CC: @frank

But that's not so. You do make use of scripture. I explained this, here:
Your post relies on god's having a son, and an ontology that includes sin and the dignity of god and damnation and so on. These are from scripture and revelation. So the arguments there are not examples of natural theology.— Banno
These ideas derive from scripture, not natural theology.

I understand why you said that, because you are assuming I believe in the Son of God because of the Bible. I don’t.

I believe in God, in the classical theistic sense, because of arguments from natural theology—e.g., the argument from change, essences/existences, contingency/necessity, parts vs. wholes, etc. The Trinity follows, I think, from the nature of God as understood in classical theism (starting from the aforesaid arguments). This can be outlined briefly as follows:

1. God must have perfect knowledge of Himself because He is an intelligence and purely actual. If He lacked knowledge what is metaphysically possible or what is real (such as Himself), then He would have the potential to learn; but a purely actual being cannot have any potential.

2. God is absolutely simple, so His pure act of will and pure act of thought are identical. He creates by willing something as real and His will and thought are identical; so it follows that Him creating something (i.e., willing something as real) is identical to Him thinking of something as real. His perfect knowledge of Himself is Him thinking of Himself as real; which must, then, be identical to Him willing Himself as real. Him willing something as real necessarily creates something that is real; so Him knowing Himself generates something real out of Himself. His object of knowledge of this creation is Himself: He is both subject and object. However, He knows Himself as absolutely simple (because He has perfect knowledge of Himself); so Himself as the object of thought, in this case, cannot generate another ‘god’ that is completely separate from Himself. Instead, it generates a real subsistent relation between Himself (as knowledge of Himself) and Himself (as the one that is known). The Father is the one that is known; and the Son is the knowledge of Himself.

3. His knowledge of Himself, the Son, is not merely “abstract” knowledge like our knowledge of ourselves because He is absolutely simple: when He thinks of something as real, it becomes real necessarily. His self-knowledge is subsistent insofar as there is Himself as the object of His thought that is generated (as real) from His own self-contemplation and is a substance of a rational nature because God is, as the Father or the one thinking, a being that is a person and He is absolutely simple; so the Son collapses in nature into having the same nature.

4. The one known (i.e., the Father) knows Himself (i.e., the Son) as perfectly good because His essence and existence are identical and He has perfect knowledge of Himself. Since His willing and thinking are identical (because He is absolutely simple), it follows that Him thinking of Himself as perfectly good is the same as willing Himself as being perfectly good; and since love is to will the good of something for its own sake, it follows that God necessarily loves Himself in the most supreme and perfect sense (because the degree of love is proportionate to how much a person wills the good of something for its own sake and God must will Himself as the most and perfectly good). God’s willing is what creates though: so His willing of Himself as perfectly good, which is identical to Him willing Himself as perfectly good, generates perfect love as the object of His thought (or object of His willing). The generation of perfect love cannot be a kind of willing of the good for God that creates something different from Himself (because He is absolutely simple): it would have to be a real subsistent distinction in origin between Himself (as Love) and the Son and the Father because Love itself—God’s pure love of perfect goodness—is generated out of Himself (as the knower) and Himself (as the known). Likewise, Love shares the same rational nature as the Father because Love is a generation out of the Father about Himself and He is absolutely simple. Love is the Holy Spirit.

5. A person is a substance of a rational nature. The Son, Father, and Holy Spirit all have a rational nature and are subsistent; therefore, they are all three persons but they, given that God is absolutely simple, share one rational nature.

Disagree with my reasoning all you would like, but please do not straw man my position as that of revealed theology. Nothing about this is revealed theology.

You take it as granted that justice involves retribution. See the SEP article for some critique of that view, and consider if it is an ad hoc move. Your "synthesis" takes it as granted that God will seek to punish, not to restore and mitigate.

A part of restoration is a price being paid to the victim in some form proportionate to the crime. I agree with you: I think you are talking passed my points.

Rehabilitation is punishment? No wonder the jails are so full.

It can be: I don’t think our jails rehabilitate.

Are you saying restorative justice does not have an element of retribution in it? I find that hard to believe.

A vague utopia? If you were god, THIS would be the world you come up with? How about a world where we don't have to kill other creatures to survive? A world without physical pain? A world without sickness? Etc. — RogueAI

I was asking you what you think the best possible totality of creation would be. I do think this is a part of the best possible totality of creation.

