How about judgement and reason? Is a rational judgement, like a syllogism, reducible to sensations?

I hold that awareness, will, and reason are non-physical and aren't really objects--as all three are dependent on the will or is the will itself. What I was trying to convey was that all objects (i.e., physical stuff) is reducible to sensations themselves and there is no need to posit conceptually some kind of sensation-free object.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Realists say that all statements, even those about things we we don't believe, know, perceive or whatever, are either true or false. Antirealists say that at least some statements either do not have a truth value at all, neither true nor false, or have some third truth value that is neither true nor false.

I don’t think this is an accurate depiction of either view. To me, moral realism is the thesis that:

1. Moral judgments are cognitive (which you mentioned); and
2. They are objective.

Whereas, moral anti-realism is that there are no true objective moral judgments, and there are three main sub-categories: subjectivism (i.e., expressivism), non-cognitivism, and error theory (i.e., nihilism).

The subjective/objective discussion remains mired in imprecision, sometimes being about the difference between public and supposedly private statements, sometimes being about distinguishing the world from supposed mental states, and sometimes being about grammatical differences between first and third person accounts.

It seems to me that you might have inadvertently carried the ambiguity of the subject/object discussion into the realist/antirealist discussion.

That is fair. I think that, upon further reflection, that I failed to separate out clearly the distinction between an “objective” moral judgment and one that is absolutely obligatory: but I think that my “fixated-upon” vs. “implicit” moral judgment distinction suffices.

Bob

Hello Benj96,

I appreciate your response!

for me the morality/ethics of a phenomenon is dependent on the entity/being or even system to which we concentricise/centralise the moral question.

That is fair, but at that point, I would argue, it is a matter of studying inter-subjectivity and not objectivity (which is fine if you aren’t claiming moral judgments are objective).

In terms of your examples, I think you are rightly noting that our actions have consequences (e.g., environment crisis leads to an inhabitable planet, etc.), but is there any “objective” or “absolutely obligatory” moral judgments guiding (or should be guiding) our actions?

Bob

Hello Manual,

I appreciate your response!

I suppose I'd take the pragmatic approach here and ask the question, what practical differences in our conception (and action) of morality follows from one being either a moral realist or an anti-realist?

Generally speaking, one’s metaethical position is going to shape their normative ethical and applied ethical positions; in other words, metaethics asks the fundamental question of what it means for something to be “good” (“right”) or “bad” (“wrong”), normative ethics uses that definition to determine what is considered “good” and what is considered “bad” (and usually tries to formulate them as rules), and applied ethics is an attempt to apply those normative ethical rules to nuanced, every-day-to-day situations to see what the “right” or “wrong” thing is to do.

For example, if one is more of a moral anti-realist (generally speaking) then they don’t think there are objective moral judgments and so there general outlook on moral philosophy is to determine what is right or wrong based off of usually either their “desires” or their “will”; whereas, moral realists tend to view the world as if there are absolutely obligatory moral decrees and they must obey them regardless of their own personal stance.

I mean, one can claim that they don't believe that murder is a crime. But rarely do such views lead to such acts. On the other hand, those who are serial killers, may actually believe this, and act according to this belief.

Metaethics, although it definitely influences what ought to be laws, is not itself a study of what should be a crime: it is whether there are any objective moral judgments. I agree that simply whimsically thinking that one doesn’t think killing (in the sense of what is normally considered murder) is wrong will usually result in nothing, as they don’t sincerely and deeply believe it. I can tell myself I don’t belief something that I belief, but that won’t thereby make me unbelieve it (as I am think beliefs are involuntary to a large degree). But, imagine that someone does sincerely believe it is right to kill an innocent person as they take a walk passed their house: are there any absolutely obligatory judgments that you can point to to condemn their behavior? That would be a metaethical question.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I'm not saying that. "Come buy my snake oil, it will make you immune from snake bites." Some people do lie all the time.

I am understanding this analogy to be agreeing that your moral system doesn’t purport to have objective moral judgments, is that correct?

It is corrosive to society. I'm saying that one cannot in good faith say say it is good to lie. One cannot found a society on the practice of lies, because lies only work at all in a social context of trust and honesty

This is all fair enough, but, to me, when you use the term “good” you are invoking a moral term. This term, so far, has not been demonstrated to be objective nor absolutely obligatory; which, as far as I am understanding you, you aren’t trying to claim that. But…..

It is an argument against subjectivism and against error theory.

Then you state this: your view, as far as I understand, is moral subjectivism. You are claiming:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (i.e., cognitive); and
2. There are not true objective moral judgments; and
3. Moral judgments are ultimately grounded in the subject (i.e., moral expressions truth is relative to the subject at hand).

Which is the definition of moral subjectivism. If you are refuting that position, then I think you would have to refute one of the above theses of it.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

I am sorry that you are being tormented by solipsism: I hope that you find a way to overcome the negative impact it has had on you!

Let me try to give a brief “remedy”, but let me first note that this is from my perspective (so I am importing my philosophical positions): do what you will with it.

Firstly, one must understand what aspects of solipsism are “irrefutable” and which aren’t. In its most generic form, it is the view that only one’s “self” exists, that only one’s “mind” exists, or that only one’s “consciousness” exists (or all three)—but these are entirely different things! A “self” is what one is identical to, a “mind” is a faculty of reason, and consciousness can be described as awareness and sensibility. Therefore, to me, a “self” is a will, a “mind” is the faculty of reason which gets its obligations from oneself (i.e., a will), and “consciousness” is just the ability to or/and actuality of sensations and awareness.

The solipist could be arguing that they can only know of their own “self” (which is a will), but, in that case, we can clearly acquire from our experience that there are other wills (regardless of whether they stem back, ultimately, to one will or many). They could be arguing that they can only know of their own “mind” (e.g., do other people have thoughts?), but we can infer very reasonably that other people think (and thusly have a mind): just ask me to do a hard (or honestly even easy) math problem and take note of how long it takes me to come up with an answer. They could be arguing that they can only know that they are “conscious” (i.e., aware and sensing), but, to me, we can know they are aware: just watch a human for 30 minutes and note their concerns, as “concern” is what is fundamentally awareness; and we can know people sense: watch someone get stabbed. However, what the solipsist is going to note, which is the irrefutable part, is simply that one cannot know that all of these observable reactions and interactions with other people (previously described) aren’t a product of something other than what we would infer (e.g., how do you know that they all aren’t mechanical robots—philosophical zombies?); and I can’t say with absolute certainty that they are wrong.

But let’s think about it for a second: I can provide extreme skepticism to virtually anything. For example, let’s say you are in the company of two people who are essentially foil characters (i.e., they have complete opposite personalities) and I point out to you that you can’t be 100% sure that their wills aren’t ultimately one will (i.e., how do you know that, in reality in the sense of what transcends our current experience of the two, that they aren’t really a part of one will expressing itself differently?). Can you refute it? No. However, can you really ever know either way? No. Can you know that they have two different personalities and are embodied by two different bodies? Yes. Isn’t that enough to treat them like two different wills? These kinds of extreme skepticism simply removed the ability to be absolutely certain about empirical things, but that doesn’t mean it is valid to affirm their claims (e.g., just because it is logically possible that they are one will, deep down in reality, doesn’t entail that it is the most cogent belief to accept).

Likewise, let’s say they are actually right (that there are philosophical zombies, with no minds, no consciousness, and let’s say no wills of their own): does that change your experience of them? No. Are you justified in doing abhorrent things to them now that you know? No. Are you alone?. NO: you still interact with them, can talk to them, they can relate to you, they can love you, you can love them—and why would it matter that you are able to think of your own accord while they cannot?

Secondly, the fact that you think solipsism is true and that it is making you suffer are two separate things: and the latter, I would argue, is the only problem. Right now, I am presuming that you are thinking that the solution to eradicating your torment (suffering) is to find a refutation of solipsism, but that is no permanent cure. “Suffering” is the “attachment to what is outside of one’s control”, and it appears as though you are attached to the idea that other people can think of their own accord, can feel (in the sense of consciousness), etc.; but you can’t control the truth pertaining thereto--so why fret about it? Now, I know that fret is not something one can just shut off on a whim, or on a thought, but I would strongly suggest looking into stoic philosophy (such seneca and marcus aurelius) and start practicing and working at detaching from what is outside of your control: just because the world is a particular way which is outside of your control, does not mean you need to suffer about it. Again, I totally understand that you can’t control it immediately: but you can indirectly work towards reshaping yourself to eliminate that suffering (if that makes any sense).

