i.e. separate from the world, or disembodied), no? Evidence?

The “world” is in that mind (under my view). It is disembodied in the sense that it doesn’t have an organic body if that is what you are asking; and, as for evidence, I would like to focus on the argument I gave in the OP for a mind-dependent, qualitative world.

Hello Charles Ferraro,

I would suggest reading his ‘A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge’, which is a relatively short work outlining his idealism, to determine for yourself an answer. However, with that being said, I will attempt to give you my interpretation of him.

Firstly, to answer you directly:

Bottom Line: Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception?

He clearly meant dependent on all perception (viz., on perceivers) (and, as a side note, the divine perception is what keeps things continually existing), and this is not disputed by anyone in the literature (as far as I am aware). In fact, he states it quite explicitly and adamently in the previously mentioned work:

Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER

(A Treatise…, p. 24).

I didn’t add in those all-caps: that’s how emphatically he wants us to understand that point.

It is disputed how much of a subjective idealist he really was and to what degree of difference he has with the newer objective idealists (like Bernardo Kastrup); and, to me, after reading him, I think he was a hybrid premordial formulation of idealism which both subjective and objective idealists owe respect. He was the first to carve out idealism in the west, and you will find even ideas that Kant uses in his views—like, for example, you see space being argued as ‘a priori and synthetic’ in a more rudimentary way in his work:

first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived

(A Treatise..., p. 48)

His main point is to refute materialism, which was the predominant and newly fashionable view at the time, and so he really focuses on the mind-dependence of one’s experience; but he uses a term ‘perception’ for it, which is what causes a lot of trouble in his view (for modern day objective idealists): it entails that that the objects only exist so long as something is perceiving them, and not merely so long as they are ideas in a universal mind, and thusly, for Berkeley, he gets around this by postulating that God, very similarly to ourselves, is constantly perceiving the world. This is an entirely different view from modern objective idealists, like Bernardo Kastrup, who posit that the universal mind cannot perceive and is much more fundamental and primitive then ourselves, as we are evolved minds. The objects exist mind-dependently for objective idealists, no doubt, but not on a mind consciously experiencing them like we do.

Now, I would like to include a response from @Tom Storm:

George Berkeley … is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter—a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments. He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived. To the objection that, in that case, a tree, for instance, would cease to exist if no one was looking at it, he replied that God always perceives everything; if there were no God, what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them; but as it is, owing to God’s perceptions, trees and rocks and stones have an existence as continuous as common sense supposes. This is, in his opinion, a weighty argument for the existence of God.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (1945), III, I., Ch. XVI: "Berkeley", p. 647

This is the exact issue objective idealists tend to have with Berkeley, and tends to make them claim he was a subjective idealist for it; but it is important to remember that he was the first to sketch out the entire family of views under idealism (as he is quite literally the father of idealism) and, upon a close examination of his works, he isn’t entirely consistent nor coherent—but that’s true of pretty much every main philosopher that started a movement.

Hopefully that helps.

Hello Alkis Piskas,

Emerging from what exactly? What could be something on which both an objective and a subjective process can be applied?

I am not sure if I fully understood the question, but I would say that it is possible for a thing to exist as emergent from the relationship between subject and object; that is, between a thinking mind and the world of which it thinks about.

1) Can anything at all emerge from truth? What could be that?

I don’t think anything emerges from truth per se in the same manner as truth is emergent from the relationship between object and subject; as only ‘emergent’ things from truth are really just aspects of the truth: there’s nothing extra emerging. However, with both subject and object, there really is a new thing which we call ‘truth’, which is a correspondence of thought with the referent thereof.

Can truth ever be objective? Who is out there who can speak about it? And if he can speak about it, wouldn't that have a subjective tint?

I would say that truth is neither objective nor subjective but, rather, a relationship between the two. It is still absolute (i.e., we do not get to make up the truth), but it isn’t objective.

I have more questions, but I don't want either to overwhelm you or become too critical (because I already seem to be! :smile:)

Feel free to ask away my friend! I can assure you that I will not think you are being too critical nor that you are overwhelming me. Depending on what you say, I may need to take some time to think it over, but that is the nature of these kinds of substantive conversations!

Hello T Clark,

That being said, what would a mind-independent world be? Is that just objective reality? Is it what was there before there were minds? Did nothing exist before there were minds? I don't think that is a ridiculous idea to propose.

I would say that objective reality is a mind-at-large, and our conscious experience is a survival-based dashboard of experience of mental events. Since you said you agree that the world is mind-dependent, what do you think that entails or implies?

Also, yes, I think that there was a world before our minds but, under my view, not of all minds.

Hello chiknsld,

Modus tollens:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.

Therefore, not P.

Correct. In my case, it also uses double negation and modus tollens—which I forgot to mention in the argument form:

1. If P, then Q.
2. Not Q.
C: Not P.

In my case, Q = ‘!T’, so it becomes:

1. If P, then !T (If P, then Q).
2. !!T (!Q).
C: Not P.

It’s the same form of inference: modus tollens. Granted it also assumes the law of double negation.

If a proposition is objective when its truth value is mind-independent, and there are no truths or truth values which are mind-independent, then there are no objective propositions. The same holds of subjective propositions given your assertion that truth is not subjective.

This is a very good point that I am honestly slapping myself for it! I definitely need to refurbish my definitions, as they are clearly insufficient. For 'objectivity', then, I think I am trying to express "that which is not contingent on minds" and by 'subjectivity' 'that which is contingent on minds'. Defining them in terms of propositions, as you noted, cannot work since propositions are an expression of truth-values.

Within these new definitions, it would be said that propositionalizing things, as well as all Truth in general, is contingent on both object (being) and subject (mind).

I am going to refurbish the OP to reflect this definitional change: thank you Leontiskos!

I must concur with , as you are describing Schopenhauer's the 'Will-to-Live' (as he put it) and, I would say, not really the 'Will-to-Power' nor definitely not Nietzsche's affirmation of life. Although, granted, I do think Nietzsche's 'Will-to-Power' is a rip off of Schopenhauer's Will-to-Live.

Nietzsche actually "revolts" against his cherished schopenhauer insofar as he thought he was too pessimistic. His affirmation of life, best described with his analogy of the demon that offers one the eternal recurrence of their life and amor fati, is to say that one has not rid himself completely of that disease, that 'decadence', until they are ready to live their life over-and-over again for all eternity; until then, for Nietzsche, there's a bit of nihilism in them still.

Intuitions, in the philosophical sense, are what one intellectual immediately grasps of the situation (whereas, in colloquial speech, it can also mean 'going with your gut'): this is why it is sometimes called 'an intellectual seeming'.

Intuitions, like reason, are fundamental to the way by which we come to know the world and, as such, are presupposed as reliable as opposed to determining how reliable they actually are. For example, if I start noticing that my intuitions are causing me to stray incredibly far from the truth (to the point, perhaps, that I am endangering myself constantly), then that is itself an intuition. Likewise, to say that intuitions are reliable or unreliable is to intuit that--thusly, the very affirmation or denial of it presupposes it in the first (and that's why I like to think of intuitions are simply inevitable).

Because you can never know a single thing without intuiting, I find epistemic conservatism to be quite appealing; that is, that one should use their intuitions until they can be countered with evidence that demonstrates their unreliability (which would itself use other intuitions).

Perhaps why we inevitably use intuitions is because there is much more processing occurring when we view reality than what we have introspective access to and, thusly, we can't retrospectively cognize 100% accurately at why we intuited what we did (at a deeper level).

we now know that both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries can be used successfully to try to explain the occurrence of certain physical phenomena.
…
This, I think, disproves the validity of Kant's explicit (testable) epistemic hypothesis that only Euclidean geometry must apply to the physical world because it is a transcendental (necessary and strictly universal) form of human sensible intuition.

I agree. Kant, however, was more interested in our representative faculties and assumed, like a lot of people in his time, that newtonian physics would never be superseded. Obviously, many of his newtonian-based claims are stale; but his idea of there being transcendental truths seems still rather convincing.