How about a world where we don't have to kill other creatures to survive?

Is that metaphysically possible without removing the possibility of the virtues, free will, and eudaimonia? I don’t know: it’s more complicated than you are making it out to be.

 A world without physical pain? A world without sickness? Etc.

You are blanketly asserting this is metaphysically possible to do and that they would be better; but I’m questioning that. For example, an organism that cannot feel pain is much more likely to damage themselves: is that good? Sickness is a consequence of having nature: you can’t have a natural world like our own and not have things that can make organism sick.

But they still robbed me and stole from me! Even if they pay the money back, I was violated! Should they not pay for that?

That’s true: you are right. To be just, the price would have to be greater than the amount stolen. Whether that be in the form of a physical punishment, paying back the debt plus interest, etc.

But suppose they were sorry for it and told me they spent the $20 on booze and they can't afford to pay me back because they need to feed their kids. Should they be punished for not paying me back, even if they're sorry? What is twenty bucks to me? I would still forgive them. Is that wrong?

All else being equal, it would be unjust for you to forgo retribution; but since the Son of God paid the price for our sins you can be merciful without being unjust.

:up:

CC: @Samlw

"Malo periculosam, libertatem quam quietam servitutem. Even this evil is productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of government, and nourishes a general attention to the public affairs. I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical" -- (Jefferson's Letter to Madison)

I think this is a thoughtful and good post. As an american that would rather die than give up the 2nd amendment, let me offer you some brief points you can address (if you would like):

1.The people well-regulated in arms is necessary to mitigate the tyrannical nature of the government: a militia is necessary to keep checks and balances on a military. This is a key concept in American politics that you did not address.

2. Guns are the great equalizer. Although you mentioned “individual security”, you omitted the key fact that guns are the best and safest way to defend oneself from aggressors—which has no bearing on this idea that “well, everyone already has a gun, so I should too!”. E.g., a woman cannot truly defend herself properly with pepper spray or a knife or her fists; a man cannot properly defend himself against three men; etc. Likewise, it is the safest way to de-escalate or at least deal with a lethal threat. Anyone who engages in melee fighting, unless they are heavily trained, should expect to end up in the hospital best case scenario. A knife fight, a fist fight, a bat fight, etc. is a lose-lose situation. If someone is lethally threatening me or a loved one, usually I could just pull out my firearm in compressed ready position and they will walk away: most criminals want to go after the sheep—the easy target. Most people think guns only escalate situations, but the vast majority of the time they de-escalate them.

3. You can’t just look at homicide or violent crime rates. You also have to look at how often guns are used in self-defense. In America, they are used anywhere from 500,000 to 3 million times per year to legitimately save someone.

4. Removing the people’s ability to carry weaponry in a responsible manner ONLY makes it harder for law-abiding citizens to defend themselves. Most people in any nation are generally law-abiding and so most people will not carry anything if it is illegal; but this is something a criminal will not follow. For example, I was shocked to find out that even pepper spray is illegal in Britain to conceal or open carry: a criminal that wants to do damage will carry a weapon (e.g., a knife, bat, etc.) and the fact that their victim, who most likely will be a law-abiding citizen, will not just helps them!

5. Any kind of technology that allows the government to well-regulate firearms or any weapons defeats the purpose of the 2nd amendment: it is meant to allow the people to be a well-regulated militia to defend against the government itself.

Ok, so you accept the principle that "if one must do something to survive, then it is amoral". So if I need to rape a woman to survive, it is neither good or bad for me to do it; if I need to murder 1,000 people to survive, then it is neither good nor bad; if I need to commit mass genocide to survive (or the nation needs to do it to survive) then it is neither good nor bad; etc.

Not only is the idea of amorality false; but your principle is atrociously immoral.

A good God is not allowed to allow evil in His creation.

Why? Evil is a privation of the good that God always wills.

Good and evil are fundamental features of our experiences. We do things for a reason, which could be pleasure or pain. Therefore, the God of the Old Testament is right since something is missing in a creation without good or evil! Of course, if His intention is to create a universe in which you could find good and evil!