With respect to depersonalization and derealization: I also had that. I no longer do (in a unhealthy sense) because I detached from everything outside of my control and realized that what is real is experience (the direct): it is acquiring answers to transcendent (and unattainable) questions which torment us the most. “We suffer more often in imagination than in reality” – Seneca.

There’s much more to say, but hopefully this provides a bit of insight.
Bob

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Not quite! I am saying the opposite: fixating on a moral judgment is subjective; and moral judgments which one cannot opt-out of (cannot unfixate upon) are objective.

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case?

The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

As you can probably guess, I am confused by the last sentence: why would that be an objective truth of moral judgments? Are you claiming there is a force (or something) which is the ultimate reason why we do what we do?

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

I went ahead and read your initial post for that discussion board, but, nevertheless, I don’t see how cooperation problems are objective moral judgments nor how it pertains to morality itself. I don’t think something is determine right or wrong solely on whether it helps us cooperate better. Also, even if is the case that cooperation is a key driving factor for why people tend to have certain obligations, that would tell us nothing about whether those obligations are objective or not.

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

Personally, I just don’t think that description by SEP is correct: morality is not an appeal to the populace.

Bob

We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.

But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty.

Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time.

The part which one cannot choose in that example is something which is not a moral judgment: it’s the best means of abiding by the moral judgment—it is the means not the judgment itself.

Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations.

I agree and totally understand; however, it seems to me that you are simply noting that one cannot control the sub-obligations which emerge as a result of the ultimate obligations that one commits themselves to (which I agree with): I am failing how those moral judgments are objective in that case. It seems as though they are ultimately objective but there are better ways of achieving them (or abiding by them).

Bob

I find your qualitative/quantitative typology to be a bit imprecise. For example, idealism is often a priority monism (one basic concretum, which is God), but typically not an existence monism (one concretum, i.e. it has no proper parts). Perhaps I am wrong on that, but either way, I'm sure you see the importance in differentiating between priority and existence monism.

That is fair: I should have included that distinction in my synopsis.

I am familiar with the argument from parsimony, and although I find myself somewhat agreeing with it from a pragmatic point of view, I am in the enterprise of creating a theory of absolute certainty. Thus, making ontological assumptions based on pragmatic considerations is not really what I am about.

In that case, I think we are both in the same boat then: the only valid ontological position in philosophy of mind is in principle agnosticism.

I do think, however, that epistemological idealism is obtainable by the argument from parsimony.

Furthermore, the argument from parsimony is not an argument for how it is impossible for the mental and non-mental to interact; instead, it is an argument for how it is unlikely and/or how it is most economical to assume they do not, one the basis of the how it is uneconomical to posit/unlikely that the non-mental exists.

Just to clarify, I wasn’t trying to claim that the argument from parsimony is related to the problem of interaction: you are right that they are two separate things.

Bob

Hello 0 implies everything,

I have not found any proof/argument of how it is impossible for the non-mental to interact with the mental

It sounds like you may be referring to the “problem of interaction” for substance dualists; and the argument is founded on the acceptance of substratum theory (and so is the stereotypical subtance dualist position): simply put, substratum theory is the conjecture that properties require a substance to bare them. In other words, properties are bore by a “bare particular” which is distinct from the properties themselves. For example, from a substratum theorist perspective, the properties of a chair (e.g., material, color, etc.) are bore by a bare particular which is the compresence for the chair’s properties. This is how they would explain how objects have properties which are “tied” or “glued” to themselves as opposed to being “floating” properties.

This is where the idea of a “substance” comes from in philosophy of mind: it is the ultimate substrate which bears all the properties of that “type”.

Under this substratum theory, originates the first fundamental distinction in philosophy of mind: qualitative (i.e., pertaining to “types” of substances) vs. quantitative (i.e., pertaining to “tokens”, or “how many”, compose fundamentally reality within each “type” of substance) considerations. With respect to the former, here are the basic distinctions:

Qualitative:

Monism: there is one “kind” of substance.
Pluralism: there are three or more “kinds” of substances.
Dualism: there are two “kinds” of substances.


Within the latter:

Quantitative:

Monism: there is only one “thing” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).
Pluralism: there are three or more “things” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).
Dualism: there are two “things” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).

Sometimes the “thing” is referred to as a “token”.

Now, within philosophy of mind, under this substratum theory, there are five main (stereotypical) categories of views:

1. Physicalism (also sometimes used synonymously with materialism): a qualitative monist, quantitative pluralist view whereof the “kind” of substance is physical (or matter, depending on how the terms are hashed out) and there is fundamentally many of that “kind” which make up the real world.

2. Property Dualism (also sometimes called irreducable materialism/physicalism): a qualitative monist, quantitative pluralist view whereof there is one “kind” of substance which is physical but the mental is irreducable (somehow) to the physical (i.e., strong emergence) and there is fundamentally many of this “kind” which make up reality.

3. Substance Dualism: a qualitative dualist, quantitative pluralist view whereof there are two “kinds” of substances which are physical and mental and there is fundamentally many of both “kinds” which make up reality.

4. Idealism: a qualitative monist, quantitative monist view whereof there is one “kind” of substance which is mental and there is one “thing” which fundamentally constitutes reality (which is usually God).

5. Non-dualism: a qualitative pluralist, quantitative monist view whereof there are three or more “kinds” of substances which are usually mind, matter, and an unknown God-like unifying substance; and it is usually one “thing” which fundamentally constitutes reality (usually God in a pantheistic sense).

Now, I want to note that these are just stereotypical, basic definitions and many people will not fit nicely into them. For example, I am a subjective idealist (more or less), and definitely am not a quantitative monist. So do what you will with those definitions: I just thought it may be useful.

In terms of the interaction problem, by definition two substances have no communal attributes (as they are two fundamentally different “kinds” of existence): so one “kind” cannot, by definition, have any interaction with the other “kind” unless one is positing that two things can interact without sharing at least one communal property.

In terms of arguments for idealism, I will briefly elaborate on the argument from introspection and parsimony:

When one introspects upon their experience (which is consciousness), they will begin to realize that every object within their experience is wholly reducible to a collection of sensations. Now, unless there is a reason to posit conceptually external (consciousness-independent) objects to explain the data of one’s experience, then by occam’s razor one ought to hold Idealism over the other positions because it is more parsimonious (i.e., it explains the same data with less entities). The million dollar question you must ask yourself is thusly this: do you need to posit (conceptually) a consciousness-independent object to explain any data within your experience? If not, then Idealism is for you. If you do, then it is not for you.

Now, what your argument seems to be what is sometimes called a “malicious” argument (although I don’t find it such at all) that even if there was hypothetically a non-mental substance somehow, from the perspective of the subject it would still be all consciousness and they wouldn’t ever need to conceptually posit consciousness-independent objects (even if there actually were some). To some extent, I sympathize with the view because I, likewise, do not think I can rule out there being something non-mental nor that the non-mental isn’t, from a transcendent perspective, physical (or neither or what have you) because I do not subscribe to substratum theory.

Bob

Hello Banno,

In summary, seems to me that the realist/antirealist distinction and the objective/subjective distinction are very different, but that your account does not recognise this.

Hmm, I see: could you please elaborate on that more?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

I agree with your first paragraph and I think I understand better what you are saying: thank you!

However, your last sentence is confusing me:

One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.

To say someone can choose to be moral (or immoral) is to concede that there is a standard ultimately outside of themselves for what is moral (or immoral); and, likewise, to say that they cannot choose what is moral is to say the same thing. However, I thought in agreement that your position doesn’t have any objective moral judgments in it: so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose?

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Wonderful response! Let me see if I can adequately respond.