However, can Kant's theory of sensible intuition be modified to better fit contemporary facts, or must it be completely discarded as a once very interesting, but now debunked, theory

I think the core of his theory is fine: we are representative beings who do have necessary a priori knowledge and synthetic a priori judgments. Just think of how your brain fills in the gaps constantly as it guesses what it is experiencing: it is adding something which is not there beyond phenomenal experience. Likewise, it seems rather convincing that the objects (or whatever the things-in-themselves are or thing-in-itself is) conform to our representative faculties: we don’t get any direct knowledge of the world-as-it-is. Now, can be philosophically decipher what a priori synthetic conceptions we have? I don’t think so: I will that up to neuroscience and the like.

Might there not be, instead, objective multiverses, each functioning according to different kinds of mathematics and geometries, some already known others not, which have nothing at all to do with any transcendental forms of human sensible intuition?

Kant adamantly claims that we cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves; so his theory does not negate nor affirm the existence of a multiverse. He calls things-in-themselves “purely negative conceptions”, which are placeholders for whatever we are representing.

Personally, I don’t a need to posit extra universes doing their own things in parallel with ours. All I see needing explanation is the reality in which we live, and it seems unparsimonious to posit extraneous realities.

I also think that Kant's notions of space and time are not the same as the space and time that I experience on a daily basis.

Einstein's notions of space and time are the dynamic ones that can be empirically verified through a wide range of experiments.

I sort of agree. Space and time are not experienced, they are the necessary forms of your experience: our minds don’t produce space and time but, rather, are conditioned by it; however, I think you are correct that they are not purely a priori (in the sense Kant wanted it to be), as we can gain more understanding of them via a posteriori investigations but they are still a priori insofar as they are the necessary preconditions of our experience (as the necessary forms thereof). In other words, their behaviors can be empirically investigated, but they are still only the form of your minds representations. I think Kant made the mistake of thinking that because something is synthetic a priori that it must be impossible to understand empirically—but that simply isn’t true.

I think the degree of use of Kantianism in one’s view is just relative to the metaphysical theory one holds. A physicalist could hold that there is a phenomenal and noumenal space and time, such that the former is attempting to represent the latter; and many ideas from Kant will follow therefrom. However, they will deny that they synthetic.

As an analytic idealist, I salvage many of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s metaphysical views; and, thusly, I hold time and space are synthetic a priori.

For example, empirical space bends in the presence of large masses and their strong gravitational fields; Kant's transcendental space is a static, rigid, container. Empirical time passes slower or faster depending on how near or far one is from a strong gravitational field, Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person.

This is true; but I think it only demonstrates that:

1. Even the form of our experience can be empirically investigated;
2. It can behave differently than we would initially intuit (upon empirically studying it);
3. Newtonian physics doesn’t work anymore; and
4. They are governed by objective laws (and are not purely subjective productions of our minds).

However, this doesn’t mean that they aren’t synthetic (i.e., add something to the world that isn’t already there) nor that they are not a priori (i.e., that they are the necessary preconditions for the possibility of our phenomenal experience). For me, without a perceptive being, there is not extension (space) nor temporality (time) other than the ideas pertaining thereof in the mind of God.

Bob

I have found that Transcendental Idealism is interpreted very differently depending on the person and Kant was a very poor writer (as far as I am considered) so it is hard to tell exactly what he meant (precisely); so here is my take.

Is the space Kant discusses in the Aesthetic the same space I experience and move through on a daily basis and is the time he discusses in the Aesthetic the same time I experience passing by on a daily basis?

Space and time are not something you experience (in the sense that Kant means it), as @Mww noted, but, rather, the necessary precondition of your experience. Space, for example, is not an entity which you encounter but, rather, is the pure form of your experience.

Now, if you are a realist about space and time, then it may be that the pure forms of one's experience corresponds or is governed by whatever laws affect them; but Kant is not claiming anything about that, as space and time beyond the forms of one's experience, would be something related to the things-in-themselves.

For example, Einstein famously held that Kant can't have space and time as synthetic and a priori; as he thought that there really is a space and time, of which we can empirically treat like entities, that are mind-independent. Is he right? I will leave that up to you and your metaphysics.

With respect to idealism, Kantianism paved the way for Schopenhaurian metaphysics that posits that the only space and time there is the pure forms of one's experience--as all there is are mind activities happening.

Last thing I will say is that time and space as originally proposed by Kant do not hold up to Einstein's special nor general relativity; as Kant, and Schopenhauer, held that we can be a priori certain of how they work and that the succession in space and time is universal for rational minds: both of which have been refuted by Einstein.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.

As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.

Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about “rationality”. Likewise:

I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob.

I apologize, as you never actually said you supported moral realism; however, in the interpretation of your contentions with my view on rationalism, they are only work if you are claiming to be a “normative realist” at a minimum—that’s why I said that; but I should have asked first.

To try and clear things up, I think that by “rationality” you are simply referring to something toto genere from what I mean. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are referring to the act (or lack thereof) of corresponding to reality in one’s assertions—which I call (more or less) truth and not rationality. Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that “truth” is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with “rationality”. I am associating “rationality” with an act which is in accordance with one’s primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical).

With that in mind:

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; and I completely agree with you here as it is exactly what I said:

if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not

Your “resolution” section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted “should” for “want”, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesn’t matter: normative statements are subjective.

When I said “this is true regardless...” I was agreeing with you that “smoking leads to poor health” and so if I should be healthy, then it logically follows that I should not smoke; and this is not subjective.

Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational

And here’s where I think you are saying more than just that truth is absolute: you are saying that what defines a person as rational is the epistemic norm that they should try to correspond with reality. This is a normative statement which, as I said before, you cannot prove is objective.

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross

P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?

I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. Secondly, P1 is not ambiguous at all: it is the claim that “one who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational”--it doesn’t get any clearer than that. The person is saying, apart from what is the case, that what should be the case is that…. . Thirdly, I purposely made the premises have “oughts” in them: you can’t just arbitrarily change them to descriptive statements. If you want to do that and it not be considered irrelevant to the conversation, then you must demonstrate that rationality is objective—then you can claim they are descriptive statements. I am saying rationality is just epistemic norms, which are prescriptive statements.

To be charitable, I think you are noting that truth is absolute and objective; and from that interpretation, I would agree that one can demonstrate that. So, it would be fair to say that P1 is either true or false, and that is objectively so; however, to claim someone is irrational or rational is to posit that they should be epistemically doing something else: it is not a descriptive statement. In other words, within your terms, you could claim that a person that holds a contradiction is not holding something which is objectively true, but not that they are irrational for it. These are two different claims.

Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.

If you are confused by what the premises are saying, then it is on you to ask for clarification: you don’t get to just dismiss the argument because you don’t understand what the premises are claiming. I find them to be very, very clear.

Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.

Correct! But….:

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.

NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from one’s (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it.

I do not let you hold a contradiction as true: I let you hold that you are not objectively irrational for holding a contradiction as true (although it is false).

Now on to the distinctive sets!

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.

No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. I know there are 4 jacks and 52 cards, and I can analytically deduce the probability of pulling a jack. This is not the same claim as building off of that probability to say that “I will pull a jack next time because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it”: that’s the induction. Probabilities are absolutely never inductions themselves: they are mathematically deduced from what is already known.

We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction.

You have not “deduced an induction” when you claim that “I will pick a jack because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it”: you have used deduction knowledge to formulate an induction. If you think that you can deduce that induction (or something similar), then provide the syllogism.

An induction is a form of argumentation where the premises do not necessitate the conclusion: the 4/52 chance is purely a deduction, and the induction is built off of it but is not deduced from it. I cannot provide a syllogism that absolutely entails the 4/52 deduced chance with the claim that I will pull a jack next time (and, thusly, it is not deduced).

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num

Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by “essential properties” of the inductions.

For example, in your example #1, you didn’t use the same properties nor some essential set to formulate the patterning and probability based inductions. Is it supposed to be what is essential to the scenario given?

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.

What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isn’t distinctive knowledge itself.

