After pulling literally two billion boxes and noticing there was a 100% match of design to air or not air, it seems silly not to consider it.

According to the entirety of your methodology (and not just the hierarchy), there is no justification for this claim you have made here. You can’t say it is less cogent, even when it seems obvious that it is, for a person to say “no it doesn’t seem silly to just go off of the probability”. Without a clear criteria in your view, the vast majority of scenarios end up bottoming out at this kind of stalemate (because the hierarchy is unapplicable to the situation). — Bob Ross

Well, no, there's a clear criteria. You go for what is most cogent in the property situation you have. Taken another way Bob, if you know the probability of the boxes for X/Y was 25/75, but you've also randomly pulled 50/50 on your boxes so far, its more cogent to go with the probability. Again, the issue is you're taking two different inductions with two different identities when the hierarchy is used for two different inductions with the same identities.

I totally am (; I mean:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

You can’t say this if you generated two separate, uncomparable hierarchies and there is nothing else in the methodology that determines cogency of inductions! Philosophim, you are admitting it is more cogent and that there’s absolutely no justification in your methodology for knowing that! — Bob Ross

I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone? Isolate this point from all other points and tell me where you think this is flawed.

Take the above, and just realize that when you include the X/Y properties, the highest induction you can make is a pattern. You don't have a known probability on the X/Y properties. So when you refer to the boxes as "just boxes", the most cogent thing is to take the 49/51 split. When you refer to the boxes as having a X/Y distinction, you take the pattern as you have no known probability with the X/Y distinction.

You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context. To my mind, I've never intended to imply that. Its always been within contextual identities. I don't know how else to communicate this to you. But any claim to the contrary is again, a straw man.

I 100% agree with you that it is most rational, but the problem in your view is you cannot justify it.

Let’s make the danger in having no means of determining cogency of the inductions more clear in this scenario: imagine that if you guess incorrectly they kill you. Now, we both agree that the obviously more cogent and rational move is to bet it is a BWA; but imagine there’s a third participant, Jimmy, who isn’t too bright. He goes off of the probability. Now, he isn’t misapplying your methodology by choosing to go off of the probability: he carefully and meticulously outlines the hierarchies involved in the context just like you, and realized (just like you) that he cannot compare them and is at a stalemate. He decides that he will use the probability. — Bob Ross

First, the risk of outcome does not change what is more cogent within the hierarchy. Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference. We'll make them miniscule when its all over, but for now, we'll say a air/no air is 25/75. What is rational is always rational. We simply decide to go with the less rational alternative sometimes due to how much it might cost us to be rational such as time/effort, and risk of reward/punishment, but this does not change what is rational in the hierarchy.

If Jimmy did a meticulous comparison, he would have a choice not in going against the hierarchy, but in determining the essential properties he considers in regards to the box. Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.

1. Don't use the hierarchy

So Jimmy just guesses. Is that more rational than using the 25/75? No, I think we both agree on this.

2. Use the hierarchy

Jimmy guesses "not air". He may be wrong, but it was the most rational choice.

Ok, now lets do the miniscule odds. Its not much more rational in this case, but its still the most rational to use the hierarchy. The difference in odds, no matter how miniscule, does not change the outcome. if X > Y, its always greater than Y and therefore the most rational choice. This is proven and really not debatable.

Now Jimmy includes the X/Y pattern. He knows both the probability without the X/Y, but also the pattern with the X/Y. He pulls an X. Since he does not have a probability which concerns am X/Y correlation, the most cogent induction he has when including the X/Y is the pattern. Therefore, according to the hierarchy, he would choose that the X had air.

We're going to change this example up a bit more however to make things more clear. Now we're going to include two new pieces of information. First, we have the total number of boxes at 100. Second, Jimmy has pulled 10 boxes. Third, Jimmy has pulled 3 X's, and 7 Y's. Fourth, the question is now, "Will Jimmy's next box he pull have air or not?"

While the pattern for X/Y's still holds, in this question, Jimmy can't see the pattern ahead of time. The X/Y consideration has been removed. So what's the most cogent thing for him to do? Take the probability without considering the X/Y pattern. So the most rational choice would be "air". And if Jimmy were then also asked, "What pattern do you think the box is going to be?" he would reply, "X", because now the X/Y pattern is pertinent and he still doesn't have the odds for what the X/Y air/no air outcome would be.

I'm not sure I can make it more clear at this point. Just to let you know, I do not need the hierarchy to be right. I've worked on this for years, and have many, many times realized I was wrong or illogical in my claims here, so being wrong again is simply an opportunity for me to refine it better, or try a new approach. What I need is something logical, of which I have failed at countless times before. :) So trust me, I'm as interested in thinking about this critically as you are.

But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy. If you need a refresher, just post what you believe the hierarchy entails and I can agree/correct points so that way we're on the same page. I want to find whether the hierarchy holds, not keep clarifying what the hierarchy is. I think a major problem is you're taking a more complex problem without understanding the fundamentals of a basic problem. The complex problem is simply the application of the basics to a reasonable conclusion. Try to take your critiques of the complex problem and apply them to a simple problem first and maybe that will bring clarity in either understanding the hierarchy, or showing me if there is a flaw.

I look forward to hearing your replies Bob.

Hello Philosophim,

But try as well to be as critical to your own argument too. You keep misunderstanding the hierarchy.

Let try to clarify what I am understanding you to be saying and then explicate the problem I am bringing up; because I think I am agreeing with you more than you might be realizing.

You are saying that in this scenario the two inductions (i.e., a probability and pattern) are within separate inductive hierarchies because they do not use the same essential properties (i.e., what I call “relevant factors”). Thusly, they cannot be compared to each other. It would look like this:

Hierarchy 1 (H1): probability
Hierarchy 2 (H2): pattern

In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold.

I agree with you here (in terms of what I just explained) and correct me if I am getting it wrong.

Now, perhaps to explicate this clearer, I am going to distinguish “comparing inductions” from “comparing hierarchies”. We both agree that both inductions are within their own hierarchies and thusly cannot be compared; however, I am talking about comparing hierarchies.

In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1.

Now, the actual crux of determining the cogency, because otherwise it is arbitrary, is comparing H2 to H1 in S. If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean?

I think you missed what I did then. I didn't compare the two different property setups, I simply overlapped them. I've said it several times now, but its worth repeating. The probability in the first case is regarding an identity with less essential properties than the second case. So I can very easily say, "All boxes have a 49/51% chance for air/not air". Since the probability does not consider X/Y pattern, it does not tell us the probability of air/not air for an X/Y pattern. So if we disregard the X/Y, we hold that probability. To help me to see if I'm communicating this correctly, what is the problem with this notion alone?

I don’t have a problem with it, because you are just separating them out into different hierarchies, but then that is where the issue I am talking about arises (as explicated above).

You can say there is a probability and a pattern and they don’t use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors), but you still can’t evaluate which is more cogent to use in S because you can’t compare H2 to H1 without it being arbitrary (so far) under your view.

You seem very hung up on this idea that a probability is always more cogent then a lower portion of the hierarchy no matter the circumstance of context.

To clarify, now that you clarified that you are separating them into different hierarchies, I am saying that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S.

I understand that within H1, for example, if there was a pattern and a probability, then the probability is more cogent in H1: but you’ve now expanded this into multiple hierarchies.

Second, I'm going to change the odds for a bit because we need to get you off this idea that the odds being miniscule make a difference.

It makes a difference when you are comparing hierarchies: H2 to H1. All you are noting here is that within H2 or H1 the miniscule odds do not matter.

Does he include the X/Y design as part of his potential identification of whether the box has air or not? Let say Jimmy's not very smart and doesn't see a correlation of the X/Y pattern with air/not air. Jimmy has two options then.

You seem to try to resolve this issue I am talking about by just leaving it up to the person, but I am saying that it actually is more cogent to use H2 instead of H1 in S. Jimmy can disregard the pattern all he wants, and he would still be making an irrational decision.

I think all your scenarios with Jimmy missed the point, because you are just, again, elaborating on what is most cogent in a hierarchy while missing the point that you have two equally cogent hierarchies according to your position: you can’t claim, without further proof or elaboration, that H2 is more cogent than H1 in S. I am trying to see if you think it is an arbitrary choice (i.e., left up to the person to decide) or if you think it is actually more cogent to choose H2 over H1 in S.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Bob

In the scenario, there are no other inductions that use the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors) and since there are only two given the two hierarchies only contain one induction; which entails that within each hierarchy each induction is by default the most cogent to hold. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's right.

In the scenario, which let’s say is context S, there are two hierarchies, H1 and H2. Although you can’t compare the inductions, you have to compare the hierarchies to decide which is most cogent to go with (because it is a dilemma: either use the probability or the pattern—there’s no other option). Now, if we are to claim that in S H2 is more cogent than H1 (and thusly go with the pattern), then there must be some sort of criteria we used to compare H2 to H1 in S. If not, then we cannot claim either is more or less cogent to each other and, consequently, cannot claim that using the pattern is more or less cogent than the probability and if that is the case, then it is an arbitrary decision between using H2 over H1. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I see your issue now. Your issue is not with the hierarchy. Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose. The hierarchy does not make any such claims. It does not say, "Taking only A/B is more cogent then considering A/B and X/Y." As I thought, you're lumping too much together instead of seeing all the parts as separate first. The solution to understand this is to first stop looking at the hierarchy entirely and go back to our understanding of distinctive knowledge.

If you recall, there is no limit to what we can distinctively know, or how we choose to identify existences. If I want, I can say a tree is a plant made of wood and leaves. Or I could say a tree is what fits to the level of detail that a botanist would consider. Of course the question we can ask next is, "What should I use?"

The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context." The more detailed the identity, the more time and effort it takes to verify that what you are looking at is applicably known as that identity. If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

In less risky circumstances, you may not care about there being further details to a tree then leaves and wood. Its not like a more detailed botanical explanation is going to affect your life in any way. Why waste time using such an identity when it benefits you in no way?

Notice how none of these questions have anything to do with the hierarchy. If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation. The hierarchy of inductions in and of itself does not evaluate the effort or risk to yourself in deciding how many attributes you should or should not include in your identity. What it can do however, is help you determine the most rational course of action if you limit the question appropriately.

If that is the case, then the hierarchy analysis that you keep giving, which would apply to H2 and H1, isn't doing any actual work in evaluating in S what is the most cogent decision to make. Do you see what I mean? — Bob Ross

If you mean the hierarchy isn't doing the work in telling you whether H1 or H2 is more cogent to pick, you're right. The hierarchy rules do not tell you what set of distinctive properties you should pick without context. That's an entirely separate discussion, which of course we can have.

So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1? Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge? Can you use the hierarchy of inductions correctly to do so? And if not, that's ok, Its more of a check to see if you understand. I'll add my own agreements or critiques after I see yours.

Hello Philosophim,

I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. For the applicability of your induction hierarchy itself is miniscule in the practical world: very (and I mean very) rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. Sure, we can dissect that one particular piece of sand and understand the cogency hierarchy within that oddly specific scenario, but it isn’t relevant to the other millions of particles of sand. In order for a epistemic methodology to be viable, I would argue, it must, at the very least, be able to provide what is most cogent to hold generally in the vast majority of cases—not a small minority.

Your issue is you are attributing what people decide as distinctive knowledge, and questioning what level of detail people should choose.

I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; that’s like me saying that people can choose what level of detail to use when it comes the hierarchy itself—e.g., I choose to exclude probabilities, so I choose this possibility. No, we both agree there is actually something most cogent to choose within each hierarchy: I don’t get to shift that into distinctive knowledge. Likewise, there is something most cogent in relation to the hierarchies we generate for the scenario: I don’t get to shift that into my distinctive knowledge. Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time”, I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide.

The answer I gave in the paper was, "Whatever outcomes would best fit your context."

To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. Again, we normally do not face possible inductions that use the exact same relevant factors—the real world doesn’t work like that.

If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. I am not saying you have to have an incredibly oddly detailed equation for determining cogency—but you should have a general account.

For example, I actually think that the best criteria of knowledge is a justified belief, and the factors for justification are: internal coherence, external coherence, parsimony, logical consistency, reliability of supporting data, intellectual seemings, and explanatory power. These are NOT super specific criteria, but I am not saying “you do you, and that’s what’s most cogent”: epistemologies are supposed to give general guidelines for how to acquire knowledge, but yours seems to revolve around a very miniscule scenario where the inductions have the exact same relevant factors.

If you go back to the hierarchy now, you'll understand that your question is not about the hierarchy, its about determining what would be best, to include more or less details in your assessment of the situation

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; but I understand you do not see it that way, so I am conveying my point in the form of “comparing hierarchies”.

So I'm going to put the issue back to you. Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am not going to answer this yet, because that is what I was originally asking you and you still haven’t answered. So far, all I am understanding you to say is that your methodology doesn’t tell them what to do (i.e., “whatever fits best for you in the context”).

Can you do so within the understanding of distinctive and applicable knowledge?

I don’t use your exact epistemology, so that is why I am asking you for clarification; but I can attempt an answer (after yours) of a potential solution under your epistemology by my lights.