I think that, firstly, I must, regrettably, dive into a bit of semantics, as I think you are alluding to such a discussion with:

My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

I certainly agree that we can use terms how we please; so let me explain how I am using the terminology and why so that we can compare.

By “objective moral judgement” (and “categorical imperative”), I mean “a description of an involuntary obligation”, and, by my lights, the only valid source thereof is a will. However, this is not a contemporary definition in terms of the traditional definitions of moral realism and moral anti-realism: it would be, technically speaking, a niche subgroup within moral realism—but I disagree that it should be there as I think it also agrees with fundamental aspects of moral anti-realism (and thusly think the distinction fails to function properly).

For example, I totally understand that moral cultural relativism (which, correct if I am wrong, is what it seems you are at least partially describing) is a moral realist position in the literature; however, within my view, I don’t see it is a view that is holding truly objective moral judgments as existent. To me, it is describing inter-subjective judgments at best (i.e., judgments which are not contingent on one particular will but, rather, on multiple—but is still contingent on wills and thusly not objective). Nevertheless, my view is not a mainstream, traditional definition when it comes to the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; and that is why, I would presume, standford keeps the definition incredibly ambiguous:

“Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way). ...It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/)

So, to answer:

Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

No. The reason I use my definition is because I think there is a lot of ambiguity and overlap between moral realism and anti-realism. Something being “objective” means for it to be “will-independent” (by my lights), “subjective” is to be “contingent on at least one will”, and “inter-subjective” is to be “contingent on wills”. The study of what laws we put in place, as a cooperative society, is an objective study of inter-subjective facts.

A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

I suspect that you are using a different definition of “subjective opinion” than me, as I don’t think societal norms and laws are truly independent of wills. What do you mean by a “subjective opinion”? Is it being used more in a whimsical, colloquial sense of the term?

Now let me try to address your disadvantages of my definition:

No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.

I actually do think such involuntary obligations exist: I can elaborate on them if you would like.

Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.

Firstly, I agree and understand my view is confusing, but I would argue it is confusing in light of the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; in other words, it is only confusing when one tries to fit it into one category or the other as traditionally laid out. Secondly, I would like to clarify that the objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations) which I refer do not result in moral anti-realist claims: the involuntary obligations are squarely within a realist’s perspective of the world; however, anyone’s obligation to fixate on those objective moral judgments is squarely within a moral anti-realist’s perspective (since I don’t think there is such a thing as a fixated-upon-stance-independent judgment). In other words, the term “objective moral judgment” has the idea of “absolute fixated-upon obligation” stripped out of it completely.

Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

I think it does (in just the same manner any other moral realist could argue for): we resolve our disputes by committing ourselves to fixating upon any objective moral judgments.

Let me know address your advantages of your definition:

Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.

If “objective moral judgments” are defined as “will-independent”, then those are not objective features pertaining to moral judgments. At best, it is really objective features of events which themselves are inter-subjective facts about societies.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

In a literal sense of the term, cultural norms and laws are not involuntary at all. They are very much voluntary—albeit sometimes hard to get away with disobeying (but that isn’t thereby involuntary).

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Let me try to explain with an analogy. Let’s say I wake up in the morning and, despite my bodily wants directing me to go back in my cozy bed and fall back asleep, I decide to workout. I then workout. Now, from a post-analysis, it is an objective fact that (1) I “wanted” to workout (in the sense of myself as a will and not my bodily wants) and that (2) decision (which is an obligation I issued upon myself) originates from my will (and is thusly contingent upon it). In this example, it would be incorrect to say that my decision that “I ought go workout instead of fall back asleep” is objective because it one can post-analyze the events that occurred. In other words, the fact that I worked out because I decided to doesn’t make the judgment (which is my decision) objective.

I think that is what you are doing with cultural norms and laws: you are correctly noting that we can post-analyze the events, which ultimate originate from wills, and that those events are objective facts—but that doesn’t make the judgments themselves (which originated from the wills) objective.

Bob

Hello Banno,

See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.

I see. The problem (I think) is that consequentialism does not entail, in itself, any metaethical position specifically. I wasn’t trying to claim that all consequentialists tend towards the view that there are no categorical impertatives, as simply noting that one is going to derive “the good” from consequences (and not intentions—like deontic normative ethical theories) does not entail anything about the fundamental origins of this “good”: it could be objective or subjective (or inter-subjective or what not). So, to clarify, I think that a consequentialist can be a moral realist or a moral anti-realist; but, fundamentally, if a given consequentialist claims there are categorical imperatives, then they are thereby a moral realist and if they claim there aren’t, then they are thereby a moral anti-realist. The “good” which a consequentialist is analyzing in the consequences of an action is what a metaethicist is going want to get a clear answer on (and that isn’t really a part of normative ethics to answer that question itself).

Same, I think, goes for deontic normative ethical theories: one is simply noting simply that one has a duty to a rule, and that rule could be grounded in a subject (i.e. a will) or something objective. Simply telling me that one has deontic ties (or is wholly subscribed to a deontic normative ethical theory) does not, in itself, tell me whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. Now, I will grant that it is usually a safe bet to assume they are a moral realist, but that isn’t actually deducible therefrom.

Hopefully that clears things up. If not, then please correct me where you think I am wrong!

Bob

Hello Moliere,

Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D

Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)

Fair enough my friend!

Yup! I think we understand one another now!

I think so too.


As I am unsure what to segue into now, I would like to just tell you that I really appreciated our conversation Moliere, and I look forward to many more! I think, as of now, we understand each other, so I don’t think there’s much more to say; but please do not hesitate to contact me (or respond to this message) if you have anything you would like to discuss further!

Bob

Hello Mww,

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

If by “causal freedom” you are referring to libertarian free will, then I do not think that such is necessary for one to have obligations (as I am equally perfectly happy with a compatibilistic view as much as a libertarian one).

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Exactly! I would say that a description of an involuntary aspect of our will would be an objective moral judgment.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

This is the man wherefrom I get my name (;

Bob

Hello Mark S,

I appreciate your response!

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

I agree, as there is no such thing as a “stance-independent” judgment.

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

Very interesting! To be honest, I have a hard time conceding this definition as truly a moral realist position (but please correct me where I am wrong here): it seems to me that this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective, but it adds that there can be inter-subjective norms. By my lights, these inter-subjective norms can persist and function very similarly to objective norms (insofar as any given individual can die an the norm is still present in some manner—i.e., laws) but are not themselves objective (for they are not stance-independent nor are they deptictions of involuntary aspects of one's will): they are formulated based on collective agreement). To me, theoretically, the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will).

2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

The problem I have with this is that it seems to conflate description about prescriptions with the prescriptions themselves. The fact that you can describe that I obligated myself to X does not thereby make that obligation objective; that is, the empirical inquiry of obligations is not itself an indicator of obligations themselves being objective—it is just an indicator that we would like to study them.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

This could the issue: I am not sure. However, currently I don’t think it is: I think that the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction is broken for my views; but it could be due to me misunderstanding them or formulating an invalid metaethical theory—that is partly why I create this discussion board!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello unenlightened,

No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving.

I apologize: I must have, somewhere along our conversation, misunderstood what you are claiming. Are you claiming there are objective moral judgments, or are you not?

But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.

This is all fine and well if you are claiming that there are no objective moral judgments and, consequently, the obligation is ultimately subjective; but once one obligates themselves (by subjective affirmation) to keep living, then they must determine the best means to achieving that, which produce sub-obligations (so to speak). Is that what you are trying to convey?

Bob

Hello Mww,

I appreciate your response!

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production because I don’t think a subject is reducible to its body and, even if it were, I do not know which organ(s) would specifically deal with producing norms. Regardless of which way one leans in terms of philosophy of mind, I don’t think it matters for all intents and purposes: by analysis of wills (i.e., subjects) we can come to understand how they issue norms (i.e., obligations) and see if there are any which are involuntary. By “faculty of normativity”, I just mean a power (i.e., faculty) which produces norms for a given being—whether that is a physical organ or a spiritual substance (or neither), I think it is irrelevant (but correct me if I am wrong).

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

By “faculty”, I just mean the power to produce norms: are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? In other words, are you taking more a bundle theorist approach?