Given your previous elaboration that I didn’t understand, I don’t think you are talking about good and evil in the classical sense: it seems like you are talking about happiness and suffering.

Why create a natural world at all? Why not create a paradise without suffering or scarcity?

Firstly, that would be a world. Secondly, what do you mean by paradise? That just begs the question: you’re appealing to a vague “Utopia”.

Suppose someone mugged me and stole $20 bucks and then a day later ran into me again, broke down crying, apologized and gave me the $20 back. Should I call the police on them? What would be the point of punishing them? I would forgive them and move on. What's wrong with that?

There’s nothing wrong with that: in fact, you should do that. Why? Because the retribution was paid and they have rehabilitated themselves: they gave you the $20 back and are sincerely sorry. Now, if they hadn’t paid the $20 back but you knew they stole it, then just forgiving them would be mercy at the expense of justice; and if they pay you the $20 back but aren’t sorry about it then they need rehabilitation which would normally be in the form of a punishment for something like that.

This is God's creation. Would you do the same if you were God? Let's create and let injustice be in it!

Allowing for evil is necessary when creating a good world. A world with natural laws allows for natural evil; a world with persons allows for person evil.

I could see your point to an extent with respect to what may seem as pointless evil, but I don’t accept that they really are pointless.

Good and evil to me are features of our experiences only.

I didn’t understand what you were saying: can you say it a different way? Are you saying that getting stabbed isn’t evil, but that our suffering involved in getting stabbed is evil?

I was saying please, please, please, don't use a dignity-scale as a justification for killing

Dignity is relative to the nature of a thing; and I would argue you are implicitly using it to determine how wrong an act is (and the justice system does too).

 It's ok to kill rabbits and eat them because you're an omnivore.

That’s horrible. You are saying that if you naturally need to do something then it is automatically permissible to do. If there were a species that needed to eat people to survive, would that be permissible to you? What if there was an alien species that needed to torture people from other animals or else they would necessarily fall into deep, deep depression to the point where they necessarily would kill themselves?

The reason we can eat rabbits is because it is not immoral to eat a thing which is not a person if one needs to. That is different than saying that we can eat a rabbit because we need to. It is possible for the dignity of a being to include innate rights.

The dignity of a rabbit does not include innate rights; but we do have to respect its dignity (such as by not torturing it).

I would suggest you read my explanation of the requirement for sacrifice I gave to @frank: you are also misunderstanding the point. It's about synthesizing justice and mercy. You can't pardon the person that victimized you and be just: that would be mercy at the expense of justice.

A quick google search also shows a lot of arguments against capital punishment by Christians.

Retribution is more a caricature of justice than an implementation.

One consequence of this is that a retributive god appears to be morally questionable.

Is your critique of retribution that it is too harsh? In an ideal world, would you say the justice system would never punish people for retribution? Would they just punish people for rehabiliation or future prevention?

My understanding of "Natural Theology" is that it does not rely on scripture, revelation or mystery. Your post relies on god's having a son, and an ontology that includes sin and the dignity of god and damnation and so on. These are from scripture and revelation. So the arguments there are not examples of natural theology.

My arguments didn’t rely on scripture. I keep telling you this, to no avail.

 Now an ad hoc assumption is one that is adopted specifically to maintain a given position n the face of an objection

Yeah, so I think this would be a valid criticism of Aquinas; but I am not a Christian and even if I ever were to be I wouldn’t begin with Christianity and come up with ways to justify it through natural theology.

 In that regard, the post is ad hoc. 

Sure, insofar as I was offering a solution that a Christian might take that assumes a starting point of the Bible (and that's assuming it is an attempted patch-work); but, again, someone could be a Christian and it not be ad hoc: they may have come to believe various aspects of Christian theology through means that are not merely the Bible.

Whether it is ad hoc depends on whether the person starts with a position they are trying to rationalize or if they come to rationalize their way into the position.

Bob, we are at loggerheads because not only can't we agree on the definition of murder

You never provided a definition of murder: I am still waiting to hear it.

Your defense of my charge of God committing murder is that no one can commit murder on earth because no person actually dies completely when they are “killed”.

 You were with your friend living an innocent ordinary life when God appears and struck you with a thunder bolt.

Everyone would call this “God killed you”. For you, you couldn’t say that because you didn’t actually die. How would you describe it?

