A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'.

The job of philosophy is no doubt to provide analytical explication of things, but it is not meant to incessantly attempt at explicating things. If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it (unless new evidence arises). Philosophy is not the study of delusionally trying to run through a concrete wall.

Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.

Not at all. There are good reasons to believe that some concepts are inexplicable, which is not to say we can’t know them.

Knowledge is not merely information which has been explicated: it is also the range of information implicated. You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I don’t.

I think we can know just fine what ‘being’, ‘value’, etc. are even though we cannot explicate them properly.

Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term.

I don’t know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is.

To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience.

1. You can’t verify independently of your experience any terms—that’s impossible.

2. That definition includes inter-subjectivity in it, which demonstrates it is false.

3. The meaning of words are inter-subjectively defined, and are thusly not objective.

4. Concepts are objective, not words.

5. Objectivity is that which exists mind-independently.

I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case

What has intrinsic value, is a matter of objective inquiry: the truth of the matter is stance-independent. If I feel or believe as though something is intriniscally valuable, that doesn’t make it so. Intrinsic value is objective. Even if you don’t agree that anything has intrinsic value, I think you can appreciate that the inquiry would be objective.

If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible?

It isn’t going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it.

For example, how do you properly explicate the color green to a blind person? You can’t. “It’s a particular wavelength in light that one’s eyes interpret a particular way”: how does that explain what the color green looks like? It doesn’t.

The (phenomenal) color of green is not explicable whatsoever: it is shared conceptual through experience. You cannot give a definition of green that will adequately convey what it looks like. Does that mean the concept of green doesn’t make sense, or that you can’t know what green looks like (just because you can’t explicate it)? I would say no.

For you, either you (1) explicate the phenomenal color of green, or (2) you have to reject that you know what the color green looks like. There’s no definite proof that the color green can’t be explicated, but for those who know (implicitly) what it is (in terms of what it looks like), they understand what I mean.

Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof

It’s inductive: I don’t have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions don’t work like that.

There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.

Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say “well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like”. I would say “ok, let’s hear it”. You say “X”. Now, either X does define it (and I am wrong), X begs the question, or X doesn’t define what it looks like. Upon investigating and attempting to define what the color green looks like, coupled with my understanding of what it is (from experience), I eventually abductively conclude it cannot be properly defined (explicitly), and I am willing to bet that X is going to fall under one of the latter two options (and not the first).

Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.

I have, with my pain example. That’s why I keep trying to get you to explain your take on the example. If we can’t converge on that, then there’s no hope.

Just like if we can’t converge on what the color green is, by way of our experience, then there’s no hope in coming to a conclusion on whether we can define it fully (explicitly).

"External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs.”

I don’t find this to be an accurate definition, but that’s a minor quibble at this point.

If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.

The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/894861 .

Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.

I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective.

I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesn’t help our conversation.

I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy can’t see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other can—they then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail.

Here’s the key question: can you see how pain an motivate someone to negate it despite them having any desire or belief to negate it? Or is that not something you can see happening?

They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself

To value avoiding pain, is to negatively value pain. Either way, I was talking about avoiding pain (if I have to choose).

Bob

Notwithstanding my critique of your "functional" definition, I wholly agree with your description: :up:

Thank you! I will take a look.

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good"
...
Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal)

It seems like you are anchoring your ethics in reducing harm, and not progressing towards flourishing.

Your keep parroting "You missed the point." in most messages you write wouldn't help you on understanding.

I have explained it multiple times, and am unsure what else to say. Concepts are not words.

"Beyond" can mean other things too depending on the context. For example, "It is beyond me." - it does't mean something in space.

“it is beyond me” refers to something which is spatially separate from yourself; so, no, this is not an example of a different meaning of ‘beyond’ that is aspatial.

If your reader didn't understand what you wrote, then it is likely that your writing was not grammatically correct or it was out of context.

I didn’t understand this part: what do you mean?

My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake:

Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that ‘flourishing/happiness’ [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic value—it cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subject’s evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that ‘intrinsic value’ = ‘something done for its own sake’. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.