I mean it more generally, as I don’t think it matters what position one takes on that in philosophy of mind, but I could be wrong on that.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

I totally understand: hopefully I did an adequate job of addressing your questions. Otherwise, please ask away!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Not the point at all. What people want is absolutely to be removed from the equation. Animals take shelter from the storm, or the predator, or the heat or cold, or they die. No recourse to subjective wants explains how a yeast cell absorbs sugar and excretes alcohol. that's just how they work, and this is how humans work, - they shelter or they die. they arrange the environment just as rabbits do or birds do We don't have to invoke the subjective world of these animals at all, any more than we have to invoke the subjective world of a yeast cell.

Life does what is necessary to survive, or it dies. but if it dies, it is no longer life. Therefore life does what is necessary to survive. And human life is no exception. We need to control our environment or we die. And those that are homeless must make a shelter from cardboard and plastic waste as best they can.

Again, if you are going to claim that peoples’ wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. By my lights, all you are noting is biological (or otherwise scientific) facts and not moral ones: it is a fact that “life does whatever is necessary to survive, or it dies”, but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all.

In other words, a person needs to control their environment (to some extent) to survive, but this tells me nothing of why I am obligated to keep surviving—why not just die? That is where the moral facts come into play (if any). All I know, at best, from your argument is that if I would like to keep living, then I must control my environment; but that is just, by definition, a hypothetical imperative.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative...Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.

If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). That's not to say that all consequentialists are anti-realists, but if they make that specific claim then I do think they are an anti-realist. A “categorical imperative”, in metaethics, I would argue, is an “objective moral judgment” (as they are used inter-changeably). When a moral realist claims there are true objective judgments, they are thereby claiming that there are categorical claims they can make about moral judgments (hence the use of “categorical imperatives”).

Now, with being said, I totally understand your distinction (and I agree) that something being objective does not entail that it is obligatory for a person to obey it (and so one could denote an objective moral judgment as disynonymous with a categorical imperative in that sense); but, traditionally, if a moral judgment is objectively true, then it is thereby obligatory for one to obey (and it is true and applies in all cases—which is a categorical imperative).

I, like you (as far as I am understanding), would push back on this presumption (that an objectively true moral judgment is thereby obligatory to hold) and I, instead of making a “objective moral judgment” vs. “categorical imperative” distinction, am inclined to make a implicit-moral judgment vs. fixated-upon-moral judgment distinction—but these are essentially (as far as I am understanding) expressing the same critique. Within how you are using the terms, I would say that I am claiming that there are no categorical imperatives (i.e., no absolutely obligatory moral judgments which are not grounded ultimately in a will) but there are true, objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations that are grounded in the nature of the being).

Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.

I agree that most ethical theories that invoke “categorical imperatives” tend to only have one, but the definition of a “categorical imperative” does not entail, by necessity, that there is only one.

Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.

I agree that normative ethical theories are fundamentally grounded in meta-ethical theories; but that doesn’t mean there isn’t a clear difference between the two different studies themselves. Normative ethical theories are not the study of the metaethical differences that each may instantiate—but, to your point, they are definitely pertinent to such discussions.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.

General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study.

The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.

But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.

But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there…

...But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.

I agree that it is best to come to set definitions before discussing a topic, as we do tend to make general distinctions and then make (usually false) assumptions about each other’s views; but I do think that distinctions should and can have set definitions (including for general ones). Moral realism and anti-realism have set definitions (and are not, in terms of their definition, blurry), and I would argue that my position simply breaks it (and that is what I meant by “blurring the distinction”) in it being mutually exclusive and exhaustive options. It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are arguing that we just simply don’t have set definitions at all (unless we dive in precisely into each other’s views)—whereas, for me, I would grant that humans tend to make ambiguous, general distinctions but, nevertheless, people should derive clear definitions of things (and certainly can if they put in enough effort) which includes general distinctions. In my opinion, the realist vs. anti-realist distinction was predicated on false presumptions, which is why I am able to validly (I would argue) break it; but that just means we need to re-think the distinction and make it better. To your point (I think), we can never truly know that we aren’t still operating on false presumptions until someone validly breaks the new distinction we make; but I still think we should be trying to achieve clear distinctions and would say that we can (just not in the sense of absolute knowledge).

I do agree, to your point, that we do seem to be no longer working with the general categories once we’ve been discussing each other’s particular views for some time, but if the general distinction is supposed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then ours views should be squarely in one or the other. If we can provide a view which doesn’t, then we have successfully broken the distinction and need a new one—because the old one is ambiguous now.

And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.

I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point).

From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.

I see; so a reversal would be to negate what one previously held (e.g., “this position was realist, now it is anti-realist”), is that correct?

Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)

It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally).

Bob

Hello Moliere,

I don’t think I am still quite following, but let me address your points and you tell me if I am getting closer.

I'd formulate realism-nihilism as more of a gradient, I think, where the most extreme form of the gradient is exclusion/inclusion rules without any exceptions, in which case it would then be two mutually exclusive options. And to make it even more confusing, I'd note that even the rules for establishing the gradient are up for negotiation.

It sounds like you are noting that words are always up for redefinition: that, at every level, we could “cut it up” differently—am I correct?

If so, then it seems to me that this is true of all words, is it not?

Also, I was using "nihilism" more loosely to be synonymous with anti-realism, and just thought it sounded better than repeating realism vs anti-realism -- purely aesthetic choice there, but I should have stuck with your terms to keep the conversation more manageable.

Absolutely no worries! Please feel free to continue using that terminology, as I now internally know what you are referring to.

Given that I don't believe there to be a general theory of moral realism or anti-realism my support for my initial claim is only due to repetition of the above procedure

I thought the point was that they are only ever general theories? Are you saying there’s no way to make a distinction (even generally) at all?

We have cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, for instance, where the former is often interpreted as a form of realism, and the latter is often interpreted as a form of anti-realism. But then error theory is a response to the sense-making argument for cognitivism (that moral statements are meaningful, and used, so how could they be different from the other statements

I am a bit confused, as moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are not indicators, in themselves, of whether a person is a moral realist or anti-realist: moral subjectivists, like nihilists (error theorists), also hold that moral judgments are propositional. If someone tells me they think moral judgments are cognitive, I do not thereby infer that they are a moral realist.

Is your point, perhaps, that error theory is an example of a moral anti-realist view that, somewhere along the history of the moral realist vs. anti-realist debate, broke the distinction; whereof they had to refurbish it to accommodate for it?

And here you're providing the realist interpretation of non-cognitivism in your OP :D -- at least if I'm understanding you correctly.

Exactly, I think that objective moral judgements are only possible as non-cognitive, whereas cognitive moral judgments are always subjective. It is, indeed, a very unusual realism (or maybe anti-realism: I don’t know (: ).

The procedure above is similar to the one I started with Kant's notion of Freedom grounding ethics. In general what I'd aim to do for any proposed rule for classifying an ethical position as moral realism vs moral anti-realism is provide an interpretation which reverses the initial determination. The stronger reversals do not add auxiliary hypotheses (which I think Error theory accomplishes), but I hope we can agree that a reversal can be accomplished through auxiliary hypotheses without that being controversial.

I didn’t quite follow this part: what does it mean to “reverse the initial determination”? I am failing to comprehend what a reversal would be.

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

I think we may be slightly misunderstanding each other, so let me try and narrow down the disagreement.

Have you ever been homeless? It might change your mind.

I am not disagreeing that I do want to have a home (or a shelter) but, rather, that it is fundamentally my preference. If I were to give an argument for why I need a shelter, then it will ultimately bottom out at my will—not something objective. The fact that most people (or even if every person) wanted a home (or shelter) does not thereby make it a moral fact but, rather, a universalized subjective fact. In other words, my mind is absolutely in agreement with you that I do want a shelter, and that most people (if not everyone) wants one, but I am disagreeing that that judgment is fundamentally (i.e., ultimately) objective: the latter is what metaethics, I would argue, is about and not the former.

"Ultimately objective" is a curious term. I wonder how it it works?

