The tree which strives towards heaven must send its roots to hell. — Bob Ross

This one gave me a chill.

Yeah, it is one of my favorites. It stems from Jung and, in turn, from Nietzsche. The idea is that suffering and happiness are intertwined insofar as one has to be willing to suffer proportionately for what is good. We tend—or at least I tend—to forget this and think that what is good involves avoiding suffering. Nietzsche tries—many times—to break us out of that line of thinking—being that it is anti-thetical to natural life—in his works. I like to remember this every day so that I am more likely to embrace the suffering—no matter how small—I must go through to become greater.

Needing a knife that is sharper than a knife is a sign of irrationality. — Bob Ross

Yet this one escapes me.

Yeah, that one isn’t too amazing; but I have it in there because I have a tendency to be like Kafka’s metamorphic creature in Der Bau: reason—and specifically my personality—tends to gravitate towards an irrational sense of security and absoluteness which cannot be afforded in real life. Kafka’s point—by my lights—was that reason tends to want something so incredibly secure that it is impossibly secure; and I just basically modified it to target my personality such that my soul wants a knife (for self-preservation) that is sharper than any knife—which is patently irrational and impossible. It serves as a reminder for me to let go of that OCD urge.

It can basically be it's own 6-tenet religion.

:up:

(though I perhaps would have worded that last one as: "Pain is not a choice, suffering is." -- just to give it some context that might be otherwise easily missed or dismissed)

This is fair and a good point. Personally, I like to force myself to think a bit about it by having to decrypt the message; but you are absolutely right that your version is more clear. I will add that as an additional version to the OP. Good suggestion!

I don't mind what you do with your previous post: I am just letting you know that most of them are not aphorisms and this OP is a list of aphorisms.

I am going to read the Politics and then get back to you: I don't believe I've read that, or if I have then I don't remember it, and so that's probably the issue here.

It's a good one for sure. I also like the Stoic one about man suffering in the imagination more than reality: same idea.

I appreciate you sharing your favorites, but most of those are NOT aphorisms. An aphorism is a short and concise statement that contains a general maxim or expression. Most of yours are just long paragraph quotes.

That's a good point: I am open to people bringing to the table their favorite aphorisms and if I think it is worthy then I will add it to the list in the OP. I'll update the OP accordingly.

If that's what it boils down to, then I prefer civic nationalism myself.

I agree.

I believe in continentalism, because I think that continentalism is to the continent what nationalism is to the nation. Non-Europeans and Non-North-Americans (what you call "The West", which is now a "global thing") would do better to just embrace Europeism and Northamericanism (respectively) instead of imperialism (and, of course, Europeans should embrace Europeism instead of imperialism, and North Americans should embrace Northamericanism instead of imperialism, as well).

I don’t understand what that would mean in the context of the values currently shared in North America or Europe. It seems to me that the West has it better than the East; but there’s lots of petty disputes in the West about different topics.

As for Western Supremacy, I don't believe in that concept, because I don't believe in Eastern Supremacy either, nor do I believe in Northern Supremacy, nor do I believe in Southern Supremacy.

So you think cultures are just different, not inferior or superior?

Sounds good: take your time :smile:

You said that you believe that you have good reasons to believe that the Absolute exists, but not that you have good reasons to believe in the sense that Hegel means it. I then asked what good reasons you have for believing the Absolute exists in this non-Hegelian sense; and you answered that you mean the Absolute in the Hegelian sense. :roll:

If you can't reconcile or acknowledge that blatant contradiction, then this conversation is over. My patience is running thin with you, my friend.

Not quite. I have good reasons to believe that the Absolute exists, and I acknowledge that. What I don't have, which I also acknowledge is that I lack good reasons to believe that the Absolute in the Hegelian sense exists.
…
Right, here's the problem: I mean the same thing that Hegel meant

This is a contradiction; and makes no sense at all. You can't say you believe in X sans a Hegelian interpretation (and that you have good reasons for it) and then turn around and say X is the Hegelian interpretation (which has no good reasons for it).

I am now thoroughly convinced you are either a sophist or incapable of admitting that you clearly cannot explain any of the concepts that you believe in. This is turning into the same problem we had with the fact that you don't know what "factiality" means...

:up:

I haven't read your guys' entire exchange, but based off of my horrible interactions with @Arcane in this thread I can guess how it went down. Either way, I don't know why @Arcane keeps quoting that given the real irony is that @Arcane originally told me I was too nice and to tone it down; and then, when I did, they said I am too mean :lol:

You give me green stop-sign vibes @Arcane. **sigh**

Sorry @Leontiskos, somehow my response didn't get recognized by this forum as an actual response to your comment (and thusly not notifying you). Here's my response: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/958145 . I must have accidentally forgot to click the reply button before typing.