I see. For me, I think that goodness is identical to 'having value'.

Great questions, Philosophim!

In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I don’t think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; and even if I don’t manage to get the point across to you, then it will still be beneficial to this thread to answer your questions.

Like I stated in our previous conversation, the concept of ‘value’ to me is primitive and absolutely simple—like ‘being’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘false’, etc.—and, consequently, has most of its meaning through intuition, experience, and action: NOT explication. The best I can say is that ‘value’ is ‘worth’, wholly admitting this is circular.

Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how ‘things’ can be valued and what has value—but, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication.

How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. The only real way to convey either is through example, so let me use the clock one you used:

You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.

You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that ‘value’ did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the ‘value’ of this clock.

The problem is that I cannot ‘finish’ this example, by providing how the clock has intrinsic value, because it cannot have it. A clock simply does not have this kind of ability to ‘demand’ to be valued. A great example we have discussed before, is pain.

I think, upon closer examination, it seems as though only (metaphysically possible) states of a subject are capable of this sort of innate insistence; but I am open to the idea that there may be other things which possess it.

What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand?

You are using a bad example for illustrating intrinsic value: that example only clearly demonstrates extrinsic value. A clock, just like a rock, cannot demand any sort of value.

The best example I can think of, of which none others will make sense if a person cannot grasp this one, is pain. Let me take one more jab at conveying it to you.

What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subject’s cognitive or conative evaluation of it—I think this is mistaken. Perhaps if I can break you out of that line of thinking, then you will catch at least a glimpse of what I am trying to convey (:

If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person.

That’s the best I can do to help you see what I mean.

Bob

In terms of the invalidity of ‘in-itself’, I just don’t buy that we can’t understand what things are in-themselves conditionally: ‘phenomena’ as it was before Kant butchered it.

In terms of grounding “Good” in the Absolute, there’s quite a few things that grab my attention:

1. The Good is not the same thing as goodness. I think Aristotle didn’t even notice this, and that’s why the analysis is so muddy.

2. This would be tantamount to claiming that what can be predicated as (morally) ‘good’, is what exists; because ‘the absolute’ refers to what exists as it is beyond any change (or perhaps appearances, depending on the view): this says nothing about what ought to be. It transforms ethics into something it is not: a study of what is.

3. Saying the Absolute, God, “grounds The Good” is vague and unhelpful (without further elaboration). What is goodness? And why and how can God be predicated to have it? In virtue of what makes this predication valid?

Bob

The main point of disagreement (between us), then, would be that I don't think that the negatively, intrinsically valuable (such as 'harm' that you refer to) is more valuable, when comparing equal or unequal 'amounts', than the positively, intrinsically valuable; because the positive counter-part includes the absence of those which are negatively valuable and provide positive value itself.

The eradication of serious and significant pain or harm is implied in a state of persistent flourishing, for example.

I merely think that you stop too short with setting your ideal as the elimination of negatively valued 'things', when the ultimate goal should be to go beyond mere eradication thereof to positively valued 'things'.

You missed the point: my linguistic expression of 'beyond' space is incoherent. 'Beyond' refers to something in space.

I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.

Lol, I thought you were both expressing the same thing; but, apparently, I missed something important.

It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.

I thought you were going to say that (; and thereby confuse the ungrammatical expression of the concept with the concept itself.

Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.

Which can’t be the case if the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here.

Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.

A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.

:up:

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic.

A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim.

Principles in logic, as far I know, are absolute. When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example?

I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing.

I don’t completely disagree with this: I am not denying that we may use different “logical theories” for different purposes; however, they are built off of classical logic.

The only classical logic axiom one may be able to get away with, is not using the law of excluded middle.

Ternary logic, for example, is just a built-up, more-complex version of binary logic. These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic.

We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other.

So you think ‘being’ is a simple concept because you choose it to be?

If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it.

What is, according to Aristotle, goodness simpliciter, then? I guess I didn't grasp that when I read it.

Unless by this you mean that the property of goodness is not identical to 'being in a state of eudamonia', which I completely agree with.

