No, it is necessary for a thing to exist for it to undertake an action

But you haven't defined what it means to exist: you have just noted that only existent things can undertake action. This doesn't define being at all.

Concepts are more universal than words, because words refer to the concepts. I think that, despite whatever limitations we may have in our language, there are concepts which are absolutely simple.

To discuss which words are absolutely simple, is to just critique a particular language; and, although that can certainly be done, it is not really what the OP is about.

I am not merely claiming that 'being' cannot be defined linguistically non-circularly: I mean the very concept is absolutely simple. No matter what conceptual analysis we give, it won't produce anything meaningful about 'being'.

:up:

You don't think concepts are determinate? How is the concept of a circle not determinate?

I don't see a definition of 'true' anywhere in your response, and am a little confused. What's your definition?

You are presupposing that space and time are only (presumably synthetic) a priori. I accept that the space and time which are our forms of experience are a priori, but not that space and time do not exist beyond that in reality.

By 'phenomenal' sense, I mean space and time as it pertains to our experience (of reality) and not reality itself; to be contrasted with 'cosmic' space and time.

Under what conditions do you believe a concept presupposed in an act of speech?

I didn’t understand this question: can you re-phrase it?

Can you distinguish presupposing a concept from using a concept?

To use a concept, is to deploy it; and to presuppose a concept is to use a concept in a manner whereof one does not explicate its meaning (but, rather, uses it implicitly in their analysis).

I am not following how this relates to the OP.

Or needing to learn a concept before deploying it?

I agree that one needs to learn a concept, or idea, at least notionally, before deploying it.

How could you come to understand what a bike is without understanding what "is" means?

Oh, I think I understand where your are heading; so let me clarify: by claiming ‘being’, or any absolutely simple concept, is unanalyzable and primitive, I DO NOT mean to convey that we cannot come to know what they are. I mean that we can’t come to know them through conceptual analysis: they remain forever notions, which are acquired via pure intuitions (about reality).

We all know exactly what ‘to be’ is, yet we can’t explicate it without circularity.

"To be or not to be" means "should something exist, or should it not?"

I don't think concepts are culturally relative. The words we use to describe them are, and the ones we expound may be a reflection of cultural interests, but they aren't relative to cultures themselves.

To be could be defined as that which is necessary for any subject to undertake an action.

So 'that thing exists' = 'that thing is necessary for any subject to undertake an action'? This doesn't address what it means 'to exist' at all.

All you have noted is that being underlies everything else; which is true, but not a valid definition of what it means to exist.

Normally, colloquially, knowledge does not refer to absolute truth. When someone says "I know that the distance to my local grocery store is 10 miles", they do not mean that they are absolutely certain nor that it is absolutely true that <...>; rather, they mean that they are (1) have a belief that , (2) are justified in, (3) and have high enough credence levels to claim that it is true that <...>.

There is a valid distinction between conceptual vs. linguistic circularity: the former is circularity in the underlying idea, and the latter is circularity in the given language.

E.g., the analysis of "Non-spatiality" is not conceptually circular, but is linguistically circular. What exists non-spatially, exists beyond, sans, without, etc. space; which is linguistically circular. However, conceptually, it is perfectly valid to ask what is "beyond" space.


Some of your examples aren't even circular. E.g., a "word" is a string of symbols which signifier a particular underlying meaning in the given language.

To exist is to be the subject of a predicate.

This doesn’t refer to being at all.

If ‘to exist’ is ‘to be the subject of a predicate, then Unicorns exist because “Unicorns are red”. This obviously doesn’t work.

You aren’t capturing what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ itself in your definition. Likewise, it is circular, as indicated with the underlines.

I think your are very close to my meaning, it is just a bit linguistic instead of conceptual--is all. :up:

How do you define 'true' (and NOT 'truth')?

I guess I didn't understand your definition of 'being': can you give it again?

My preferred example is 'the principle of noncontradiction' (PNC).

I don't think the concept of PNC is primitive: it is the idea that a proposition cannot be both true and false. However, and what I think you are getting at is that, PNC cannot be proven without circular reference. I am uncertain if that makes it a primitive concept or not, since it technically can be defined in terms of other concepts.

I don't think so. For example, try to define what 'true', as a concept and signifier, NOT 'truth', refers to without begging the question. I don't see how it can be done, and I don't see how it reduces to being.

If you would like to end our discussion, then I completely respect that. I am more than willing to continue, but I only want to if you want to—afterall, this is your thread!