Not quite. I have good reasons to believe that the Absolute exists, and I acknowledge that. What I don't have, which I also acknowledge is that I lack good reasons to believe that the Absolute in the Hegelian sense exists.

Ah, I think this is the confusion between us: I just want to know what you are meaning by the Absolute and not Hegel. I want to know what this "Absolute" is of which you clearly affirm you have good reasons to believe in, and what those good reasons are. Could you please elaborate on that for me?

:up:

I like to think that I have about the normal number of friends and acquaintances. There’s about 30 people I’m in regular contact with, and almost all are people like me, directly connected to the arts in some way.

I would challenge this: maybe I am off here, but I don't think most people have thirty people they regular are with that share in their deep interests. Don't get me wrong: that's impressive, Rob! Good for you!

I often wonder, what makes a person interested in philosophy? What is it about them that draws them to read, study and discuss philosophy?

I think most people engage in philosophy when something catastrophic in their life forces them to (in order to cope). Maybe I am too cynical, but I don't think most people look to poetry, art, truth, and wisdom too keenly with an extreme invested interest unless they are going through some serious internal battles.

On the other hand, if you are wondering not why the average person might get interested in it (and why they tend not to be interested at all) but, rather, why the people prominent in philosophy (as a hobby or profession) tend to be interested in it; then I think you are right to point out that they tend to be introverted, analytic, intelligent, socially-awkward and have a yearning for wisdom.

I can tell you right now I got sucked in naturally because I am kind of autistic, socially awkward, extremely introverted, analytic, brutally honest (with myself), and I yearn for absolute truth. I cannot live without doing philosophy, just as much as I cannot live without eating....in all seriousness.

I don't accept that rationality comes in degrees; but I understand what you are saying. So let's go back to your original point:

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it [The Absolute] is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

My point was that you seem to acknowledge that you lack good reasons to believe that the Absolute exists; so why do you believe in it?

Your original response was that people irrationally believe in things all the time; and that is justifiable. Now we agree that isn't true, so are you saying you have good reasons to believe it such that you are some degree rational in believing it? If so, what are those good reasons?

I apologize: I forgot to respond.

The other textbook example is the one about swans

I would say that they were justified in believing that Swans were all white until they had sufficient counter-evidence to refute the evidence they had. The thing with induction is that the more the occurrence, the higher the (bayesian) probability that it is true. Again, you have to argue not that they were wrong but, rather, that they were irrational for believing it prior to seeing a black swan. What’s the argument you have for it?

This is the same problem that gamblers have. Gamblers have to rely on inductive reasoning. Even the blackjack players that can count cards have this problem.

No. You are confusing induction with abduction: the former is when there is a sheer repetition in results such that a correlation is derived (which may or may not be causal at all) (e.g., expecting to get slapped if you pick up the lolipop because your mom has slapped you a ton in the past for it, seeing the sun rise and expecting it to rise tomorrow, etc.) where abduction is reasoning about evidence which you have by making inferences which do not necessarily hold (e.g., she committed the murder because she was there at the time caught holding the bloody knife used in the stabbing, he’s probably just in the bathroom because I heard him talking someone about having to go, etc.).

Gamblers are usually abducing, and abducing, at that, in irrational ways. E.g., the average gambler doesn’t count cards; and they just expect to win even though the probability is severely low: they have an irrational expectation to win.

Good gamblers aren’t just abducing: they are deducing. E.g., card games can be counted and their strict probabilities calculated.

Most imortantly, neither tend to induce. E.g., most people don’t walk into a casino and see a certain bet always win repeatedly a 1000 times and then decide to make that same bet.

So, I guess my argument is that having the justification for some beliefs is a matter of degrees

You were arguing that it is irrational; which is not implied by arguing that beliefs have different credence levels. Are you changing your position, and agreeing with me that induction isn’t irrational? If not, then what argument do you have to the contrary?

What would be your honest answer to that problem?

Good question. I don’t think Hume’s problem of induction holds any weight: I think he gave an interesting, radical, and skepticistic perspective—but at the end of the day it is a self-refuting position (in terms of his entire pure empiricist position).

Specifically with the problem of induction, it is no longer a problem if we do not allow ourselves to be absolutely certain of anything induced or abduced. At the end of the day, all Hume is really noting, IMHO, is that we cannot be completely confident of these forms of logical inference; but that doesn’t mean that we aren’t justified in having good reasons to conditionally believe things through induction or abduction.