What am trying to express is that I think that the derivation of reasons for a judgment ultimately bottoms out at a particular will, not something objective under your view, because you are simply invoking very common preferences people tend to have (e.g., have a home) or, arguably, the preference to abide by the basic objective needs of the body. No, it is not true that every human being wants a home, but I would grant, to your point, that the vast majority do; but that is not a moral realist position (as far as I am understanding you). By “contingent on a will”, I just mean that your examples are ontically true of most people (i.e., you are right that most peoples’ personalities waver towards achieving basic bodily needs—including me). It would have to be an ontological aspect of a will to be considered a moral fact (to me).

An organism exists in relation to an environment. It can only exist within certain environmental parameters to which it is tolerant, and conditions outside these parameters are lethal. So for example the antarctic is only survivable to humans with ongoing input of food, energy, materials, and shelter brought in from elsewhere. These are facts, no? The full details are complex, but most birds need to nest, and so do humans, even if their nest is a mobile or temporary one.

There is no necessity for there to be humans, or any life whatsoever, of course, but as a matter of fact there is life, and life has a necessary relation to its environment. Most of the planet is not survivable to humans without some constructed shelter. So what do you mean by saying it is subjective? shall I go into detail about how a clean water supply and waste disposal maintain the home as an optimised healthy environment along with thermostatically controlled air conditioning? Subjectively, you might prefer 60F, while I like 72F, but there is no liking to boil or freeze.

Correct me if I am wrong, but, to me, you are correct that these are facts—but they aren’t moral facts. It is a fact that my body needs food to survive—but why ought I care about survival (i.e., why am I obligated to keep surviving)? I think you may be conflating biological facts with moral ones (but correct me if I am wrong here). Perhaps, you are arguing that these biological facts should be moral ones?

Bob

Hello T Clark,

Thanks for your response. I must admit I haven't spent a lot of time thinking about it, but I don't think I believe in normative ethics, at least not as something driving our behavior. I see moral rules more as a reflection of personal and social judgements. If nothing else, your thread has helped me realize that.

I totally understand and partially agree: I think that moral facts are involuntary, and the moment one fixates thereupon then they have invoked their own preference; and I think that my normative ethics is grounded upon fixating on what are moral facts. So, I do think normative ethics are important because it gives us an ideal to persevere towards (regardless of whether we can fully actualize it) and, under my view, is just as much of an objective inquiry as epistemology (or in other words I setup moral norms the same as epistemic ones).

I don't want to send the discussion off on a tangent, so I'll leave it there.

My friend, if there is something that you wish to discuss, then please, by all means, bring it forth! I do not mind a tad bit of derailment!

Bob

I want to be a bit more realist than that. We do need buildings, and architects and all those ancillary workers i mentioned are the experts on these things.

The issue I have with this is that the “need” for buildings is subjective (or inter-subjective at best), so I think your analogy isn’t actually mapping to a moral realist position. Am I misunderstanding that part of the analogy? Are you claiming that the need for buildings is objective (and not subjective nor inter-subjective)?

But none of this makes architecture 'subjective', merely complex.

I would agree that there are objectively better ways to build, but the goal to build is subjective; so I am failing to see how this isn’t an anti-realist view.

Clearly, things ain't what they ought to be, otherwise we wouldn't need to talk about the way they ought to be.

To me, this just explicates that people have goals (which are subjective) to actualize things which are currently only potential. I am failing to see how this entails that “what ought to be” is objective itself (i.e., a moral fact).

In the same way, if I already had an adequate house, I wouldn't be wanting plans for another. But granting that things are not as they ought to be, already allows that they could really be better; and here's the plan...

They could be better in relation to what you want out of a house. Again, I am still failing to see how your idea of a “better house” is ultimately objective. I understand that if one wants a house that has a working stove, then … – but where’s the categorical imperative here?

'Flourishing'. The objective is coexistence with the environment

The objective (i.e., the goal) here, I would argue, is ultimately subjective. How is it objective?

Bob

Given any norm, be it consequential, deontic, virtue-theoretic, or somewhere in between, I claim that one can classify that norm as realistic or nihilistic based upon one's theory of realism or nihilism. The inclusion-rules for realism-nihilism can be modified without ever changing the normative-level theory. I believe it's a different question from the normative one, entirely, so as we change the rules for realism-nihilism we can include and disclude the normative-level theories -- which at least leads me to believe that there will never be a clean map between the normative and the meta-ethical. It will always be blurry, until we start nailing some terms down. And then it will be specific, and it won't be a general theory of realism/nihilism.

I am starting to understand more: thank you! It seems as though you are formulating two mutually exclusive options (which are different than the moral realism vs. anti-realism distinction, for nihilism is an example of the latter): “realism” or “nihilism”; where the former is the position that there are objective moral judgments and the latter is that there isn’t. Furthermore, this “realism-nihilism” distinction is fundamentally ambiguous (and only for general distinction purposes). If one derives an unambiguous distinction, then they are, according to your view, not making a metaethical distinction because that can only be general (which is ambiguous). Am I understanding you correctly?

If so, then it seems as though you are claiming one is barred from achieving a clear distinction in metaethics; however, I am uncertain as to why that would be true. Why, fundamentally, can we not achieve a clear distinction between objective and non-objective morals? I understand that I too am blurring the distinction; but I mean it more in the sense that the current distinction is blurred and not that I cannot fundamentally achieve a clear distinction in metaethics.

Likewise, I didn’t entirely follow the entailment from the fundamental, blurry nature of distinctions in metaethics (e.g., the “realism-nihilism” distinction) to there is always going to be a blurry line between metaethics and normative ethics: can you explain that further? I am understanding you to be claiming that the meta-normative ethic distinction is, likewise, blurry (and fundamentally always going to be that way): assuming I am understanding correctly, why?

Cool, cool. I'm shooting in the dark a bit. I don't mind being corrected, so correct away :)

I appreciate that, and please feel free to correct me as well!

to point out how there can be ambiguity in any set up of realism-nihilism, which is mostly what I'm pointing to I think: we're going to have to pin down some words and terms before being able to answer.

It sounds like to me that you are almost saying we could get a clear distinction going (if we only clarified our terminology in a precise manner); so I might have misunderstood your first paragraph.

Bob

Hello Hanover,

I appreciate your response!

As most of your message is directed at another, I will address only the part directed me: the definition from Wiki. That is, indeed, a good generic definition of moral realism, but I am failing to understand the relevance to my post?

Bob

Hello bert1,

Thank you for your response!

I thought the categorical imperative wasn't a name for a type of view, by the particular view of Kant, namely something like "act only on those principles that, if universalised (acted upon by everyone) does not lead to contradiction." Or something, there are various formulations. I've always thought it was complete bollocks but perhaps I don't get it. It's an attempt, contra Hume, to ground morality in reason rather than sentiment. Is that really what you wanted to talk about? It seems like it may be that you are looking to ground morality in reason as well perhaps:

I am not talking about normative ethics in my post but, rather, metaethics. Likewise, I am not invoking Kant, although the term “categorical imperative” originating with him, but, rather, it is a term in metaethics to discuss “objective moral judgments” in general (and not specifically a Kantian deontic normative philosophy). Kant and Hume are good examples of realism vs anti-realism in a traditional sense, but in my view I am seeing the lines between the two blur.

Are you getting at the tension between there being moral facts about the world, but the individual person is always able to say "So what? I don't actually give a crap bout that."?

Exactly. I can note that there are moral facts, but not hold that you are thereby inherently obliged to obey them, which, to me, seems like a key point that moral realist is going to disagree with (and anti-realists are going to agree with to some degree).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Moliere,

But also, no need to hold to "objective norms" or "there are/not categorical imperatives" as setting out the meaning of anti-realism.

I think, according to the standard definitions, moral anti-realism is the position that there are no moral facts (i.e., “objective moral judgments”). But I would be interested to hear more about:

Generally I believe meta-ethics tends to not map onto normative ethics -- usually you can find a way to defend a realist or anti-realist version of a norm, depending upon how you set out realism or nihilism.

What exactly do you mean here? I don’t think I completely followed.

The anti-realist could say something along the lines that these implicit and involuntary norms don't sound like categorical imperatives, because you couldn't choose them. Deontology, in its Kantian form (which I'm guessing that's appropriate given "categorical imperative") at its base, is an ethics of freedom -- so remove freedom, and it's no longer a moral choice (though it could be a legal choice, say if we brainwashed a criminal into becoming good, they would be following the legality of the moral law but not the morality)

I think that your critique is splendid for Kantian deontic philosophy, but that isn’t a contention (I would say) with the realist idea that there fundamentally are categorical imperatives. By “categorical imperative”, I am not invoking Kant (although the term does originate with him) but, rather, “objective moral judgments”. As far as I understand, one does not need to hold there is this Kantian notion (or rationalist notion) of free will (in the sense of autonomy vs. heteronomy) to be a moral realist. So an anti-realist (or, as a matter of fact, anyone) can validly state that my implict-moral judgments are not voluntary in the Kantian sense, and so Kant would probably disagree that they are moral judgments; but I don’t agree with Kant either.

So it'd be better to classify that kind of instinct as non-cognitivist -- an emotional attachment which has no reason. Hence, anti-realism.

The idea with an implicit moral judgment is that it happens regardless of whether one feels like it or not and it is objective, but you are correct that it wouldn’t be itself cognitive. This is a prime example why the lines between realism and anti-realism (in the sense of there traditional definitions) blur for me. I don’t think it is a non-cognitivist anti-realist position, but classically there are no non-cognitivist realists (but I techinically am one of those in a way).

Then, of fixated-upon norms, it kind of goes in reverse -- it's the very basis of choice which allows these to be moral! Hence, moral realism.

Interesting, I think fixated-upon norms would be anti-realist because I don’t think any of them are objective. I don’t think the thesis for moral realism entails that one has to have a basis of choice over it, but I could be wrong.

Error theory being a noteworthy example to highlight for blending those two sentences: they have a truth value, and they are false.

Error theory is not a moral realist position: it is an anti-realist one. They hold that:

1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., cognitive).
2. They are all objectively false.

I guess I should clarify that by the realist position I do not mean that they just hold a position grounded in objectivity but, rather, that there are true objective moral judgments—sorry if that was ambiguous in my post.

I appreciate your response,
Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Contrary to your name, I think that your analogy was quite enlightened and thought-provoking: thank you!

Let me try to take a crack at it, with my current understanding, and correct me where I am wrong. It seems as though this kind of metaethical view is anti-realist (squarely), and your normative ethical view is pragmatic. Your analogy is fundamentally conceding, as far as I can tell, that there are no objective moral judgments but, nevertheless, if we all subjectively want to build a building (or most of us do) then there is a procedure we can take to pragmatically achieve that goal (in the most cogent means possible). Thusly, to me, your view (or analogy at the least) seems to hold that morals are ultimately contingent on wills (i.e., subjects) and that there are objective better ways to achieve those goals; but, importantly, I don’t think you are claiming there are objective morals themselves at all. Am I understanding you correctly?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello T Clark,

I appreciate your response!

Are there consequences depending on which approach you pick? I mean moral consequences, differences in what behavior you consider moral and, more importantly, how you behave.

The metaethical one has tends to greatly shape (I would argue) peoples’ normative ethical theories. For example, most moral anti-realists that I know tend to try to found internal contradictions in another’s view to pursued them not to do some action and if they can’t find one then they just accept it as it is (because they don’t think there is any objective standard to hold that person to). Now that is just an example, and by no means every anti-realist is committed to that; however, realists, on the other hand, tend to command “do not do X” or “do X” based off of what they think is the objective standard. So you can imagine how different the normative ethical theories are that a realist and anti-realist would subscribe to.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Banno,

Thank you for your response! I think we are semantically disagreeing, as I don’t think you defined the terms correctly; so let me explain my usages of the terms and let me know what you think.

Categorical imperatives are found in deontology, but not so much in consequentialism or virtue ethics.

You are correct that the term “categorical imperative” is found most notably in deontology (specifically starting with Kant), but those are normative ethical theories, not metaethical theories. As far as my knowledge goes, a metaethicist asks the question of “are there objective moral judgments?” (where “categorical imperative” is just a synonym for “objective moral judgment”), or more generally “what are morals?”, instead of “what is wrong or right (given our understanding of what morals fundamentally are) which is what a normative ethicist would be inquiring about. I am fundamentally questioning the metaethic distinction of moral realism and anti-realism, not anything pertaining to normative ethics (at this point); but if you think it is relevant, then we can definitely dive into normative ethics as well!

Moral realism is the idea that moral statements have a truth value - they are true or they are false.

I think you are partially correct: it is a two-fold thesis.

1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., have truth value).
2. Moral statements are objective.

I think your definition only includes #1, which is also could be a moral anti-realist position (such as moral subjectivism).

So moral realism is not that "there are categorical imperatives" unless one already accepts deontology, which would be odd since if one accepts deontology one would presumably suppose that the categorical imperative is true, and hence be a moral realist.

Again, with a due respect, I think you are conflating metaetchics with normative ethics; but please correct me if I am wrong.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I appreciate your response!

I think that's one of its virtues, actually: rather than asking if there are these immutable rules which are true for all moral agents, virtue-theoretic devices focus on attempting to build the kind of character which has a tendency to make wise decisions.

I generally agree; but I actually blend, in my normative ethics, both deontic and virtue-theoretic ethics together (and also consequentialism)--for I do seek and hold that there are "immutable rules" (in sense of being a part of one's nature) which are true for all "moral agents" (which I call "wills") and, at the same time, contend that a main focus which stems out of such is fixating on the development of one's character to become "wiser" (and the only means of progression is a pragmatic approach that incorporates also the notion of analyzing consequences).

I see anti-realism (regardless of whether it be error theoretic, subjectivist, non-cognitivist, or some other sub-camp underneath anti-realism) as the claim that there are no objective norms, which I think is half-incorrect (as there are implicit-categorical norms, but no fixated-upon-categorical norms); but, likewise, moral realism tends to be that there are objective norms, and this is taken to mean both fixated and implicit types--which I disagree with. So, I am, more and more, starting to give up on the distinction itself.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello jgill,

I apologize for the belated response my friend! I have been, unfortunately, very busy and haven’t had the time to look at the forum.

Now that I have been thinking about it more, I think you are right with respect to many regards: I do think that, in hindsight, I wrote the essay too vaguely and inadequately; so I totally understand your confusion.

To answer your question, what I was talking about was, in hindsight, transcendental logic (i.e., the study of the necessary preconditions, sometimes called a priori conditions, for the faculty known as reason); and so by “derive” I was referring to reason with no direct connection (or disconnection) to causality. Personally, I don’t think reasoning is a process which can be reduced to physical causality, but I don’t think it matters which stance one takes on that issue to accept PoR.

I want to apologize again and thank you for your responses!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

As we already discussed, I apologize for the late and overdue response: I have been preoccupied with other things lately and, thusly, have not had the time to adequately respond.

Moreover, since it has been so long (which is entirely my fault), I have developed my view quite significantly since then; so much in fact, that I think a bit more elaboration on my end will suffice to relinquish all the confusion that has sprung thus far (as they are squarely, in my opinion, due to the vagueness and prematurity of my original essay).

Firstly, I would like to note which terminology (of which I used in the essay) that I find to be of no use anymore: pretty much all of it other than PoR itself. Sine qua nons are, in hindsight to me now, just an obscurity conceptually that need not be invoked to convey my view that pertains to the essay. Honestly, I should probably just re-write it. Likewise, infinites do not need to be invoked (or at least I don’t think) to portray the real, true underlying meaning I was so inadequately trying to express.

Consequently, I think it is better if I elaborate on what PoR really is instead of focusing on deconstructing my own essay (because it is too inadequate and confused to me now). PoR is really what I would consider the fundamental logic of reason (as the faculty of the mind) in a transcendental sense (i.e., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of being a mind). It is that which is implicitly required to be a mind, as opposed to something one is or is capable of fixating upon as a mind; so, to address your contention about provability, there is no requirement for a being to be capable of thinking “rationally” in sense of fixating upon formal logic or what have you to nevertheless fundamentally be governed by PoR; and there is no need for a being to “derive” in the sense of what the average human being does—as by “derive” I mean it in a more general, mere sense: an implicit conclusion. A plant doesn’t “decide” nor is it aware of its “conclusions” but it regardless “derives” to grow towards the light.

Which leads me to a giant cause of a lot of ambiguity in my essay: the incredibly blurry line between concepts and objects. I made it sound, with the use of infinites, like a sine qua non would be essentially a pure infinite object, which would just equate to an unterminating, absolute infinite of existence—which is not what I was trying to convey (but I inadequately described it). What really should have been described is that which a mind is contingent on in order to even be such (i.e., transcendental aspects of a mind) and that would have segued into PoR as an example of it.

To give you a bit deeper insight into my position now, I hold that all life is fundamentally will, and “will” and “mind” are inextricably linked—as to be a will is to choose one motive over another at any given point in time (which I would consider a process of a mind). Therefore, I view a plant just as much as a human as a will and, subsequently, as a mind where “mind” is meant to be interpreted in its most rudimentary sense (as obviously there is much difference in terms of a human mind vs a plant mind). I don’t think a plant is “thinking” in the sense that it is leveraging words and concepts to derive its next move but, nevertheless, it does fundamentally choose a motive over another (e.g., it grows towards the light). PoR is a guiding, necessary principle of being a mind (and a will): there are superordinate rules (i.e., subjectively affirmed guiding principles) which “derive” the conclusions (i.e., subordinate rules) which, in turn, guide the actions of the will. There is no person alive which can be without with principle (implicitly): no matter how disabled they may be, they are fundamentally a will and a mind which, in turn, entails that they performs actions (no matter how basic or ill-executed) based off of intentions which, in turn, are motives which were determined by obligations to rules (i.e., superordinate rules). To me, to posit hypothetically a being which has not PoR is to posit an unalive being (i.e., a being with no will: a corpse with no life).

Hopefully that helped clear up the confusion and if it didn’t them please let me know! Again, I apologize for the belated response and for the fact that my ideas have evolved since our last encounter but, nevertheless, I hope I adequately addressed your contentions (otherwise, please point out where I failed to do so).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Bob, when one expands the sequence:

Awe, I see! I thought you were outlining a set because T was encapsulated in brackets, which I thought meant 'a set'. Correct me where I am wrong, but T = { } seems to be a set and not a summation (∑). To me, nothing about the notation of T = { ... } entailed that one is summing each t of n. My question to you would be, assuming I am simply misapprehending, what about your previous notation entailed (symbolically) the summation of T's elements? I understand that your use ∑ in your most recent post does, but I am failing to see how the T = {} does.

In terms of summing t of n, I totally agree and understand that starting at 1 will result in the limit approaching infinity to equate to 1.

The real numbers constituting [0,3] are uncountably infinite, but the set of these numbers is obviously bounded above and below. This would of course be a finite line segment.

Agreed.

No. S is unbounded above, and if one plots a graph of the terms of S (vertical axis) vs n (horizontal axis) one would need a piece of paper having infinite dimensions. However, the sum of that series diverges so slowly that the sum of the first 6,000,000 terms is less than 21 !

That is true; however, the entirety of mathematics is bounded philosophically speaking. For example, S is unbounded above because it approaches infinity, but S is a bounded concept of which I can negate: not S. This is where we start the philosophical inquiry which has no bearing on formal mathematics. If S were philosophically "unbounded" as a concept, then it would bleed into everything, so to speak: S would also encompass a jurisdiction over my apple I am eating right now, which we both completely understand this is by no means the purpose of formal mathematics whatsoever.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, we are simply contextually utilizing the term differently for different contexts of inquiry (one of philosophy and the other of formal mathematics). For example, in mathematics, a line segment is bounded and yet has an infinite amount of points in between (due to intermediate value theorem), while a line that approaches negative infinite and positive infinity that is constrained to asymptotes x = 1 and x = 5 is also bounded with an infinite amount of points in between those asymptotes; for math, there's is a meaningful distinction between the two, but, in terms of what I am noting, they are both bounded infinites.

If you believe this to be a confusing conflation of mathematical terminology, then I am more than willingly to consider what you think would be better terms!

Bob

'Poetry' is a just a metaphor for these ideas that are not yet in mathematical shape. It's fair to expect some mastery of real analysis from an innovator. (Algebra and topology are natural mentions, but real analysis is the serious theory of the numbers we all are somewhat familiar with.)

I appreciate the elaboration: thank you! I understand what you are conveying and I think it is perfectly fair and reasonable. However, I would like to note that my essay is not within the actual sphere of mathematical discourse (in other words, it is not a paper intended within the context of formal mathematics): it is a philosophical work pertaining to metaphysics (which I am understanding your metaphorical use of 'poetry' to be synonymous with 'non-formal-math' so to speak). Although there is always much to read, I can say that the vast majority of philosophical works pertaining to metaphysics that I have read do not provide formal mathematical proofs because, quite frankly, it isn't meant to do so. With that being said, if you think I ought to provide a formal mathematical proof of something within the essay, then please feel free to let me know! I would love to hear your critiques.

Bob

Thank you jgill for the elaboration! I am most definitely not an expert mathematician and I most certainly do not want to come across as disconcerting. Let me attempt to adequately respond to your post and you correct me where you deem fit.

Unfortunately, I do not know how to properly format mathematical equations on this discussion forum, so for now I will have to write it in less pretty formatting (dearest apologies in advance).

S is countable, infinite, unbounded above but bounded below.

I think that I understand: there is a set, S, where S is the outputs of the function equal to:

f(n) = n + 1 / n

Where n is constrained to be positive integers (i.e., natural numbers).

It is infinite because the limit as n approaches infinity is infinity, i.e.:

limit n + 1 / n = ∞
n → ∞

Because 1 / ∞ is equal to 0 and thus we have ∞ + 0 = ∞

T is countable, infinite, bounded above and below.

This one is confusing me a bit, as I don’t see how it is bounded above. By my lights, since we are speaking of natural numbers, then the negative n values do not exist and, therefore, are omitted from our consideration. Therefore, although taking the limit of n → - ∞ is - ∞, it holds no relevance if we are speaking of only positive integers for n. Therefore, the limit one really ought to care about is n → 0:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0 +

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0 -

They equal each other, therefore:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0

And, also, it is important that as n approaches infinity it also equals positive infinity:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → ∞

Both, in quadrant one, approach infinity and, consequently, I do not understand why the related function, f(x), that is the values contained in set T, would be “bounded above and below”: are you referring to the x = 0 asymptote (i.e., that it is constrained to natural numbers)?

I is uncountable, infinite, bounded below by its greatest lower bound, which it includes, and above by its least upper bound, which it does not include.
Y is countable, infinite, bounded below by its GLB, which it includes, but unbounded above.
X is finite and bounded above and below.

Makes sense.

I think that “bounds” in mathematics is simply asymptotes, limits, restraints to X or Y, and any finite segments (e.g., T would be bounded on the left and restrained to natural numbers—contrary to my previous contention--, and a line segment from the interval [0, 3] inclusive would be a bounded finite).

To explain my form vs content, take set T that you defined and, more specifically, take note of my previous contention/confusion (i.e., the limit exists for 0 even though 0 is an asymptote because the left and right converge to the same value, which is valid technically). The content of f(n) would be the y outputs and the form would be, with respect to the left in quadrant one, its bounds to the asymptote x = 0.

At a deeper level, though, the problem would be that any “unbounded” f(n) one could provide is bounded to the, in toto, concept of that two-dimensional spatial graph. Nothing about it is an unbounded infinite; although I understand the confusion now, as I am not refer to a contextual usage of the term “unbounded” as in n → ∞ = ∞.

Bob

Wonderful analysis as always Philosophim: let me try to adequately respond.

To my mind, the words total and toto is more like potential vs. actual. If I imagine the total amount of trees I can conceive of, its infinite. But if I imagine the tota number of trees I can conceive of, this seems to require a form of some sort, like trees. But, when speaking in total, I require some word like "trees" as well. There's no real difference in this instance, because both are still the unrealized concepts of trees themselves.