I will respond to your post, and will leave it up to you, since this is your thread, if you would like to continue the discussion, segue into a different discussion, or end the discussion (altogether).

You ask me to give you a definition of existence that doesn't devolve into circularity, then when I do, you're saying my definition doesn't fit what you think it means. Do you see the problem? You can't ask me to give you a definition, then say, "That's not what I wanted you to define it as."

I completely understand the frustration you are expounding here; but I don’t think you are being charitable to my challenge. Let me briefly explain.

Imagine I asked you: “Can you non-circularly define what an orange is?”
Imagine you answer: “Of course, an orange is a really fast truck”.

Technically, you “beat” the challenge; but, in a more meaningful sense, you evaded, inadvertently, the challenge. I was asking about the fruit we are both thinking of, what is commonly referred to by an orange, and not whether you can come up with any non-circular definition that you could semantically assign the term “orange” (such as “a really fast truck”).

So, since this doesn’t address the intentions of the challenge, I have no choice but to try to guide you to what I mean by an orange, which is that fruit, to try to get you to try to define that thing. You could easily, and analogously, complain, rightly, that you did exactly what I asked (technically); but it misses the intentions of the question.

I was asking you to define what it means to exist (which is what is usually referred to as ‘existence’), and not asking you to come up with any definition that you could semantically assign the word ‘existence’. Do you see what I mean?

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning. — Bob Ross

No, now you're disregarding things I've written. Existence = X. Being equals "some piece of X". Existences are the reference to beings, so "pieces of X".

I apologize: that’s a typo. It was supposed to say “if existence = X, then existences = plurality of X”. My point was that in your own sentence, which referred to ‘existence’ in a singular and plural fashion, betrayed its own meaning; insofar as the plural version didn’t make any sense.

No. Because I already mentioned that 'to exist' is a synonym of being, not existence.

Philosophim, do you see how that indicates you have a bad schema? That ‘exist’ doesn’t refer or relate whatsoever to ‘existence’? That violates basic grammar rules. A better explanation would be that ‘being’ is a synonym for ‘existence’, which is how it is usually used.
That’s like me saying ‘red is the number 2 and blue is the number 3’ and then saying “but ‘to be red’ is referring ‘blue’, not ‘red’”. It’s ungrammatical, even if one accepts the semantics.


Bob

The confusion lies in the fact that I am using there term “probability” in a looser, more colloquial sense, than you. If we are talking about “probability” in strictly the sense of a mathematical, quantitative likelihood; then I completely agree with you.

If we use it more loosely, as also “plausibility”, then your issues disappear. The probability, in this sense, of me writing this message is qualitative and to the degree of confidence I have, given the evidence I have to support it, that would suffice for me to claim it is true.

:up:

Would you include the so-called 'primary intuitions' of time and space? (It might be their very 'primitiveness' that makes them so hard to explain!)

I do consider the concept of space and time, in a phenomenal sense, to be primitive.

In terms of numbers, I am not sure that they are all primitive---perhaps they are. We can represent the number 2, for example, as the conjunction of the concepts of number, repetition, and the number 1. It is definitely word-resistant to explain, but conceptually I don't think it is circular. "2 = 1 1"

I’m ok with that; word-resistant just means the concept is difficult to represent for the use of expression, and prior to language just means the concepts have no relation to communication.

“word-resistant” isn’t a good way to describe it, as that implies that the qualification of conceptual simplicity is linguistic (as opposed to conceptual) and some complex concepts which are word-resistant (e.g., non-spatiality) are thereby simple.

That is exactly the issue, and what I was trying to convey to @Janus.

You didn't define what it means to exist; and that was the whole point.

It irrelevant what you call the entirety of reality, or a parcel of reality. I want to know how you define what it means to exist (which is what 'existence' commonly refers to).

It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences.

"existence" here is supposed to be referring to the general and generic quality of existing; and not 'the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved': your definition just doesn't cover what the word refers to. If I take your definition seriously, then:

"It was meant to emphasize we're talking about existence, not existences." = "It was meant to emphasize we're talking about the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved, not multiple sums of all discrete identities observed and unobserved."

If existence = X, then existence = plurality of X. Your use of 'existence', and its variants, betray your own meaning.

This completely misses the mark, and is confusing.

You don't say "Existences to exist". You say, "That" exists

Correct. But do you see how the word 'exist' here isn't referring to what you have been calling 'existence' and how that is really weird?