 Your friends all said that you were murdered by God when they buried you.

Let’s take a step back, though: you are saying that God didn’t kill me—let’s forget if it’s murder for a second. Do you agree God killed me?

You were brought to heaven, body and soul., and in the presence of God, you asked: Him why did you murdered me?

This is incoherent with the hypothetical as outlined before this sentence. If God struck you down with a thunder bolt, then your body lost its life—you were killed: you are dead. Now, your soul has a faculty of mind which is immutable because it is immaterial; so although the body and the soul’s faculties which pertain to bodily/material functions ceases, the mind continues to live. You have now posited that God either did not end your body’s life—kill you—but instead teleported you to his “throne” to judge you OR God did in fact kill you and then resurrected your body. Which is it in your view?

 Now you are truly dead

You are equivocating the killing of a person in the natural sense of the body dying and the soul be killed.

Why does God hide from us?

Yes, so your argument is from Divine Hiddenness. This assumes that it is better for God to reveal Himself constantly to people throughout history than for them to come to know Him from His effects/creation; and I am not so sure that is true, although I get the appeal.

That says nothing to me. To me, real means actually existing as a thing, whether it is different modes of experience or beings.

I am saying that some things exist but are not real: do you agree with that in principle?

"if God was good, could God have given a tribal, near eastern group like the Hebrews this sort of law, or would a "good God" necessarily have to give them a more enlightened law?

Not quite. As I mentioned to another person on this thread:

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).
…
I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

Can you elaborate on this? I am thinking Christianity, the herd morality, is what is abolishing it. We don't have the stomach to kill people anymore.

Theology is not philosophy.

Theology starts with a conclusion, and seeks to explain how it fits in with how things are. It seeks to make a given doctrine consistent.

We don’t have to start with the question of whether God exists to decipher God exists. Aristotle just wanted to explain change…

Also, theology is a branch of philosophy. All branches of philosophy start with a central question and try to solve it.

There was a time when black people weren't thought of as having the same "dignity" as white people. Hence, it was ok to enslave them. This is another example of how doctrine blinds people to what's moral. The Pope gave his blessing on the beginnings of the Atlantic Slave Trade, one of many cases of all out moral failure.

Yes, and they were wrong. We don’t need to reject God’s existence to accept that that was wrong. We don’t even need to reject Jesus to accept that.

The catholic church has done a lot of immoral things: that’s true.

So all that was about restoring god's dignity?

Not all of it, but, yes, retribution is about restoring the dignity of the offended. Wouldn’t you agree? When some woman gets raped, a price must be paid to restore her dignity—retribution is required for justice. Justice isn’t just about rehabilitation: even if the rapist was sincerely sorry, all else being equal there is a price to be paid.

More seriously, can you see how to one who does not accept the tenants of faith, that post at least looks like self-justifying, ad hoc confirmation bias?

Sort of, to be honest. I didn’t appeal to faith; and as we have discussed before I don’t believe in God on faith: my belief in based solely on natural theology.

Also, it’s kind of belittling and dismissive, no offense meant, to me, when I give an elaborate explanation and it is written off as ad hoc. Nothing about it was ad hoc in all honesty.

I appreciate your thoughts!

Firstly, endorsing a law that does not protect against certain evil is not the same as endorsing a law that protects evil. To use your example about pro-life voting, a pro-life law that explicates it is impermissible to abort after 6 weeks is not technically endorsing abortion prior and up to 6 weeks; whereas a law that explicates it is permissible to abort before and up to 6 weeks is endorsing abortion. The former is permissible for a person to vote for (assuming that’s the best law they can manage to get passed) whereas the latter would be impermissible. This is a subtle and seemingly trivial note but is really crucial.

I think you are focusing on the wrong part of the passage in Ex. 21:20-21: it declares it morally permissible to beat slaves because they are property: it states that explicitly. It doesn’t merely outline that beating slaves is immoral. The claim that beating slaves is immoral is true and there’s nothing wrong with endorsing that even if slavery is permitted under the current legal system (so long as you didn’t vote or comply with that being in place).

I would say God is acting consequentialistic, and so would you in the pro-life example if you endorsed the latter example I gave, because He is endorsing immorality as a means towards a good end; and this means that the action being intrinsically wrong is being ignored or denied (which is unique to consequentialism).