The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y.

Correct. That is why I am bringing up relevant factors, because that is what you are describing here: you aren’t depicting any sort of “essential properties”.

you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I already have. But I think we need to keep on track with the other points and resolve some things before revisiting this part.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I think we both see that certain aspects of our conversation do not seem to be progressing, so I am going to the parts that I think we can still as of yet further the discussion.

But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.

We are saying the same thing here: since you conceptually structure your epistemology where there are hierarchies and then comparisons of the distinctive sets, it just sounds like you aren’t cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those “bases” you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselves—so you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. I don’t see any real disagreement here.

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.

They are not antonyms: to be illogical is to hold logical contradictions as true, and to be rational is, well, I already defined that before. Being logically consistent is not enough to be rational (in the sense I mean it) nor does it equate to living in accordance with reality (or staying closely married to reality); nor does it get you to your idea of trying to not to contradict reality. A “contradiction of reality” is not a logical contradiction: the latter pertains to the form of the argument and never the content—viz., to say something contradicted reality is to affirm something about the content and pertains nothing to the form of the argument itself. This is why it is not illogical to say that “hair is short and long” whereas “hair is green and not green” is, even though most people, who are not immersed in formal logic, would think that both are logical contradictions. In formal logic, there is nothing logically contradictory with saying “∀x (Hair[x] ^ Short[x] ^ Long[x])”. It is incoherent with what most would consider true of reality (viz., once one realizes what is meant by the property of Short and Long it becomes clear both cannot cohere), but it is not illogical. I think you may be thinking about logic more loosely than I am; and perhaps all you mean is that to be rational is to be coherent, to the best of one’s ability, with reality.

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.

To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. When we try to get the most rational assessment of reality when we cannot deduce what to do, then we are necessarily trying to choose the best induction to use.

Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.

I was saying essentially this:

1. The probability of … is Z% is not an induction.
2. An inference which is not deduced from #1 but utilizes #1 is an induction.
3. #2 is an induction which has the essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #1.
4. The pattern of … is not an induction (or at least not the one in question).
5. An inference which is not deduced from #4 but utilizes #4 is an induction (that is in question here).
6. #5 is an induction which has an essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #4.
7. Therefore, #6 and #3 do not have the same essential properties (even in virtue of just their utilization of pattern vs. probability).

If you really want to say that “only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared”, then you cannot mean by “essential property” that which was essential to the formulation of the induction while claiming that there are inductions which have the same essential properties (because, as shown above, just one induction using a probability vs. pattern makes them have different essential properties)(and, furthermore, every property would be essential to each induction, so only the exact same induction, to the T, would equate to an induction which equal essential properties).

I don’t think your argument works here. You will have to clarify what you mean by “essential properties of an induction” within the context of “only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared”.

If by it you mean:

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.

Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for.

I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.

This is not the same thing as an essential property to the formulation of an induction that you were arguing before! This is a relevant factor! This is what I have been trying to get you to see: there’s no term for what you just described there in your epistemology.

Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement?

What I outlined is nothing like that statement. Please demonstrate the logical contradiction in holding that imperatives are indexical. You still haven’t demonstrated it.

I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement.

There’s no logical contradiction in you saying that I am wrong relative to what you think is “rationality”. Philosophim, if you truly think it is illogical, then please demonstrate the logical contradiction. I want you to demonstrate that my claim leads to (p ^ !p).

When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.

You disagreeing with me, relative to what you think is “rationality”, is not a contradiction of my point: it agrees with it. I contradiction is not the same thing as a disagreement; and, also, by reality contradicting my point I am assuming you mean that reality is incoherent with my point (and not that there is a logical contradiction in it). To that, I also don’t see what you are saying is incoherent about it: please demonstrate, if you cannot expose a logical contradiction, what is incoherent (with respect to reality) with my position.

I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought
…
Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought

Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others’) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other.

I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think.

With that being said, I want to clarify one thing about “rationality”: I sometimes get the impression, after hearing what you think rationality is, that you may be under the impression that I am saying we can subjectively makeup what corresponds best with reality—and I am NOT saying that. I am saying that imperatives are hypothetical and never categorical (viz., subjective and never objective). For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivity—it is subjective. Likewise, to say “one is irrational if they smoke and think that they should be healthy” is to argue that:

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational.

But whence does this obligation in P1 arise? If it is not from a categorical imperative (ultimately), then it is merely hypothetical and thusly irrationality is grounded in subjectivity.

To refute this, all you have to do is provide the categorical imperative that you are deriving rationality from (i.e., deriving that if someone is incoherent with reality then they should be considered irrational). If you can’t, then, I am sorry, but you are wrong.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so.
...
We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.

I am saying that choosing between “knowledge sets” is a comparison. The moment you decide, by analysis within or without the “induction hierarchy”, that this induction is a better pick than that one, you have thereby compared and evaluated them. I don’t think you can coherently claim to never compare the inductions if you are likewise claiming that you can determine which is better based of of analysis of the “distinctive knowledge sets”.

This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality

Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be “to be illogical”? I don’t think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.

I can’t because there is no term for it. They aren’t essential properties necessarily of anything.

As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing

There’s not logical contradiction: there’s just no term currently mapped to what I mean by “relevant factors”. All I can do is explicate again what I mean by a relevant factor and if you think there is a term that fits in your theory then please let me know: it is a piece of information that is relevant to formulating the set of possible inductions one could use to resolve the dilemma. I must repeat: they are not distinctive knowledge. I can have distinctive knowledge of what I may guess are the relevant factors (if I do not have applicable knowledge of them); but the relevant factors are what actually are, in reality, relevant to the formulation of inductions pertaining to the context and the dilemma therein. I don’t know of any term in your theory that means that: please let me know if there is.

You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions.

What do you mean by “distinctive knowledge sets”? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. That is a comparison.

You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)

I am saying:

1. When you “look at the distinctive knowledge sets [(hierarchies)]”, you are thereby comparing the inductions. A comparison is not limited to comparing within the hierarchies, but the criteria that you are using to compare within may not (and in this case are not) applicable to comparing the sets themselves; and

2. If you say that one is better than the other, even by analyzing the sets, then one can deduce that you compared them; because you can’t determine something is better than another without comparison: that’s what a comparison is.

I get that you are just joking a bit with that last alleged rebuttal of mine but, with all due respect, it demonstrates to me that you do not understand in the slightest what I am saying (and perhaps I am just not explaining it well enough).

The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead.

You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them.

So I see no lack on my part

The lack of applicability is if you actually can’t compare the inductions, which I don’t think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you can’t compare them, then you can’t say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless.

Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:

P1: Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
P2: Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
P3: Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.

P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be “the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening”: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.

Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. That’s why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.

Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about it—e.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.

Same thing with the P3.

Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument.

How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions?

I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the “A with X” and “B with Y”, but that’s just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; and, secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). The only time accidental properties emerge is if you are talking about the essence of a thing, which pertains to formulating a general class that it is a member of; but if you are talking about what makes a particular thing that particular thing—well...that’s every aspect of that particular thing!

This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.

If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We aren’t both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical.

The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way.

Because, again, subjective judgments are indexical: “I think killing babies is wrong” could true for me and false for you (or vice-versa) (or true/false for both of us). If it is true for me and false for you, then I can still say you are wrong for killing a baby because I think killing babies is wrong.

If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal.

I don’t have to agree that we are both right: I have to agree that relative to me you are wrong and relative to you you are right.

Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right.

Sort of. The problem is that we tend to psycho-analyze ourselves rather poorly. Just because I say “I think killing babies is wrong” that does not thereby make it true that I think killing babies I wrong. Subjective judgments are reflections of our psyche and usually at its deepest core, which we don’t “control” in any colloquial sense of the term. I can absolutely formulate a false belief about a subjective judgment that I hold (or don’t hold).