Not all OP's are a question. I am just curious was people's thoughts are on my position. Do you have any thoughts? I am guessing a lot :wink:

:up:

That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles

No, this is not logically necessitous; and therefore is not tautological. This is a proof derived a priori in our intuition.

What of this:
Φ∨¬Φ
Which Intuitionist logic denies; or this:
Φ,¬Φ⊢Ψ
which paraconsistent logic denies?

What relation does intuition logic denying the law of excluded middle have to do with the geometrical intuition you expounded (above)? I am completely lost at your point here, other than that there are many theories of logic; and to that I say that there is only one, and each is merely arises out of a (human) disagreement about the one: they are competing theories about whatever logic really is, and is objective.

That is not quite the point I would make, though. That relates to your thread on unanalysable concepts. Both "absolute" knowledge and "absolute" simples depend on context. They depend on what one is doing. Some things are held constant in order for us to be able to move other things. Some things are held indubitable in order for us to doubt other things. Some things are held to be simple in order for us to be able to analyse other things.

I am not seeing how the concept of ‘being’ is merely being ‘held constant’ for us to ‘move other things’: it seems, to me, to really be absolutely simple, and that it is not as malleable as you seem to think.

And we sometimes change what we hold constant in order to change something else.

What you are describing is humanity learning; which is not a negation of the existence of absolutely simple concepts.

All the reasons I have for doubting that I exist are highly implausible thought experiments (e.g., the evil demon, simulation theory, etc.) and given the immediate experience I am having, I have no good reasons to doubt my existence; although I cannot be absolutely certain I am, because those highly implausible possibilities are actual and logical possibilities.

I cannot doubt legitimately that 'a = a' because any reason to doubt it I could conjure springs from a misunderstanding of what it is. 'a = a' is a tautology and logically necessitous: there is no possibility of it being false. Any doubt I have will thusly be illegitimate.

I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.

The problem I have is that concepts are more fundamental than language, and it is a mistake to reduce the former to the latter.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical.

Likewise, if you're position is true, then that which cannot be currently express with all (or perhaps a given) language cannot be a valid concept (since what we linguistically express, for you, is the concept); but this is clearly not true. There are languages which don't have any words which express things which other languages do. The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it.

Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language. As we expand language, we are capable of explicating more concepts--and that is there relation to each other.

Failure to commit? No, rather "absolutely true" is like "solicitous chalk" or "oligarchic sandwich"; putting two words together doesn't necessitate that the result makes sense. You perhaps can't afford an answer because "absolutely true" is a nonsense.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt.

Could you take the statement "the cat is on the mat" and spell out all of its presupposed concepts, and the underlying fundamental concepts which are implicit in those presuppositions?

I can certainly make my best attempt, although I do (already) concede that it will be highly improbable that I will be able to explicate recursively all of them.

The concepts that come to mind to me, in terms of “first-order” concepts in play, are:

- Cat
- Mat
- Predication
- The concept of ‘horizontally on top of’: not sure if there is a word in english for this.

Of course, there are sub-concepts at play that I can’t take the time to expound. The most fundamental would probably be:

- Spatiality
- Being
- Identity
- Temporality

Perhaps more, as well.

Does that help?

The prospect of cleanliness strikes me as an illusion though? I don't believe concepts have a linear progression of articulation like that, especially in discrete stages of clarity.

Agreed. However, I still think the elaboration is necessary for the demonstration of the (general) evolution of “ideas”.

That history illustrates two things, in my view, that definition is in some sense derivative of communally negotiated understanding -even of intensionally fixed analysands like the concept of the Eulerian polyhedron -, and that communal articulation changes such conceptions.

Are you saying that concepts get their meaning from social interaction? This may be the source of our disagreement, as I think words are very much like you described, but not concepts.

We can call a ‘triangle’ whatever we want linguistically, and conceptually our understanding of a ‘triangle’ is limited or has evolved through social interaction, but the concept of ‘triangle’ is left unaffected by our understanding of it. I do NOT mean to say that there is an abstract object of ‘triangle’, or anything like that, but I do think that there is a distinction between the concept itself and our understanding of it; whereas, if I am understanding you correctly, there is only the concept insofar as ‘we’ (society or what not) understand it. Am I understanding correctly?