Moreover:

Suppose I am a state legislator in a country where abortion is permitted up to "viability"

I am not endorsing abortion by voting in a bill that only explicates that abortion after a certain stage is immoral and illegal: if I could pass a law that banned it outright and I still chose to endorse this other option then it would imply that I find it morally permissible to do (all else being equal).

You are absolutely right that one is permitted to limit the evil effects of evil as best one can; but this does not include doing evil as a means towards that good end. If you go around arguing that abortion is perfectly fine up to the 6 week mark, then you are doing something immoral even if it is for a good end of mitigating the effects of abortion; and you don’t have to do that to endorse a bill that limits abortion without banning it outright.

I tell you that to prevent that I would have voted for a six-week ban with exceptions for rape and incest, and I'm no consequentialist

I see the appeal, but that would be a consequentialistic move. You are saying that you would endorse a bill that explicates that in the case, e.g., of rape it is not wrong to abort when you know it is wrong. It is intrinsically wrong to abort in the case of rape and subsequently immoral to advocate or permit abortion in the case of rape. To permit it anyways is to do something immoral as a means towards the good end of mitigating the evil of abortion.

Does this passage contradict the other (Ex 21:7-11)?

No, Leviticus is coinciding with it, in fact. The author is saying, just like Exodus, Israelites cannot own each other as slaves: they can, however, own other nations as slaves. This is a common practice and rule back then: we also see it in Islam.

Could we start with a definition of consequentialist?

I accept the definition you gave from standford. I would say it is a family of normative ethical theories that fundamentally posits that the intrinsic badness of an act is either irrelevant to or not real as it relates to evaluating wrong and right action.

1. What kind of consequentialist do you think the O.T. God would have to be?

I am not sure. Rule consequentialism is a phony version of consequentialism though: that one doesn’t really meet the definition you gave IMHO, although people would consider it one.

I am going to stop here and let you respond.

Probably or certainly!? If God fails to convey His message, then He is not God.

I don’t see why that would be the case. Although maybe you are getting at a divine hiddenness objection.

I would like to bring you to the crux of our discussion: You mentioned that evil exists, but it is not real. Don't you see a problem in this statement?

I see why you see an issue; but there is none. I distinguish between being and reality; and you don’t.

Something has being if it is; but something is real if and only if it is a member of reality.

For example, the color orange that I see, phenomenally, has being but is not a member of reality—so it exists but is not real. A chair is real because it has being and is a member of reality.

I would view darkness more like having being in the sense of the color orange and less in the sense of the chair; but granted it is an absence which is different than the color orange.

Well, I'm not an expert either. I see what you are saying: it is hard to interpret the texts. They seem disparate.

I would say Catholics and Orthodox Christians accept that not everyone is equal in heaven. There are plenty of refences in the NT to Jesus talking about people sitting at the right hand or left hand of the Father and alluding to it being more glorious and honorable.

It is also the basis for Saints being held in higher regard; and Mary being held in the highest regard among the blessed.

I don't think so, but Protestants would tend to agree with you.

CC: @Banno

Why does there have to be a punishment?

Punishment to the offender is not per se necessary: the final end of justice is bringing everything under the proper respect of the order of creation. This is why rehabilitation is a higher-focus than retribution for justice; but both are aspects of it.

Retribution is necessary for justice because the offended’s dignity has to be restored, and this may require punishment of the offended (although it doesn’t necessitate it); and this is the only aspect of corrective justice that is necessary. Rehabilitation is not necessary but is good for justice, because it should restore the offender back to the proper respecting of things; rehabilitation, however, without punishment is oftentimes mercy without justice because it omits retribution(but this is not always the case). The best option for corrective justice is to provide what is owed to the victim and restore the offender back to the proper respect of things.

ETA: Scratch that. Let's say we have two people, Bob and Alice. Alice is an atheist who lives a decent life and does no great harm to anyone, just minor sins here and there. Bob is a serial killer who's tortured and killed untold numbers of kids. On his deathbed, Bob accepts Jesus into his heart. Alice doesn't. What do Alice's and Bob's punishments look like?

This is an interesting, provoking, and common counter-example to the idea of mercy and acceptance of the Son—although it isn’t necessarily only facially applicable to Jesus’ forgiveness—and I understand where you are coming from here. I also used to think this way.