Let’s take your example:

Can I guarantee that the Sun will rise tomorrow?

Of course not: does this mean that you don’t have good reasons to believe it will rise tomorrow? Of course not. You are arguing that, somehow, the ample evidence you have for the Sun rising every morning—of the sheer regularity of experience and of nature—is not good evidence that the Sun will rise tomorrow ceteris paribus; and I don’t see why one should believe that.

Of course not. But we shouldn't throw common sense in the trash bin just because it's not infallible.

I agree insofar as radical skepticism doesn’t work.

Thanks for letting me know! Although I know you think I have not found the appropriate mean between niceness and meanness, the silver-lining to honesty is that you know I really mean it when I compliment you. The OP is much better than before.

I am going to refrain from commenting further on the OP because I do not think we will have any productive conversations in here.

If you ever do figure out what 'factiality' refers to, then let me know: I would be interested to hear what the concept is trying to get at.

I wish you the best of luck,
Bob

So, ethics, under your view, is a personal habit? It doesn't hold absolute binding force when propositionalized? (e.g., "I should not be obese" is just true for me personally, but not for anyone in the same circumstances and of the same nature as me)

which are not limited to or by those norms.

Could you give an example where the "community policy" is not underpinned by "interpersonal conduct" (so that I can understand where you are coming from)?

That's fair; but I don't think most people would agree with you, and, beyond that, even if they did, one should hold only justified beliefs (I would say). Kierkegaard is a radical example: in most versions of Theism, there is a recognition that one has good reasons to believe in God but that also they have to have faith in God because they cannot explain all of it. My only point is that one must have good reasons, if it be just in the sense that they think they are good, in order to be justified in believing something. Wouldn't you agree?

EDIT: Also, when you speak of Nietzsche, the way he talks about being irrational is really more about 'arationality' than irrationality (viz., being beyond the purview of rationality vs. violating rationality).

Most Theists would not say that they lack good reasons to believe. What you are describing here is something that is irrational: you are saying that one is justified in believing X when they know they are unjustified in believing X.

Yes. Why would one be justified in holding belief in X if they recognize that they have no good reasons to believe X?

In accord with your response, I think it is best we agree to disagree and move on from this thread: this discussion is wholly unproductive (for the both of us).

I do want to clarify that nothing I have said is in any way violating the forum guidelines, I am not evangelizing anyone, and I have no intention of inciting an emotional reaction out of you. I cannot stress enough, that I was being properly polite at the beginning and you made fun of me for it; and now that I am being more plain, you charge me with impoliteness! Anyways, water under the bridge.

My original and main point in joining this thread despite knowing nothing about the book, is that the ideas expressed in the OP were not directed—ironically—at the book and of which I can provide food-for-thought. It turns out, that the OP is so disorganized—which violates the very guidelines you mentioned—that it gives false impressions.

My biggest issue is not the informality of the OP (as we’ve all been there) but, rather, that you clearly don’t understand the basic building-block concepts of your own OP; and, as I mentioned before, is the source of a lot of the issues you wish to resolve. I don’t say that to be mean: it is easy to tell when someone is not very familiar with the subject because they give nothing but vague notions and muddied explanations. I suspect you appreciate to some extent what I am saying here; because you say this OP is for “exploration”.

I wish the best of luck for you in this thread; and hopefully by the end of it you will actually know what factiality means :wink:

Bob

I see what you are saying now, but it seems merely semantical. Isn't this "interpersonal conduct" that you are referring to underpin the "community policy"? Or are they completely disparate areas of ethics?

That's how science works, Bob

Philosophy is not science.

ou imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Sure, but science requires the scientific method; which, in turn, requires a positive verification of the hypothesis through strict experimentation. We are not doing that in philosophy; and we can’t. In fact, science presupposes philosophical principles and ideas to begin with….

That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity"
…
“Let us go back to Kant….”

What you quoted was about how to properly understand the a priori forms of our understanding; and how that relates to things-in-themselves. It was not a description nor depiction of what Meillasoux means by a fact. I asked you what a fact is, and you gave me an instance where Meillassoux use’s the concept of a fact to talk about Kant vs. Hegel—do you see the problem?

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity,
…
Facticity is the 'un-reason'

It sounds like Meilassoux might be claiming that facts are grounded, in part, in the a priori modes by which we cognize; and thusly is taking a Kantian approach.

My problem is that you clearly don’t know what they mean by facticity; because you still haven’t given me a clear (or even vague) definition.