Understanding what a chair is must include the act of sitting upon it, not just the words "something you can sit on" - which includes the floor and rocks. And there are no speech acts which are behaviourally equivalent to the act of sitting, since that's not what words do, they don't sit down.

That’s fair. I don’t see anything wrong with that.

Because the majority of the concepts we enjoy in our lives are more analytically fuzzy, their "full" explication, something maximally clear, cashes out in a pragmatic - perhaps even phenomenological - understanding rather than explicating word strings. Even if that pragmatic understanding must be accompanied by the appropriate words. eg "I sit down in my chair", and I am sitting, I illustrate this by sitting down.

Where I think it gets even more interesting, is with primitive concepts. It doesn’t seem like there is an analogous action you can take, to sitting down, to implicitly demonstrate the concept of ‘being’. You know what I mean? Likewise with space, time, true, false, value, etc.

That strikes me as most concepts must, thus, be fundamental. If they are constituted by being unable to be explicated.

I don’t think so, or perhaps you are referring to something else by ‘fundamental’ (such as ~’unable to be completely explicated’). I still think you would agree that there is a sufficient, albeit not complete, definition one can give of a ‘chair’ (or ‘sitting down’, etc.); I think this cannot even be done for primitive concepts.

I split concepts into two general categories: simple (i.e., primitive) and complex (i.e., non-primitive). The former cannot be broken down into any concepts which it relates to, and the latter can be.

For example, the concept of a cat is complex; because it comprised off other concepts (e.g., ‘organism’, ‘number’, ‘(the number) four’, ‘leg’, ‘color’, ‘texture’, ‘teeth’, etc.): once one understands, whether that be implicitly or explicitly, the concepts, and their relations, that comprise the concept of a cat, the concept itself is understood. This is not the case with simple concepts.

The concept of being cannot be broken down into any smaller conceptual composition; and so it is impossible to convey (implicitly or explicitly) it by appeal to other concepts (and their relations to each other)(like the concept of a cat): only by pure intuition do we grasp what it is, and it is an absolutely simple building block of all other concepts. I cannot perform an action that demonstrates the concept of being, nor explicate it in words (without circularly referencing it). I cannot add anything new to any analytical work on the ontology of Being; because it is absolutely simple.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think what you are noting is that the fact that we cannot explicate (fully) a concept, it does not follow that it is (1) circular nor (2) primitive; and I actually agree with that. I just think that trying to explicate (sufficiently) a primitive concept demonstrates quite conclusively that it is really such—absolutely simple. Try to ask someone to define ‘being’, and, if they grasp what is being asked, they will appeal to it in its own definition.

Bob

But "time dilation" doesn't refer to a condition in the temporal form of our experience: it refers to conditions of how time works independently of our forms of experience. The temporal sequencing of events changes depending on one's inertial frame, and this doesn't seem like it is something that is merely an a priori condition of our experience. Doesn't that suggest there is a cosmic time?

But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result

How? I don't see it.

Again, you are confusing language with concepts. The dictionary doesn't define concepts, it defines words (in a particular language).

That would just be ungrammatical. I am unsure, then, what contention you are making with the OP: I am not claiming that ungrammatical sentences make sense.

It seems like you are taking a scientific anti-realism approach; whereas I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself.

The peculiarity with space and time, is that positing them scientifically doesn't itself lend support to there being space nor time per se; but that we have to posit them in a way incongruent with our modes of intuition does.

Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time.

So you think that the concept 'triangle' doesn't make any sense in itself?

'beingness' is a property, 'being' is a concept: the former is 'to have "being"'. Properties are attributes a 'thing' can have or possess; a concept is an idea of something that could be possessed.

The property of redness is 'to be red'; and so it presupposes a concept of 'red' in its definition. If one doesn't understand the concept which the property refers to (e.g., 'red'), then one can only understand that the property expounds a concept that is possessable, but not anything more than that.