I would say, to be honest, that both would end up in heaven. Let me break down the general theory first and then address your questions directly.

1. I do not believe that one has to rigidly accept the Son of God (which may be Jesus if you would like) to be saved or that they have to participate in rituals (like baptism) to be accepted. As you alluded to with your example, someone can love God—love love itself: love goodness itself—without knowing the word “God”, having a concept of God that is robust, or having been exposed to some particular religion. God is judging us based off of our choices we make given the fact that we are not absolutely in control of ourselves (as natural organisms) and is evaluating how well we exhibited the virtues and, generally speaking, loved love (Himself).

2. For the vast majority of us, we have sinned before we die (although infants, e.g., haven’t if they are killed young); so for most of us we have offended God and, as I noted to @frank who ignored me, retribution is evaluated primarily based off of the dignity of the offended party (hence why shooting a rabbit illegitimately is lesser of an offense and deserving of less of a punishment than shooting a human the exact same way). With finite dignities, which are beings that are finitely good, there is a proportionate finite retribution (at least in principle) for every sin which one could, potentially, pay before they die (and thusly “serving their time” for the sin as it relates to the immanent victim—e.g., the human who was murdered). However, a sin is always also an offense against God and God is infinite goodness which is infinite dignity; so no proportionate retribution to something finite whatsoever can repay what is owed. This is why any sin, insofar as we are talking about the aspect of it that is an offense against God, damns us in a way where we ourselves cannot get out.

3. Loving love—being the a truly exceptional human being—will not repay the debt owed to an offended party with infinite dignity: Alice, or anyone of a high-caliber of virtue, is facially damned if they have sinned at least once.

4. God is all-just and all-merciful. He is all-just because He is purely actual and a creator, and so He cannot lack at anything in terms of creating; but to fail to order His creation properly is to lack at something as a creator. Therefore, God cannot fail to order His creation properly; and ordering His creation properly is none other than to arrange the dignity of things in a hierarchy that most reflects what is perfectly good—which is Himself. He is all-merciful because He is love and love is to will the good of something for-itself even when that something doesn’t deserve it. Mercy and justice, however, as described above, are prima facie opposed to each other: if, e.g., I have mercy on you then I am not being just and if I am just then I leave no room for mercy. To be brief, the perfect synthesis of the two is for a proper representative of the group of persons that has an appropriate dignity to pay the debt of their sins so that if they truly restore their will to what is right they can be shown mercy.

5. God must, then, synthesize justice and mercy by allowing a proper representative of humans to pay for our sins; but no human can repay it. It follows, then, that God must incarnate Himself as a human to be that representative. EDIT: I forgot to mention that God is the only one that can repay the debt because He is the only one with infinite dignity to offer as repayment.

6. The Son must be the one out of the Godhead that is incarnated because God creates by willing in accord with knowledge; His knowledge of Himself is what He uses to incarnate Himself; and the Son is His self-knowledge.

So, let me answer your questions with that in mind:

1. Alice and Bob have NOT committed equal sins: I don’t think that the fact that any given sin is unrepayable to God entails that all sins are equal. It just entails that all sins require something of infinite dignity to properly repay. Admittedly, it gets kind of weird fast working with retribution for infinite demerit. For example, in hell both of them will be punished for eternity but Alice’s punishment would be something far far less than Bob’s.

2. Since God saves us through His mercy (as described before), God does not have to punish us if we repent; and repentance is not some superficial utterance “I am sorry!” or, for your example, “Jesus I accept you!”. Repentance is normally through the sincerity of heart and through actions. A person who has never heard of God at all could be saved, under my theory, because they sincerely love love itself—God Himself—through action and this doesn’t need to be a perfect life that was lived (since God must sacrifice Himself to Himself to allow for mercy upon us). Alice, I would say, would be repentant in action and (most probably in spirit) for any minor sins she commits because she is such a good hearted person. If she were to do a lot of things that are virtuous but have the psychological disposition that doing good and loving her community, family, friends, etc. is horrible and something she despises; then she isn’t really acting virtuously. That’s like someone helping the poor as a practical joke or something instead of doing it out of love.