According to your logic:

"that exists" = "that is the sum of <...>"

There's no escaping that under your terminology, because that's how you defined it. Obviously, this doesn't work, as 'that exists' is referring to the quality of existing; and you haven't defined that. This is what I have been trying to get you to define.

'to exist' is just another terminology to note that something is a slice, or discrete part of existence

The quality of existing, property of existence, 'to exist', does not refer to a slice of existence: it refers to existing itself.

So, let me ask one more time in different terminology: how do you define the generic quality of existing?

Or another way: how do you define what it means to exist?

Or another way: how do you define the concept of existing?

I feel like, at this point, my question is very clear: do those questions not make sense to you?

Bob

Well, you are claiming that the concepts are a priori, and thusly are concepts which our representative faculties, in-themselves, have for the act of representation; so I would count that as at least sort of ontological. I understand you are not commenting on what exactly those concepts exist in.

My thinking is even more basic than this: I don't even think our faculty of self-reflective reason can define certain concepts, like 'being', without merely pointing to an intuition (in the non-kantian sense of an intellectual seeming).

I can envision a concept which, in principle, could be a priori but isn't simple; because our representative faculties could be acquainted with it, but yet it is a concept which inherits from more fundamental concepts. E.g., the concept of 'two triangles' is the concept of 'two' + 'triangle' and so there is no circularity in its definition and this could be, in principle, a priori (although I am not trying to say it is). You know what I mean?

First of all, all definitions are essentially circular, as evidence by somebody not being able to immediately glean a language simply by by being handed a dictionary

Non-sequitur.

But with some ideas, the circularity of the definition becomes very short, such as in your example.

Firstly, I am NOT referring to linguistic definitions: I am referring to conceptual definitions.

Secondly, if you are just noting that all complex concepts will relate to some set of primitive, simple concepts (and that is what you mean by 'they are all circular'), then that's fine. But the definitions of the complex concepts are not themselves circular: they don't refer to themselves in their definitions.

Do you have others?

Yes. E.g., 'value', 'true, 'false', etc.

That peculiarity renders the chosen definition rather empty in my opinion.

Hence why it is unanalyzable.

I shy from such definitions and prefer something more pragmatic such as a relational definition. A exists to B if A in any way has a causal effect on B. Hence the nonexistence of unicorns because no unicorn seems to have a causal effect on humans, despite the legends to the contrary.

Firstly, not all definitions are about causality.

Secondly, I don't see how this would provide non-circular definitions for concepts like 'being'.

I appreciate you re-quoting your definition!

So, here’s your definition:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

The first thing I am going to do, is slash out ‘as a whole’, because I am not asking you to define the totality of things that exist but, rather, what it means to exist (and ‘as a whole’ is indicating your are speaking about the totality of what exists, and not what it means to exist). So, your definition is really:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

So we have:

Existence is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

Now, remember you supposed to be defining what it means ‘to exist’.

To be charitable, I don’t think you even tried to define existence in the sense of ‘to exist’ but, rather, are defining ‘existence’ as the ~‘the whole’. I can demonstrate really easily how ‘to exist’ cannot be defined as what you have defined as ‘existence’:

If ‘existence’ is ‘the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved’, then we should be able to substitute anything relating to the word ‘existence’ in for ‘the sum of all <...>’. But if we do this, we get weird results. For example:

‘this thing exists’ = ‘this thing is the sum of all discrete identities <...>’.

At best, your definition of ‘existence’ can’t be used to refer to many instances of the usage of ‘existence’ (such as ‘to exist’, ‘exists’, ‘existed’, etc.) and thusly you haven’t answered my original question, other than to use the term ‘existence’ to refer to something it normally doesn’t refer to.

At worst, your definition is circular, if I assume you mean to define:

’to exist’ is to be the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

‘to be’ is ‘to exist’. See the circularity?

To be fair, I think you are just defining ‘existence’ in a rather peculiar way, which is obvious in many examples (e.g., ‘this thing existed’ = ‘this thing was the sum of <...>’, etc.), and I think all you are noting is the totality of existence, instead of what existence is itself. If I, to be charitable, assume you mean it in this sense, then it is not circular but equally doesn’t answer my challenge: I was asking about what it means ‘to exist’? That is what ‘existence’ usually refers to.

Do you see what I mean? You seem to be confusing ‘what is the totality of what exists?’ with ‘what does it mean to exist?’. I don’t believe you are even claiming to answer the latter, which was the subject of discussion.