I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong

This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. If by this you are just noting that it is possible for “rational is X” to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is “right”), then, yeah, that’s true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless (about morality and the like) because most of the time they have false or partly inaccurate beliefs about what they will as right or wrong; and, therefore, conversing about it with other people can change their mind as they are forced to dive deeper into what they think is right or wrong (which, again, is just to say that they have to dive deeper into their own psyche to determine what they truly are obligated to). It’s not as simple, philosophim, as saying to oneself “I think X is wrong” and then thinking they are absolutely right about that because it is subjective: they could be formulating a false belief about themselves.

ts just a contradiction Bob

There wasn’t any logical contradiction in the example you gave. The proposition “I want rationality to be X” can be false for you and true for me. If you violate X, then I can thereby call you irrational and you would say you are still being rational (because it was false for you). Where’s the logical contradiction Philosophim?

As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first.

Here’s a big difference between us: I think obligations are more fundamental ontologically than reason and although, yes, we have to figure out how to know things first we necessarily utilize our obligations implicitly in formulating our epistemologies (at its core). Also, I am a moral anti-realist.

I asked this because if you are a moral realist then that is why we are disagreeing so adamantly on what rationality is, just like we could argue similarly about what “good” or “better” is: they all fall into the class of oughts.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate you summarizing our differences; but if that summary of my position is truly what you think I am claiming, then, with all due respect, I don’t think you are understanding what I am claiming at all. Thusly, I am going to summarize my points hereon so you can address them and I will respond thereafter to some of the points you made.

I am saying (in order of importance):

1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. (by “comparison”, I do not strictly mean the utilization of your concept of an “induction hierarchy”); and

2. That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. A relevant factor (of the situation…) can never end up being formulated into an induction and an induction can have essential properties which are not relevant factors (of the situation…); and

3. The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know; and

4. That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a “hierarchy induction” (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wanting—as the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. This is not a dig at the ‘induction hierarchy’ itself, as it does what it purports to do—but it isn’t applicable to the vast majority of situations which is a problem if you are trying to explicate a system of acquiring knowledge (and beliefs) in the most rational manner possible in the majority of situations; and

5. That I have provided a clear and concise definition of “rationality” (i.e., to be, to the best of one’s ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions) but you have not. I have provided a concept whereas, this whole time and within your papers, you are working with a notion.

6. Although I haven’t mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: if an essential property of an induction is a property which the induction cannot exist without, then every property of the induction is an essential property because even changing one property transforms the induction into a different induction; and if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. This is because you at not noting what is essential to what an induction is (i.e., the essence of the concept of an induction), but, rather, what is essential to the formulation of a particular induction. Just something to think about.

Now let me address some points in your response that caught my eye.

First, I ask you to trust my good faith that if a point is proven, I will concede. I trust you'll do the same.

I agree: I don’t think either of us will argue in bad faith.

In terms of your points:

#1: This is true, but doesn’t negate any of my critiques above. Likewise, with respect to my #4, you haven’t defined what rationality even is. I agree with you that it is “rational”, but I am interpreting it as my definition because you haven’t provided one.

#2: This is also true, and also doesn’t negate any of my critiques above. You “induction hierarchy” is a concept that can be used to decipher what is most cogent in certain situations; and one just stipulation of the situation is that the inductions have to have the same essential properties.

#3:

Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set.

We can create different distinctive sets and different inductions; but there are a set of relevant factors to the situation and there are better inductions to formulate with those relevant factors than others.

Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.

This is unapplicable to the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations because inductions typically do not have the same “essential properties” (and, as I said above, noting the essential properties of a particular induction, when not referring to the essence of an induction in general, is trivial and makes it unique to every other possible induction).

#4:

This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"

What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality.

And to your point that is supposed to be my point:

I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted

A relevant factor is a piece of information that impacts one’s formulation of possible inductions in the scenario; whereas an essential property of an induction is a property that if removed which change the induction into a different induction. As noted above, noting the essence of an induction is not the same thing as noting the essential properties of a particular induction: the latter leads to your hierarchy being unapplicable to every scenario (because all inductions are unique with that regard) and the former irrelevant to the properties or relevant factors of the situation (as it only outlines abstractly what makes an induction, at its core, an induction). Relevant factors, likewise, aren’t being argued as being a factor that one should use in all their possible inductions to choose from (so they aren’t essential to every induction) but rather are used to formulate possible inductions and then each induction is weighed against one another.

Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction.

This demonstrates, with all due respect, a lack of understanding of what I am saying. Obviously, if I formulate an induction with X and Y, then removing them from the formulation changes the induction to a different one. Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesn’t; so they don’t have the same essential properties. Likewise, if you mean the essence of an induction, that is just what makes an induction an induction at it core which would not have anything do with being a probability, using designs, etc.

To be charitable, I am interpreting you to be claiming not that the induction literally have to have the same essential properties but, rather, that they need to be the exact same inductions apart from their “type” (e.g., a probability, a possibility, a speculation, etc.).

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.

This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think “rationality” should be and see where it goes from there. You haven’t even defined it yet.

Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.

Again, straw man. I am not saying that “well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be”. That’s nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Hume’s guillotine). That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist?

I've proposed what is rational within the theory,

But you haven’t proposed what “rationality” is; just examples of it.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction".

I wasn’t saying you use that term in your methodology, but there is no (as of yet) 1:1 term mapping that gets at what I am talking about within your theory. Hence, I agree with a lot of what you said within your terms of “essential property of formulating inductions”, but:

Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction
…
It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.

There is a difference between claiming that (1) whatever factors are utilized to formulate a particular induction are essential properties thereof and (2) a property is essential to the formulation of inductions within the context in general. We can say, in the box scenario, that the X/Y pattern is essential to the formulation of the pattern induction; but we cannot say that it is essential to the formulation of possible inductions within the context (S). I am not saying that the X/Y pattern is an essential property of the formulation of inductions in S but, rather, that the pattern induction should be used because the relevant factor of the pattern outweighs, in S, the relevant factors of the probability induction (viz., the properties which are of, and are necessary for formulating the specific induction, the pattern induction are better than the properties of the probability induction).

The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions.

You are comparing H1 and H2 via your analysis of determining which relevant factors to use—viz., you are comparing the essential properties of the inductions themselves and determining which ones outweigh the other ones; I don’t see how you can say you are not comparing inductions. However, I get that your comparison criteria doesn’t apply here.

You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use.

Correct. Because by “comparing” you are using it in a narrow sense of the criteria you use to compare inductions which have the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors); but a comparison, in the normal sense of the word, is when one analyzes one thing juxtaposed to another—and that is exactly what one has to do to determine which induction to use in the scenario (by means of comparing relevant factors: essential properties of the inductions themselves).

What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.

No, because, again, you are talking about the comparison of inductions which have the same essential properties when you say “hierarchy”: I am saying that, when comparing inductions which do not have the same essential properties, there is a most cogent and least cogent option (assuming there are at least two). There is a most rational and least rational pick: it is not arbitrary like you are claiming. Which leads me to:

It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.

Just because changing the context affects which relevant factors are most pertinent (and cogent), does not entail that there isn’t an actually most cogent induction to hold. I agree that it is tough decisions, but I specifically chose a scenario where it is obvious (to me) which is the more rational decision.

The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not.

They are not an essential property of whether the box has air or not: they are essential to the formulated induction that proposes that it has air in it or not. The former is to claim it is an essential property of the identity of the boxes, and the latter is to use an accidental property to infer the identity of the boxes.

In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal.

And here is the crux: how, philosophim, is it more ideal if it isn’t more or less rational?

So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

Again, how is it most cogent if someone can equally cogently not include the designs as essential to their inductions? By my lights, you cannot say that one is more or less cogent than the other as essential to one’s inductions if it is not more cogent to include or not include it as essential to one’s inductions: you have now claimed both of these.

For example:

What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is.

And:

So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

I don’t think you can coherently have both here (but correct me if I am wrong).

Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.

This is irrelevant to what I have been saying: we are talking about a specific scenario. I agree that if you change the scenario we have to re-evaluate which is most cogent; but that doesn’t change in the slightest that there is a most cogent solution.

What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification.

I don’t see how it is confirmation bias at all. We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds.

The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!