You are confusing what it means to exist, with the relationship existent things have with each other: you are expounding an ontology in the sense of the structure of what exists and NOT in the sense of the structure of 'being' itself.

Sorry, I missed this response initially.

I have no problem with what you are saying, because you are using the term 'certainty' in the sense of ~'that which one doesn't have good reasons to doubt': in that sense, I agree that I am 'certain' that I am writing this reply.

In terms of whether it is absolutely true that I am writing this reply, I cannot afford an answer.

I would say the property is less fundamental than the concept it refers to; because it presupposes it.

The interesting thing with 'being', is that it isn't really a property: that opens up the discussion to absurd ideas, like beings which themselves contain being in their essence and other beings which do not (e.g., Spinoza's view).

I just want to clarify, that I was in no way intending to convey that it is your fault that you don't understand what I mean by an absolutely simple concept; I was just noting that, for whatever reason, I was unable to convey it to you. It happens, unfortunately.

I also had a definition of value that was analyzable that you did not refute

If you are referring to the definition that it is 'what ought to be', then I did counter that.

So its fairly reasonable that I wouldn't consider intrinsic value if I had no reason to accept your definition of value right?

I agree insofar as, at the end of the day, you could say "Bob, I reject your view because I disagree with your definition of 'value'"; but not in the sense that you should shut down the conversation without one (in my opinion).

I could have easily shut down the conversation about your theory at the beginning with your proof that 'existence is good' is objective, since I completely reject it altogether, but I granted it to see where the conversation goes.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I don't see why you can't grant 'value' as 'worth', even if that disatisifies you, to discuss the aspects of intrinsic value we were conversing about. I don't think the definition is as important as you may think; and perhaps that is the real source of our disagreement (;

Not a problem, you already got a free handwave as I mentioned earlier. :) I appreciate the discussion and had a lot of fun diving into it with you. I'll catch you on another post Bob.

To you as well, my friend!

What definition does Plato give that isn't circular?

Teaching children primitive concepts are the easiest to convey, ironically, because they strongly intuition. E.g., conveying what space is super easy to a child and much easier than explaining the concept an combustion engine. Complex concepts require more experience and knowledge, than their primitive siblings.

I'd very much like to see an example of this. I'm not saying I don't understand or have any idea of what you mean, I'd just like to see where you're coming from with this distinction between deploying a concept and explicating its meaning.

I think ‘using’ a concept is more generic than ‘presupposing it’: both are ‘using’ it, the former is just what it means to ‘use’ generally, and the latter is to leave it unexplicated.

You are absolutely right that one can learn a concept through merely interacting with it or observing other people discuss about it, without its exact definition being clarified. I just don’t see how this negates my position, I guess.

If we want to be really technical, then I would say that we first, in our early years, learn notions; then we (tend to) refine them in our young adulthood into ideas; then we (tend to) refine them more in our older years into concepts. I just mean to convey that we sort of grasp the ‘idea’ behind a thing slowly (usually) through experience (whether that be of other people conversing or interacting with something pertaining to the ‘idea’); and I sometimes convey this by noting a sort of linear progression of clarity behind an ‘idea’ with notion → idea → concept. It isn’t a super clean schema, but you get the point.

In terms of giving an example, I would envision that one could grasp the idea of a ‘triangle’ without ever knowing any precise sort of definition, by merely experiencing triangles and what not, and using the idea of ‘triangle’, conceptually (in a less refined conceptual sense), such as to separate shapes into their own groups or what not, would be an example of presupposing the ‘concept’. There’s not explication of what it actually means, but, rather, just an implicit, assumed, understanding of it.

To ‘use’ a concept in an explicated sense, would be have some sort of sufficiently robust concept of what it is, which is explicated sufficiently. Such as ‘a triangle is a three sided shape, whereof the sides connect at three points, each line is straight, the angles add up to 180 degrees, etc.’. Of course, the level of precision and robustness will vary: an expert in the given field that the concept relates to will probably have a more robust analysis than a layman (which gives most likely a basic definition).