Bob

:brow:

If the actor is playing the part of Hamlet, then Hamlet. This is not an example of a valid analysis of 'to be': 'to be or not to be?' ungrammatical, old english for "should something exist, or not?".

I believe you are giving more of an ontological account of why it is absolutely simple (viz., the categories of the understanding), which, by my lights, means you accept it is absolutely simple. :up:

:up:

This was not in your initial request. You just asked me to define being, then in the next request, existence. Lets go over those first instead of continuing to add new requests.

It was the initial request, because we were referring to different things by the word ‘being’.

I was meaning in the traditional and common sense of ‘to be’; and you meant is as ‘a part of existence’.

To avoid getting into a debate about that, I simply semantically refurbished the term in my challenge. You have not succeeded in beating my challenge as of yet. You defined something which was not meant by ‘being’.

Please go down my response where I lay out what existence is

You did not provide a definition in this response, and you gave the definition “Existence being defined as 'everything'” in this response.

Philosophim, a really easy way to help, would be if you just clarified what the definition is. I have tried to be charitable here, but you are starting to evade the question. Just answer it clearly, or quote where it is that I missed it.

If you wish to apply everything as a synonym to existence, that's fine.

This is a straw man. I said that ‘being’ is a synonym for ‘existence’; and this is true in standard terminology (in both colloquial and formal areas of discourse). I think you are confusing ‘a being’ with ‘being’. Either way, it doesn’t matter: all I want you to do is define what it means ‘to exist’: does that make sense?

Please go over the concepts I put forward and demonstrate where I fall into circularity please.

Philosophim, I have linked TWO TIMES my demonstration; and you have ignored it TWO TIMES.
I will link it again: here’s my response.

Also, I am not asking for a definition of what the 'totality of existent things' is: I am asking for a definition of the concept of 'to exist'. It almost sounds like you may be conflating them, with "existence as a whole".

I did read it, and didn't see a definition (e.g., 'existence' is <...>, 'existence' = <...>, etc.). What was it?

The closest I see is:

Existence as a whole, is the sum of all discrete identities observed and unobserved

Which is the same definition you gave originally, with the addition of more clarification of what you mean by 'everything'. This has the exact same issues as my response I linked; and you still haven't addressed any of it.

Am I missing something? Is that ^ your definition? Do you not see how that is circular (as I described in my response)?

Philosophim, that's the challenge: can you provide a definition of 'existence' (of 'to exist', 'to be', etc.) which is not circular?

So far, you have failed to do so: you saying "I can" doesn't beat the challenge: you have to provide the definition.

Your entire schema that uses 'existence' is circular with respect to the definition of that word: nothing you have provided in your analysis has amended the issues I spoke of in my response.

I am going to tell you right now, you can't do it. That's why I am challenging you to do it, so I can break you out of this illusion that only concepts with analyzable definitions are valid definitions. Some concepts are primitive, and are not non-circularly definable; and they still valid.

So, what is your definition of 'existence' (i.e., 'to exist')?

I see where the confusion lies: you don’t think ‘being’ = ‘existence’.

I disagree, but that is despite the point. My challenge needs to be semantically refurbished, then: I challenge you to define ‘existence’ (i.e., ‘to exist’) without using it in its own definition. Fair enough?

You took a jab at it here:

Existence being defined as 'everything' and being as 'a part'.

Ok, so you define ‘existence’ as ‘everything’. This doesn’t work and is circular.

If ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then:

1. ‘to be’ = ‘to exist’ = ‘to be everything’. the latter presupposes a concept of ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, which was supposed to be being defined.
2. “this exists” = “this is everything”. Same problem as #1, and it makes no sense.
2. “that should not exist” = “that should not be everything”. this clearly makes no sense, and same problem as #1.
3. “discrete existence” = “everything that exists discreetly”. Same problem as #1.
4. “amorphous existence” = “everything that exists amorphously”. Same problem as #1.
5. etc…

Remember, if you say X = Y, then I can substitute Y for X. If I say that ‘to be flub’ = ‘to be red’, then ‘this is red’ = ‘this is flub’. Of course, to be charitable, one may have to linguistically refurbish a bit of the language to make it grammatical; but that doesn’t help your case here.

If ‘to be’ = ‘to be everything’, which is what you are claiming by ‘existence’ = ‘everything’, then we can abstract this to a definition:

‘X’ = ‘X + Y’.