Here, I’ll go first. A fact, by my lights, is a statement about reality which corresponds appropriately to what it references about reality; and thusly I accept a version of correspondence theory of truth. What do you mean by facticity? What does Meilassoux mean by facticity?

So Bob, you see why these debates are not restricted to formal mereology. There are of interest and relevance to metaphysics, as I've hoped to have shown.

I agree mereology is important; and I would say it is a branch of philosophy—specifically metaphysics.

God damn, that's a hard question. What do you want from me, Bob? You just want to "beat the metaphysical truth out of me, whatever that metaphysical truth might happen to be". I mean, it feels like intellectual torture, "mate".

This is how philosophy works, lol. I want to know what you believe and why you believe it. E.g., I would go for a physical substrate—as a physicalist myself—and no other substrates. This is important because once you posit two it gets zesty.

I have no idea, I'd have to think about it. See my comment above.

Hegel’s concept of the truth being the whole of negativity and reality is the closest I’ve got to whatever you are trying to say. For Hegel, subjectivity is inherently negativity—it isn’t real, but rather negates what is real. So there’s the real and there’s the negativity that negates it; and both makeup the totality of what exists. Hence Hegel’s triad of negativity, reality, and totality.

I am going to be honest, I don't think you know what 'The Absolute' means (based off of the fact that you can't explain it at all); and I therefore don't think you have good reasons to believe it exists. No offense meant.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself.

Ok, now we are getting somewhere. Why would facticity have an essence but a cat wouldn’t?

Also, it seems like an equivocation is going on here; as the kinds of essences that abstracta have are not the same as the in concreto—viz., the essence of truth, propositions, true, false, facts, etc. is not really the same as the essence of a tree, a cat, etc.

1) From an ordinary point of view (the POV of ordinary life), Reality is not a single, gigantic, homogeneous block. It's a bunch of stuff, it's a plurality of entities. That's just how it seems.

Substance theory doesn’t deny that: it is claiming that each ‘entity’ has a substrate for its existence whereof its properties are bore by it. E.g., the apple has a bear existence which provides the compresence for its properties (like redness).

2) And that l

Again, substance is being used here in the sense of substrates; which doesn’t negate the possibility of a plurality of objects.

3) From

I am not familiar enough with what you are referring to by metaphysical conservatism, eliminativism, and permissivism to comment adequately on this one; but I suspect you are addressing a view which has no relevance to substance theory (in the sense of rebuking a position that holds that everything is one concrete entity).

I'm not sure that's correct, but I'll just ignore it, for now. Unless you want to make that point clearer, because I didn't understand what you said there.

So, I mean that we can describe the type of substrate a substance is to meaningfully discuss things. Idealists accept hat there is a mental substrate; physicalists accept a physical substrate; a substance dualist accepts both; a non-dualist adds a third; etc.

No, I am not. There are things that have a metaphysical substrate.

Ok, cool. So, then, under your view, is this “Absolute” of a different type of substrate than physical stuff?

Reality is what exists, and the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense, is the truth (it is the Ultimate Truth) about that (about Reality itself)

Ok, so are you just noting by “The Absolute” the totality of reality and negation? I know that much about Hegel haha….

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

Then why do you believe in it?

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password.

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is?

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views.

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions?

Well, I'm trying to explain it to the best of my ability. I'm not the best philosopher in the world, you know.

That’s ok: most of us on here aren’t the best philosophers.

I accept a version of non-dualism (I accept several versions of non-dualism, actually), yet I disagree that there is some substance

I mean it in the Analytic Philosophy sense of a substrate which bears the properties of things.

yet I disagree that there is some substance (if by that, you mean something like an Aristotelian substance) which unites both the mental and the physical (because the mental, as far as I'm concerned is physical). If by "the mental" and "the physical" you are speaking non-scientifically, as a mere folk would, then yes, I'm saying "something like that", if you will

Ok, so you are a ‘materialist’; so there’s, so far, two types of substrates for you: the physical and the kind that bears the properties of this ‘Absolute’. Are you a bundle theorist? Otherwise, how does things which are of this non-physical (and non-mental) interact with or relate to the stuff which is bore by the physical substrate? The hard problem of interaction seems to plague this theory.

The absolute is not a object, it is not one more thing in the world like this stone on the floor or this table. And it is not a subject, it is not like you, and it is not like me. It is something else.

Ok, it isn’t physical. What is it? When you say ‘The Absolute’, I am thinking of just reality as it is in-itself. Why should be posit this thing as being real?