Bob

I think you are understanding where my problem with your methodology lies (and what it is); and I think you are conceding that it doesn’t give an actually account of which hierarchy is most cogent—which, to me, is a major problem. — Bob Ross

The theory is a foundation. Does it work consistently and logically for what it does? Yes. The fact that its a screwdriver and not a hammer isn't really a critique of the theory.

rarely does the possible inductions use the same exact relevant factors (i.e., essential properties); and, consequently, your hierarchy, and methodology in general (since it doesn’t account for a viable solution comparing them), is only applicable to one piece of sand in an entire beach. — Bob Ross

That's just an opinion and not really an argument Bob. No one has ever used the hierarchy before, so they haven't had to think in terms of it. Its not difficult to start thinking using the hierarchy to compare different inductions. Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.

I wouldn’t count it is valid to shift the determination of cogency to distinctive knowledge; — Bob Ross

But you should. The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around. If A => B => C, you shouldn't criticize that C doesn't lead to A. I'm letting you know that your critique is a misunderstanding of what relies on what. Distinctive knowledge does not rely on the hierarchy. The hierarchy relies on distinctive knowledge.

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction." If you're not using the hierarchy of induction you get to do this as there is no other objective measurement to decide what induction is more cogent than another.

I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the designs relevant in this case, so I am going to go with the probability of 51% that it is a BWOA”. Epistemology doesn’t leave these kinds of cogency decisions up to the user to arbitrarily decide. — Bob Ross

Why not Bob? Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want. There is no rule within nature that necessitates what a person must consider distinctive. Now there are arguments and situations that we can break down to try to convince a person to take on certain properties.

In fact, I've been trying to do that during our conversation. Notice how I stated earlier that you weren't addressing the hierarchy correctly. You had a different distinctive notion than I did. If you don't want to accept the distinctive notion that I'm putting forward, what can I do about it? Nothing. I can show you why its rational and consistent to do so. I can note that if you don't accept the definition I'm putting forward, not because its a contradiction, but because you don't like what it entails, that your critiques will be straw men arguments and we'll go nowhere. But ultimately, that decision is on you right?

To clarify, this means that the crux of the cogency determination in the vast majority of cases is left up the person to arbitrarily decide for themselves; which renders the scope of your methodology to only oddly specific examples. — Bob Ross

No, I've noted that with individuals, they are free to choose whatever distinctive knowledge they like. But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.

If a bear is rushing quickly towards you in the woods, you don't have a lot of time to test to see if the bear is rushing towards you or something behind you. Another thing is to consider failure. Perhaps there's a lot pointing towards the bear not rushing towards you. But if you're wrong, you're going to be bear food. So maybe you climb a tree despite your initial beliefs that its probably not going after you.

You aren’t giving a general account of what is most cogent: you are just saying that the person can do whatever they want, and that’s what is most cogent. — Bob Ross

No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm noting that there are reasons why we limit the distinctive considerations in our choices. This wasn't a hierarchy point about cogency, just a discussion about why we find certain things distinctive. If I was unclear about that, my apologies.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why. That's why I asked you. I'm trying to get some reasoning from you, as well as get you back into thinking about the theory instead of insisting things about the theory. As of now, I'm not seeing anything but critiques on the idea that it doesn't do more than it does, that it should do more than it does, or that it does more than it does. I'm asking you to understand the actual theory, and critique the theory from within that understanding. So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.

I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical. Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!

Hello Philosophims,

Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.

You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesn’t matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isn’t what they should be doing. What they should be doing, is exactly what the epistemic theory is supposed to furnish us with.

Which leads me to:

The hierarchy is built off of the consequences of distinctive and applicable knowledge, not the other way around

You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesn’t tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do.

Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. If I want to survive and there’s a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out alive—and my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events.

If you are claiming that the hierarchy is contingent on the distinctive knowledge, then that’s another area of dispute us.

Just because we have to use our discrete experiences to get at reality, that does not entail that what is most cogent is contingent on our discrete experiences (nor knowledge that we distinctively derive therefrom).

Just as a start, it solves many problems in epistemology that have to do with induction.

I know you have expounded this before, but can you briefly give a couple examples (so I can re-evaluate them)? I honestly don’t think it applies to most situations. Take a simple example that is analogous to the scenario which I gave you before: is my dog in the other room?

Let’s say I know there is a 50% chance that he is in the room and that I am outside of the room (with the door closed). The probability was calculated by a person who, with me not looking our hearing anything, flipped a fair coin and if it is heads will put my dog in the room (and if tails, won’t).

Now, to make this analogous and render your hierarchy useless to this situation, I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dog’s bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).

This is true of vast majority of situations, including possibility vs. possibility (which can also have two which use different relevant factors), possibility vs. plausibility, etc.--I can keep adding example after example if you would like.

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."

This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. What I can epistemically do is different from what I should epistemically do. If I reject the hierarchy in a situation where it is clearly applicable in favor of something less formidable, then I am being less cogent. I don’t get to just say “well, you can’t complain because it is my distinctive knowledge”.

But there are risks and consequences for doing so as I mentioned in my last post.

You can’t say there are more risks in choosing A over B if you can’t determine A as a more cogent option than B: those claims go hand-in-hand. If there’s more risk in being wrong, then I would imagine that actually factors into the cogency of the decision.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question:

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not?

I get the feeling that you're more interested in simply not accepting the hierarchy then you are in demonstrating why.

I am refraining from derailing into why I think H2 and H1 in S are within a over-arching hierarchy, H3, because my critique here applies either way: it doesn’t matter. Forget about that for now.

In the question I asked, I am granting the hierarchy itself is stable and legitimate: the critique is of the comparison of hierarchies themselves.

So try to answer the question first. I'm not trying to trap you, I'm trying to see if you understand all of the terms correctly, and also get a better insight into why you're making the claims that you are.
…
I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.

I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it.

I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: it’s the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. Imagine, perhaps if it helps, that I don’t have a solution to provide you: so what? If I don’t have a solution, then it doesn’t change the fact that either you do or you have to concede that your epistemology fails in this regard.

Hope the week is going well for you Bob, I'll catch your reply later!

You too my friend! (:

Bob

Happy Saturday Bob! After looking over your last few responses, you keep saying things that show you don't understand the paper. Its been quite a while, and I think you dove into inductions and have forgotten the points that lead up to inductions in the first place. I think it would help you greatly to re-read the paper first, building up how I got to proposing how to handle inductions in the first place, then come back. Its just an observation from my end and I don't want to have to retype the entire paper from beginning to end so you understand again. :) Please re-read.

Its been logically concluded that a person can create whatever distinctive knowledge they want.

You are confusing what a person can do with what they should do epistemically. It doesn’t matter if a person can act irrationally: it is still irrational because it isn’t what they should be doing. — Bob Ross

I am not confusing that. I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you. The conclusion that we can create whatever distinctive knowledge we want within our personal subjective context does not make any claims to what distinctive knowledge is more rational than another.

Now, I welcome a discussion about rational choices in distinctive knowledge. I've dabbled in a few non-hierarchy reasons why we should consider having certain distinctive knowledge over others that don't involve the hierarchy. If you want to involve the hierarchy, you can apply it to the question of when you make a distinctive induction. But, you must first understand the core tenants of distinctive knowledge.

You are confusing what is most cogent to do with our expounding of it (to ourselves). Distinctive knowledge us just out ability to discretely parcel reality: it doesn’t tell us in itself what is most cogent to hold nor what is even most cogent to parcel. — Bob Ross

I am not confusing anything here. I've been trying to tell you you're barking up the wrong tree! Yes, you are correct that distinctive knowledge alone does not tell us what is more cogent to hold or parcel. I've been noting this the entire time.

The epistemic theory is supposed to attempt to get at what in reality, beyond our mere distinctive knowledge, is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross

Correct. With distinctive knowledge, we apply that to the world. When we reach the limits of applicable knowledge, we use the hierarchy. Recall that the hierarchy is based off of how far away our inductions are from applicable knowledge.

Philosophim, conceptualizing and abstracting what one thinks is most cogent to do is useless if it is not closely married to reality, which is what furnishes us with what actually is most cogent to do. — Bob Ross

Correct, that's what the hierarchy does.

If I want to survive and there’s a bear coming at me, then there is actually a best sequence of counter moves to maximize my chances of getting out alive—and my decisions in terms of what to distinctively classify and parcel could go against that most cogent sequence of events. — Bob Ross

I think you're confusing inductions with knowledge. I generally use cogency as a means of evaluating inductions. Knowledge is a rationally deduced match of our identities with reality. If we know the best sequence of counter moves, we're not talking about induction anymore. Induction happens when we lack the full knowledge of a situation and must make a guess at outcomes. At that point, we can evaluate our inductive choices and pick the one that is most cogent using the hierarchy.

I am allowed to, after the coin flipping and placing of the dog (or not placing of the dog) is finished, stand outside of the room with the door closed. I clearly hear a dog barking in that room and, to put the icing on the cake, my dog’s bark matches that bark exactly (as I have experienced it for 60 years). This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies). — Bob Ross

First, you didn't use the same properties in each case. Did we evaluate the coin flip if the dog barked in the first probability? No. So you can't compare the probability to the second situation where we ARE considering the dog barking for our belief.

This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond. You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here. Relax and try to understand first. You don't have a need for this theory to be wrong right? We have a need to get to the truth of the matter, whether the theory is wrong or right.

First, because this argument isn't really any different than the box argument, what do you think is more rational to choose here? Then, why?

Just like how I don’t get to distinctively say “well, I just don’t find the probability of flipping the coin relevant, so I am going to say it will be heads because that is what it was last time” — Bob Ross

The reason why you don't get to do this is if you also add, "When I'm using the hierarchy of induction."

This is irrelevant to what I was saying: just because I can decide to not use the hierarchy that does not entail that I am determining the most cogent solution. — Bob Ross

Its completely relevant to what you were initially saying. You said you were able to just decide willy nilly what distinctive knowledge you held. Which is fine. But you can't if you hold that you are applying to a particular distinctive knowledge, that of the heirarchy. While you can choose what personal distinctive knowledge you hold, if you agree to accept someone else's distinctive knowledge, you're stuck. That has nothing to do with the most cogent solution.

For the record, I actually do think that comparing hierarchies is within the over-arching hierarchy of the entirety of the inductions and, thusly, is a critique of your hierarchy; — Bob Ross

But you're not arguing for it. You're not showing or proving it Bob. That's just a statement. Its why I asked you

I was just clarifying the record: I am not going to derail into that right now. I would much rather you just answer the question. My statement here is irrelevant to the question: — Bob Ross

I did answer the question. The answer is, please justify your statement by showing me why you think that, not simply stating that you think that. Asking you to provide a reason for your statement when asked is a sensible and standard response. Let me understand your reasoning so I can answer your question. I can take a stab at trying to figure out your reasoning, but if I miss it, we'll be right back here again.

Why do you think its more reasonable to choose H2 than H1?

I am asking that within the context that we have two hierarchies, H2 and H1, in context S and that is it: there is no over-arching hierarchy at play here. I think I made the question very clear. So, does your epistemology account for a method of determining the cogency of the hierarchies or not? — Bob Ross

Again, you did not make that clear. You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim. Give me justification so that I understand where you are coming from. Only then can I adequately understand your claim and answer it.

I definitely have an answer for you, but I feel that too much of these discussions has been going back to whether you understand the actual theory as defined instead of whether the theory is flawed or illogical.

I think my question is very clear, and I am not going to speculate at trying to provide potential solutions to your theory if you already have a solution. The critique is of your theory, now it is time for you to rebut it or concede it. — Bob Ross

No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.

I already stated in the context of the question that the hierarchies are legitimate: it’s the comparison of hierarchies I am asking about. — Bob Ross

If you agree with me, then you understand that the hierarchy is a rational comparison of inductions over the same identity set. You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man. You're saying because the hierarchy is not claiming to be something it isn't, that its wrong. That's just not logical Bob. We can of course question what identity set would be more rational to choose, but that does not invalidate what the hierarchy does.

Hello Philosophim,

Happy Saturday Bob!

You too!

you keep saying things that show you don't understand the paper...I think it would help you greatly to re-read the paper first

Fair enough: I will re-read the OP and the papers (from the previous discussion board); however, I feel as though I am asking a very clear question that doesn’t require re-reading the paper, so I am going to ask again but with as much clarity as I possibly can.

We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. An answer to that question is not to throw the question back at me: it doesn’t matter why I think it is more cogent: you said it was here:

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

If you think it is more rational, then I can ask “why under your view is it more rational?”. You, then, cannot simply respond with “why do you, bob, think it is more rational?”.

So, let me start over with the question and ask:

Do you think it is more cogent to pick H1, H2, or neither (are more cogent) in S?

If you answer one over the other, then I am asking a follow up question of:

Under your view, what makes one more cogent over the other?

Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?

I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions.

This part alone should have been obvious to you if you've been listening to me, and you should have easily predicted how I would respond

I said this in the example:

This is another situation where the probability and possibility do not use the same relevant factors and, consequently, your epistemology is useless for figuring out what the most cogent thing is to do (regardless of the fact that it can calculate what is most cogent within the two hierarchies).

The example wasn’t demonstrating that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies is flawed: it was noting, just like with the box example, that there is no way to determine the most cogent thing to do in the situation because there are two hierarchies that cannot be compared.