See how it is circular? And how you provided no clarification nor definition of what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ by noting ‘existence’ = ‘everything’?

Bob

From what you say it follows that we don't know that we know. If knowledge must be true and everything I think is true may not be, then I cannot be confident that I possess knowledge, even though I may, despite not knowing it or even being able to know it, possess knowledge.

You are confusing absolute knowledge with knowledge.

If knowledge is a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true, then you can know you know X IFF you have a justified belief that has a high enough probability of being true that X.

All you have noted, is that you can’t be absolutely certain that it is true; which is not a qualification of knowledge.

If we have no knowledge, then by what standard could we assess the likelihood of something being true?

One’s theory of knowledge, just like truth, will be used to examine itself: it is necessarily circular.

For example, take correspondence theory of truth: what makes the correspondance theory of truth true? If one accepts that theory, then they would say: it is true IFF it corresponds with reality. See what I mean?

If you ask “how do we know what knowledge is?”, then same deal: you have to evaluate that from the perspective of your theory of knowledge.

It is not that we have no knowledge, it is that we only have probabilistic reasons to support the truth of things. There’s nothing particularly wrong with this: the alternative is absolute truth.

I think there many things I can know to be true, or at least can be certain are the case

The only way this negates my position, is if you could validly claim to it is absolutely true; and you can’t. The things you know, are based off of probability: all you are noting is a high probability.

People who think that something is morally permissible but yet no one should do it, are either (1) confused about what morality is, (2) what they believe is actually immoral, or (3) holding onto an irrational belief.

Philosophim, I know you think you are providing key counter-points to my theory: but you are not at all. You don’t understand the theory completely yet, and this the source of your counter-points. I think you appreciate, even if you disagree, this, because I have, from your perspective, done the same with your theory.

Minds are like ship docks/ports, ideas are like barrels of merchandise, and explanations are like ships that carry those barrels to another ship dock.

We may completely understand our own theory, but sometimes it is difficult to get those barrels to another dock. I have sent all my finest ships, and none of docked at your shores. Therefore, I need to try different avenues of explanation, because I know you aren’t quite getting the theory.

Forget about value for now. Let’s talk about being. Why?

Because you accept that being is unanalyzable and primitive; but you just don’t completely realize it yet. I think I can convey the idea of a primitive concept with being, if I am allowed to smooth out some of the wrinkles in your analysis of being. Then, I think I can at least convey how value is analogous. That’s the vessel I am going to try, because nothing else has worked.

So I want to emphasize that I am not ignoring your responses: they are just completely missing the mark; and we need to take things more systematically and try other ways of explanation.

So, let’s talk about your definition of being: “a slice of existence”. Philosophim, are you telling me ‘existence’ is different than ‘being’?

A slice of existence is a discrete section of existence.

This is a circular definition, because you are using the term to define it. I can swap ‘existence’ with ‘being’ and lose no meaning: “a slice of being is a discrete section of being”.

Circular would be if I said 'being' is defined as 'narsh' and when you asked what narsh is, I replied with 'being'.

That is exactly what you just did!!!! You just said “being” is “a slice of being”. Unless you are really about to tell me that “existence” is different than “being”, which is obviously isn’t, then you are using the term in its definition.

We need to address your definition here, because if we cannot agree that you are defining it circularly, insofar as it circularly references itself in its own definition, then we are hopeless for any discussion about value.

There are several other philosophers who have also defined being

No philosopher has ever been able to define being validly: it is the grand-daddy of primitive concepts; and the vast majority of philosophers understand this.

Your link didn’t contain any definition of being that was not circular; and some of them weren’t even definitions, but an analysis of different ways we can separate being.

Ok, so either give me (1) a different definition which actually defines 'being' without circularly referencing it, (2) explain how 'existence' is different than 'being', or (3) concede it is undefinable without circular reference. This isn't a gotcha, by the way: I need us to get on this common ground if we are to have any hope of progressing our conversation.

I look forward to you responding,
Bob

Let’s take a different approach, because I think our heads are in totally different spaces; and that’s fine, but we need to converge somewhere if we want to progress. So, let’s talk about being.

My challenge to you is simple: (I want you to) define ‘being’ without circularly referencing it. Fair enough?

No, its not. Being is a slice of existence.

Do you see how you just circularly defined ‘being’ by referencing it as ‘existence’ in its definition? So this fails to beat my challenge.