1) Realism
2) Materialim
3) Atheism
4) Scientism
5) Literalism

I think this detracts from the conversation: I think you should be able to briefly explain what the Absolute is, conceptually, if you have a firm grasp of what it is.

We (as in, Meillassoux's typical readers) honestly don't know.

**sigh**

Hmmm... so let's reconstruct your argument, a bit more formally

Nothing about your reconstruction was formal. Here’s a crude formal version:

P1: If A only pertains B, then everything about A pertains to B. [ (A ↔ B) → (A → B) ]
P2: Facticity only pertains to facts*. [ A ↔ B ]
C1: Therefore, everything about facticity pertains to facts. [ A → B ]

Is that right?

Arcane: why are you asking me? I provided an informal argument (or more like explanation) of why it was jibberish, you copied and pasted what I said into numbered bullet points, and then asked me if it is correct???

Does that mean anything to you?

No, because you aren’t actually engaging in the discussion. You are supposed to be the one who understands After Finitude: you are supposed to explain it to me. If you ask me about something I am familiar with, then I would be able to give a brief and basic explanation of the core concepts involved. You seem to keep failing at doing that with this book.

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it?

The Absolute, as I understand it, is what is ontologically greater than subject and objects

Are you conveying here that you accept a version of non-dualism? Viz., the idea that there is some substance which unites both the mental and physical and of which is neither?

I don’t know what else it could possibly mean to say that something exists as neither a subject nor an object. EDIT: unless by this you mean some transcendental mode (Kantian style).

"Transcends what?", you might ask?

Everything. Including itself

Well, with all due respect, Arcane, that’s patently incoherent. You are saying here that some third substance and being of that substance exists, and it exists in a manner where it is not identical to itself.

. It is why there is an External World, called Nature, in the first place.

How?

Absolute Spirit is the realization of this as a brute fact, as something that one simple "encounters"

Oh, are you an ontological idealist?

It is a presence of some sort, but in the way that Derrida spoke about Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence". It is the phenomenon of oddness itself as a psychological phenomenon. And it is a great source of poetry (how could it not be?), at the same time it is a great source of philosophical perplexity (how could it not be?), and of scientific inquiry (could it not be?).

This may make sense to you because you are familiar with the ‘Absolute’; but I have no clue what you are trying to say here.

the principle that things could be other than they are — we can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality — part of a critique of correlationism.

Ok, so this sounds like “factiality” has nothing to do with facticity; since this definition tells us that the former is a principle about the modality of states of affairs (namely, that reality could be different).

This sounds like merely the negation of necessitarianism.

From now on, we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity, viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

Just working with what I’ve got here—admitting full well I haven’t read the d*** book—this sounds completely incoherent with the other definition you gave; since this definition does link ‘factiality’ to facticity and the above merely notes that at least some parts of the world are properly contingent (i.e., anti-necessitarianism).

Let’s break it down a bit more though.

we will use the term 'factiality' to describe the speculative essence of facticity

What does this mean?!? What is a “speculative essence”?!?

viz., that the facticity of every thing cannot be thought as a fact

What?!? That’s just jibberish. Facticity is the noun for anything pertaining to facts; and so everything that pertains to facticity pertains to facts. Give me example where the facticity of a proposition cannot be thought of as a fact or non-fact.

Likewise, what theory of truth does this Meillassoux accept? How do they define facticity and fact?

Bob, specifically the Thread titled How to Write an OP.

The guidelines you linked is essentially what I am advocating here for.

You see, you are rude, objectively speaking

I am going to kill you with kindness :kiss: ; and, since you have mentioned this at least twice, I am disregarding your request for me to be less kind.

This part will be incorporated as well into the original OP once we approve the suggested changes throughout this discussion

Again, this is the wrong way to do it; but, alas, I remove my hat from the ring (since I have nothing more of use to say).

And by that point, you will have a full understanding of the concept of "factiality". And once you do, we can begin the "real talk", so to speak.

Let me know once you change, and I can take another look at the OP. Right now, I don’t know what “factiality” means, I haven’t read the appropriate works (to this OP), and have said everything noteworthy about the form and methodological approach (in this OP). I fear, there is nothing else I can contribute at this point; unless you want to explain to me what “factiality” means.

:up:

I want to know what "The Absolute" means to you, in whatever sense you mean it. You keep saying the ultimate truth is the Hegelian concept of the Absolute; and I have no clue what you mean by that.

What do you mean by "explaining"? Let's start with that if you don't mind.

I mean “explain” in the basic, common use of the term. If you can’t describe it, then that’s a huge issue which begs why you even believe it in the first place; and, no, I am not denying the idea of ineffability.