3. For Bob, it gets more interesting: your hypothetical eliminates the possibility of the good deeds part of what is normally a part of repentance since he is on his death bed when he has a change of heart. I would say that assuming he is not superficially saying “I am sorry (psst: hopefully I get into heaven this way!)”, then I would say that God’s mercy would allow him into heaven—at least eventually. Maybe there’s a purgatory faze where he is punished a bit for it first: I don’t know. However, what I do know is that Alice will be rewarded more than Bob; because reward is proportionate to the good deeds you have performed and goes beyond giving someone mercy from punishment. I do not believe that everyone in heaven is equal; or that God loves us all the same. That’s hippie bulls**t.

Let me know what you think.

:up:

Feel free to let me know your thoughts on Biblical slavery.

You didn't reply to my last post here, so I don't know what you think about it. The current discussion started from the point that I replied to your post, in which you were saying that OT is wrong.

I may have missed something: I apologize. I still don’t see the relevance of:

Why didn't Jesus Himself say that portion of the OT is false?

Given Jesus failed to address the OT’s mistakes and given him referring to himself as the messiah and that the OT is errant, it follows that Jesus probably wasn’t God.

With respect to your post you linked:

You do when you relate evil as privation of good. Good and evil are fundamental features of our experiences. We humans mostly prefer good over evil because of our genes. So we are biased.

Goodness is the equality of essence and esse; so it follows that badness is the privation (inequality) of essence and esse. So badness to goodness is like darkness to light.

You would have to provide a different account of goodness to make it work with your view that evil is some positive, real thing out there. My point was that I am a privation theorist about evil; so I do no think it is just as unreal as darkness.

Wait a minute. If God says masturbation or gay sex or eating the wrong thing is a sin that needs to be absolved, isn't that the end of the discussion right there? Even if I grant that other sins are legitimate and might need absolving, the God of the Bible, by declaring nonsinful actions sinful, is obviously not the entity to do it.

That’s an argument from external incoherence for the Bible; but that has no relevance to frank’s OP: they are asking about why God would sacrifice Himself for our sins.

My point was that we don’t have to agree on what is sinful to agree that if we sin then there must a punishment; and from there my argument begins.

Yes, I was providing a common Christian view to why Jesus had to die: I wasn't commenting on if I am a Christian or not. I clarified that to @frank and they ignored that too! :roll:

No we don't need to talk about it: all you need to concede is that there are some legitimate sins; then God would have to incarnate himself through hypostatic union to absolve those sins. We don't need to agree on specifically what is sinful.

BANNO. @frank ignored the Thomistic response I gave: even if you don't think that kind of response will be received as plausible by frank, they didn't even try to respond to one of the top answers historically to the very issue they wanted to address in the OP; and they continued to desecrate on the idea of God's sacrifice.

How can you not agree that that is intellectual vicious? It doesn't matter if at the end of the day you find it implausible: it's one of the most prominent responses to this issue.

Cc: @Banno @frank

:up:

I can tell now that neither of them want to have a productive conversation: they just want to straw man and desecrate on their "enemy". It's intellectually vicious and stupendous.

Then you need to refurbish your position. You said that God does not murder because when he kills us we don't truly die. This applies to all killings within your view.

You need to clearly define what murder is and then apply that standard to God's killings. So far you just keep ad hoc patching your view. You say God can't murder because you don't really die, but we both agree that's false; so now you are appealing to God just being special.

I'll ask you again: how do you define murder?

You just continue to be disingenuous. I'm done talking to you.

I wouldn't answer because it is irrelevant; but ok, I'll answer to further the discussion. I don't believe Jesus is the Son of God.

This is irrelevant because:

1. I was providing a view that is internal coherent and plausible within Christianity to address why God sent His Son to die on the cross; and

2. One could hold the view I gave and not be a Christian. Nothing about what I said actually entailed that Jesus was the Son of God. It entailed that the Son of God would have to incarnated at some point to be sacrificed for our sins in some way.

Asking me if I believe that Jesus was God is like:

1. Me asking "what are reasons someone would believe that we have a soul?".
2. You give me an exposition of one avenue someone could take to believe in us having a soul.
3. I ignore your exposition and ask you "do you believe that we have a soul?"

Well, that's irrelevant if you think about it: you could hold that we have no souls and that your exposition suffices to give a plausible account of us having a soul relative to some metaphysical theory.