Happy fourth to you as well my friend!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I feel we're back to discussing the situation properly now and can continue.

Good! I am glad to hear that!

I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent.

You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense.

I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2

Agreed.

I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. You are still comparing the hierarchies, and you must to make a decision; however, you are noting that you are not applying the rules of your “induction hierarchy” to the comparison of the hierarchies themselves, which is fine.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"

My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?

Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)?

I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses

That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. What is relevant to determining what to induce is not a property of an induction nor of an entity within the scenario; but, rather, merely an identified relevant factor of that situation.

A property is an attribute that a thing has, whereas a factor is a piece of information that is relevant to the question at hand.

For example, a property of the induction to pick BWA (in the box scenario) could be that it affirms (or utilizes) the relevant fact of the designs; whereas, the relevant factor of their being a correlation of designs is exactly that despite if it is used in an induction (and consequently if it is a property of any induction made).

You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties.

I was slightly wrong last time I explicated this, so let me clarify: the essential properties factor into what is a relevant factor, but it is not the sole consideration. If in the box scenario you disputed that the boxes which you saw a billion times were actually boxes (due to a difference in what we both considered the essential properties of a box) then will nullify certain aspects as relevant factors to determining if this selected box has air in it. However, I must stress, that the scenario I gave eliminates this possibility of dispute because the essential properties are stipulated from the beginning. So any dispute between what is a relevant factor to determining if the box has air in it is going to stem from something other than essential property disputes of the identity of entities.

I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless.

Also, relevant factors are determined by the stipulations of the scenario (i.e., the context), and so some can outweigh others. For example:

but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort

You have just added a new stipulation (to the others I already gave) to the scenario which changes it. The time limit stipulation will affect what is a relevant factor for inducing a conclusion within the context: you just changed the context.

Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes

Again, you have just changed the context is all. In this scenario, it would depend on if they still trusted the heavy correlation between the designs and the box types. Is someone they trust with their life tagging along with them when they experience the box correlation a billion times (to let them know which one was which)? Anyways, this is all irrelevant to the scenario I gave you.

The relevant factors in the scenario do not change, and the design patter is one of them. It is a relevant factor because it can affect the conclusion (and in this case, quite heavily).

"If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?"

I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entity—I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. The essential properties of the boxes are already given to you as a stipulation. It’s assuming you actually agree that you experienced a billion times a box with design X/Y. Expounding on how we determine what a “box” is is outside of the scope of the scenario.

My point is that you don’t get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it (and that part I left out before). In the scenario, the essential properties of the boxes are already given.

This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone.

I think this is wrong: although it is not a “hierarchy question” in the sense that it bears to relevance to the induction hierarchy criteria, it is nonetheless a comparison of the inductions indirectly based off of the comparison of relevant factors. The minute you decide to go with the pattern you have chosen that induction over the other one by means of comparing the relevant factors and determining that you ought to include the designs in there. You haven’t completely left the inductions behind at this point: you determining the relevant factors to compare them (and, yes, I know that it will not be a comparison in the sense of the “induction hierarchy”).

Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.

I don’t have a problem with this; but I am failing to see where I made these errors of “crossing applicable knowledge with inductions”.

So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential.

As said above, I am not talking about “relevant factors of an identity set”: that is just another way of saying “essential properties of an entity”. I am talking about the factors that are relevant to formulating an induction within the context: these are not the same thing.

The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions.

You applicably know the pattern and the probability in the box scenario, and I am saying that using the pattern is more cogent: you are saying you can’t say whether it is more cogent or not unless I give you what relevant factors the person decides to use.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner.

But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency.

What do you mean? I said that logical consistency is a criteria of being rational: that is a logically consistent position because there is no logical contradiction in claiming that.

If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".

I am saying it is analogous to logical consistency (as well as others); and it is what I mean when I say someone is rational or irrational. If you have a different definition, then I am all ears.

The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications.

The first underlined portion is false: we have never confirmed via an empirical test that the law of non-contradiction is true; secondly, with respect to the second underlined portion, that is circular logic: you are saying that LNC is true because it does not contradict reality which, in turn, presupposes that a law cannot both be true and false of reality—which is the LNC and that premise is what you were supposed to prove in the onset. You basically just said LNC is true because LNC.

Our desires to not change this

Desires do not change what is in reality; but it does affect what we come to claim to know about reality. If a proposition cannot be both true and false, then that is either true or false irregardless of what we both desire; however, if either of us claim either way, then our claims will bottom out at desires. This is hume’s guillotine at work here.

Likewise, rationality is different than LNC insofar as it is something that does NOT exist in the world beyond our wills: it is utterly dependent on what we think we ought to be doing—and obligations are not objective.

Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now.

Bob

Also, to clarify my distinction between the essential properties of an identity of an entity and the relevant factors of resolving a dilemma within a context; it can be noted that both are essential properties: just not pertaining to the same thing. To say that I can decide what I think is essential to what this "entity" is does not mean that I can decide what is an essential factor to assessing the entire situation. For example, a essential factor of assessment of a context can be an accidental property of an entity within the context, and an essential property of an entity within the context can be irrelevant to one's assessment. I can choose what I use to identify an entity within the context, but I don't get to choose what is relevant to assessing the dilemma within that context.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate the elaboration: I see more clearly now what you are and are not saying. I want to say it back to you so as to confirm that I am getting it right:

You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant (e.g., if X/Y and A/B, then go with A; if just A/B, then go with B; etc.); but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct?

After re-reading the OP and essays, I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. In your essays and OP, you never discuss relevant factors of a context (i.e., situation) in the manner that I am talking about but, rather, essential properties: the latter being what is essential to the identity of an entity, whereas the former is what is essential to the consideration of the resolution to a dilemma within a context. My creation of distinctions plays no role in what is relevant to figuring out the best solution to a problem within a context: the relevant factors are any factors (i.e., bits of information) within the context that could affect the decision.

To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.
...
I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I don’t believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.
...
I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality.

So, if I say that what is essential (i.e., relevant) to determining whether my dog is in that room or not is only the probability, that tells me nothing in-itself about what the actual set of relevant factors are to determining whether my dog is in that room or not in reality: I have to apply a test to figure that out, which is, by definition, applicable knowledge.

My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test.

So far, you keep insisting that which set one will use is utterly determined by which factors are considered relevant, and the determination of what is relevant is merely distinctive—not applicable. However, this is wrong: there are an actual set of relevant factors to whether my dog is in that room and it is unconditioned by my distinctive knowledge of it.

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered

The problem is that you don’t get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they don’t get to choose that part.

Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.

Yes, this is fine; but there is an actual most cogent set to choose (over the others).

But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational.

To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequate—all to the best of one’s ability. If I say that X is true and false, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I say that X is true but do not realize that I am also implying it is false, then I am not thereby being irrational; if I say that I can explain the data with X and still insist on explaining it with X + Y, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I explain it with X + Y as I do not realize I can explain it with just X, then I am not thereby being irrational; etc.

Also, as a side note, standards, which ground all reasoning and justification, are fundamentally grouned in wants (i.e., ought statements); but the idea is to try and hold what provides the best utility towards truth. Just because parsimony bottoms out at a want, which may be an intellectual seeming in this case, does not mean it cannot be a criteria for the standards of what being rational is. All of our epistemic imperatives (e.g., what we use to do science) and moral imperatives bottom out at wants. As a matter of fact, all of our reasoning does: our will’s are what furnish us with our principles that we think we are obligated to use during our derivations.

A desire is not a rational argument.

Desires, ultimately, are what define what “being rational” is. There’s no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define “being rational” as including “abiding by the LNC”. That doesn’t make my argument irrational.

That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.

Yes, that is what I have been asking about with the H2 and H1 in S question.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Happy Saturday Bob!

You too!

you keep saying things that show you don't understand the paper...I think it would help you greatly to re-read the paper first

Fair enough: I will re-read the OP and the papers (from the previous discussion board); however, I feel as though I am asking a very clear question that doesn’t require re-reading the paper, so I am going to ask again but with as much clarity as I possibly can.