You're smart as a whip Bob, but I think you're still in attack mode, not discussion mode, and you're not thinking through it correctly here

I apologize if that is the case, but, as I showed above, I did not straw man your position and I did anticipate that response by purposely explicating that I am not claiming that in the example itself (as seen above). You just ignored or missed it in my response.

Again, forget about my claim that H2 and H1 are within an over-arching hierarchy: that is irrelevant right now. Forget that I said that and deal with what I am saying right now.

You are claiming that because it does not claim to have a rational comparison between identity sets, that its somehow broken. That's a straw man

Agreed, that is a straw man. I am saying that because the two inductions do not use the same “identity sets”, I have, in the box and dog example, no way of determining which is more cogent to use because they are of two distinct hierarchies.

You claim that it is more rational to pick H2. It seems to be a crux of your argument against the hierarchies inadequacy, so I want to know what justification you have for making that claim.

Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you can’t compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). My rationale for why I think it is more cogent is irrelevant. For example, if I thought it was more cogent to pick H1 over H2, I could still validly ask why you think H2 is more cogent than H1 because it appears as though there is no way to determine this under your view.

But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say “yeah, that’s probably a BWA”.

Again, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent when, as far as I can tell, your epistemology affords no means of determining it. Is it an intellectual seeming to you? Is it because it is more parsimonious? Is it something else? You still have yet to answer!!!

No, its not clear, that's why I'm asking you to give your rationale! Also, lets not put ultimatums like "rebut or concede". Lets not make the discussion one sided, please address my points so that I can better address yours.

Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): I’ve asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You haven’t even responded.

Perhaps, if the question is truly unanswerable, then please demonstrate why. If it is because I am misremembering something, then let me know what exactly (briefly). I don’t see why you can’t at least answer it within the schema of your methodology.

I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.

Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do.

I am not going to respond to the distinctive knowledge stuff yet until after I re-read the essays. Plus, I think there’s plenty for you to respond to herein already.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

We both agreed that it is more cogent to pick H2 over H1 in S, so I was asking you why it would be more cogent under your view. — Bob Ross

Oh, I think this was lost in communication then. I did not intend to say this. I noted in the circumstance where you take in A/B and X/Y then you should pick H2, as H1 does not have X/Y considerations. In the circumstances where you do not have the X/Y additional consideration, then H1. You have been claiming that H2 is more rational than H1, not myself.

The most rational is to take both into account and assume that 49% of the boxes we find will be with air, and we believe that all of these boxes will have the X pattern.

If you think it is more rational, then I can ask “why under your view is it more rational?”. — Bob Ross

As you can see here I did not claim that H2 was more rational than H1, I noted we could simply overlap them. This is rational because in the case of A/B without an X/Y consideration, we do have knowledge that overall its a 49/51 split. That does no go away if we add the X/Y consideration and have no induction. If we add a X/Y consideration, we can then also consider that.

I think its the pattern that's made it confusing. Lets look at different probabilities instead.

H1 49/51% A or B
H2 A is 98 % X, B is 98% Y

In this case we have no pattern. We know both probabilities. These now overlap. If I pull a Box with an X, its likely an A, or air box. Further, if I did not know the next box I was going to pull, I would guess it was B, and also guess that it would be a Y box.

Now go back to our original example and you should see what I'm talking about. We simply overlap the inductions we do have depending on what properties we're considering for the outcome. In the case of H2, we don't have a probability, we only have a pattern.

Correct me if I am wrong, but we have discussed well enough for me to get an answer to those: we both agree that the cogency criteria within the hierarchies (H2 and H1) work perfectly fine, but is there any criteria in place to compare those hierarchies themselves?

I think the aspect of the papers you are saying I am forgetting pertains to the claims I made about distinctive knowledge, but that is irrelevant to whether you can briefly answer those questions. — Bob Ross

I keep telling you its not irrelevant, because I've already answered the question, told you it has to deal with distinctive knowledge, and you still seem to insist it doesn't. :) This is why I suggested you read the paper again, because you seemed to gloss right over this.

Right now, I am asking you why you think it is more cogent to pick H2 (which you said, and I quoted above, in a previous message) if you can’t compare the hierarchies themselves (which is what you were also claiming). — Bob Ross

I've already mentioned above that this is not the case.

But since you asked, I will tell you why I think H2 is better than H1 in the box example: I think that, in that situation, in a nutshell, that the overwhelming experiential correlation of the BWA with design X and design X exclusively on BWAs outweighs the 1% increased probability that it is a BWOA; and so I go with it being a BWA (and thusly not with the probability). Why do I think it outweighs the other? Just because, in this situation, because to go with the other option is to have to makeup unparsimoneous explanations of the situation: it is more parsimonious, all else being equal, to say “yeah, that’s probably a BWA”. — Bob Ross

Thank you, this is what I was trying to understand. My overlap explanation and an understanding that we compare hierarchies within the same identity set should also be quite parsimonious. But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational. There are plenty of unparsimoneous but highly rational things in this world. A desire is not a rational argument. If this is your only reasoning, then its really just an opinion. Lets examine my point about taking the identity sets into consideration, as well as cases of overlap, and you can see the rationale of the hierarchy, as well as the rationale of overlap.

Sorry, I am not trying to give you an ultimatum; but I feel as though you are avoiding the question (perhaps unintentionally or I am misunderstanding your response): I’ve asked the same question now four or so times and you haven't answered nor have you demonstrated why my question is currently unanswerable. You say we need to clarify some things about how the methodology works (as I am misremembering), but you can still answer the question with the terms from your methodology and then note if my response confuses the terms. You haven’t even responded. — Bob Ross

I have responded, I just think we both didn't quite understand that each had responded. Hopefully this answers your question now. If not, I'll follow up.

I am not saying what a person should do, you are. You are saying they are acting irrationally, and I'm still waiting for why from you.

Are you not saying that the hierarchy is the most cogent means of determining which induction to hold when they have the same identity sets? If so, then you are telling them what they should do. — Bob Ross

No, I am not saying which identity sets a person should choose. You keep accidently blending what one distinctively knows vs the hierarchy, which relies on what distinctive knowledge one knows and uses. The hierarchy at its base is say claiming that one set of distinctive knowledge identities is more rational to hold then another. That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.

To sum:

1. You create an identity set with distinctive knowledge and its applications.

Set 1 A/B box
Set 2 A/B Box and X/Y design

Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy. I'm going to repeat this again, because its been missed several times. Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.

You then create inductions considering that distinctive knowledge and applications. You can compare though a hierarchy of inductions created from that set.

If you combine two sets together and their hierarchies, you cannot use the hierarchy betwixt the two sets, but you can overlap, or switch between the sets as the set you use changes based on your circumstances.

Example:

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered. Thus if I'm asked to guess which air box will come out next, I only need set one. If I'm asked to guess which air and design box will come out next, I can overlap the two.

I hope this clears it up.

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate the elaboration: I see more clearly now what you are and are not saying. I want to say it back to you so as to confirm that I am getting it right:

You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant (e.g., if X/Y and A/B, then go with A; if just A/B, then go with B; etc.); but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct?

After re-reading the OP and essays, I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. In your essays and OP, you never discuss relevant factors of a context (i.e., situation) in the manner that I am talking about but, rather, essential properties: the latter being what is essential to the identity of an entity, whereas the former is what is essential to the consideration of the resolution to a dilemma within a context. My creation of distinctions plays no role in what is relevant to figuring out the best solution to a problem within a context: the relevant factors are any factors (i.e., bits of information) within the context that could affect the decision.

To clarify, distinctive knowledge is simply the awareness of one’s discrete experiences. Claims to their representations of a reality outside of the experience itself are not included.
...
I can decide how detailed, or how many properties of the sheep I wish to recognize and record into my memory without contradiction by reality, as long as I don’t believe these distinctions represent something beyond this personal contextual knowledge.
...
I cannot know that if I discretely experience something that resembles these distinctions, that the experience correctly matches the identities I have created without contradiction by reality.

So, if I say that what is essential (i.e., relevant) to determining whether my dog is in that room or not is only the probability, that tells me nothing in-itself about what the actual set of relevant factors are to determining whether my dog is in that room or not in reality: I have to apply a test to figure that out, which is, by definition, applicable knowledge.

My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test.

So far, you keep insisting that which set one will use is utterly determined by which factors are considered relevant, and the determination of what is relevant is merely distinctive—not applicable. However, this is wrong: there are an actual set of relevant factors to whether my dog is in that room and it is unconditioned by my distinctive knowledge of it.

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered

The problem is that you don’t get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they don’t get to choose that part.

Your choice of set, is not the hierarchy.

Yes, this is fine; but there is an actual most cogent set to choose (over the others).

But regardless, parsimoneous is just something we want, it doesn't make it rational.

To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequate—all to the best of one’s ability. If I say that X is true and false, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I say that X is true but do not realize that I am also implying it is false, then I am not thereby being irrational; if I say that I can explain the data with X and still insist on explaining it with X + Y, then I am thereby being irrational: however, if I explain it with X + Y as I do not realize I can explain it with just X, then I am not thereby being irrational; etc.

Also, as a side note, standards, which ground all reasoning and justification, are fundamentally grouned in wants (i.e., ought statements); but the idea is to try and hold what provides the best utility towards truth. Just because parsimony bottoms out at a want, which may be an intellectual seeming in this case, does not mean it cannot be a criteria for the standards of what being rational is. All of our epistemic imperatives (e.g., what we use to do science) and moral imperatives bottom out at wants. As a matter of fact, all of our reasoning does: our will’s are what furnish us with our principles that we think we are obligated to use during our derivations.

A desire is not a rational argument.

Desires, ultimately, are what define what “being rational” is. There’s no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define “being rational” as including “abiding by the LNC”. That doesn’t make my argument irrational.

That is a separate question that must be asked of the distinctive knowledge sets themselves. Which if you understand this part, we can go into next.

Yes, that is what I have been asking about with the H2 and H1 in S question.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Also, to clarify my distinction between the essential properties of an identity of an entity and the relevant factors of resolving a dilemma within a context; it can be noted that both are essential properties: just not pertaining to the same thing. To say that I can decide what I think is essential to what this "entity" is does not mean that I can decide what is an essential factor to assessing the entire situation. For example, a essential factor of assessment of a context can be an accidental property of an entity within the context, and an essential property of an entity within the context can be irrelevant to one's assessment. I can choose what I use to identify an entity within the context, but I don't get to choose what is relevant to assessing the dilemma within that context.

Bob

Fantastic Bob! I feel we're back to discussing the situation properly now and can continue.

You are claiming that the two sets, H1 and H2, can only be evaluated as more or less cogent than one another insofar as you know which factors are being considered relevant — Bob Ross

I am not saying that, but this is close. I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent. I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2. I am saying that we use H1 or H2 based on the properties we are evaluating as essential within the justification of our inductions.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?" This question is important, but I needed you to understand that it is not a hierarchy question. The hierarchy does not care why you picked H1 or H2. All it notes is that when you are within H1 or H2, you can compare inductions as I've noted. This is not a flaw or a lack of the hierarchy. This is just a logically concluded set of rules.

but, most importantly, the person can decide which factors are relevant, being distinctive knowledge, and thusly it is not more or less rational (i.e., cogent) to use factors X/Y and A/B (or to just use A/B, or just X/Y). Is this correct? — Bob Ross

I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses. Once you are deciding to use the hierarchy, you have already decided on the distinctive properties you are applying in the induction. Now, that doesn't mean that we cannot have a separate discussion about which properties should be essential. It also doesn't mean that we cannot come to a rational conclusion about what properties would be best. But it is not something that the hierarchy itself cares about.

Second, I think the other confusion you have is you keep crossing applicable knowledge with inductions. Inductions can always be wrong. Always. They are at best rational, at worst, irrational. There is the decision as to which induction is best before application. To test an induction, it must be applied. This is why your distinctive knowledge set is prioritized over your applicable knowledge in choosing a set to apply the hierarchy. Within the hierarchy, we use our applicable knowledge of that distinctive knowledge set to determine the most cogent induction. Let me give you an example.

Distinctively, I consider A/B, air box and no air box, to be the only essential properties I care about. I applicably know the probability is 49/51%. I applicably know I have a pattern of 50%. Then I invent a plausibility that there is a box that breaks physics, and has half air, and not half air.

Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.

I think I have finally pinned down my disagreement here (assuming my above summary is accurate): the relevant factors of the actual situation are not themselves distinctive knowledge but, rather, are applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential. The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions. And the closer your inductions to the applicable knowledge that you have, the higher up the hierarchy those inductions are.

My distinctive knowledge of what the relevant factors are, which is just my ability to cognitively enumerate different options and single out different entities, is really an asserted hypothesis of what they actually are; and I can only confirm this by application of a test. — Bob Ross

Yes.

Take Set 1 when X and Y are not considered. Take Set 2 when X and Y are considered

The problem is that you don’t get to decide what to consider in the context: the relevant factors are there in reality within that context. In the box example, the designs and the probability are relevant factors. All you are noting is the enumeration of which are more cogent depending on what they consider as relevant, but I am saying they don’t get to choose that part. — Bob Ross

You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties. Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes, but the person having to make the induction is color blind? Or, lets say the person just doesn't put it together that there's a design pattern correlation between A and B? Can they consider those properties?