I can imagine a world in which deploying a concept is an instance of explicating a meaning, regardless of whether a definition is offered.
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But you do pick up and refine concepts just by listening and chatting.

That’s fair, and I agree. I just don’t think one can explicate what primitive concepts are, albeit understood by pretty much everyone.

‘being’ is the best example, but also ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘true’, ‘value’, and ‘false’ are good ones. They are very intuitional, and inexplicable (and some more than others).

Concepts have their own meaning despite how they relate to concepts. The concept of the number 3 is obviously distinct from the number 2, and they don't rely on how they relate to each other to be defined.

???

You just tried to prove 'being' is vague because 'to be or not to be' doesn't refer to Hamlet's existence: why would Hamlet not existing have anything to do with it?

I think physics demonstrates quite sufficiently that space and time are valid 'entities' in our calculations, and not in the sense that they are merely our modes of intuition, but I would be interested to hear how you would interpret it (since you obviously disagree).

I don't think that space and time are proper substances, because I don't think literal extension and temporality exist in reality (beyond our modes of intuition): but I do think, at a minimum, the things in themselves must be related to each other with the concepts of space and time---it just seems like physics goes out the window otherwise at this point.

I think we know exactly what being is: I just don't think we can properly explicate it. Knowledge isn't just the sphere if explicable information.

We can have an idea of what it is to be, but we can't say exactly what is its essence. But there is one thing we know about it: it is counterfactual to any action or state of a subject.

Yes, subjects are negativity; insofar as they negate what exists. But this seems like you are agreeing now with me that you cannot define being.

You posts often do not come up in mentions and are not flagged. Something to do with the way you are editing them, at a guess.

Oh, I am sorry to hear that. Unfortunately, I am unsure as to what mistake I may be doing—all I do is hit the reply button and it adds a reply link at the top of my response.

In terms of your response, I only have one problem with it: you are analyzing “is” in the english language when you refer to ‘being’ and not the concept of being.

I have no problem with you analysis that ‘is’ is deployed in various different ways, and that some of them do not even make any sort of existential claim—all of that is completely correct. However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words).

This is important, because your definition of ‘being’ is really the valid definition of the usage of ‘is’; and not the definition of ‘being’ in the sense of the concept of ‘to be’.

An easy example, is your existential quantification sense of ‘is’:

the "is" of existential quantification ∃(x)f(x), "there is something that is green".

Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean?

Apart from that, I totally agree (:

I am sorry you feel that way. From my perspective, I gave you two different ways to think about intrinsic value, you ignored both, and segued immediately into a discussion about how you will reject the whole theory if I cannot define 'value' other than as an unanalyzable, simple concept.

Therefore, I had no choice but to try to convey to you the Moorean idea of primitive concepts; but that didn't latch. So I tried giving the example of 'being', because that is the most obvious example of it (that every philosopher I have ever known recognizes as such); but that didn't latch either. I was hoping to then, by analogy, demonstrate why some of your critiques of an unanalyzable concept were completely off (such as claiming it is 'subjective'); but I have failed to even get the idea across to you of what an absolutely simple concept is: if you don't understand how it is impossible to define what it means to exist, then I am at a loss of words how to explain what a simple concept is to you.

My ethical theory is Moorean, insofar as it posits the concept of 'good' and 'value' as primitive and absolutely simple. Ironically, I don't think people are going to care about that part of the analysis: when I say 'value' is 'worth', people will understand sufficiently what I mean, just like how they will understand that 'being' is 'existence'. Maybe I am wrong about that, but we will find out soon enough when I open a thread on it.

In terms of your theory, I think I understand it more than adequately (at this point), and disagree with it. So I don't think there is much more to discuss.

Until we speak again!
Bob

:lol: :kiss:

That you are reading this now is not just "plausible"; rather if that is to be doubted, we no longer have a footing for this conversation to proceed.

This is the part I don't see why it is necessary (for knowledge). Are you saying that we must be certain (which, to me, requires absolute truth) of something to have any knowledge?

I would say that we must be very confident that we both exist and are in a discussion to continue the conversation: I don't see why we need to add in 'and I am certain of it'.