 Do you really think that there was a chance of @frank accepting Thomism as an answer to his questions? Wouldn't he simple see it as a more verbose expression of the very same confusions? And indeed, with good reason.

@frank wrote in the OP:

The Catholic Church teaches that God Almighty came down from heaven to save us... from His own wrath... by allowing Himself to be tortured to death. And apparently this strategy worked in spite of the fact that he didn't actually die (people saw him walking around three days later), and most people didn't get saved.

Don't you agree this is a straw man? The Catholic Church does not teach this nor is it an iron-manned position on the topic. I think we all can agree that it is intellectually vicious to straw man positions when creating an OP; especially when it is written in a condescending way.

I would not think to purposefully desecrate and straw-man anyone's position in an OP on a philosophy forum: that's just disingenuine, closed minded, and dishonest. Can we agree on that? Can we not agree on being intellectually virtuous when discussing ideas on a philosophy forum?

I've suggested silentism as the most reasonable response to such issues - admitting that we don't know the answer.

I don't know what that means. Can you elaborate please?

You didn't just read it, frank, you ignored it and responded to low hanging fruits. I've given you many opportunities to engage and you refuse, which is your perogative; however, it saddens me that you go along with people in this forum in straw manning and condescending claims about views when people have and are willing to provide you with the real positions that you should be responding to.

I understand for @Banno Christianity probably holds no water and has every right to desecrate on it in here (although that also is disappointing); but you made the OP: there's no excuse. I responded to your OP with the Thomistic response and you ignored it and continued to act like no one can give any responses to what you are asking. Banno isn't obligated to read all the other posts in someone else's OP and respond accordingly.

All I am saying is why do you create an OP asking about a topic in a condescending and straw-manning way just to ignore anyone that gives you a response that is actually challenging for you?

What variables? You mean truth and the actual reality of the situation at hand? That's a bit of an abrasively dismissive way of describing such, wouldn't you say? But alright then.

When we discuss hypotheticals, they are in a vacuum: they are ceteris paribus. We add in variables to test our reasoning and decipher what we believe. You keep shifting the goal posts because you are not quite envisioning or appreciating this aspect of hypotheticals.

If I say “is it permissible to run a red light all else being equal?”, then it is not a valid response to say “it is permissible if its 1 AM with no traffic and your wife is bleeding out in the car while you rush her to the hospital”. Do you see what I mean?

And the officer responds, "oh you're just importing variables into the hypothetical". It is not a hypothetical. It literally happened. At least, allegedly, per the text we're discussing.

That’s not at all what’s happening. That’s adding context to a real scenario: these are hypothetical scenarios. Do you understand the difference between a hypothetical scenario and a real-life scenario?

Okay, so like I said. Maybe your premise is invalid. Simply, perhaps you're just wrong about one or more things. This is why religion is not generally a "hot topic" in the halls of philosophy. Because faith is belief, and belief is anything you deem fit. It's your right, after all.

Nothing about my definition of murder is faith-based or religious: I don’t know why you went there.

To be clear, if you reject that murder definitionally has to do with killing an innocent person then you are using a definition that is completely and utterly foreign to the modern justice system. A definition that includes killing guilty people would imply that there may be scenarios where what normally is considered legitimate self-defense is murder and scenarios where normal murder is not self-defense and yet not murder or manslaughter.

I don't see the relevance: can you elaborate on how this relevant to the OP?

Let me grant you that Jesus relates himself to the messiah from the OT which, in turn, is related to the God of the OT (the father). My argument demonstrates that the OT gets some stuff wrong about God because God can't do some of the things the OT claims God did; so those portions are false. However, it could be true that some of the other portions are accurate or none of it is. This argument certainly would jeopardize the standard Christian view that the Bible is inerrant.

Ok, thank you for the clarification. If you are using my definition and leveraging that God is not murdering people because they can't truly die, then no one ever commits murder. Are you accepting that? I want to make sure we are on the same page about the consistent conclusion of your position here.

If I kill an innocent infant, then the same logic would apply: I have not murdered them because they haven't truly died.

That's why I added in the "and a killing is to end the natural life of a being" since rational souls have a supernatural component that the stereotypical idea of killing does not apply.