We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. An answer to that question is not to throw the question back at me: it doesn’t matter why I think it is more cogent: you said it was here:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

If you think it is more rational, then I can ask “why under your view is it more rational?”. You, then, cannot simply respond with “why do you, bob, think it is more rational?”.

So, let me start over with the question and ask:

Do you think it is more cogent to pick H1, H2, or neither (are more cogent) in S?

If you answer one over the other, then I am asking a follow up question of:

Under your view, what makes one more cogent over the other?

Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?

I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions.

This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond

I said this in the example:

This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).

The example wasn’t demonstrating that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies is flawed: it was noting, just like with the box example, that there is no way to determine the most cogent thing to do in the situation because there are two hierarchies that cannot be compared.

You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here

I apologize if that is the case, but, as I showed above, I did not straw man your position and I did anticipate that response by purposely explicating that I am not claiming that in the example itself (as seen above). You just ignored or missed it in my response.

Again, forget about my claim that H2 and H1 are within an over-arching hierarchy: that is irrelevant right now. Forget that I said that and deal with what I am saying right now.

You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man

Agreed, that is a straw man. I am saying that because the two inductions do not use the same “identity sets”, I have, in the box and dog example, no way of determining which is more cogent to use because they are of two distinct hierarchies.

You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim.

Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you can’t compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). My rationale for why I think it is more cogent is irrelevant. For example, if I thought it was more cogent to pick H1 over H2, I could still validly ask why you think H2 is more cogent than H1 because it appears as though there is no way to determine this under your view.

But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say “yeah, that’s probably a BWA”.

Again, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent when, as far as I can tell, your epistemology affords no means of determining it. Is it an intellectual seeming to you? Is it because it is more parsimonious? Is it something else? You still have yet to answer!!!

No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.

Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): I’ve asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You haven’t even responded.

Perhaps, if the question is truly unanswerable, then please demonstrate why. If it is because I am misremembering something, then let me know what exactly (briefly). I don’t see why you can’t at least answer it within the schema of your methodology.

I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.

Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do.

I am not going to respond to the distinctive knowledge stuff yet until after I re-read the essays. Plus, I think there’s plenty for you to respond to herein already.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Mikie,

But I’m not sure your characterization of AA is correct. There’s strong arguments in favor of it.

Could you elaborate on some of them? Otherwise, I am unsure as to what about my characterization is incorrect.

Every one of these controversial cases are along party lines. When things are so predictable, you know it’s not a matter of a fair assessment of evidence — it’s foregone.

Everything you said along these lines is perfectly accurate: I am not trying to defend dogmatic political actions but, rather, I was just agreeing with their decision on AA (regardless of why they chose to decide such). I just happen to agree that AA is wrong, if that makes sense.

Bob

Hello Mikie,

Although helping the underprivileged is something we should all strive to do, I think that the use of someone's race or gender as a criteria or indicator of need is insufficient (to accomplish the goal of helping those in need), racist, "genderist", sexist, and immoral. If a college wants to allocate funds, admission slots, etc. for underprivileged candidates, then that is perfectly fine with me--but their race, for example, should have nothing to do with that decision.

It is insufficient to achieve the goal (of helping the underprivileged), because you can most certainly have children of all races that are in desperate (or moderate) need of help and, without it, will definitely not have the majority of opportunities they otherwise could have had; and usually it is of no fault of their own. If someone uses gender, sex, or race, they are going to inevitably include people that don't need the help and will exclude people that do need it. Better indicators are financial indications (e.g., how much does their family make? What jobs do they have?), family indications (e.g., do they have a family? Are they abusive?), etc.

It is racist, sexist, and "genderist" because no person should ever be punished or rewarded for merely the skin color, sex, or gender that they have: period. These are not indicators of merit, need, or otherwise.

It is immoral because I believe that we should be striving towards a world with the maximal sovereignty of wills, and this entails disbanding from judging people on their race, sex, and gender.

I think we can salvage the good intention of affirmative action while disbanding from the bad: we can allow schools to shift their criteria to allocate help for the underprivileged that does not consider directly their race, sex, or gender.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophims,

Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.

You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesn’t matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isn’t what they should be doing. What they should be doing, is exactly what the epistemic theory is supposed to furnish us with.

Which leads me to:

The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around

You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesn’t tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do.

Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. If I want to survive and there’s a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out alive—and my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events.

If you are claiming that the hierarchy is contingent on the distinctive knowledge, then that’s another area of dispute us.

Just because we have to use our discrete experiences to get at reality, that does not entail that what is most cogent is contingent on our discrete experiences (nor knowledge that we distinctively derive therefrom).

Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.

I know you have expounded this before, but can you briefly give a couple examples (so I can re-evaluate them)? I honestly don’t think it applies to most situations. Take a simple example that is analogous to the scenario which I gave you before: is my dog in the other room?

Let’s say I know there is a 50% chance that he is in the room and that I am outside of the room (with the door closed). The probability was calculated by a person who, with me not looking our hearing anything, flipped a fair coin and if it is heads will put my dog in the room (and if tails, won’t).

Now, to make this analogous and render your hierarchy useless to this situation, I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dog’s bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).

This is true of vast majority of situations, including possibility vs. possibility (which can also have two which use different relevant factors), possibility vs. plausibility, etc.--I can keep adding example after example if you would like.

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."

This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. What I can epistemically do is different from what I should epistemically do. If I reject the hierarchy in a situation where it is clearly applicable in favor of something less formidable, then I am being less cogent. I don’t get to just say “well, you can’t complain because it is my distinctive knowledge”.

But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.

You can’t say there are more risks in choosing A over B if you can’t determine A as a more cogent option than B: those claims go hand-in-hand. If there’s more risk in being wrong, then I would imagine that actually factors into the cogency of the decision.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question:

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not?

I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why.

I am refraining from derailing into why I think H2 and H1 in S are within a over-arching hierarchy, H3, because my critique here applies either way: it doesn’t matter. Forget about that for now.

In the question I asked, I am granting the hierarchy itself is stable and legitimate: the critique is of the comparison of hierarchies themselves.

So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.
…
I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.

I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it.

I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: it’s the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. Imagine, perhaps if it helps, that I don’t have a solution to provide you: so what? If I don’t have a solution, then it doesn’t change the fact that either you do or you have to concede that your epistemology fails in this regard.

Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!

You too my friend! (:

Bob

Hello Mww,

The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.

How can a self “think transcendentally” but not be a transcendental self? Those sound like the same thing to me.

This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different.

True.

When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;

Included in what act? I didn’t quite follow this part. The “I think” would be the act itself and different from the explication (to ourselves) of the act—but that, to me, is still a concession that the “I think” is transcendental and, thusly, not the mere aggregate of appearances of a self.

That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;

I didn’t follow this part either: what do you mean?

That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.

Correct.

The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.

I honestly don’t think his works (especially CPR) are well written, so, yeah, I mean he tend to presuppose a lot of things slash say things that can be interpreted three or four different ways without clarification.

I must agree with
↪Janus
when he says you’re not listening.

Well, I apologize, but I feel as though I have been. For example:

I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless.

This is not evidence that I am not listening: I have said many times that I understand that you find whatever convinced you insignificant but that I would like to hear it anyways (if you don’t mind). And:

Same with requests for proofs

This is just semantics. By ‘proof’, I think I have been clearly asking for ‘whatever pursuaded you’ which is not equivalent to whatever you are using the term for with respect to theories. Bottom line is that something convinced you and if you don’t want to share it (for whatever reason) then that is fine. I was just curious.

Also, theories have proofs; but I would reckon you are referring to something wholly different by ‘proof’ than me.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. For the applicability of your induction hierarchy itself is miniscule in the practical world: very (and I mean very) rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. Sure, we can dissect that one particular piece of sand and understand the cogency hierarchy within that oddly specific scenario, but it isn’t relevant to the other millions of particles of sand. In order for a epistemic methodology to be viable, I would argue, it must, at the very least, be able to provide what is most cogent to hold generally in the vast majority of cases—not a small minority.

Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose.

I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; that’s like me saying that people can choose what level of detail to use when it comes the hierarchy itself—e.g., I choose to exclude probabilities, so I choose this possibility. No, we both agree there is actually something most cogent to choose within each hierarchy: I don’t get to shift that into distinctive knowledge. Likewise, there is something most cogent in relation to the hierarchies we generate for the scenario: I don’t get to shift that into my distinctive knowledge. Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time”, I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide.

The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context."

To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. Again, we normally do not face possible inductions that use the exact same relevant factors—the real world doesn’t work like that.

If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. I am not saying you have to have an incredibly oddly detailed equation for determining cogency—but you should have a general account.

For example, I actually think that the best criteria of knowledge is a justified belief, and the factors for justification are: internal coherence, external coherence, parsimony, logical consistency, reliability of supporting data, intellectual seemings, and explanatory power. These are NOT super specific criteria, but I am not saying “you do you, and that’s what’s most cogent”: epistemologies are supposed to give general guidelines for how to acquire knowledge, but yours seems to revolve around a very miniscule scenario where the inductions have the exact same relevant factors.

If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; but I understand you do not see it that way, so I am conveying my point in the form of “comparing hierarchies”.

So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am not going to answer this yet, because that is what I was originally asking you and you still haven’t answered. So far, all I am understanding you to say is that your methodology doesn’t tell them what to do (i.e., “whatever fits best for you in the context”).

Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge?

I don’t use your exact epistemology, so that is why I am asking you for clarification; but I can attempt an answer (after yours) of a potential solution under your epistemology by my lights.

Bob

Hello Mww,

If you would like to not give a proof, then that is perfectly fine. But, to clarify, I am saying I would like to hear your proof (or argument) for what convinced you of it.

My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant. I’m sufficiently persuaded by the affirmative argument to think he’s come up with a perfectly fascinating metaphysical theory. That’s it

It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. I’m curious what convinced you, as you clearly interpreted the text differently than me.

On your “Of The Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception” quote, the very next line after what you posted, shoots your argument in the foot.

I don’t think it did. Here’s the whole snippet:

The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think”, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But the representation, “I think” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive aperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations...the unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it

He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self; and that the transcendental self is the necessary precondition (i.e., subject: mind) for the former.

Bob

Hello Janus,

The categories of understanding are identifiable simply by reflecting on the ways we experience and judge things; nothing at all to do with the thing-in-itself.

All I was asking Mww in the quote you made of me was to expound briefly the argument for the twelve categories that he hold and not that he is trying to prove that they are things-in-themselves nor a part of a thing-in-itself.

Now, you correct that I do think that the 12 categories, if they existed, would be a part of a mind which, in turn, would be a thing-in-itself; but that is irrelevant to what I was asking Mww for.

The problem is, Bob, I don't think you are listening to anyone else.

I hope that is not the case: I do my absolute best to hear everyone’s perspectives; but I just think it is wrong to think that we can claim there are 12 categories of the understanding and not admit to ourselves that the understanding is either an (1) illusion or (2) a part of a thing-in-itself.

I appreciate your chiming in and please continue to do so as you deem fit!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy.

Let try to clarify what I am understanding you to be saying and then explicate the problem I am bringing up; because I think I am agreeing with you more than you might be realizing.

You are saying that in this scenario the two inductions (i.e., a probability and pattern) are within separate inductive hierarchies because they do not use the same essential properties (i.e., what I call “relevant factors”). Thusly, they cannot be compared to each other. It would look like this:

Hierarchy 1 (H1): probability
Hierarchy 2 (H2): pattern

In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold.

I agree with you here (in terms of what I just explained) and correct me if I am getting it wrong.

Now, perhaps to explicate this clearer, I am going to distinguish “comparing inductions” from “comparing hierarchies”. We both agree that both inductions are within their own hierarchies and thusly cannot be compared; however, I am talking about comparing hierarchies.

In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1.

Now, the actual crux of determining the cogency, because otherwise it is arbitrary, is comparing H2 to H1 in S. If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean?

I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone?

I don’t have a problem with it, because you are just separating them out into different hierarchies, but then that is where the issue I am talking about arises (as explicated above).

You can say there is a probability and a pattern and they don’t use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors), but you still can’t evaluate which is more cogent to use in S because you can’t compare H2 to H1 without it being arbitrary (so far) under your view.

You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context.

To clarify, now that you clarified that you are separating them into different hierarchies, I am saying that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S.

I understand that within H1, for example, if there was a pattern and a probability, then the probability is more cogent in H1: but you’ve now expanded this into multiple hierarchies.

Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference.

It makes a difference when you are comparing hierarchies: H2 to H1. All you are noting here is that within H2 or H1 the miniscule odds do not matter.

Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.

You seem to try to resolve this issue I am talking about by just leaving it up to the person, but I am saying that it actually is more cogent to use H2 instead of H1 in S. Jimmy can disregard the pattern all he wants, and he would still be making an irrational decision.

I think all your scenarios with Jimmy missed the point, because you are just, again, elaborating on what is most cogent in a hierarchy while missing the point that you have two equally cogent hierarchies according to your position: you can’t claim, without further proof or elaboration, that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S. I am trying to see if you think it is an arbitrary choice (i.e., left up to the person to decide) or if you think it is actually more cogent to choose H2 over H1 in S.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Bob

Hello Mww,

My interest here is waning , sorry to say.

Absolutely no worries! We can stop at anytime that you deem fit.

Convinced of a proof grounded in an idea? Nahhhh….no more than persuaded, and that in conjunction with his claim that he’s thought of everything relevant, and needs nothing from me to complete the thesis. For me to think he could have done better, or that he trips all over himself, implies I’m smarter than he, which I readily admit as hardly being the case.

I didn’t see a proof in that quote of the 12 categories of the understanding but, rather, a summary of transcendental philosophy.

Funny, though, innit? To help you understand? You realize, don’t you, that is beyond my abilities? No matter what anybody says in attempting to help you, you’re still on your own after they’ve said whatever it is they going to say. And because you’ve rejected some parts, it isn’t likely you’re going to understand the remainder as a systemic whole, which necessarily relates to the parts rejected.

Come on Mwww! (; If you are convinced that there are twelve categories, then you should be able to articulate the proof that convinced you. I am not asking for a super meticulous exposition of all of transcendental philosophy: I already understand the basic transcendental idealistic context for the argument.

I am just curious, within that context, why you would think there are these twelve categories. Why not, for example, hold there is one: the PSR of becoming. Why place the function and purpose of reason in the understanding, such as concepts?

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I see what you are saying, but the problem is that there is not means of determining the cogency when comparing:

After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.

According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You can’t say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say “no it doesn’t seem silly to just go off of the probability”. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation).

You're still hung up on comparing that pattern to the probability though. You can't because you're not considering the same properties in both instances. It doesn't work that way. Stop it Bob. :D

I totally am (; I mean:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

You can’t say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that there’s absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that!

I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.

Let’s make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine there’s a third participant, Jimmy, who isn’t too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isn’t misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability.

We are both witnessing this irrational decision, and we want to help Jimmy not make a collosally dangerous mistake here in his reasoning; but, according to your methodology, what are we to cite as his mistake in his reasoning? What is it philosophim?!? Absolutely nothing. He did everything by the books.

The fact that people can misunderstand, misuse, or make mistakes in applying a methodology is not a critique on the methodology. Do we discount algebra because it takes some time to learn or master? No.

But, Philosophim, Jimmy isn’t misapplying your methodology—it just doesn’t afford an answer to what is the most rational and cogent decision between the inductions! The mistake is in the lack of usefulness of the methodology, not Jimmy’s application of it!

What justification would you give to Jimmy to try and save him?

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I understand better what you are arguing, but, in light of it, I think, by my lights, that is a concession that the hierarchy does not function (as I thought it was intended) in this scenario; and here is the crux of it:

That depends on what you find essential in pulling the boxes.

Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting that these two inductions (which pertain to answering the same question in the same context) cannot be evaluated with respect to each other to decipher which is more cogent because you are generating two different hierarchies for them; and you are expressing this in the form of saying that it is up to the person to define what they think is essential. However, this is very problematic.

Firstly, unless there is some sort of separate criteria in your methodology for what one should consider essential, then it seems like, according to your methodology, a truly arbitrary decision of what is essential. I am ok with the idea of letting distinctive knowledge be ultimately definitional: but now you are extending it to applicable knowledge.

Secondly, because it is an arbitrary decision whether one wants to include the X and Y designs into their consideration, the crux of the cogency of their induction is not furnished nor helped by your induction hierarchy and, thusly, your methodology provides no use in this scenario. I think you are agreeing with me here implicitly by admitting that you had to generating to two competing but completely uncomparable hierarchies. This is a clear demonstration of the inapplicability of your methodology to determine cogency of inductions.

Thirdly, I find that it would actually be less cogent to go with the probability (in that scenario) and someone merely saying they don’t want to include the designs as essential doesn’t seem like a rational counter. The strong pattern, in this case, clearly outweighs using the miniscule probability. So I think that, as far as I am understanding it, using this methodology in this scenario can lead people to making an irrational decision (in the case that they arbitrarily exclude their knowledge of the patterns).

To me, this is the cost of claiming these two inductions as uncomparable, and it seems way too high to me to accept.

Would you at least agree that this scenario demonstrates how your methodology affords no help in some scenarios?

The bridge between them cannot be made (according to you) and so you have to arbitrarily pick which hierarchy to use.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

An example of the hierarchy
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I pull 1 billion A's and 1 billion Bs.
…
Another example of the hierarchy:
Probability of getting either A or B with design X is 75% or Y at 25%
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y
…
An example that is NOT the hierarchy:
Probability 49/51% of getting either A or B.
Pattern I always pull an A with X, and always pull a B with Y

I understand what you are conveying, but this just segues into my questions because if you are saying that the inductive hierarchy doesn’t apply (like in your last example one above), then, by my lights, it is useless (since it cannot be applied) for practical examples. My scenario is an example of that. But to not get ahead of myself, please answer my previous questions directly.

Bob

My internet is down so I'm having to type these on the phone for now.

Absolutely no problem! I will answer your questions, but my questions aren't related directly to yours; so if you could answer them as well that would be much appreciated!

Take the situation with X and Y properties, then come up with a probability, a possibility/pattern, and a plausibility. Add no other properties, and remove none. Then show if a lower hierarchy results in a more cogent decision.

My situation is an example of this, and to keep it simpler I excluded a plausibility: do you want me to add in a plausibility as well? I think it will just clutter up the discussion adding it in.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y.

To do that, in my scenario, we would have to add in the idea that each box has a 50.001% of it being a BWOA and design Y, and you've experienced design X <-> BWA and design Y <-> BWOA a billion times. I just don't see the relevance of this, as it is no longer the same scenario, but that is my answer.

Bob

And I should clarify for question #3 that by "question" I am referring to the same asked one within the context. Of course, I could ask question X in context Y and question X in context Z, but I am asking you if you think that all possible inductions formulated for answering question X in context Y are within the same context. If that makes any sense.

I will refurbish it in the original post.

Hello Philosophim,

You usually do fair readings, but this time you're not. I've told you how the theory works, you don't get to say my own theory doesn't work the way I told you!

I apologize if I am misunderstanding you! To better understand what you are saying, let me ask you these:

1. In the scenario I gave, is the possibility or the probability what you would go with (or perhaps neither)?

2. Do you agree with me that if you decide one over the other that you are thereby comparing them?

3. Do you agree that all the possible inductions for a question within a context are thereby within the same context as each other?

In this case, you're telling me the theory I made should be something different. That's a straw man...But insisting it is something it is not is wrong.

Although I think I understand what you are saying, it isn’t necessarily a straw man to point out that a theory needs to be revised; and that is what I am trying to convey.

From your perspective, you just disagree with that; but that doesn’t make it a straw man argument.

I am going stop here for now because I need to know your answers.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I think we have finally pinned down the disagreement: so I am going to focus on that. Which can be summarized on your post as:

If you introduce new properties which are of consideration within the probability, that is a new context.
…

A^B != A^B & X^Y

You can have two induction which use different relevant factors to infer a solution to the same question in the same context. The use of different relevant factors does not change the context.

The context in the scenario includes both the information that the probability of pulling a BWOA is 51% and that you’ve experienced the design correlation which can be used to produce two induction that use different relevant factors in the context to derive a solution.

To summarize:

1. The context does not split into two contexts in virtue of the possible inductions using different relevant factors.

2. You have to compare them, because you must either use one or the other as your inductive inference.

#1, A ^ B & X^Y are a part of the same context: the inductions are what use varying aspects of that context. They are not two separate contexts themselves if they are a part of the same scenario and answering the same question with in that scenario.

#2, It is very clear in the scenario that you have to compare them, so if you are saying that the induction hierarchy is unapplicable then it is useless for practical situations and thusly warrants a new methodology.

You do agree that you are comparing them by saying that you think the pattern is most cogent, right? If so, then you are contradicting your claim that they cannot be compared (because they are different contexts).

You are not asking the same question

Perhaps the scenario wasn’t clear enough: within the scenario you know (1) probability of pulling BWOA and (2) a strong correlation with the designs; this is within the same scenario. The question that is asked is “does this randomly pulled box have air?”, and that question is within that same scenario. Since both bits of knowledge are within the same scenario, you can either to induce a conclusion; but not both (because they contradict each other). There’s no room for you to claim that it isn’t asking the same question.

Obviously, the inductions themselves are using different relevant factors, and so they don’t reach the same exact conclusion (in this case) nor do they have the same reasoning behind them; but that doesn’t matter: you have to compare those two inductions to see which is more cogent to hold.

Think of it this way. You say that the pattern is more cogent in the scenario, but I say it is the probability. If you also hold that you can’t accurately compare them, then you can’t claim my conclusion (to the same question within the same scenario) is less cogent. As a matter of fact, you wouldn’t be able to justify you own claim that it is cogent at all. Do you see the problem here?

Otherwise its just a strawman argument.

I honestly think this is an iron man argument, and your hierarchy is being demonstrated to break here. I think you agree that the pattern is more cogent, so we are getting closer to seeing why.

You are just noting that the inductions themselves don’t use the same factors, but that is irrelevant to the dilemma: which are you going to use to make your educated guess? The one that is more cogent. But, wait, according to you, they can’t be compared! So, according to you, you could only say it is undeterminable. Do you see what I mean?

Simply prove the coin flip example wrong, and then you'll be able to back that its not proven

This is unproductive to say this. I already addressed this: in the coin flip example you are right, but it doesn’t imply that probabilities are more cogent than possibilities. The antecedent does not imply the consequent that you want it to.

For example, if I claimed “giving someone a hug is always worse than killing them” and tried to prove it with the example:

1. A person is skinning your wife alive.
2. You go give them a hug.
3. That was worse than if you would have killed them (to defend your wife).

You could agree with the example and disagree that it proves the claim I made: no problem.

In logic, you are a committing a fallacy of a claim about the some to the all, and I can demonstrate it in a predicate logic:

∃y∃x (Prob<x> & Poss<y> & Better<this: x, than: y>) ⊬ ∀y∀x (Prob<x> & Poss<y> & Better<this: x, than: y>)

Thusly, I can completely agree with you on the coin example and claim that that is insufficient to prove that all probabilities are better than possibilities. You asking for me to disprove it disregards what I am telling you my position is: you would have to provide a proof that ever probability is better than a possibility, which is clearly unafforded by your example.

After, do the same as above, but this time add in the X/Y consideration for all the inductions. All the inductions must now include the X/Y.

They don’t. In real-world practical (and theoretical) scenarios, there are a range of possible inductions one could use that are (1) competing and (2) using different factors of that context. One has to pick one as the most cogent inference. Period. If you hierarchy cannot handle this scenario, then it isn’t complete enough.

Bob