Besides that, there’s just a couple clarification questions I have about your response.

No, its very different. Because I proceed to explain that it can be quantified in a moral sense.

1. That value can be quantified, does not entail any sort of definition of value itself. Are you asking for how, in my theory, we quantify value, or what value actually is itself?

2. When you say it is ‘very different’, are you referring to that you explain how to quantify value, or that you don’t think ‘importance’ and ‘worth’ are circular references to ‘value’?

Its not Moorean, its incomplete and ill defined

Moore held that goodness, and ‘good’, is undefinable, unanalyzable, and primitive. Your objections to my view, hold the same to Moore’s arguments. I am just noting that it is not uncommon in metaethics for moral realists to consider goodness primitive in this sense without conceding it is subjective.

I am going to stop here, because I want to see how you define ‘being’ without circularly referencing (: , and we will go from there.

Bob

My definition of value, is Moorean—not subjective.

What value is itself, is not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to have worth. Just like being is itself not something contingent on subjective dispositions: it is to be.

By your reasoning, being is also subject; which is clearly false.

Value: A designation of importance.

This is no different than defining it as ‘value: a designation of worth’. Philosophim, you haven’t done anything here but use a (rough) synonym for value: you have done nothing to expound the idea of value. Rather, you have pushed the question back, just the same as if you would have said ‘worth’ instead of ‘importance’.

Likewise, value isn’t a designation: it would be, by your definition here, equal to importance. Something designates value, value is not some sort of designation itself; just like how someone can designate tasks, but a task isn’t defined as a designation <of something>.

Irregardless, I am confused why you are insisting on disregarding the whole theory, in the sense of not even granting my definition of value for the sake of the conversation, when you clearly understand that my use of ‘value’ is ‘to have worth’; and you know darn well what ‘to have worth’ means, and that it is not itself subjective.

You are playing word games and trying to win on technicalities.

In terms of competing definitions of value, I have never heard a satisfying one other than one’s which reiterate the primitive meaning (such as ‘to have worth’ or ‘to be important’). People use the term ‘value’ exactly, by-at-large, how I am using it: I am not using it in some toto genere different way, so I am confused why you ignored the real content of my responses.

I have been thinking about how to express my view differently, in light of your currently way of thinking about it, so as to hopefully provide more clarity. I came up with one more way to express it.

"Intrinsic motivation" is anything which is its own source of motivation; whereas "extrinsic motivation" is anything which depends on something else (as a source of motivation) to motivate anything else about it.

An example of intrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is subjects--specifically their psychologies. I can very well become motivated to do something, because of my interpretation or (subjective) disposition towards it; and, thusly, I am a source of motivation for myself, and so I am an example of intrinsic motivation.

An example of extrinsic motivation, that you can agree with in your current mode of thought, is one being motivated to play basketball because they like the sport. Basketball itself is not motivating anyone, but, rather, the subject's interpretation (or subjective disposition) towards it motivates them; and so this motivation to do basketball is extrinsic to basketball itself.

Now, something which has intrinsic value, has a (1) mind(stance)-independent source of (2) intrinsic motivation. This is a combination that you currently haven't completely incorporated into your mode of thought and is why, I think, you are having a hard time understanding what intrinsic value would even be.

So, I devised a simple test, for all intents and purposes, that will get my point across. We can test if something is intrinsically motivating by asking: "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from X, does X still motivate?".

For example, if we ask "if all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from basketball (itself), does (playing or what not) basketball still motivate?", then the answer is clearly "no"; because if we remove our own motivation, then there is no motivation left. If I remove my own subjective disposition about basketball, then I am no longer motivated to play it; because all my reasons for doing it were from my own preferences about it. So basketball is not intrinsically motivating.

Now, let's contrast pain to basketball. "If all other sources of motivation are removed which are not from pain (itself), does pain still motivate?". The answer is 'yes'. If I remove my own subjective disposition towards pain, which could be a subjective understanding that it is worthless or valuable, I am still motivated, in a state of pain, to avoid it. Thusly pain is intrinsically motivating. Since it exists stance-independently--insofar as the state of pain is not dependent on our feelings, preferences, or cognitive approval/disapprovals--and it is intrinsically motivating, it has intrinsic value.

What you are having a hard time understanding, I think, is that every mind-independent state is NOT analogous to the basketball example because some states, per their nature, motivate independently of our own internal motivations about them.

Hopefully that helps.

Bob