Further, what if there are an essential set of properties that could tell whether a box was an air box or not without opening the box, but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort ten boxes, and being slightly off was ok, wouldn't it be smarter to use the probability instead?

And here we can finally ramp off of inductions, and go back to the real question that you're asking: "If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?" This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone. If you finally realize these are two separate questions, then we can drop the hierarchy at this point and focus on this major question.

If you recall, I only briefly touched upon this in the original paper. There was enough to cover as it was, and I had to cut considerations somewhere. I'll start now.

First, we need to revisit a point you made earlier that I agreed with. Distinctive knowledge must be applied to make any real assertions about reality. We'll go back to the sheep and goat example. If I say that a sheep has magical powers as an essential property, until I can actually applicably know a creature that has magical powers, my distinctive knowledge does not apply to reality.

Second, useful distinctive knowledge allows us applicable knowledge of reality that gives us what we need to survive. If your distinctive knowledge set leads to death or unnecessary harm to yourself or others, then we can rationally conclude this is not a great distinctive knowledge set. If you are dead or harmed, you are unable to exist, or diminished. I think we can both agree this is a rationale pretty much everyone in society would agree with.

Third, useful personal distinctive knowledge is that which makes our life better in having it as an option for application. Lets say there's an herb in the wild that tastes wonderful. By sight alone, its indistinguishable from an herb that tastes bitter. However, a person with a keen sense of smell can note that the tasty herb smells pleasant, while the bitter herbs smell acrid. Having and using these properties is more beneficial to a person trying to get rid of a tasty meal then not having them.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

a. Reward for being correct in the application.
b. Time/effort invested in the application (aka. Ease of use)

Fourth, useful distinctive knowledge is based on our ability to apply it. If I cannot see but only hear something, the distinctive knowledge of sight cannot be used. If I require a tool to apply distinctive knowledge, like a scale for pounds for example, but I don't have a scale, its not useful at that time.

I'll leave those as a start. Let me quickly address your last points on rationality.

To be rational, is to be parsimonious, logically consistent, to assess the reliability of the evidence, to be internally + externally coherent, and empirically adequate—all to the best of one’s ability. — Bob Ross

But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency. If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".

Desires, ultimately, are what define what “being rational” is. There’s no way around that. That I am irrational for violating the law of noncontradiction is grounded in my desire that I ought to define “being rational” as including “abiding by the LNC”. That doesn’t make my argument irrational. — Bob Ross

Your desire has nothing to do with it. The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications. Our desires to not change this. Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

Hello Philosophim,

I feel we're back to discussing the situation properly now and can continue.

Good! I am glad to hear that!

I am not saying that H1 or H2 is more cogent.

You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense.

I am not applying the hierarchy to whether I should chose H1 or H2

Agreed.

I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. You are still comparing the hierarchies, and you must to make a decision; however, you are noting that you are not applying the rules of your “induction hierarchy” to the comparison of the hierarchies themselves, which is fine.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"

My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?

Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)?

I am saying the hierarchy does not involve making any claim to the rationality of the distinctive properties a person chooses

That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. What is relevant to determining what to induce is not a property of an induction nor of an entity within the scenario; but, rather, merely an identified relevant factor of that situation.

A property is an attribute that a thing has, whereas a factor is a piece of information that is relevant to the question at hand.

For example, a property of the induction to pick BWA (in the box scenario) could be that it affirms (or utilizes) the relevant fact of the designs; whereas, the relevant factor of their being a correlation of designs is exactly that despite if it is used in an induction (and consequently if it is a property of any induction made).

You'll need to prove that you cannot choose your essential properties.

I was slightly wrong last time I explicated this, so let me clarify: the essential properties factor into what is a relevant factor, but it is not the sole consideration. If in the box scenario you disputed that the boxes which you saw a billion times were actually boxes (due to a difference in what we both considered the essential properties of a box) then will nullify certain aspects as relevant factors to determining if this selected box has air in it. However, I must stress, that the scenario I gave eliminates this possibility of dispute because the essential properties are stipulated from the beginning. So any dispute between what is a relevant factor to determining if the box has air in it is going to stem from something other than essential property disputes of the identity of entities.

I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless.

Also, relevant factors are determined by the stipulations of the scenario (i.e., the context), and so some can outweigh others. For example:

but it took 2 hours of examination to figure it out? If I only had 3 hours to sort

You have just added a new stipulation (to the others I already gave) to the scenario which changes it. The time limit stipulation will affect what is a relevant factor for inducing a conclusion within the context: you just changed the context.

Bob, hypothetically what if there was a color difference of red and green on A and B boxes

Again, you have just changed the context is all. In this scenario, it would depend on if they still trusted the heavy correlation between the designs and the box types. Is someone they trust with their life tagging along with them when they experience the box correlation a billion times (to let them know which one was which)? Anyways, this is all irrelevant to the scenario I gave you.

The relevant factors in the scenario do not change, and the design patter is one of them. It is a relevant factor because it can affect the conclusion (and in this case, quite heavily).

"If I have an option to make a property essential to an identity, when should I?"

I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entity—I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. The essential properties of the boxes are already given to you as a stipulation. It’s assuming you actually agree that you experienced a billion times a box with design X/Y. Expounding on how we determine what a “box” is is outside of the scope of the scenario.

My point is that you don’t get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it (and that part I left out before). In the scenario, the essential properties of the boxes are already given.

This is not a hierarchy question. I repeat, this is not a hierarchy question. At this point, we must leave inductions behind and focus on this question alone.

I think this is wrong: although it is not a “hierarchy question” in the sense that it bears to relevance to the induction hierarchy criteria, it is nonetheless a comparison of the inductions indirectly based off of the comparison of relevant factors. The minute you decide to go with the pattern you have chosen that induction over the other one by means of comparing the relevant factors and determining that you ought to include the designs in there. You haven’t completely left the inductions behind at this point: you determining the relevant factors to compare them (and, yes, I know that it will not be a comparison in the sense of the “induction hierarchy”).

Recall that the hierarchy is based on its distance from applicable knowledge within the distinctions chosen. I applicably know the probability. I don't distinctively know the probability. I applicably know the pattern. I don't distinctively know the pattern. Finally, I don't applicably know that I can get a box that has half air, and not half air. So if I choose an induction, whether I'm going to get an A or B box next, I have to choose an induction that strays away the least from the applicable knowledge that I have. In this case, its the probability.

I don’t have a problem with this; but I am failing to see where I made these errors of “crossing applicable knowledge with inductions”.

So then, the relevant factors of the identity set are the distinctive knowledge that you see as essential.

As said above, I am not talking about “relevant factors of an identity set”: that is just another way of saying “essential properties of an entity”. I am talking about the factors that are relevant to formulating an induction within the context: these are not the same thing.

The relevant factors within the hierarchy are your applicable knowledge involving those distinctions.

You applicably know the pattern and the probability in the box scenario, and I am saying that using the pattern is more cogent: you are saying you can’t say whether it is more cogent or not unless I give you what relevant factors the person decides to use.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner.

But you didn't demonstrate logical consistency.

What do you mean? I said that logical consistency is a criteria of being rational: that is a logically consistent position because there is no logical contradiction in claiming that.

If you want to equate parsimonious with rationality, you have to demonstrate that rationality. As it was, your claim is its rational because its "rational".

I am saying it is analogous to logical consistency (as well as others); and it is what I mean when I say someone is rational or irrational. If you have a different definition, then I am all ears.

The law of non-contradiction is a distinctive bit of knowledge that when applied to reality, has always been confirmed. What is rational is to create applicable identities which assess reality correctly. We know this if reality does not contradict these applications.

The first underlined portion is false: we have never confirmed via an empirical test that the law of non-contradiction is true; secondly, with respect to the second underlined portion, that is circular logic: you are saying that LNC is true because it does not contradict reality which, in turn, presupposes that a law cannot both be true and false of reality—which is the LNC and that premise is what you were supposed to prove in the onset. You basically just said LNC is true because LNC.

Our desires to not change this

Desires do not change what is in reality; but it does affect what we come to claim to know about reality. If a proposition cannot be both true and false, then that is either true or false irregardless of what we both desire; however, if either of us claim either way, then our claims will bottom out at desires. This is hume’s guillotine at work here.

Likewise, rationality is different than LNC insofar as it is something that does NOT exist in the world beyond our wills: it is utterly dependent on what we think we ought to be doing—and obligations are not objective.

Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now.

Bob

You are saying that, as far as I am understanding, the hierarchy which is more cogent is dependent on what essential properties the person uses; so you are indirectly speaking to which is more or less cogent in that sense. — Bob Ross

No, I am not. You keep inserting these words in my claims, and I'm not doing that. To be clear, we're talking about hierarchy sets, H1, and H2. We are not talking about the hierarchy itself. Why do H1 and H2 come about? Because of the distinctive knowledge held to create those sets of inductions. The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions. You've just got the emphasis on the wrong place. The emphasis is not on the inductions, its on the distinctive knowledge.

I just want to clarify that the determination of which relevant factors to use in the context is a comparison of the hierarchies. — Bob Ross

No. This is wrong. You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use. You determine the essential properties you will use, then create inductions. You can't make inductions without first having distinctive knowledge to justify them. What distinctive knowledge should we choose when we have a question of the properties involved? As noted, I listed several considerations that lead to useful distinctive knowledge. It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.

Now, and hopefully this doesn't confuse you, you could decide to take H1 and H2, compare them, and then use that as a factor in deciding what essential properties you use. There's nothing preventing that. But this is not a hierarchy decision, this is a decision in what essential properties to use after you've established two sets of distinctive knowledge, and inductions relative to each set.

Basically:

Distinctive1 => inductions 1
Distinctive2 => inductions 2

1 or 2? You pick 1 because you like that pattern in set 2. You like set 2 because of the confirmation bias of the pattern, and perhaps because you believe considering the X/Y distinction is smarter. This isn't really rational justification, its just your justification for picking Distinctive set 2.

But as I've noted, we can consider much more than the inductions. As I've mentioned, we can consider the personal or social benefit of a proper guess, time, effort, etc. And of course, you could disregard all of this and just decide to use a set of essential properties without any rationale at all. Its your choice. What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.

Your question seems to be, "Which identity set should I use?"

My question, is which induction do you think, in totality of your analysis of the situation, is most cogent to hold in the box scenario?

Your answer seems to be contingent on the relevant factors used in the situation, and it seems as though you may have a criteria for deciphering which is more cogent to include (in terms of relevant factors). Perhaps now you can answer the original question (above)? — Bob Ross

So again, we're not comparing the induction sets. We're comparing what essential properties we wish to use in our distinctive knowledge application. Its all about what you decide are the essential properties involved in your induction.

quote="Bob Ross;819588"]My point is that you don’t get to choose what is relevant to determining what induction to use in this scenario apart from what essential properties you use to determine what the things are within it[/quote]

That's the exact point I've been making all along.

That is fine; my original question seems to boil down to what makes a factor relevant; but I want to clarify that I am not talking about properties but, rather, relevant factors. — Bob Ross

I already addressed this in an earlier post. I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction". If you use it in any other way, that's not anything I'm claiming in my theory.

I will say it again: an accidental property of an entity within a context can be a relevant factor: not just essential properties. — Bob Ross

This translates to, "An accidental property of an entity within a context can be an essential property involved in forming an induction."

Thus in the first case of only considering A/B on the box, the X and Y properties are accidental, but also non-essential for the formation of the inductions we compare. In the second case, you've elevated X and Y as essential to the formation of the inductions we compare. X and Y have become essential to the identity of whether the box has air or not in your mind by the inductions you've created. As these are two sets of essential properties for the formation of these inductions, we cannot compare the two sets using the hierarchy.

The essence of a thing is just the properties that it cannot exist without; in the box scenario, the designs are not essential properties but are relevant factors to the scenario nonetheless. — Bob Ross

So translating this then "The identity we create is just the properties that it cannot exist without. In the first box scenario, the designs of X and Y are not essential properties to a box existing. In the second scenario, they are also non-essential properties to the box simply existing. But in the second scenario, they become essential properties in determining inductions for whether that box also has air inside it or not."

I think we may have veered off from the original scenario and I think it is time we revisited it: I am not asking how one should determine the essential properties of an entity—I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which factors are relevant. — Bob Ross

Translating this again: "I am asking how you are determining, in the scenario, which essential properties are necessary for the set of inductions". Hopefully this is clear by now. Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction. If you include X/Y, it doesn't matter if it is an accidental property that a box can have regardless of whether it has air in it or not. It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.

At that point you are claiming X/Y is involved with not just a box, but whether a box has air in it or not. Thus you have changed the distinctive knowledge of, "A box with air" being essentially tied to the design on the box. The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not. Its an entirely different identity set to just looking at a box to see if it has air, then looking at a box and including its design as a consideration of whether it has air.

"Usefulness" of distinctive knowledge can be broken down into a few categories (and I'm sure you can think of more):

I would like you to, in light of these criteria you gave, tell me which induction within the box scenario is more cogent to use; and no I am not asking you to compare them within your induction hierarchy criteria because we already agreed that they are in two separate hierarchies and cannot be compared in that manner. — Bob Ross

I already did, but if it was misunderstood I'll state it again. In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal. As I noted earlier, I even changed the odds to avoid bias. Lets say its 25/75 for air no air, and X is always air, Y is always no air. I can both hold that there is a 25% chance of getting an A box, and observe the pattern that A boxes so far have always had an X design. I could consider the X design relevant to whether the box has air with this pattern, but I don't have a probability that includes the X/Y design. So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is. There's not enough information on that alone in this limited thought experiment to determine an answer as more than an opinion. Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.

Sorry Bob, but I'm not going to accept any idea that our feelings or desires are the underpinnings of rationality, at least without a deeper argument into why.

For now this is really an offshoot of our conversation, so I will refrain from going too deep into it for now. — Bob Ross

I agree! We have enough to talk about right now. Lets focus on this part first and if we need to revisit rationality, we will. What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification. Until more is given, that tells me that you do not have a rationale that H2 is more cogent to pick then H1.

The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!

Hello Philosophim,

I do not have a term "relevant factors" in my theory. I noted the term was ok as long as you understood it was a synonym for "essential properties in consideration of the induction".

I wasn’t saying you use that term in your methodology, but there is no (as of yet) 1:1 term mapping that gets at what I am talking about within your theory. Hence, I agree with a lot of what you said within your terms of “essential property of formulating inductions”, but:

Whatever you involve in creating your inductions, are essential properties for that formation of that induction
…
It becomes an essential property in an induction about whether that X/Y pattern determines whether the box has air in it or not.

There is a difference between claiming that (1) whatever factors are utilized to formulate a particular induction are essential properties thereof and (2) a property is essential to the formulation of inductions within the context in general. We can say, in the box scenario, that the X/Y pattern is essential to the formulation of the pattern induction; but we cannot say that it is essential to the formulation of possible inductions within the context (S). I am not saying that the X/Y pattern is an essential property of the formulation of inductions in S but, rather, that the pattern induction should be used because the relevant factor of the pattern outweighs, in S, the relevant factors of the probability induction (viz., the properties which are of, and are necessary for formulating the specific induction, the pattern induction are better than the properties of the probability induction).

The question is not about comparing the H1 and H2 set then, its about deciding what essential properties you're going to use in your inductions. So we don't compare hierarchy sets. We decide what essential properties we're going to use, then that leads to us into a place where we can make comparisons of our inductions.

You are comparing H1 and H2 via your analysis of determining which relevant factors to use—viz., you are comparing the essential properties of the inductions themselves and determining which ones outweigh the other ones; I don’t see how you can say you are not comparing inductions. However, I get that your comparison criteria doesn’t apply here.

You're not comparing the hierarchies to determine which essential properties to use.

Correct. Because by “comparing” you are using it in a narrow sense of the criteria you use to compare inductions which have the same essential properties (i.e., relevant factors); but a comparison, in the normal sense of the word, is when one analyzes one thing juxtaposed to another—and that is exactly what one has to do to determine which induction to use in the scenario (by means of comparing relevant factors: essential properties of the inductions themselves).

What you seem to imply is that there is something in the hierarchy that is the end all be all of rationality that shows one set to be more rational than another. There is not.

No, because, again, you are talking about the comparison of inductions which have the same essential properties when you say “hierarchy”: I am saying that, when comparing inductions which do not have the same essential properties, there is a most cogent and least cogent option (assuming there are at least two). There is a most rational and least rational pick: it is not arbitrary like you are claiming. Which leads me to:

It depends on a great many contextual factors, so its not a blanket, "This is always better" situation.

Just because changing the context affects which relevant factors are most pertinent (and cogent), does not entail that there isn’t an actually most cogent induction to hold. I agree that it is tough decisions, but I specifically chose a scenario where it is obvious (to me) which is the more rational decision.

The X/Y are accidental on just a box. But when you now tie them in with the identity of having air or not, they are now an essential property of whether the box has air or not.

They are not an essential property of whether the box has air or not: they are essential to the formulated induction that proposes that it has air in it or not. The former is to claim it is an essential property of the identity of the boxes, and the latter is to use an accidental property to infer the identity of the boxes.

In this very specific scenario you originally mentioned, overlapping the two is ideal.

And here is the crux: how, philosophim, is it more ideal if it isn’t more or less rational?

So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

Again, how is it most cogent if someone can equally cogently not include the designs as essential to their inductions? By my lights, you cannot say that one is more or less cogent than the other as essential to one’s inductions if it is not more cogent to include or not include it as essential to one’s inductions: you have now claimed both of these.

For example:

What I don't have an answer for you, is whether you should use a distinctive knowledge set where X/Y is irrelevant to whether the box has air or not, vs where it is.

And:

So the most cogent induction I have when including the X/Y designs as essential to my inductions is the pattern.

I don’t think you can coherently have both here (but correct me if I am wrong).

Change the set and context and we have to re-evaluate which distinctive knowledge set would be more rationale to take, or if there is no answer for that specific scenario.

This is irrelevant to what I have been saying: we are talking about a specific scenario. I agree that if you change the scenario we have to re-evaluate which is most cogent; but that doesn’t change in the slightest that there is a most cogent solution.

What I will note is that your claim that H2 is more rational to choose than H1 has only provided a confirmation bias justification.

I don’t see how it is confirmation bias at all. We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds.

The fourth is coming up btw! I don't know if you're American, but happy 4th regardless!

Happy fourth to you as well my friend!

Bob

Ok, at this point I can see nothing new is being said, and I think I understand your points. We're going round and round at this point, so I'm going to summarize where things stand to really narrow in on what's important, and what you need to do if you're going to have a valid case. After we address this major point, we can bring back in any point you still feel needs addressing. First, I ask you to trust my good faith that if a point is proven, I will concede. I trust you'll do the same.

First: My points

1. The hierarchy of induction allows a rational way of comparing inductions based on their distance from what is and can be applicably known. You know how this works from the paper, so no need to repeat it here.

2. In detail, the inductions compared must involve the same essential properties used to construct the induction. Thus comparing an induction about a space ship to an induction about a sun is pointless.

3. Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set. Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.

4. This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?" I've put forward several discussion points, but this will have to wait as we must first address the one point you hold that prevents us from doing so.

Second: Your point

1. You claim that I can somehow cross compare inductions despite the essential properties needed to make the inductions being different. You do this as follows:

You take an identity, then have non-essential properties about that identity, an air box. Second, you then use a non-essential property of the previous identity as part of an induction about the air box. I point out that it may be non-essential in your original identity, but now it is essential to you needing to make the induction. You disagree by saying "relevant properties" are different.

My counterpoint:

I've informed you that the only definition I will accept for relevant properties is "essential properties for the formation of the induction", as adding any knew vocabulary or concepts apart from this would not be addressing the hierarchy, but something else.

I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted. As such, for this point only, we are going to drop the phrasing "relevant properties" and examine only the vocabulary I've introduced. This is the only way to ensure that you are discussing the theory, and not something else. I claim X and Y are essential to the inductions conclusions in the second case. You can prove me wrong by doing the following:

Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction. If you cannot, then we both agree that this is the conclusion going forward. If you then wish to add a claim that we should consider a new term called "relevant properties", please break down exactly what that is, and show why it is different from the argument which uses essential and non-essential properties. But prior to this, this one major point must be decided one way or another.

One last note:

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do. Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob. :) If you insist this point is true, then its been a good discussion, and we'll have to chat another time. If however you want to discuss within the confines of the theory, I've proposed what is rational within the theory, and you'll have to provide more than you have so far for your justifications.

Hello Philosophim,

I appreciate you summarizing our differences; but if that summary of my position is truly what you think I am claiming, then, with all due respect, I don’t think you are understanding what I am claiming at all. Thusly, I am going to summarize my points hereon so you can address them and I will respond thereafter to some of the points you made.

I am saying (in order of importance):

1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. (by “comparison”, I do not strictly mean the utilization of your concept of an “induction hierarchy”); and

2. That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. A relevant factor (of the situation…) can never end up being formulated into an induction and an induction can have essential properties which are not relevant factors (of the situation…); and

3. The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know; and

4. That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a “hierarchy induction” (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wanting—as the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. This is not a dig at the ‘induction hierarchy’ itself, as it does what it purports to do—but it isn’t applicable to the vast majority of situations which is a problem if you are trying to explicate a system of acquiring knowledge (and beliefs) in the most rational manner possible in the majority of situations; and

5. That I have provided a clear and concise definition of “rationality” (i.e., to be, to the best of one’s ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions) but you have not. I have provided a concept whereas, this whole time and within your papers, you are working with a notion.

6. Although I haven’t mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: if an essential property of an induction is a property which the induction cannot exist without, then every property of the induction is an essential property because even changing one property transforms the induction into a different induction; and if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. This is because you at not noting what is essential to what an induction is (i.e., the essence of the concept of an induction), but, rather, what is essential to the formulation of a particular induction. Just something to think about.

Now let me address some points in your response that caught my eye.

First, I ask you to trust my good faith that if a point is proven, I will concede. I trust you'll do the same.

I agree: I don’t think either of us will argue in bad faith.

In terms of your points:

#1: This is true, but doesn’t negate any of my critiques above. Likewise, with respect to my #4, you haven’t defined what rationality even is. I agree with you that it is “rational”, but I am interpreting it as my definition because you haven’t provided one.

#2: This is also true, and also doesn’t negate any of my critiques above. You “induction hierarchy” is a concept that can be used to decipher what is most cogent in certain situations; and one just stipulation of the situation is that the inductions have to have the same essential properties.

#3:

Because we can have different distinctive knowledge sets, we could create a different set of inductions to compare within each knowledge set.

We can create different distinctive sets and different inductions; but there are a set of relevant factors to the situation and there are better inductions to formulate with those relevant factors than others.

Once you choose your distinctive knowledge set, you then look within the hierarchy that results within that distinctive knowledge set to choose the most rational induction.

This is unapplicable to the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations because inductions typically do not have the same “essential properties” (and, as I said above, noting the essential properties of a particular induction, when not referring to the essence of an induction in general, is trivial and makes it unique to every other possible induction).

#4:

This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"

What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality.

And to your point that is supposed to be my point:

I have not seen any justification from your end that we should view "relevant properties" as anything different than I've noted

A relevant factor is a piece of information that impacts one’s formulation of possible inductions in the scenario; whereas an essential property of an induction is a property that if removed which change the induction into a different induction. As noted above, noting the essence of an induction is not the same thing as noting the essential properties of a particular induction: the latter leads to your hierarchy being unapplicable to every scenario (because all inductions are unique with that regard) and the former irrelevant to the properties or relevant factors of the situation (as it only outlines abstractly what makes an induction, at its core, an induction). Relevant factors, likewise, aren’t being argued as being a factor that one should use in all their possible inductions to choose from (so they aren’t essential to every induction) but rather are used to formulate possible inductions and then each induction is weighed against one another.

Demonstrate how you can create the induction pattern that involves X and Y without using X and Y. If X and Y are accidental or secondary to the induction, then they are not needed for the formation of the induction.

This demonstrates, with all due respect, a lack of understanding of what I am saying. Obviously, if I formulate an induction with X and Y, then removing them from the formulation changes the induction to a different one. Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesn’t; so they don’t have the same essential properties. Likewise, if you mean the essence of an induction, that is just what makes an induction an induction at it core which would not have anything do with being a probability, using designs, etc.

To be charitable, I am interpreting you to be claiming not that the induction literally have to have the same essential properties but, rather, that they need to be the exact same inductions apart from their “type” (e.g., a probability, a possibility, a speculation, etc.).

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.

This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think “rationality” should be and see where it goes from there. You haven’t even defined it yet.

Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.

Again, straw man. I am not saying that “well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be”. That’s nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Hume’s guillotine). That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist?

I've proposed what is rational within the theory,

But you haven’t proposed what “rationality” is; just examples of it.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Alright, I think we have some focus again! Let me get right to your points.

1. That one has to compare the inductions in the box scenario or leave it up to an arbitrary decision. — Bob Ross

And I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so. Since the distinctive knowledge identities are not the same, we're comparing inductions between two sets of identities. While you note that it is arbitrary, I note that it does not have to be. We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.

In the box example, I noted that if the question was, "Will you pull a box with air next?" the X/Y properties are pointless, so we just go with the A/B set and use the probability. If you ask, "Is the Box with an X design filled with air?" we use the pattern because we do not have a probability within the A/B X/Y set.

This leaves the question, "What is the most rational distinctive knowledge set to hold?"

What is most rational to distinctively hold is what corresponds best to reality. — Bob Ross

I agree. This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality. Almost a semantic difference, but we are in agreement here. The problem when asking this question with distinctive knowledge sets is we won't know what will be contradicted by reality until we apply it.

This is why distinctive knowledge which is applicably known together is the complete picture of knowledge. When we need to make a prediction where we do not yet know the outcome, we need to make an induction. The most rational induction is of course that which has the least distance from our distinctive knowledge that has been applicably confirmed.

That relevant factors of a situation for resolving a dilemma are not necessarily essential properties of any induction: the former is a piece of information that could affect the conclusion, whereas the latter is a property that a formulated induction cannot exist without. — Bob Ross

The relevant factors of a situation are not distinctive knowledge, they are applicable knowledge. One can formulate distinctive knowledge about the relevant factors, but there are necessarily a set of relevant factors to the situation irregardless of what one distinctively claims to know — Bob Ross

Ah, ok! This clears this up a little bit. If you recall, applicable knowledge of our distinctive knowledge set is how we determine the cogency of the induction. An induction is not an applicable knowledge claim. An induction means you do not know the applicable conclusion. As such, you can only judge the rationality of the induction based on the distinctive knowledge set, and the applicable knowledge within that distinctive knowledge set.

If you already know the outcome, its not an induction anymore, its applicable knowledge of what happened. So we can say, "Induction Z (a plausibility compared to a probability for example) was the one that lead to the correct outcome," but in no way can we say it was rational to pick the Z plausibility when compared to a probability in the identity set when you didn't now what the outcome would be. If you are saying that the outcome of the induction is a relevant factor, it is not. Otherwise, I still do not see what a relevant factor is that necessitates its introduction from the vocabulary I've used.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established. When there is debate on specifics, larger abstracts must be dropped for smaller abstracts to help us nail the points down. I don't think I quite understand what relevant factors are, and as such they are muddying the conversation. As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing. There shouldn't be anything that cannot be communicated through the vocabulary I've already introduced, and using a phrase that I have not introduced feels like its hiding something, whether intentional or not.

That because you have only provided a method of determining cogency of inductions within your concept of a “hierarchy induction” (and have adamantly asserted that we cannot determine cogency otherwise), I am left to conclude that the applicability of your epistemology to decipher what is most cogent to believe is severely wanting—as the vast majority of practical and theoretical situations force the person to compare two inductions that have different essential properties. — Bob Ross

And I've informed you that you're looking at it incorrectly. You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions. You're doing it in the wrong order, and there's no reason to do so. Putting the cart before the horse I think they say! So you are incorrect that it does not apply to many cases. Your argument essentially boils down to this:

You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)

Now, maybe there is a reason to compare the inductions without comparing the distinctive knowledge sets, but I've seen no reason why we should. The theory I've presented here doesn't claim we should. The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead. So I see no lack on my part.

By analogy, you're trying to use multiplication to solve a problem when you need to look to the base, addition, to do so. If I can show you how to solve the problem through addition, because you can't through multiplication, that doesn't make multiplication useless. So unless there's a very good reason that you can give that allows us to compare different hierarchy sets alone, I'm just not seeing why we should.

That I have provided a clear and concise definition of “rationality” (i.e., to be, to the best of one’s ability, logically consistent, internally/externally coherent, empirically adequate, considerate of credence, considerate of explanatory power, parsimonious, a person that goes with intellectual seemings, and a person that goes with their immediate apprehensions — Bob Ross

And I have not disagreed. As noted earlier, I also agree that what is rational at its core is that which is not contradicted by reality. My theory is rational. Its not this definition I have a problem with. Its that your argument in claiming H2 is more rational to use then H1 has not been demonstrated with any rational argument beyond confirmation bias. That we'll need.

Although I haven’t mentioned this yet, noting essential properties of an induction is trivial: — Bob Ross

Yes! This is why it has been odd to me that I've had to clarify this repeatedly. I feel like we've been talking past one another on this.

if that is the case, then there are no inductions which have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross

Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:

Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.

How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions? I feel this is the main source of our disagreement, and I feel either I or you keep missing something here when we address it. I feel if we can resolve this, the conversation can move forward.

Again, a induction being a probability and another being a possibility likewise would be, under your definition here, essential properties which one has and the other doesn’t; so they don’t have the same essential properties. — Bob Ross

To clarify again, a distinctive knowledge set happens first. The applicable knowledge involving that distinctive knowledge set is what determines the type of induction.

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

If this statement is correct, then the discussion is over. I believe my point is more rational, you believe your point is more rational, and there's nothing that either can ever do.

This is clear straw man. We can both explicate what we think “rationality” should be and see where it goes from there. You haven’t even defined it yet. — Bob Ross

I think its not a straw man. This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right. If you say I'm wrong, then you're wrong. Its really not a very good argument Bob.

Therefore its pointless to even discuss it. Its the ultimate, get out of argument card Bob.

Again, straw man. I am not saying that “well, I want it to be that, so I am not going to hear what you think it should be”. That’s nonsense. I am saying that, fundamentally, how we define rationality is dependent on our obligation (as it is literally a definition about how we ought to behave), and obligations are subjective; so it will bottom out at a desire (because of Hume’s guillotine). That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss it just like morals. Are you a moral realist? — Bob Ross

The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way. If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal. Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right. To say I'm wrong is to claim something objective, and defeat your own statement.

Example: I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong. But then you're right! But then you're not. Its just a contradiction Bob and doesn't hold up in any serious discussion. When you've introduced an argument for rationality, that by its own argument, allows everyone to say its wrong; that's an argument that just doesn't work. Reality is the objective arbiter of rationality, and the reality is, your argument leads to contradicting itself.

As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first. :)

Hello Philosophim,

I've informed you that not only do we not have to compare the inductions between the hierarchy sets, we logically can't justify doing so.
...
We can reason why we should choose certain knowledge sets over others, and I've set different scenarios to demonstrate this.

I am saying that choosing between “knowledge sets” is a comparison. The moment you decide, by analysis within or without the “induction hierarchy”, that this induction is a better pick than that one, you have thereby compared and evaluated them. I don’t think you can coherently claim to never compare the inductions if you are likewise claiming that you can determine which is better based of of analysis of the “distinctive knowledge sets”.

This truly is the core of rationality without any extra detail. Just to specify a tad more, I would say it is that which is not contradicted by reality

Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be “to be illogical”? I don’t think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.

I can’t because there is no term for it. They aren’t essential properties necessarily of anything.

As the person who's established the theory, I want to see a contradiction or a lack using the terms involved first. If you can do so, then we can discuss trying to figure out what is missing

There’s not logical contradiction: there’s just no term currently mapped to what I mean by “relevant factors”. All I can do is explicate again what I mean by a relevant factor and if you think there is a term that fits in your theory then please let me know: it is a piece of information that is relevant to formulating the set of possible inductions one could use to resolve the dilemma. I must repeat: they are not distinctive knowledge. I can have distinctive knowledge of what I may guess are the relevant factors (if I do not have applicable knowledge of them); but the relevant factors are what actually are, in reality, relevant to the formulation of inductions pertaining to the context and the dilemma therein. I don’t know of any term in your theory that means that: please let me know if there is.

You compare the distinctive knowledge sets, not the inductions.

What do you mean by “distinctive knowledge sets”? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. That is a comparison.

You: People want to compare inductions across different distinctive knowledge sets.
Me: Can't do that. Its incorrect thinking. If they want to think correctly, they need to look at the distinctive knowledge sets.
You But I don't want to. (I'm poking fun a little bit, I just don't see anything else in your argument so far)

I am saying:

1. When you “look at the distinctive knowledge sets [(hierarchies)]”, you are thereby comparing the inductions. A comparison is not limited to comparing within the hierarchies, but the criteria that you are using to compare within may not (and in this case are not) applicable to comparing the sets themselves; and

2. If you say that one is better than the other, even by analyzing the sets, then one can deduce that you compared them; because you can’t determine something is better than another without comparison: that’s what a comparison is.

I get that you are just joking a bit with that last alleged rebuttal of mine but, with all due respect, it demonstrates to me that you do not understand in the slightest what I am saying (and perhaps I am just not explaining it well enough).

The theory has a logical solution to the problem you've proposed, to look at the distinctive knowledge sets and compare those instead.

You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them.

So I see no lack on my part

The lack of applicability is if you actually can’t compare the inductions, which I don’t think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you can’t compare them, then you can’t say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless.

Please explain what you mean by this. By my example below:

P1: Probability of A with X and B with Y is Z%
P2: Pattern of A with X and B with Y predicts the next pull will be an AX
P3: Plausibility of A with Y will be pulled next time, even though it hasn't happened yet.

P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be “the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening”: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.

Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. That’s why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.

Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about it—e.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.

Same thing with the P3.

Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument.

How is that not a set of three different types of inductions that use the same essential properties to create those inductions?

I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the “A with X” and “B with Y”, but that’s just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; and, secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). The only time accidental properties emerge is if you are talking about the essence of a thing, which pertains to formulating a general class that it is a member of; but if you are talking about what makes a particular thing that particular thing—well...that’s every aspect of that particular thing!

This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.

If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We aren’t both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical.

The problem is you're saying its subjective, then asserting it can't be a certain way.

Because, again, subjective judgments are indexical: “I think killing babies is wrong” could true for me and false for you (or vice-versa) (or true/false for both of us). If it is true for me and false for you, then I can still say you are wrong for killing a baby because I think killing babies is wrong.

If its fully subjective, then I subjectively believe you're wrong, and you have to agree with me to keep your proposal.

I don’t have to agree that we are both right: I have to agree that relative to me you are wrong and relative to you you are right.

Something which is fully subjective cannot be wrong if the subject says its right.

Sort of. The problem is that we tend to psycho-analyze ourselves rather poorly. Just because I say “I think killing babies is wrong” that does not thereby make it true that I think killing babies I wrong. Subjective judgments are reflections of our psyche and usually at its deepest core, which we don’t “control” in any colloquial sense of the term. I can absolutely formulate a false belief about a subjective judgment that I hold (or don’t hold).

I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong

This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. If by this you are just noting that it is possible for “rational is X” to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is “right”), then, yeah, that’s true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless (about morality and the like) because most of the time they have false or partly inaccurate beliefs about what they will as right or wrong; and, therefore, conversing about it with other people can change their mind as they are forced to dive deeper into what they think is right or wrong (which, again, is just to say that they have to dive deeper into their own psyche to determine what they truly are obligated to). It’s not as simple, philosophim, as saying to oneself “I think X is wrong” and then thinking they are absolutely right about that because it is subjective: they could be formulating a false belief about themselves.

ts just a contradiction Bob

There wasn’t any logical contradiction in the example you gave. The proposition “I want rationality to be X” can be false for you and true for me. If you violate X, then I can thereby call you irrational and you would say you are still being rational (because it was false for you). Where’s the logical contradiction Philosophim?

As for morality, I may one day post my thoughts on it. Its a little more complicated then something as simple as moral realism. You have to have knowledge before you can know morality. So we'll have to finish this up first.

Here’s a big difference between us: I think obligations are more fundamental ontologically than reason and although, yes, we have to figure out how to know things first we necessarily utilize our obligations implicitly in formulating our epistemologies (at its core). Also, I am a moral anti-realist.

I asked this because if you are a moral realist then that is why we are disagreeing so adamantly on what rationality is, just like we could argue similarly about what “good” or “better” is: they all fall into the class of oughts.

Bob

I am saying that choosing between “knowledge sets” is a comparison. — Bob Ross

As am I. But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.

Why is rationality that which is not contradicted by reality? Why cannot not be “to be illogical”? — Bob Ross

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is. Not being contradicted by reality is something objective and beyond human emotion the gives an applicable confirmation of the distinctive knowledge of "rational".

I don’t think you can justify this without it bottoming out at a desire: the desire to obtain and abide by that which most closely aligns with reality. — Bob Ross

Its not a desire, it starts with simple surviving. If you can't figure out what will kill you in reality, you're doing to die. Same with undue harm. That is the root of rationality. Rationality allows us to exist. We simply apply it beyond there to things that may not kill or harm us, but benefit us. This is not a subjective point, but objective. If I want something in reality, and I can identify it without contradiction, I can obtain with purpose and planning instead of chance.

As such, I'm going to ask you to drop the "relevant factors" and just communicate using the basic terminology we've already established.

I can’t because there is no term for it. They aren’t essential properties necessarily of anything. — Bob Ross

Then I see no argument and I believe this line is at an end. I do not understand nor see any justification for relevant factors. As it is a non-term that I see no application for, its not a point I cannot consider any longer.

What do you mean by “distinctive knowledge sets”? You said inductions are distinctive knowledge, and the sets (hierarchies) of inductions are also distinctive knowledge; so when you compare the hierarchies (sets) themselves, you are doing so to compare the inductions within different hierarchies to determine which one to use. — Bob Ross

I think I've been clear. Its the distinctive knowledge set needed to form the induction.

You compare the sets to compare the inductions. The end goal is to pick an induction and if there are two in different sets then you compare the sets to compare them. — Bob Ross

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality. Inductions within a hierarchy are a consequence of what set you choose, and the applicable knowledge you have with that distinctive knowledge set, not the other way around. I've said this enough at this point, and I'm still not seeing any viable objection besides an insistence that you want it to be the other way around. If nothing more is added I think this point needs no more consideration.

The lack of applicability is if you actually can’t compare the inductions, which I don’t think you are truly saying (although you keep saying it). If you can’t compare them, then you can’t say one set is more rational to hold than another and, in turn, that one induction (within one set) is more rational than another (in another set). At that point, you theory is effectively useless. — Bob Ross

Bob, I've been as clear at this point as I can. I've been saying I have no rational justification to compare inductions between hierarchy sets. I've asked you several times to give me a rational justification to compare inductions between distinctive knowledge sets. You just keep repeating yourself without providing this asked for justification. At this point, your critique is useless. I've tried to drill into it as much as I can to see if there's anything to your point. Mere disagreement or doubt is not an argument, so there is nothing more to be said here either.

P1 is not an induction itself: a probability is a deduction itself and the induction is the inference made utilizing it. So P1 should really be “the next pick is a A with X because there is a Z% chance of it happening”: I am going to call this rP1 (revised-P1). rP1 has an essential property of Z% chance of getting an A with X, which neither the pattern nor plausibility can ever have.

Without the utilization of Z%, rP1 is not longer rP1: it is another probability. That’s why I said talking about essential properties of particular inductions is trivial and useless.

Likewise, P2 has an essential property of the pattern (as, again, the patter itself is not the induction, the inference made about it—e.g., I will pull an A with X because of this pattern), and the probability, rP1 can never have that property. Without the pattern, the induction is not longer that induction: it is something else.

Same thing with the P3.

Now, the only other option when speaking about essential properties is the essence of a general class of things and, in this case, the essential properties of an induction (i.e., what makes an induction, at its core, an induction?)--and that affords no foreseeable use to your argument. — Bob Ross

Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.

I think you are thinking that the essential properties of the inductions are the “A with X” and “B with Y”, but that’s just plainly false. Firstly, the inductions themselves are not the patterns nor probabilities; — Bob Ross

Of course a probability and a pattern are an induction. They are noting that we predict something will happen next before we have applicable knowledge of what will happen. When we say something has X% chance of being, we are saying we don't know the actual outcome, we're just making a prediction based on the rational of what we applicably know. You can applicably know of a probability or pattern, but the probability or pattern is an induction. This is basic English, so I think you're trying to stretch far too hard to make your point. That's an indicator your point isn't based on a solid rationale Bob.

secondly, if we are talking about the essential properties of a particular induction (which is what you were talking about), then every property thereof is essential (because without even one property it would not longer be that exact induction). — Bob Ross

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction. Then we examine what we applicably know in that distinctive set to determine whether we have a probability, possibility etc. So yes, you are absolutely correct that there are no accidental properties needed to form an induction. That could make it confusing as saying essential properties would be redundant.

To be clearer then:

I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.
I have applicable knowledge based on those properties.
Inductions I make considering that full distinctive property set are then evaluated into a hierarchy based on the applicable knowledge I have of that full distinctive knowledge set.

This is what I think I ought to be doing epistemically, and does not exist apart from my will/mind. So if you're right, I'm right.

If we have conflicting views on what rationality is, then I would be wrong relative to you and you to me. We aren’t both right. Propositions that are subjective are indexical. — Bob Ross

Then again, the discussion is over. What's the point? I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement. When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.

Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement? "Everything is relative." Is this certain? "Rationality is subjective". Then subjectively I can state that statement is irrational. Statements like this can be tempting because of the problems you think they can solve. They always cause the biggest problem of all however, in the fact that they are so easily contradicted and dismissed.

I ought to behave in a way that demonstrates your idea of rationality is wrong. This is my desire. Therefore it is rational that you're wrong

This just pushes the more important question back of what you think rationality is, as you are implicitly using it by saying that you demonstrate that my idea of rationality is wrong. — Bob Ross

Yes. And under your statement, I can. That's why it leads to a paradox, a contradiction, etc.

If by this you are just noting that it is possible for “rational is X” to be false for you and true for me (and that there is nothing objective to decipher which is “right”), then, yeah, that’s true. However, people tend to have productive conversations nonetheless — Bob Ross

No. People who hold this view do not have productive conversations. They are often dismissed as irrational, and people generally don't listen to further arguments they say. I know how rational you are Bob, so of course I don't.

I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought. I don't say this to be mean or imply that I hold special knowledge or pedigree. I'll be the first to say its the arguments that count in the end, and nothing else. I say this because you are insisting on holding onto an irrational argument, and if a person holds onto an irrational argument despite seeing it is irrational, the appeal must be to better people than myself. I don't want you to fall into this logic trap that a lot of early philosophers can fall into. You are far better than that Bob, and I want to see more people in awe of your persuasive prowess and insight! Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought, and I highly encourage that you think deeply on it before continuing to hold it.

As for my part, I'm not going to consider it anymore in this conversation. If you insist on holding that position of rationality, that is of course your choice. I see nothing more to explore here.

Hello Philosophim,

I think we both see that certain aspects of our conversation do not seem to be progressing, so I am going to the parts that I think we can still as of yet further the discussion.

But a knowledge set is the distinctive properties you are using at its base, not the inductions. The inductions rely on the base. You can compare inductions between the bases, but it always comes back to the bases in the end. I've noted there is no rational justification for comparing inductions between knowledge sets. So far you have not provided any either.

We are saying the same thing here: since you conceptually structure your epistemology where there are hierarchies and then comparisons of the distinctive sets, it just sounds like you aren’t cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those “bases” you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselves—so you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. I don’t see any real disagreement here.

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.

They are not antonyms: to be illogical is to hold logical contradictions as true, and to be rational is, well, I already defined that before. Being logically consistent is not enough to be rational (in the sense I mean it) nor does it equate to living in accordance with reality (or staying closely married to reality); nor does it get you to your idea of trying to not to contradict reality. A “contradiction of reality” is not a logical contradiction: the latter pertains to the form of the argument and never the content—viz., to say something contradicted reality is to affirm something about the content and pertains nothing to the form of the argument itself. This is why it is not illogical to say that “hair is short and long” whereas “hair is green and not green” is, even though most people, who are not immersed in formal logic, would think that both are logical contradictions. In formal logic, there is nothing logically contradictory with saying “∀x (Hair[x] ^ Short[x] ^ Long[x])”. It is incoherent with what most would consider true of reality (viz., once one realizes what is meant by the property of Short and Long it becomes clear both cannot cohere), but it is not illogical. I think you may be thinking about logic more loosely than I am; and perhaps all you mean is that to be rational is to be coherent, to the best of one’s ability, with reality.

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.

To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. When we try to get the most rational assessment of reality when we cannot deduce what to do, then we are necessarily trying to choose the best induction to use.

Bob, I read this a few times and I could not understand what you were trying to say at all. Please see if a second pass can make this more clear.

I was saying essentially this:

1. The probability of … is Z% is not an induction.
2. An inference which is not deduced from #1 but utilizes #1 is an induction.
3. #2 is an induction which has the essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #1.
4. The pattern of … is not an induction (or at least not the one in question).
5. An inference which is not deduced from #4 but utilizes #4 is an induction (that is in question here).
6. #5 is an induction which has an essential property, to it as a particular induction, of #4.
7. Therefore, #6 and #3 do not have the same essential properties (even in virtue of just their utilization of pattern vs. probability).

If you really want to say that “only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared”, then you cannot mean by “essential property” that which was essential to the formulation of the induction while claiming that there are inductions which have the same essential properties (because, as shown above, just one induction using a probability vs. pattern makes them have different essential properties)(and, furthermore, every property would be essential to each induction, so only the exact same induction, to the T, would equate to an induction which equal essential properties).

I don’t think your argument works here. You will have to clarify what you mean by “essential properties of an induction” within the context of “only inductions with the same essential properties can be compared”.

If by it you mean:

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.

Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for.

I have a set of distinctive properties I consider important to a decision.

This is not the same thing as an essential property to the formulation of an induction that you were arguing before! This is a relevant factor! This is what I have been trying to get you to see: there’s no term for what you just described there in your epistemology.

Its just like these statements, "Nothing is true." Is that a true statement?

What I outlined is nothing like that statement. Please demonstrate the logical contradiction in holding that imperatives are indexical. You still haven’t demonstrated it.

I can just say you're wrong and I'm correct under your statement.

There’s no logical contradiction in you saying that I am wrong relative to what you think is “rationality”. Philosophim, if you truly think it is illogical, then please demonstrate the logical contradiction. I want you to demonstrate that my claim leads to (p ^ !p).

When your point allows a contradiction of your point to stand, that's reality contradicting your point.

You disagreeing with me, relative to what you think is “rationality”, is not a contradiction of my point: it agrees with it. I contradiction is not the same thing as a disagreement; and, also, by reality contradicting my point I am assuming you mean that reality is incoherent with my point (and not that there is a logical contradiction in it). To that, I also don’t see what you are saying is incoherent about it: please demonstrate, if you cannot expose a logical contradiction, what is incoherent (with respect to reality) with my position.

I've been formerly trained in philosophy and have been around some incredibly intelligent, learned, and capable people. Every single one of them would dismantle your point without a second thought
…
Your statement on rationality is a well tread and thoroughly debunked idea in any serious circle of thought

Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others’) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other.

I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think.

With that being said, I want to clarify one thing about “rationality”: I sometimes get the impression, after hearing what you think rationality is, that you may be under the impression that I am saying we can subjectively makeup what corresponds best with reality—and I am NOT saying that. I am saying that imperatives are hypothetical and never categorical (viz., subjective and never objective). For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivity—it is subjective. Likewise, to say “one is irrational if they smoke and think that they should be healthy” is to argue that:

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational.

But whence does this obligation in P1 arise? If it is not from a categorical imperative (ultimately), then it is merely hypothetical and thusly irrationality is grounded in subjectivity.

To refute this, all you have to do is provide the categorical imperative that you are deriving rationality from (i.e., deriving that if someone is incoherent with reality then they should be considered irrational). If you can’t, then, I am sorry, but you are wrong.

Bob

it just sounds like you aren’t cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those “bases” you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselves—so you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. — Bob Ross

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create. The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y. I've pointed out that comparing a derivation is not the goal, its comparing the base that we start with that is the goal. This is not the same thing as comparing the inductions between the sets, and if anyone were to use the theory in such a way I would inform them this was incorrect. The theory give no rational argument to do so, so therefore it is not part of the theory as the proper way to organize and compare inductions in a rational manner.

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.

To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. — Bob Ross

Yes, as long as you realize its the induction of picking a distinctive knowledge set. What is important is not to compare the inductions that you can form with the distinctive knowledge set, as inductions themselves are unknowns. Perhaps this is what you need to finally see why we're not comparing the derived inductions, but must compare the distinctive knowledge sets first. If you're looking to the derived inductions to establish an induction upon which that derived induction would form, this is trying to rationalize an induction by an induction and very low on cogency. Its much more rational to establish a justification for the base induction before deriving from it. Do you understand now why we it is less cogent to use the derived inductions as a reason to pick our initial induction of our distinctive knowledge set?

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.

What is illogical is one way you can be irrational. That does not explain or define what rationality is. That was my only intended point. I also noted that I was fine with your general identification of rationality. The main point stands that despite the definitions, you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I was saying essentially this:

1. The probability of … is Z% is not an induction. — Bob Ross

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card. We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction. If you mean its not an induction until we decide to believe it or not, that doesn't work either. That's choosing an induction to believe in.

One thing I will clear up in case this is causing confusion is that "pattern" as an induction is not the same as a pattern itself as a noun. The capture of the pattern as a noun is the applicable knowledge one has when repeating the same steps and counting the number of times an outcome occurs. The number of outcomes alone is not an induction, this is applicable knowledge of results. This applicable knowledge allows us to make an induction I've been calling a pattern, that repeated results that favor a particular outcome means we believe that particular outcome will occur again. To avoid this confusion going forward (and until I can think of a better term :) ) lets call the induction of a pattern "patterning".

If by it you mean:

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.

Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for. — Bob Ross

No, I've attempted to note this over several posts. Lets go back to cards instead of boxes because you might be misunderstanding this.

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. I do not include the particular type of suit.

Applicable knowledge: I have applicable knowledge that there is deck of 52 cards with this setup. I've pulled three cards, and its been a jack 3 times in a row. I have no applicable knowledge as to what the next card is in the deck after its shuffled.

Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack out is 4/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack again.

Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. The four suits are hearts, diamonds, spades, and clovers. (The new properties for the inductions)

Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack of hearts out is 1/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack of hearts out again.

As you can see, the difference between both sets is the distinctive knowledge set used with the applicable knowledge using that set, to set up different types of inductions. We were able to use the same distinctive knowledge set to create different inductions within it based on our applicable knowledge. Please use this example specifically to point out issues. I think your problem is you're missing the fact that that applicable knowledge, or lack thereof, is what allows us to make different inductions within the distinctive knowledge set. But the distinctive properties used to make the inductions do not change themselves.

Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others’) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other. — Bob Ross

Agreed, I am not interested in comparing either. I hesitated to even post it as I was unsure of your level of development and education in philosophy. The intent was to persuade you to re-examine the idea carefully, but I see that was not the way to do so. I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.

I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think. — Bob Ross

I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob. I was noting that your position was what was easily debunked. Perhaps you intended some implicit references that I did not see within your points read as is. As is, the point you are making is easily refuted.

For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivity—it is subjective. — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. Lets say not debate the statements validity, lets assume that it is true. Lets also make it so that it fits with what you are intending to convey. Because technically I could decide not to smoke, but get sick for example.

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

This is an objective statement that has nothing to do with your subjective opinion on the matter. If you stated, "I think I'll retain good health while smoking, this is simply untrue."

Deciding to smoke or not smoke is a decision. Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational. You could be emotional. You have a subjective choice, but that subjective choice may or may not be rational.

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross

P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?

P2, should should be "will". P2 is an affirmation of a future action. Should doesn't really communicate this clearly.

The refutation is not the argument, but the nature of the words and premises. They aren't clear. Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.

But not to detract from your point as I saw it:

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

This translates directly to this:

Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.

Maybe you didn't intend that, but from the reading of that sentence alone, what I've noted is equivalent. Thus my conclusion:

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.

Hello Philosophim,

I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.

Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about “rationality”. Likewise:

I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob.

I apologize, as you never actually said you supported moral realism; however, in the interpretation of your contentions with my view on rationalism, they are only work if you are claiming to be a “normative realist” at a minimum—that’s why I said that; but I should have asked first.

To try and clear things up, I think that by “rationality” you are simply referring to something toto genere from what I mean. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are referring to the act (or lack thereof) of corresponding to reality in one’s assertions—which I call (more or less) truth and not rationality. Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that “truth” is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with “rationality”. I am associating “rationality” with an act which is in accordance with one’s primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical).

With that in mind:

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; and I completely agree with you here as it is exactly what I said:

if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not

Your “resolution” section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted “should” for “want”, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesn’t matter: normative statements are subjective.

When I said “this is true regardless...” I was agreeing with you that “smoking leads to poor health” and so if I should be healthy, then it logically follows that I should not smoke; and this is not subjective.

Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational

And here’s where I think you are saying more than just that truth is absolute: you are saying that what defines a person as rational is the epistemic norm that they should try to correspond with reality. This is a normative statement which, as I said before, you cannot prove is objective.

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross

P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?

I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. Secondly, P1 is not ambiguous at all: it is the claim that “one who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational”--it doesn’t get any clearer than that. The person is saying, apart from what is the case, that what should be the case is that…. . Thirdly, I purposely made the premises have “oughts” in them: you can’t just arbitrarily change them to descriptive statements. If you want to do that and it not be considered irrelevant to the conversation, then you must demonstrate that rationality is objective—then you can claim they are descriptive statements. I am saying rationality is just epistemic norms, which are prescriptive statements.

To be charitable, I think you are noting that truth is absolute and objective; and from that interpretation, I would agree that one can demonstrate that. So, it would be fair to say that P1 is either true or false, and that is objectively so; however, to claim someone is irrational or rational is to posit that they should be epistemically doing something else: it is not a descriptive statement. In other words, within your terms, you could claim that a person that holds a contradiction is not holding something which is objectively true, but not that they are irrational for it. These are two different claims.

Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.

If you are confused by what the premises are saying, then it is on you to ask for clarification: you don’t get to just dismiss the argument because you don’t understand what the premises are claiming. I find them to be very, very clear.

Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.

Correct! But….:

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.

NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from one’s (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it.

I do not let you hold a contradiction as true: I let you hold that you are not objectively irrational for holding a contradiction as true (although it is false).

Now on to the distinctive sets!

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.

No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. I know there are 4 jacks and 52 cards, and I can analytically deduce the probability of pulling a jack. This is not the same claim as building off of that probability to say that “I will pull a jack next time because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it”: that’s the induction. Probabilities are absolutely never inductions themselves: they are mathematically deduced from what is already known.

We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction.

You have not “deduced an induction” when you claim that “I will pick a jack because there is a 4/52 chance of getting it”: you have used deduction knowledge to formulate an induction. If you think that you can deduce that induction (or something similar), then provide the syllogism.

An induction is a form of argumentation where the premises do not necessitate the conclusion: the 4/52 chance is purely a deduction, and the induction is built off of it but is not deduced from it. I cannot provide a syllogism that absolutely entails the 4/52 deduced chance with the claim that I will pull a jack next time (and, thusly, it is not deduced).

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num

Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by “essential properties” of the inductions.

For example, in your example #1, you didn’t use the same properties nor some essential set to formulate the patterning and probability based inductions. Is it supposed to be what is essential to the scenario given?

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.

What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isn’t distinctive knowledge itself.

The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y.

Correct. That is why I am bringing up relevant factors, because that is what you are describing here: you aren’t depicting any sort of “essential properties”.

you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I already have. But I think we need to keep on track with the other points and resolve some things before revisiting this part.

Bob

This kinda breaks down as you don’t really demonstrate we have discrete experiences but just assert we do. Same with a lot of other things in the OP.

Also the differences between the forms of induction are just splitting hairs than any actual distinction between them, apart from irrationality.

I found your “split” between knowledge and truth iffy at best. Knowledge does capture the truth at times but not always.

And my usual final question, what’s the point here?

Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about “rationality”. — Bob Ross

Yes, we may be at an impasse at this point simply due to differences in definitions. If we can't agree on those, there's really nothing we can debate over. As I've noted, what we choose as distinctive knowledge is up to us as individuals. We can attempt to persuade one another, but at the end of the day, the choice is in our own hands. Whatever you choose Bob, the discussion has been good until now.

Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that “truth” is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with “rationality”. I am associating “rationality” with an act which is in accordance with one’s primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical). — Bob Ross

To clarify, it is the processing and thoughts which do not lead to a contradiction from reality that I consider rational. Something rational may not be true, as someone simply hasn't encountered that which in reality would contradict their reasoning yet. At that point, holding onto the original statement would be considered irrational, while a rational individual would amend or eliminate their identities and thoughts which now lead to a contradiction.

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; — Bob Ross

The above statements do not consider whether you should want to be, or are obligated to be in good health. This is not a subjective argument. It is objectively the case that if you want to be in good health, you should not smoke.

if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not

Your “resolution” section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted “should” for “want”, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesn’t matter: normative statements are subjective. — Bob Ross

This is why I do not use broad generic philosophy terms as absolutes in detailed argumentation. The debate then shifts from the actual idea to the debate of about a generic term. We'll debate whether this or that statement is actually normative, and whether there will be exceptions to normative, and does context change whether its normative and we don't actually debate the point. Show me why the statements are subjective after I've demonstrated they are objective. "They're normative" is not a good enough answer. If you don't want to do that, its fine. But if you don't want to, I don't want to go down that rabbit hole of time and effort.

I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. — Bob Ross

Correct, a wrong term on my part. What I meant to say was that this was not an unambiguous assertion. My problem is "should" in this instance is ambiguous. If you say,

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.

My first question is, "Why?" Does "should" mean, "But they could also not be?" Its a poor word for a specific argument. A well constructed set of statements avoids all ambiguity where possible. One who is incoherent in their beliefs "is" or "is not" or even "is or is not" irrational is a clear and unambiguous statement. I'm not going to consider an ambiguous statement as anything valid. Please try to remove the ambiguity and create an example that demonstrates why rationality is always subjective and therefore never objective.

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.

NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from one’s (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it. — Bob Ross

Let me translate that first sentence. "I am saying in truth (objectively) that what is rational does not exist apart from our subjective standards. Therefore if you hold there is a truth (something objective), you hold a false belief.

This is just word play and spinning in circles Bob. If rationality is subjective, I can tell you, by my subjective rationality, that its objective. And according to you, I'm being rational. Meaning I can come up with a rational conclusion that contradicts your conclusion, and somehow we're both right. I'm done with this. I feel like you're arguing for the sake of argument at this point and its fully distracted from the debate at hand. I don't care what you hold at this point, because according to you, we're both right. You can't even objectively say I'm irrational for saying so. Therefor the debate is over. Believe what you want, its lets me believe what I want too. :)

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.

No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. — Bob Ross

If we're debating what an induction is, then I'm satisfied that my theory has held up. No one in any normal setting is going to debate this. This is so far from a debate about the theory at this point, its just a rabbit hole. If you have to go this far Bob, you don't have a good point.

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num

Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by “essential properties” of the inductions. — Bob Ross

Bob, I'm tired of re-explaining this. At this point I just feel like you're arguing to argue. Re-read it. I've posted this countless times and if you can't understand it, I don't care anymore. I'm putting in a lot of work here to make careful examples, and I'm not feeling like you're putting the same effort back. Please consult the example and try to work through it. Show me where the example lacks as you try to reason through it, just don't ask me a generic question without an example.

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.

What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isn’t distinctive knowledge itself. — Bob Ross

I've asked you to stop using this term. If you can't respect that, there's nothing more to discuss.

you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I already have. — Bob Ross

Beyond confirmation bias? You haven't. Almost every time you've claimed I haven't given an example, I've taken the time and effort to repeat it to you or reference it in some way. You are not doing me this favor back. As such, I'm going to keep believing that you haven't given me a rational argument to explain why H2 should be picked over H1.

Looking back over this, I think we're about done Bob. The original argument was whether you could compare between hierarchy sets. I've said no and presented reasons why. Giving my best to understand your points, I do not find them enough to counter what I've noted. Further, we're getting into redefining basic terms and introducing all odd manner of arguments that its not even the original subject anymore. If you disagree, that's fine by me at this point. I beginning to feel like if I said the moon was in space you would argue it wasn't somehow, and when I've gotten to point in discussion like that with good people, I know its time to end it. Feel free to redefine your last terms, but if its just more of the same or goes too off base, I'm just going to let you have the last word.

Hello Philosophim,

It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.

As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum!

Bob

This kinda breaks down as you don’t really demonstrate we have discrete experiences but just assert we do. — Darkneos

Let me repost this section.

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.

Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim

That's the claim. If you believe its incorrect, why?

Also the differences between the forms of induction are just splitting hairs than any actual distinction between them, apart from irrationality. — Darkneos

This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.

When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?

Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.

This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right?

I found your “split” between knowledge and truth iffy at best. Knowledge does capture the truth at times but not always. — Darkneos

Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.

Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.

The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.

As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.

What was the problem you were thinking this missed?

And my usual final question, what’s the point here? — Darkneos

A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.

As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem.

It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.

As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum! — Bob Ross

Thanks Bob! I appreciate it, I just felt like both of us were getting nowhere with each other at that point. Have a great day as well, I look forward as well to the next ideas you bring to the forums!

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.

Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim

Mostly from some forms of eastern philosophy and some branches of non dualism that don't create identity from experience. This also assumes you know the state of the minds of others and just assume people do this. On could also un knowingly be able to experience discretely and yet not be able to comprehend the idea of it, I would cite animals as this case (at least I assume from their behaviors). So this act of creation is more an assumption than a fact of living things, or in this case humans.

This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.

When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?

Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.

This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right? — Philosophim

I guess that probability is more a likelihood within a known quantity like a deck. Possible is if it can happen. Plausible is more like a maybe it COULD be. I'm still not sure how one is more useful than the other though.

Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.

Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.

The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.

As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.

What was the problem you were thinking this missed? — Philosophim

I guess I have a more loose version of truth. For me truth is what IS and what comports with reality and evidence. Because one can "know" something and it be false (flat earth, autism and vaccines). It's why I said that knowledge sometimes yields truth. But I wouldn't exactly say that just because it doesn't know what it's got it has nothing, just that it might be so and not be aware of it.

Science I wouldn't really use as an example as it's designed to be a constantly evolving process, and even then it's complex. Like classical and quantum physics. It's not that classical is "Wrong" per se, just useful at our level of complexity (and that it is if you see what we've done with it). But in terms of reality as it is then the quantum world is where it's at, maybe.

A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.

As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem. — Philosophim

I guess I never really give much thought as to how I know what I know because in the past I tend to spiral into some radical skepticism where I know nothing and end up catatonic. I usually operate on what works and so far it seems to be the case.

While "how do we know what we know" is a nice question to ask, at some point we have to realize that everything ends in some irrational position, according to the Munchausen Trilemma. I think there was a thread on here called On Knowing that seems to illustrate my point.

I think a youtube video I saw put it well: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2Vx9qoLzFs&t=185s&ab_channel=ExtraHistory

"When you drill all the way down, you'll find something you're just gonna have to believe".

This also assumes you know the state of the minds of others and just assume people do this. — Darkneos

Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction.

On could also un knowingly be able to experience discretely and yet not be able to comprehend the idea of it, I would cite animals as this case (at least I assume from their behaviors). So this act of creation is more an assumption than a fact of living things, or in this case humans. — Darkneos

We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans.

I guess that probability is more a likelihood within a known quantity like a deck. Possible is if it can happen. Plausible is more like a maybe it COULD be. I'm still not sure how one is more useful than the other though. — Darkneos

Here's an example.

Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.

If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use.

I guess I have a more loose version of truth. For me truth is what IS and what comports with reality and evidence. Because one can "know" something and it be false (flat earth, autism and vaccines). It's why I said that knowledge sometimes yields truth. — Darkneos

I agree. I was just clarifying from the paper's viewpoint for some very specific critiques someone could have, but what you are saying seems fine to me.

Science I wouldn't really use as an example as it's designed to be a constantly evolving process, and even then it's complex. Like classical and quantum physics. It's not that classical is "Wrong" per se, just useful at our level of complexity (and that it is if you see what we've done with it). But in terms of reality as it is then the quantum world is where it's at, maybe. — Darkneos

If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another.

I guess I never really give much thought as to how I know what I know because in the past I tend to spiral into some radical skepticism where I know nothing and end up catatonic. — Darkneos

Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue.

While "how do we know what we know" is a nice question to ask, at some point we have to realize that everything ends in some irrational position, according to the Munchausen Trilemma. — Darkneos

As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.

Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.

We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.

We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.

Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion.