I am glad to see you are more active again on the forum! I am guessing the new job has settle down a bit (:

We have discussed a lot of this in depth, so I just have one objection worth adding (that we didn't discuss):

Good - what should be

I don't think this is internally coherent for your position: you use the term 'good' to denote things which you do not thereby concede should exist. Let's take it by example.

Imagine you could combine two elements (in the periodic table) to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, this would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination would be, then, "good".

Imagine, though, that you could combine those two elements with two other elements to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, that would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination, likewise, would be, then, "good".

However, imagine that the first combination doesn't produce as much existence as the second combination: they are both "good", when considered in themselves, but the second one is more "good".

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

Gradations, or degrees, of goodness are eliminated if one accepts that goodness is identical to 'to ought to exist'.

As an external critique, the other issue is that defining goodness in this manner eliminates many commonly accepted usages of the concept; e.g., by saying that this clock is good for telling the time, one is not at all implying that the clock should exist.

Just food for thought (:

Bob

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP.

:up:

I don't understand what you mean by saying:
but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross

Can you explain?

A moral proposition is any proposition which is normative that pertains to what is morally good. Propositions like “I believe <...>” are NOT normative and do not pertain to what is morally good: they are non-normative facts about one’s psychology.

The moral statements, of which the moral subjectivist was supposed to be arguing is still propositional, are like “one ought not torture babies”; but re-writing them like “I believe one ought not torture babies” transforms the statement into a proposition about one’s psychology and NOT about the original moral statement.

If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, then why can I not say that it is truly morally wrong for me?

There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”.

:up:

I changed the OP to help dissolve this dispute:

C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

That is all I need to convey the original point.

In other words the truth of the proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief - something you appeared to deny when you wrote.

I disagree with your characterization of it as "truth of a proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief": truth is objective. Again, this is a rather moot point with respect to the OP, though.

What you are really saying, is that the truth of the proposition is dependent on whether or not someone has the belief; and not that it is dependent on a belief.

E.g.,

A claim that "john "believes X" is not dependent on any belief about John' s beliefs (your point) but it is dependent on whether John's has that beliefs about X (Michael's point)

(@Michael,@Count Timothy von Icarus,@ChrisH)

I don't mind the underlying meaning you are referring to by "relativity to belief"; so here's a way I can express my view without getting into semantics.

A belief about a proposition cannot make it true or false (e.g., "aliens exist" cannot be made true or false relative to any belief formulated about it); but a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which it is about.

Put that way, the mistake a moral subjectivist makes is NOT the idea that a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which is contained in it; but that a belief about a proposition can make it true or false.

The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved.

:up:

The only dispute we may have, is:

P: "I believe that aliens exist"
P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"

I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief

I would be wary to say that P has its truth relative to a belief; because this would mean that "I believe that aliens exist", P, is true or false depending on if I believe "I believe that aliens exist", P.

I understand what you are conveying and agree with it, but I think describing it as "truth relative to a belief" contributes to the confusion people are having: propositions that take the form "I believe <...>" are not "special" when it comes to the truth about them---truth is objective. This is what causes, in my opinion, people, including my past self, to conflate "aliens exist" being true or false relative to a belief with "I believe aliens exist" being true or false not relative to a belief.

I completely agree with your assessment, and I think you understand what I am trying to convey. I have been trying to explain this to @Michael, but they seem to keep overlooking this point: I am not denying that a proposition be about a belief, and this can, thusly, require one to evaluate it relative to the subject-at-hand.

However, to be fair, I see how C1 was worded in a way that did provide the ambiguity necessary to birth this dispute; so I just re-worded it in the OP to better reflect what I am saying (and what I am not saying).

Yes, what he is noting is that "I believe <...>" is true or false depending on whether or not the person, being referenced by "I", has the belief. This is NOT the same thing as claiming that the proposition "I believe <...>" is true or false depending on our beliefs about it: this is the difference between a proposition being about a belief, and a proposition's truth being relative to a belief.

I admit it can be confusing, and this is why we have to be very careful: the proposition "I believe <...>" is about a belief of the subject-at-hand, but whether or not it is true is not dependent on any beliefs about it.

@Michael keeps overlooking this point I am making, and reverts back to insisting on a point that I agree with---i.e., that some propositions are about beliefs.

"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.

For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"

Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition

Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>".

It has been addressed at length, but you refuse to engage in the conversation:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/903115
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/903011

:roll:

Repeating yourself three times, while ignoring my responses, does not help further the conversation.

That is fair: a moral subjectivist could get out of this internal inconsistency by positing that moral judgments are propositions because they are just propositions about beliefs; but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd.

Likewise, in this version of the position, one can't say that the moral proposition "one ought not torture babies" is true for them: they would have to say that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is true for them. I think most moral subjectivists do not realize this, and fall into the (internally inconsistent) trap that I outlined in the OP.

They would no longer be discussing ethics, essentially.

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".

I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that.

I'm only saying that "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist.

This is correct.

Therefore your conclusion that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.

This is false; and does not follow from the former claim you made. I already explained this in great detail, so let's try a different way.

I would ask you: "what belief makes the proposition 'I believe that aliens exist' true or false?"
You would say: "that I believe that aliens exist".
I would say: "that you believe that aliens exist, is not a belief about the proposition: that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false."

I am (obviously) not denying that a proposition can be about a belief but, rather, am denying that a proposition is true or false relative to a belief. That a proposition cannot be evaluated as true or false without determining a belief (or lack thereof) that one has, it does not follow that the proposition's truth is relative to that belief. E.g., I believe "aliens exist" != "I believe aliens exist": the former is invalid and a proposition that has its truth relative to a belief, the latter is valid and a proposition that is about a belief.

:up:

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinctdependent fromon B?

The answer is "yes".

I just meant that whether or not a thing is true or false, is independent of the stance one has of whether it is true or false. That's all.

(@Count Timothy von Icarus)

Correct, but no need for “Tarski’s T-schema”: it plainly and obviously follows that p ↔ p.

You are also correct that “I believe that aliens exist” is true iff I believe that aliens exist. However, this does not entail that the truth of the proposition is contingent on beliefs.

There’s a couple ways to explicate this to you, which I have done already (but let me try again).

The first way, is to note that if “I believe that aliens exist” has its truth-value relative to a belief, then it is true iff I believe that I believe that aliens exist. This plainly follows, because one would be literally evaluating whether or not the proposition, which is “I believe that aliens exist”, is true or false relative to another belief.

The second way, is to abstract it out: let’s call the proposition “I believe X” Y. If Y’s truth-value is relative to a belief, then Y is true iff I, or some group of people, believe, or believes, that Y is true. Y is, though, NOT X. So let’s apply this to your example. If you were to argue that “aliens exist” has a truth-value that is relative to beliefs, then “aliens exist” is true iff I believe “aliens exist”. What you are trying to do, is express this with “I believe aliens exist”; but this is not the same proposition: you have went from X to Y in an equivocating fashion. If “aliens exist” is true iff I believe “aliens exist”, it does NOT follow that “I believe aliens exist” is true iff I believe that “I believe aliens exist”: the latter is a separate proposition, which does not have its truth-value necessarily relative to beliefs. I merely recognize, in my argument, that, in fact, propositions cannot be true or false relative to a belief: “I believe aliens exist”, like any other proposition, is true or false irregardless of what you or I believe about “I believe aliens exist”.

What you are doing, is confusing X with Y: you are thinking that "aliens exist" is true or false relative to a belief when really you are working with the separate proposition "I believe aliens exist". You have to re-write it this way for your idea to be a valid proposition, but that contradicts your idea: it transforms it into a different proposition that does not demonstrate that "aliens exist" is true or false relative to a belief.

:up:

I would add, that a proposition can never actually be true or false relative to a belief; and this is the real, underlying problem.

Many people are inclined to say "it is wrong to torture babies" is a (1) proposition and (2) its truth is relative to beliefs; however, they then proceed to re-write it, to make it valid, as "I believe it is wrong to torture babies" which is not the original proposition. What they have done is NOT the demonstration of a proposition that has its trueness or falseness relative to beliefs but, rather, have demonstrated that there are certain kinds of propositions, of which their truth is still not relative to beliefs, that is about beliefs.

(@Michael, @Count Timothy von Icarus) The proposition "I believe <...>" is NOT true or false relative to a belief. I can't say "oh, well, 'I believe X' is true because I believe that 'I believe X' is true".

Yes that is a proposition, and whether or not it is true or false is independent of any belief about it: that's what you keep missing, because you keep conflating a proposition referencing something about a belief with a proposition having its trueness or falseness being relative to a belief (e.g., the difference between claiming "aliens exist" is true relative to a belief one has and "I believe aliens exist" being true).

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for truth---it is the 'lack thereof' that disbars me from simply saying 'truth' instead of 'truthity'. I went ahead and changed the OP to use 'trueness or falseness' instead of 'truthity'.

Does it follow from A not being dependent on B, that A is not distinct from B?

I apologize: I was using “distinct” and “independent” interchangeably: reread my response as using “independent” instead of “distinct”.

Your definition of moral subjectivism misses the mark because it rests on two questionable assumptions:

1. That moral beliefs are adequately addressed in terms of propositions.
2. What makes a moral claim true or false is whether or not it is believed.

#1 sounds like this form of “moral subjectivism” denies moral cognitivism; which is a contradiction in terms.

#2 is absolutely a required, essential aspect of moral subjectivism. By moral subjectivism, I am not merely referring to any “subjective morality”: I am referring to a specific moral anti-realist position.

I don't disagree with a premise. I simply prove the conclusion false, and therefore prove that one of the premises is false or that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. I'll leave it to you to determine where you've gone wrong.

That doesn’t help at all: I provided an argument, which outlines a certain way of thinking about it, to demonstrate the conclusion; and all you have done is taking a claim that I am obviously going to deny, which is the very thing under contention, and posited it as true to negate my conclusion.

I'm not really sure what you're trying to say here

I gave examples and an elaboration here, which you seem to have ignored. If there is anything in there that requires further elaboration or clarification, then please let me know!

I go for a job interview. For whatever reason, I am confident that I am going to get the job. As a result, I am very relaxed and personable, and this in turn is what helps me beat out another candidate. But suppose that if I thought I was unlikely to get the job I would have been much more nervous and flubbed the interview, in which case I wouldn't have gotten the job.

In this case, my belief that I would get the job is not independent of my getting the job. It is a determinate factor.

I have no problem with this; again, I refer you back to my response: a proposition referencing something about a belief does not make the proposition itself true or false relative to a belief…I cannot stress this enough. It is the difference between, e.g., saying that “1 + 1 = 2” is true because one believes it and saying that “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is true because they do, in fact, have that belief (that 1 + 1 = 2). This is the distinction which you are currently overlooking.

The only thing I can say, that is not a reiteration of my response (linked above), is that this is a bad example, although I understand why you would use it, to give to counter my points in the response; because you didn’t specify what the proposition is that you are claiming has a truth-value relative to a belief. I am assuming you don’t mean to say that the proposition “I got the job” is relative to a belief (even if your subjective disposition contributed to you getting the job) (:

I think you've both highlighted the initial problem though, which is P1 here
↪Bob Ross
. It seems entirely possible that a belief could be related to the truth value of some proposition.

Do you think that a stance about the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of something?

I think we have to be very careful here, because I don’t disagree that a “belief could be related to the truth-value of a proposition” in the sense that I think you mean it. “I believe tacos taste good” is a proposition and part of what it references relates to a belief (in this case, a belief about tacos), but this is not the same thing as saying that a proposition’s truth-value is relative to a belief.

For example, “1 + 1 = 2” is a mathematical proposition of which its truth-value is clearly not relative to a belief; however, the same is the case for the non-mathematical proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”...it is just harder to spot. The truth-value of “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is not relative to any stance: either the subject believes it or they do not—irregardless of their stance on the proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”. The “truthity” of “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” is stance-independent.

Why, then, do so many people, including yourself, say it is not? Because, of course, to evaluate the truth-value of the proposition “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” one must evaluate the belief of some subject; and, in this sense, one wants to say “the ‘truthity’ of <...> is stance-dependent”.

It is imperative, then, to pinpoint what the proposition is: when someone, like yourself, says the above, they are thinking of the truth of whether or not what the belief references is true or false (e.g., “1 + 1 = 2”, “tacos taste good”, etc.) and not the actual proposition at-hand (e.g., “I believe 1 + 1 = 2”, “I believe tacos taste good”, etc.). They then conflate them, and say that the proposition at-hand is stance-dependent (in terms of its “truthity”) when, really, the part of the content, which may or may not itself be a proposition, has its “truthity” relative to a stance.

We have to dissect this with razor-sharp knives and as elegantly and precisely as a surgeon to avoid this conflation (which I think you are making).

Why is this a big deal, you may say? Because what was originally being accounted for as propositional by way of relativity to beliefs dissipates with this transformation—e.g., one that argues that “1 + 1 = 2” does not express something objective but is propositional because it is relative to a belief, will have to transform it into “I believe 1 + 1 = 2” which loses its original meaning (viz., it is no longer the same proposition, and the one which was denied as objective is not actually propositional: it is, rather, the indexical statement that is).

See what I mean?

When it comes the sort of self-reference at work in the OP though

What self-reference? A stance about something is independent of that something; which does not negate, to your point, that some statements reference subjective dispositions which, in turn, require one to evaluate to determine the truth-value of it (which, again, is not the same thing as the truth-value itself being relative to a subjective disposition: I am cutting ever-so precisely here, or at least trying to, in order to convey the point).

That I have to evaluate the subjective dispositions of a person to determine the truth of something, does not entail that the truth of that something is subjectively determined.

1. "Torturing babies is wrong," is propisitional. It has "truthity"; i.e. it is either true or false. (Do I understand your use of "truthity" correctly here?)

Yes, by “truthity” I just mean the trueness of falseness of something. “torturing babies is wrong” is truth-apt.

5. a) Is that I believe torturing babies is wrong dependent on torturing babies being wrong?
5. b) Is torturing babies being wrong dependent on me believing that torturing babies is wrong?

5A is about whether or not your belief was in any way constructed based off of the fact that torturing babies are wrong; whereas 5B is about whether it is fact, or even capable of being a fact, that torturing babies are wrong. It is in the 5B sense that my OP is addressing.

It is entirely possible that you arrived at the belief that torturing babies are wrong without ever even contemplating the possibility of it being morally factually wrong.

How do you arrive at that conclusion? You have shown that the belief is independent of the truth(ity). You have not shown that the truthity is independent of the belief.

Those are both the same. If a belief is independent of the trueness or falseness of a proposition; then the proposition’s trueness or falseness is independent of the belief: those are two ways of saying the same thing.

P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false.

However:

P3: "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist

This is just a re-iteration of your previous post, which does not address which premise you disagree with.

In terms of your “P3”, I responded here.

If A is distinct from B, then B is distinct from A. But if A is independent from B, it does not follow that B is independent from A.

This seems to be the crux of your argument, and I am not following this distinction you are making.

All I meant, was that the truth-value of something is completely independent of any stance taken on it.

There seems to be a desire to go from uncontroversial to "absolutely true" or "objectively true"?

This is a non-sequitur: although I agree that most people are inclined to do so.

If “torturing babies is wrong” is propositional, then it is true or false independently of what anyone believes about it. For a moral subjectivist, they would have to rephrase it to “I believe torturing babies is wrong” and evaluate that instead.

The issue is more that "truthity" is a word that quite literally doesn't exist.

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or falseness of something (and not necessarily that it is true).

I see you used “truth-value”, which is fine as well.

P1: A stance taken on the truthity of something, is independent of the truthity of that something.

P1: A stance taken on the truth-value of something is independent of the truth-value of that something.

I interpret these to mean the same exact thing: am I missing something you are trying to convey? How have I changed it?

If the stance is distinct from what the stance is about, then the truth-value of ‘what its is about is independent of the stance itself—that’s what makes it a stance.

Of course, a moral subjectivist will disagree with this; but it is the root of the issue with their position.

The moral subjectivist will reject that.
A moral proposition is true if and only if I believe it is true.

If it is truly a proposition, then your belief that it is true is independent of the truth-value of the proposition itself; otherwise, you have to concede that the proposition is not distinct from the belief.

You’ve stipulated conditions under moral subjectivism, but you haven’t stipulated moral subjectivism itself. What if moral subjectivism, as a self-consistent doctrine, has nothing to do with mere belief?

Correct. I was contending with the prominent understanding of moral subjectivism—of course there may be nuanced versions.

I would say, though, that there is no other foreseeable way that a moral judgment could express (1) something subjective AND (2) be cognitive if one is not grounding the moral judgment in beliefs. Humans don’t have any other aspect of cognition that is subjective (stance-dependent) that could make moral judgments true or false.

deontological moral doctrine predicated on necessity of law alone, which makes the contingency of mere belief irrelevant?

How is that not a form of moral realism?

What makes subjectivism “moral” anyway?

It merely denotes a metaethical position: that’s all.

What it is that makes subjectivism in general reducible to a particular instance of it?

Again, I can’t think of a single version of moral subjectivism that contends with the idea that beliefs make moral propositions true or false: that’s a core aspect of the theory. If not, then perhaps the view is a form of moral non-cognitivism or something...not sure but I would be interested to hear it.

Would any of that matter with respect to your thesis?

It is definitely relevant, but my focus in the OP is the contemporary, standard view called moral subjectivism; and I wholly concede that there may be a very nuanced version of it that escapes these issues...but I have never heard of it (yet) and it seems pretty conclusive that it will have to revolve around beliefs.

My example of "I believe that aliens exist" being true iff I believe that aliens exist is proof that a belief can make a proposition true or false.

I think it may be better if you elaborated on which premise you disagree with, because this is false and I demonstrated it in the proof.

“I believe that aliens exist” is NOT a proposition that has its “truthity” relative to a belief: irregardless of what you believe about your beliefs, if you have the belief then the proposition is true. The proposition itself is objective and absolute.

The conflation you are making is that the proposition containing a reference to a belief DOES NOT make the proposition true or false relative to a belief. I would challenge you to explicate what the “proposition” is in your claim “that a belief can make a proposition true or false”: I can guarantee you that you think it is “I believe that aliens exist” while implicitly assuming it is “aliens exist”.

In the more abstract, “I believe X” is a valid proposition and is NOT relative to a belief; whereas claiming “X” is true because I believe it is true is incoherent. See my section on the rejoinder to the moral subjectivist’s response for more details.

As such you are left with this:

You cannot just cross out a conclusion in a syllogism without crossing out a premise; unless you are noting something illogical with its form.

Unfortunately, I did not understand this at all: can you please try to elaborate in a manner that ties it to the OP's thesis?

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is NOT a moral proposition: the moral proposition is that "one ought not torture babies". All you have noted is that one can take a stance on the truthity of a proposition, while simultaneously rejecting that there actually is a proposition to take a stance on.

In your example, it would be like denying that "aliens exist" is propositional in its own right while claiming that "I believe aliens exist" somehow makes "aliens exist" true or false.

Initially, I would change truthity for just truth.

Truthity is whether or not something has truth, and not that it has truth.

So it seems to me the argument begs the question by rejecting the challenged view from the start.

P1 is not the claim that beliefs cannot make something true or false (which would beg the question): it is an uncontroversial claim that the stance taken on something is distinct from that something.

If I take a stance of how delicious pineapples are, then my stance about it is distinct from the deliciousness of the pineapples...that’s what makes it a stance about the deliciousness of pineapples. Otherwise, one is making no distinction between a stance about something and that something itself. Along the same lines, the truthity is separate.

Believing X makes it true (subjectivism strictly defined).

This is internally inconsistent, unless you deny the basic nature of a belief: to make it consistent, you would have to transform moral judgments from “one ought to X” to “I believe one ought to X”.

Then you end up in the rejoinder section (in terms of issues with that kind of transformation).

When it comes to the rejoinder, I am not sure, I haven't wrapped my hand around it yet. A rewording in simpler terms would be welcome.

A moral judgment is of the form “one ought to X”, “one should do X”, etc. and NOT “I believe one ought to X”, “I believe one should do X”, etc.; but this sort of transformation is required in order to avoid the original concern of the position being inconsistent: one has to say that the moral judgment is enveloped in an indexical statement. BUT THEN, the indexical statement is the proposition, and not the moral judgment.

I would agree with Lionino here, that this isn't capturing the position very well.

See above.

One's belief in what one 'ought' to do is true in vitue of the fact that one believes it. This does, as Lionino point out, make it entirely arbitrary.

Then, there are no moral judgments which are propositional: all you noted is that our beliefs about, according to you, NONEXISTENT moral propositions are made true by our beliefs...of course! That’s a tautology.

The original American Dream was not about becoming rich: it was about manifest destiny, second chances, and acquiring sufficient wealth to provide and protect one's family.

After all the land was conquered and inhabited, the American Dream died; and was replaced with a new 'American Dream': greed. Now, the capitalism found in the US is, inevitably, slowly moving the wealth into a minority few--fewer and fewer people are able to acquire that baseline wealth. I wonder how long until we sublimate it with a better system.

See:



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