For clarification, in toto and in total are meant to describe totality in relation to forms vs. contents of concepts (as a distinction between them) and are not infinites themselves. In other words, I would like to clarify that neither “in toto” nor “in total” are concepts that directly entail an infinite: the former is a conception which is conceived (i.e., defined) as holistic, whereas “in total” is the conception of the summation of its parts (i.e., in content).

Therefore, one can have a conception, A, of which they conceive in toto (i.e., as complete in form) and be able to formulate a conception, B, that is the summation of the parts of A (which would be in total). For example, I can manifest a conception of a set of integers {1, 2, 3} and determine that the summation of the parts as 6: the former is a conception in toto, and the latter is a conception of that conception in total. Firstly, I would like to clarify that by “summation of parts”, I am purposely leaving it vague, like that of a protocol, which is merely meant as any sort of combination of entities (e.g., {1, 2, 3} could be concatenated or mathematically summed for all intents and purposes or even a limit: 123 or 6 or what have you).

Secondly, it is important, as you probably immediately noticed, to note that my previous example is of a concept of finite form and content: now, we must properly determine the possible permutations of both to provide further exposition into such a distinction. For both, I think it is reasonable to conclude that there are three options for each:

1. Indefinite
2. Infinite
3. Finite

And, thusly, we can analyze each permutation of such, like so (briefly speaking):

Indefinite form and indefinite content

Indefinite in content dictates we cannot determine it in total but, rather, only the scope which we currently have.

Indefinite in form is a bit trickier to imagine, but it is something which the individual at hand has neither asserted its finitude nor its infinitude. Arguably, this is simply a state of confusion; that is, I am fairly confident, given a confused example, that I could expose whether it is finite or infinite.

An example of this would be if I were to know that there is a function, f(x), which has a point (3.3, 4.27) and I were to conceive of its form as simply undetermined in bounds (i.e., I am simply confused or, at least, refraining from judgment). The knowledge of the point is a scope, so to speak, of which I know of the content of f(x) and my undetermined boundaries of the concept of f(x) is form. In terms of the former, I cannot determine in total, but I can meaningfully assert that whatever it is it must involve that point. In terms of the latter, regardless of how mislead I may be, I simply have not asserted a form (even though, as I stated previously, I think both of us would probably be able to tell which one it really is).

In terms of the essay, this kind of conception (in form and content) is simply a state of confusion or ignorance and, therefore, is not relevant to the principle of regulation.

Indefinite form and infinite content

An infinite content can be determined in total.

An indefinite form, as per the last example, is simply a state of ignorance, so I won’t linger on it any further.

An example would be a function, f(x), where I know it’s absolute minimum is y = 2 and that the limit as x approaches infinity from the right side is infinity (no rhyme or reason to those numbers, I just made them up). I can conclude, in total, that the sum of its parts (i.e., y values, let’s say) is infinity: for an absolute minimum at y = 2 indicates that f(x) is never negative ys and the limit from the right being infinity tells me that even if the limit to the left is a finite number that the summation of the ys will be infinity.

Again, I would say the concept is finite (that is, bounded), but technically I could be in a state of ignorance or confusion, thusly determining it as indefinite.

Indefinite form and finite content

This is really just ditto but with finite set of numbers (for example), so I won’t linger on this either.

Infinite form and indefinite content

So this is interesting, because it is incoherent: if I assert that a concept is infinite in form, then its content must be infinite. If I assert the content is finite, then I must, conceptually, either implicitly or explicitly, fill the remaining parts with voids (or a filler of some sort). Otherwise I am admitting the concept to be unable to be negated, for example, yet have a totally negatable finite content, which isn’t coherent. The only way to repair this conception is to admit of it void filler parts.

Infinite form and infinite content

This is the realm of sine qua nons (and, in virtue, the principle of regulation): a concept which is repetitive affirmation of negations would be an example of it. This kind of form entails, I must add, only one of its kind as a conception (and not just merely in existence).

Infinite form and finite content

Same situation as infinite form and indefinite content: I must either (1) fill with voids to ensure the form is coherent with the content or (2) strip the form to a finite.

Finite form and indefinite content

This would be a concept which we have limited scope of its content, but we do conceive of it in toto; that is, as a finite form. This is perfectly coherent in itself.

Finite form and finite content

There are ample examples of this one that I feel you are well aware of, so I will not linger.

Finite form and infinite content

This would be like the whole set of natural numbers.

Besides providing the aforementioned as hopefully a means of better explication on my end, the other main point here is that nothing about knowing “in total” grants anything “in toto”, and vice-versa.

So, let me finally address your trees analogy:

So for example
1. The total number of trees I can realize is the unformed potential of all possible trees. As they are unformed, we cannot establish them all. It is an unending pattern.
2. The toto number of trees I can realize is the actual number of trees I realize (perhaps through my life? Or X time?). Perhaps in your original conception we could say if you lived an infinite time, the toto number of trees would be all the trees you actually conceived of during your infinite life.

The concept of “trees” is a bounded concept because it is conceived in toto (that is, a holistic concept) and I can determine in total the summation of its parts. In other words, for example, I can negate your entire concept of “the toto number of trees ...” just as much as I can for your “total number of trees ...” because I can bundle them up into a holistic concept (i.e., both are actually in toto). Likewise, I would like to stress that nothing about me asserting it as conceivable in toto entails what the state of “in total” is (other than what one could infer from my explication of the permutations of form and content).

The point that I want to note is that there is no actual infinity, only a potential infinity. As we are limited beings, the actual of what we are cannot be noted in terms of infinity.

Arguably, I would say there is one which could be valid but if it is then there cannot be more.

As such, we could say the toto number of concepts would be the derivation chains I've conceived of, but in total, there are an unrealized infinite I could conceive of. Is this along the lines of your thinking, or am I still missing or confusing something?

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would say that you are noting something distinctly different from “in toto” vs “in total”; they refer to the same conception and, therefore, to convert your idea here, it would be more like: the number of concepts that you have conceived of would be finite in content and bound in form; or, if you wanted to attempt it, infinite in content and bounded in form; or, infinite in content and unbounded in form; etc.

This leaves the sqn. What I feel you are trying to imply is that a sqn is what is required for the potential of derivations to exist at all. Because the total number of derivations I can make is unrealized, we're not going through and cancelling a "set" of all unrealized concepts I would actually make, but the total potential of what I could make. Because this is unrealized infinity, there are no "numbers" or actuals to negate, only the potential itself. Does this work?

I believe so: a sine qua non (specifically denoted as the principle of regulation) is what is required for the potential of derivations to occur. A sine qua non is sort of like a procedure wherein one negates all concepts in total, but obviously by means of strategic elimination and not brute force (as that is impossible).

What is to prevent a person from defining derivation as something that is only subordinate? What if they made a different word for constructing a superordinate, and did not find that was a derivation at all?

Thinkers can most certainly (and arguably will) construct their own derivations that omit, in definition, the concept of superordinates, subordinates, PoR, sine qua nons, etc. To me, this is not a problem: I am not attempting to argue that it is impossible for one to miss this principle. By means of it, it is entirely possible to never realize it. In your philosophy, I would view this as analogous to “discrete experiencers”, which do not, for your argument to work, have to ever realize they are discretely experiencing. Nothing about this, to me at least, is wrong nor a contention with the essay. But please correct me if I am wrong!

Yes, you are doing so, but you didn't negate the fact that the being could not derivate. And this being may be a highly intelligent being, even another human. Such a human could not use the the PoR. But this is basically because we have defined it as such right? If something cannot conceive of both superordinate and subordinate ideas, by definition, it cannot derivate. The PoR is not a universal concept that can be used or understood by all thinking things. It is a descriptor of certain logical processes of some beings.

I guess I am a bit confused here: what, in terms of mere possibility, could be defined as a “thinking being” which necessarily does not derivate? I would argue, upon further reflection, that all life can be classified as using PoR. PoR itself holds no inherent necessity of the degree by which it can produce superordinate/subordinate rules: a plant grows towards light, a bee operates by means of calculated movements (albeit not necessarily self-aware), etc. By my lights, I am having a hard time thinking of anything that would be constituted as “thinking” yet cannot derivate (to any degree, more specifically).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob