ucarr_180 Proof

If existence is eternal, you're metaphysically constraining existence to a binary structure of "to be" or "not to be." Do you feel completely comfortable excluding a grayscale gradient between "to be" or "not to be"? — ucarr

Suppose you could choose whether or not the universe is binary or complex. Which would you choose? — ucarr

Please explain how 'existence does not exist' without self-contradiction. Otherwise, necessary (eternal) existence. — 180 Proof

We're looking at a metaphysical binary structure for existence, and thus everything conceivable is metaphysically constrained to a fundamental binary. Can we liberate ourselves from this constraint?

You're almost certainly correct in your perception of the status of existence as indivisible lest there be self-contradiction, so that keeps us confined within the binary. And yet, however, we frequently question the existence of things conceived mentally. I know, this is retracing Meinong.

I'm just thinking a possible attack upon the binary might involve configuring an equation that computes a probability that sits between two limits as a bounded infinity. This is supposed to be a mathematical picture of an approach to an existing thing with no arrival, thus partial existence.

With establishment of a grayscale zone between "to be," and "not to be," we might calculate non-binary wave function states that might predict a class of elementary particles hovering between differential_integral functions.

Let's imagine these elementary particles bridge QM and Relativity states. Our work might be moving us toward T.O.E. Consider that tough problems in practice point to unexamined problems in our metaphysical commitments. Perhaps the existence binary is blinding us to the bridge linking QM with Relativity.

You are counting back to a start point. — ucarr

I'm grouping all of the causality within an infinite universe in a set which then leads to one final question of causality, "What caused all of that causality?" This is commonly stated as, "What caused the universe?" So I'm not counting back to any start point. I'm noting that the starting point in causality is "What caused the universe?" — Philosophim

You are counting back to a start point:

A first cause is logically necessary... A first cause is merely the point in the chains of causality throughout the universe that lead to the [terminates] at the point in which there is nothing prior. — Philosophim

Logic is the soul of your argument; logic is continuity; many times have you written, in your own words, for every causal chain we can count back until it's not possible to count back any further; this is the start point,i.e., the first cause.

You should immediately discard your current would-be equations that use infinity as one of your input values. Using infinity as an input value is a violation of math form. It’s like trying to start a combustion engine with water instead of gasoline. Fundamentally wrong. If, however, you have your own math that rationally discards proper math form, that’s another matter. Do you have your own system of math? — ucarr

Incorrect. Infinity is a representation of a set of numbers. Just like 23 represents a set of 23 ones. Read here: — Philosophim

Computing with Infinity

Can you show me one equation in your reference that doesn't compute to infinity? Yes, you can. There's one equation that computes to "undefined."

So, all of your authorizing equations compute to a non-specific value. You want to represent an infinite causal chain mathematically. You use ∞ for the representation. Okay. What's important to your argument, by my interpretation, is logically working back through an infinite causal chain to a first cause which has nothing prior to it. Your first cause is not non-specific. Arguably, its most important attribute is its well-defined position in specificity as number one. The heart of your premise entails tracing back to a well-defined number one position for the start of real things.

Can you cite an equation with infinity as an input value that computes to a well-defined discrete position on the number line? It needs to be a number neither irrational nor approximate.

Your language for your premise needs to draw a parallel: Infinite causal chains are infinite series made empirical and bounded by eternal existence instead of by limits. — ucarr

I don't understand this, can you go a little more in depth? — Philosophim

You're making a logical argument about the beginning of causal chains of real things. You've said this is true for a universe posited as existing eternally. Set theory has an established procedure for binding infinite series with limits that can be mathematically approximated to with no final arrival at the limit.

The point in our context here is that this insuperable disjunction between a bounded infinite series and its limit is evidence your premise is incoherent: the infinite series you're tracing back to first causes cannot reach their first causes. There's a gap of separation within your thought experiment you can approximate to mathematically, but you can't bridge that gap.

Infinity is not a discrete number. It therefore cannot be precisely situated on the number line. It therefore cannot be precisely sequenced in a series populated with numbers. For these reasons, infinite values cannot be computed directly. — ucarr

Math is symbolic representation of quantities. You can symbolically represent infinity. You may not have heard of Georg Cantor's work on infinite sets. Here's an intro: — Philosophim

In my quote you don't see me denying infinity can be represented symbolically.

In the link to Cantor's differing levels of infinite series, can you cite a passage addressing infinity conceptualized as an infinite series with a discrete starting point?

Cantor's Levels of Infinity

The Crux: QM Governs Cosmology – an infinite causal chain cannot have a precise first cause because it amounts to putting the whole number line – infinite in volume – within itself. Infinite values can be bounded (as argued above) but they cannot be definitively sequenced. — ucarr

Incorrect again. Read Cantor. — Philosophim

You need to highlight a passage in Cantor that addresses discretely sequencing an infinite value on the number line without approximation to a limit. That's what I'm specifically talking about. What are you specifically talking about?

Given these limitations, the attempt to sequence an infinite value amounts to claiming a given thing is greater than itself; this irrational claim holds moot sway within QM, as in the instance of superposition; prior to measurement, the cat is neither dead or alive. — ucarr

Ucarr, randomly bringing quantum mechanics into this isn't going to work either. You misunderstand that statement and what it means. I can go into depth on this later if needed, but you need to understand Cantor and infinities first. — Philosophim

You need to go into probative details now because: a) you need to meet the same standard you apply to me:

If you want to say I'm wrong, you're going to have to prove I am wrong, not merely say I am. — Philosophim

; b) show how my reference to QM is random and irrelevant to this context; c) show how my citation of Shrödinger's Thought Experiment is both misunderstood by me and misapplied to this context.

If we represent the infinite series of nothing-to-something as undefined, or 1/0, and observe that infinitely small approximates to the limit of zero, then infinitely-small-to-zero and its reverse take an infinite amount of time. So, speaking logically and computationally, nothing-to-something is a bounded infinity of undefined.

You don't want to go this route Ucarr. I can say it doesn't because when there is nothing, there is no time. On the other hand, if you include time what you're saying is that an infinite amount of time would have to pass to get to this moment. Ucarr, if the universe has existed for infinite time, didn't you just disprove that the universe has always existed? — Philosophim

You're debating against my claim nothingness doesn't exist. How is it you think you can slam dunk my claim by merely stating that nothingness does exist. I see you believe my 1/0 argument is wrong. Where is your argument proving this?

Explain how an eternal universe and a universe with infinite time difffer.

I don't see how what you've written here is related to what I've written previously in response to Philosophim. I can't grok what you're saying, ucarr, possibly becauae of the way you're saying it. — 180 Proof

If existence is eternal, you're metaphysically constraining existence to a binary structure of "to be" or "not to be." Do you feel completely comfortable excluding a grayscale gradient between "to be" or "not to be"?

Suppose you could choose whether or not the universe is binary or complex. Which would you choose?

True randomness cannot be constrained or predicted. — Philosophim

Is true randomness a phenomenon; is inception of first cause an event? These questions are meant to suggest how all things -- including true randomness -- generate networks of connections that contextilize their identites.

Can what could or could not have been lie beyond probability in the case of true randomness? Does the concept of true randomness suggest to you its bond with time forever approaching but never reaching actuality? This question is meant to suggest entropy weakening true randomness to something not authentically random. More specifically, this question is meant to suggest every thing -- because of its existence -- generates entropy. In this particular context, the irony is that entropy -- the measure of increasing randomness -- diminishes the purity (non-randomness) of true randomness. (This also suggests there is no purity because there is no total isolation).

Is probability only possible in the absence of true randomness? This question is meant to suggest the presence of probability generates a measure of determinism regarding the outcome of events.

Not like the constraints of rolling a die which are really just a lack of knowledge which would necessarily lead to the outcome. — Philosophim

Is rolling a die more phenomenal than inception of a first cause? This question is meant to suggest any event -- including inception of a first cause -- by the fact of its existence, prevents true randomness; if something exists, the specificity of its existence as a particular thing with specific dimensions and attributes means that its process of being created is not random; creation cannot carry out a design of creation toward a specific thing by means of true randomness; there's no initial period of a thing's existence when, during its coalescence into a clearly defined thing, its being randomly assembled with the randomness of its assemblage gradually diminishing to zero.

Is inception of a first cause less eventuary than rolling a die? This question is meant to suggest events cannot happen with their determinism at zero.

Is inception of a first cause less presential than rolling of a die? This question is meant to suggest the presence of a specific thing (all things are specific) precludes the pure isolation of from nothing. Moreover, a particular thing-in-itself cannot be a first cause in of itself because -- per QM -- a thing-in-itself cannot only be a thing-in-itself. From Heisenberg we have reason to believe we can't know every essential attribute of a thing simultaneously, and thus we infer that all things are networked and thus we infer that no apparently distinct thing is truly distinctly alone and only unto itself. There is no transitional period when a thing is distinctly alone and unto itself in a process of transformation into existence within the natural universe governed by the laws of physics.

...logically, there is a limit to prior causality and that we will eventually reach a point in our causation query in which there is no prior cause for some existence. — Philosophim

Imagine that each causation within a causal chain -- because of the fact of its existence -- generates a prior (or subsequent) causation. How does the chain of causation reach the point of no prior (or subsequent) causation?

True randomness is the lack of limitations on what could, or could not have been. — Philosophim

Let us suppose true randomness is not a process. Is it still a phenomenon? This question is meant to suggest that if true randomness is to any degree intelligible -- as in the case of it being a phenomenon, even if not a process to a specifiable end, then it must possess a specificity of form and content and this is a curiously ironic entropy-by-presence of a particular thing that diminishes the non-randomness of "pure" randomness (I say non-randomness of "pure" randomness because I equate "true" with "pure." By definition it is something wholly unmixed and that implies absolute isolation (extreme disequilibrium). But if a thing is specific in its form and content, it cannot be wholly isolated because specificity of form and content is naturally connected to prior specificity of form and content by the design of the agency that brought it into being. If this were not so, the particular thing would not have been brought into being. Because of what we know from QM (superposition) we know this applies no less to self-creation. So, the phenomenal thing -- through the agency of its existence as a specific thing -- ironically randomizes the purity of true randomness by agency of the entropy of its presence.

A first cause 'is'. — Philosophim

In your case, the universe has no start, but has always existed. — Philosophim

Not quite. For me, existence itself..."always exists" (how could it not?) — 180 Proof

What if I characterize nothingness as undefined somethingness, and represent it as 1/0, with
no-beginning zero = potential matter-energy-motion-space-time moving infinitely across time towards something. Does this imply a category of something-not-exactly-existential?

My attempt at naming something not-exactly-existential is strained and probably fallacious, but I'm trying to honor a metaphysical notion that nature always hedges her bets, even re: the phenomenon of eternal existence.

There are now no more questions of prior causality to explore. — 180 Proof

you commit a compositional fallacy, Philo, arguing from the causal structure intrinsic, or dynamics internal, to "the universe" to the conclusion that "the universe" is the effect of a "first cause" that is extrinsic, or external, to it when, in fact, our best science (QG) describes "the universe's" earliest planck diameter as a random event – a-causal. — 180 Proof

..."prior causality" is as incoherent as "prior existence" or "prior randomness" or "prior spacetime" ... — 180 Proof

I see your commentary here as an elaboration and illumination of my enduring intuition something is fundamentally wrong with separating an existing thing from all other existing things, and also something is fundamentally wrong with partially separating any component of a causal chain from its associate causations.

My goal is to nuance the following premise: “Logically, an infinite causal chain cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause."

I will argue that given an eternal universe – which can be construed as an infinite causal chain – a precisely determinable first cause is not possible.

I will show why an infinite causal chain cannot inevitably and precisely arrive at a first cause.

Question – Has pi been situated on the number line? Answer – Yes, but asymptotically.

Philosophim, you’re establishing a set containing an infinite series and then counting back to its start point and asserting no prior member to the start point can exist.

Can an infinite series be counted? Yes, but there are rules for doing this type of counting.

Your domain of operations for this premise is set theory.

For the math representation of your premise, you need an equation that computes toward the limits bounding your infinite series. In other words, you must treat the volume of your infinite set as an approximation forever approaching a limit.

Structurally speaking, you’re concerned with infinite volume of membership juxtaposed with limited extent.

Your input values need to all be finite and configured with math operators that compute for approximation towards the limits bounding your infinite series.

• You should immediately discard your current would-be equations that use infinity as one
  of your input values. Using infinity as an input value is a violation of math form. It’s like trying to start a combustion engine with water instead of gasoline. Fundamentally wrong. If, however, you have your own math that rationally discards proper math form, that’s another matter. Do you have your own system of math?

Your language for your premise needs to draw a parallel: Infinite causal chains are infinite series made empirical and bounded by eternal existence instead of by limits.

My Argument – Infinity is not a discrete number. It therefore cannot be precisely situated on the number line. It therefore cannot be precisely sequenced in a series populated with numbers. For these reasons, infinite values cannot be computed directly.

In order to compute an infinite value, you must treat it as if it’s a discrete number; this is achieved through approximation to a number. In its calculation with infinite values, calculus establishes limits toward which infinite series approximate; it’s as if they’re discrete numbers situated on the number line.

A parallel to these calculations of calculus are sequences of reasoning towards axioms. An axiom is a limit for logical reasoning. It cannot be precisely sequenced within a chain of logical reasoning. Logic approximates toward its axioms just as calculus approximates toward infinite values, i.e., toward limits.

The Crux: QM Governs Cosmology – an infinite causal chain cannot have a precise first cause because it amounts to putting the whole number line – infinite in volume – within itself. Infinite values can be bounded (as argued above) but they cannot be definitively sequenced.

Claiming an infinite series has a precise first cause is an irrational attempt to sequence an infinite value within itself. Put another way, it’s the attempt to make something – a number sequence – greater than itself. This is a paradox. The compatibility of an infinite value with sequencing must be asymptotically approached as an infinite progression towards a limit.

The empirical parallel to the above argument is the attempt to sequence being – general existence – logically. You cannot precisely sequence general existence logically, that is, you cannot definitively attach a first cause to general existence for the same reason you cannot discretely sequence the whole number line within itself. The attempt to do so involves putting general existence into a logical sequence as if it were rationally compatible with reasoning. You cannot reason definitively with imprecisely sequenceable values, i.e., with infinite values.

Premise – Imprecise sequenceability, an attribute of an infinite value, such as the whole number line or general existence, precludes definitive analysis. Without definitive analysis, infinite values can only be axiomatic. Axioms are the necessary start points of analysis. They can be forever approached as an approximation to a limit, and this is an analytical_logical process, but the asymptote does not equal the limit. So, there can be a logical approach to proof of infinite values, but no complete and final proof of them. Well, analysis_logic is rooted in continuity, and there is a gap in the continuity linking infinite values with analysis_logic.

This gap is the door-ajar entrée for QM into our universe.

Given these limitations, the attempt to sequence an infinite value amounts to claiming a given thing is greater than itself; this irrational claim holds moot sway within QM, as in the instance of superposition; prior to measurement, the cat is neither dead or alive. This points our reasoning mind towards an eternal universe without a discrete first cause being possible.*

My Conclusion - The nuancing of: “Logically, an infinite causal chain cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause."leads to "Moot Instead of Necessary." So, at the matrix of 3D+T, an infinite causal chain probabilistically arrives at an ad hoc, QM super-positional first cause towards the next-order matrix of dimensional expansion.

Undefined> 1/0 (nothing-to-something).

Within the objective materialism of modern science, logic and computation assume axiomatically the eternal existence of matter, energy, motion, space, and time. These five fundamentals preclude any direct connection between something and nothing. Therefore, all existing things are mediated through the fundamental five.

Nothing-to-something takes forever when the bounded infinity structure – infinite volume within limited extent – applies.

If we represent the infinite series of nothing-to-something as undefined, or 1/0, and observe that infinitely small approximates to the limit of zero, then infinitely-small-to-zero and its reverse take an infinite amount of time. So, speaking logically and computationally, nothing-to-something is a bounded infinity of undefined.

*Of course, a thing-greater-than-itself is really just the fun-house mirror distortion of higher-dimensional expansion as seen in its collapsed state at our level of perception at 3D+T. In actuality, superposition is the whereness of a material object with more than 3 spatial dimensions. Because whereness beyond 3D is so radically different, it renders QM’s insights into higher dimensional whereness as whacky gross distortions of normal whereness, i.e., common sense perception of material objects at the dimensional expansion of 3D+T.

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. Could it be you have nothing to say about a first cause and its followers? — ucarr

Look at this again Ucarr. A -> B -> C Nothing caused A. A is a first cause. I don't see me evading anything, you seem to be overcomplicating the issue or seeing something there that I don't. — Philosophim

So, A→C. Okay, you've shown me the transitive property via implication. No dispute from me, but the transitive property by implication is not what I'm focusing on when I accuse you of evasion.

After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain? — ucarr

That's definitely not what I intended. The first cause is the start of the causal chain. — Philosophim

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. — ucarr

As you can see, I ask you about the physical connection between first cause and the members of its causal chain. This is a particularly important question for you to answer because you say first cause is not a member of the set of its causations. You're apparently talking about causation without physical connection between first cause and its set of causations. You say you're only concerned with a logical argument while leaving an empirical argument to other thinkers. Well, causation -- whether viewed logically or empirically -- entails by definition a physical relationship between cause and effect, or am I mistaken?

If I'm mistaken, and you're ready to demonstrate how your logical truth directly impacts our material world, then you're opening a big can of worms regarding top-down causation from mind directly to physical effect. Whether or not this is possible is an unresolved debate. This issue is too large for you to ignore completely.

If I'm not mistaken, then your proposition: "Every causal chain traces back to a first cause," needs to explain how it is that material causal chains trace back to origins from which they're materially disconnected.

These two big and unresolved issues motivate me to charge you with evasion.

I have listed this repeatedly. Please go back and re-read where I mention the value of realizing what a first cause is and its consequences. I would relist this if it were once or twice, but I've already mentioned this at least 3 times. — Philosophim

Again, I'm not herein focused on the simple transitive property you keep repeating.

So, first cause possesses the distinction of prior nothingness? — ucarr

Yes. This has been said numerous times as well Ucarr. Please stop asking the same questions again and again and just start asserting your thoughts. I will correct you if you make a mistake. My current correction is your mistake in asking the same question again and again. — Philosophim

No. You fail to note the importance of "distinction" in context here. I'm specifically talking about what sets off first cause from its causations. The emphasis here is on the physical relationship between first cause and its causations, not on the definition of first cause. If I were muddled about the definition of first cause, I would've asked: "What's the definition of first cause?"

Now the question arises: "How is the second law of conservation preserved?" You must answer this question about one of the foundational planks upon which physics stands.

Such an emergence would be stupendous if coupled with playing the role of an on-sight parent nurturing children, but you say, with pique, first cause is not party to its descendants. — ucarr

It would be stupendous. But such an empirical claim must be empircally proven. If you claimed, "This pregnant woman incepted out of nowhere with a biological age of 23," you better have airtight proof that your claim matches reality. — Philosophim

For this reason, you must explain and justify the partition you posit between a first cause and the set of its causations. It is clear to you that partitioning first cause from its causal chain implies a citation from empirical evidence, right? Since causation is specifically concerned with how one thing causes another thing, it follows that claiming first cause is not directly connected to its set of causations results from direct observation of this disjunction.

I make this argument, in part, because we don't say "causation" when we talk about a chain of reasoning evaluating to a conclusion.

If you do have a logical proof first causes are separate from their sets of causations, I wonder why you don't present it. It's reasonable to think it essential to your proposition.

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. — ucarr

Yeah...that's an opinion about me not about the theory. Maybe you've just reached the end of exploring this Ucarr. We've gone over it numerous times, it still stands, and maybe its time to accept that. Admitting it works for now doesn't mean you have to like it, or that it can't be disproven in the future. But if we're descending into insults about the creator of the idea, it seems like the idea is pretty solid and there's nothing more to be said for now. — Philosophim

You charge me with attacking you instead of attacking your thinking supporting the proposition. Is it not possible for a living organism to be a first cause? If so, I've misunderstood what you've been telling me about a first cause: "There are no limitations on the inception of a first cause."

If there's truth in my defense here, then the accusation of a personal attack flies back in your direction: you're hurling at me a derogatory opinion about my frustration with your perceived endurance of the veracity of your proposition.

What sort of questions about nothing cry out for answers? Let's suppose our world has nothing for its ancestor. How does nothing animate and uplift human nature? — ucarr

Why do you need something else to do that? If there was something out there that intended humanity to be inanimate and hated human nature, wouldn't you give it the metaphorical finger and uplift humanity anyway? Purpose is not found from without. It is found from within us. — Philosophim

You seem to be forgetting we're talking about first causes. First causes, by your definition, are the inescapable sources of the many causations that populate our world. Causations always trace back to them. Well, that includes the human population. There's no doubt of it; you're first causes hold the position of God. Inescapable God needs to be inspirational, or is the universe really that cruel?

First cause has no truck with us? How dismal. — ucarr

Lets say there is a God Ucarr. It would know its a first cause. Meaning it would be in the same boat you're talking about. "Why am I hear? There's no outside reason for me, a God, to exist. Oh woe is me!" The God would need to make the same decision we do. They must find value and purpose in their own existence. So Ucarr, there is no escaping the reality that even a God has no prior cause, no prior purpose, no sanctioned greater purpose than what they are. — Philosophim

This is an argument not for causation -- first or otherwise -- but against it. It's a recognition and endorsement of self-actualization. Well, first cause and self-actualization being twins, you've inadvertently supported the denial first cause and its set of causations are separate. After all, humans and gods alike, we're all in the same boat.

Ironically, this endorsement -- meant to exalt God and humanity together -- trivializes the logical dimensions of first cause in isolation. The interweave of God and humanity self-actualizing together -- an existential project -- dwarfs the importance of logical isolation.

...as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven — ucarr

Hey, I'm just accepting David Hume's reasoning, about the universality of cause & effect. I'm not an expert in these matters, so you can argue with him. — Gnomon

Hume points out that we never have an impression of efficacy. Because of this, our notion of causal law seems to be a mere presentiment that the constant conjunction will continue to be constant, some certainty that this mysterious union will persist. — edu/hume-causation/

For an explanation supporting the reality of causation, I'm inclined to cite the second law of conservation: matter and energy are neither created nor destroyed. In conjunction with this, I'm inclined to propose that matter and energy are continually changing form and position via self-organizing dynamical systems across time and space. In a complicated way, causation is about shape-shifting. So, causation tells us our world is thoroughly networked.

After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain? — ucarr

That's definitely not what I intended. The first cause is the start of the causal chain. — Philosophim

My first impulse is to deem your non-response a blatant evasion. Could it be you have nothing to say about a first cause and its followers? Let me examine your thoughts a bit further. If a first cause is not part of its causal chain, is not connected to its causations, what meaning does first cause possess? Merely repeating over and over that its a necessary first means nothing real and practical if you can't elaborate details of first cause active in our daily world. Merely being necessary to the inception of a descendent translates to a man who sires a child and then abandons both the child and its mother. Why is a thought experiment to such a conclusion worth your time and effort?

As the first cause, is the first cause bacterium distinguishable from its offspring? — ucarr

It is distinct in the fact that if we were to trace the bacteria back to the first, we would find there was no evidence of there being a prior bacterium. — Philosophim

So, first cause possesses the distinction of prior nothingness? Such an emergence would be stupendous if coupled with playing the role of an on-sight parent nurturing children, but you say, with pique, first cause is not party to its descendants.

Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction? — ucarr

What do you think? Ucarr, I've told you the value already in understanding the idea. What do you think about that? — Philosophim

I think in your mind you've journeyed to a lonely place defined by the absoluteness of its isolation. Moreover, the solitary denizen of that yawning emptiness flails about, haunted by unbreakable seclusion. Might this be where Nietzsche landed finally, with the last, dimming glow of twilight absorbing into the darkness of his transcendent idols?

The logic is about prior causation, so its use is in questions about prior and ultimate causation. — Philosophim

What sort of questions about nothing cry out for answers? Let's suppose our world has nothing for its ancestor. How does nothing animate and uplift human nature? Perhaps more important is the question how does our first material ancestor, first cause -- no more connected to us than nothing -- impact our lives? At least the God of antiquity has thrown a Tanakh our way. First cause has no truck with us? How dismal.

David Hume addressed the philosophical Causation Problem by noting that, in Physics there is no Causation, only Change*1. Yet, the human mind attributes the Power of Causation (potential) to some unseen force. By the same reasoning, there are no Laws or Logic in the physical world. But the human mind seems to inherently "conceive" of consecutive Change as the effect of some prior physical input of Energy. It's a Belief, not a Fact. — Gnomon

...as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven. — ucarr

I would question what you mean by 'not proven'. Without causation all of science and reason goes out the window. If causation is gone, then I can't say you typed your reply to me. "You" didn't cause it. And that's absurd. — Philosophim

Perhaps Gnomon can elaborate so rules of inference governing formal proofs not yet satisfied by reasoning about causation.

It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things not causations. — ucarr

First causes would not be causations, but everything after their inception would be. — Philosophim

Regarding causal chains, you define two types of things in the world: first causes and causations.

What I remember pertinent to first causes within the context of causality is that after inception, a first cause is henceforth subject to the laws of physics in application to all things inhabiting the natural world. — ucarr

More accurately, it exists in the way it exists, and interacts with others in a resultant manner that can be codified into rules and laws. — Philosophim

What you say above is a re-wording of some of your earlier statements. What you're saying is generally clear, but now I want to take a closer look at some details. You say a first cause is not part of its causal chain. After inception, when the first cause is in the world existing as it exists, how is it physically related to its causal chain?

Let's imagine a new type of bacterium incepts into our world. Empirical examination leads medical science to believe it causes a new type of disease with unique symptoms. During its lifetime, the first cause bacterium reproduces. As the first cause, is the first cause bacterium distinguishable from its offspring? Is it indistinguishable from its offspring? Does nature provide any means by which a first cause is known as such? If it doesn't, don't we have to doubt there's any way to isolate a first cause beyond the domain of abstract reasoning? Does this raise a question about the practical value of isolating a first cause in abstraction?

If an effective treatment for the new type of bacterium is developed, does any knowledge of the first cause bacterium, whether abstract or empirical, amount to anything more than an academic exercise in thought experimentation?

It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things that are not causations. Is it the case that whatever is not a causation is a first cause? — ucarr

I have been over this numerous times at this point. Its been answered already several posts up, please review. We had a lengthy discussion about first causes and how they enter into causality once formed. Please look for that again. — Philosophim

What I remember pertinent to first causes within the context of causality is that after inception, a first cause is henceforth subject to the laws of physics in application to all things inhabiting the natural world.

Here's a question I think unaddressed and important that arises: With the exception of first causes, is it true that -- within the everyday world of things material and otherwise -- all things are part of a causal chain that inevitably arrives at a first cause?

My issue with contingency is that we don’t know enough about reality to know if all things are contingent. — Tom Storm

You respond to Tom Storm's uncertainty about universal contingency with "correct." Is it the case your thesis posits universal contingency abstractly while, in fact, empirically you're uncertain about it being true? Is it the case your uncertainty -- if it exists -- stems from a lack of empirical verification? If so, your uncertainty might be tied to deep and complex questions about the veracity of knowledge a priori with respect to phenomena supposedly amenable to empirical verification. You've addressed the issue of empirical verification by saying it's a nearly impossible standard to meet. To my thinking this throws doubt upon the probativity of your thought experiment.

For a parallel, consider Einstein and his theories of General and Special Relativity. He developed them abstractly as thought experiments employing calculations. Subsequent to the publication of his papers, empirical verifications of their claims were established. The logical and the empirical are sometimes two halves of one whole.

This is not an empirical proof, but a logical proof based on what we know today. — Philosophim

Your implied dismissal of any crosstalk between the logical and the empirical herein notwithstanding, the two modes of inquiry are indeed herein inter-dependent because, as I've learned from Gnomon, causation is believed but not yet proven.

I write the above paragraph in reference back to the importance of: "It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things not causations."

I know you think I'm pettifogging your thesis with irrelevant blather; I hope my questions are piquant.

It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things that are not causations. Is it the case that whatever is not a causation is a first cause? — ucarr

I haven't forgotten you telling me after inception the causal chain develops within the everyday world as we know it.

The infinite causal chain equals members populating a set; they are more commonly referred to as the universe? — ucarr

No, as mentioned before its the set of all causations within that universe up to the point in which we ask, "What caused that universe?" — Philosophim

We had a lengthy discussion about first causes and how they enter into causality once formed. — Philosophim

Regarding: 'up to the point in which we ask, "What caused that universe?,"' it's not clear to me when this point is reached. Is this the point when: "It entails eventually putting it into a set." — ucarr

Yes. We take the entirety of the causations over the infinite time in the universe then ask, "What caused this to be?" Why is it 3T + infinity = y instead of 2T + infinity = y? — Philosophim

Since both of your equations evaluate to the same result, I wonder whether there's any meaningful distinction between them.

Does this evaluation of all causations into a set occur in time as we know it? — ucarr

A causation chain in total is not taken in 'time'. Its an evaluation of everything that has happened so far. You are given the formula 2T + infinity = Y. This formula contains all the causality by time in that universe. So you say, "That's neat. What caused the universe to be infinite and eternal in that way?" Is it "Nothing" or is there something else that caused it? If there's nothing which caused it to be eternal, then there was nothing that deigned its inception; it simply is. A first cause to all the rest of the causality. — Philosophim

I understand you to be telling me you arrive at your premise:

Every causal chain inevitably arrives at a first cause — Philosophim

by way of a thought experiment.

The infinite causal chain equals members populating a set; they are more commonly referred to as the universe?
— ucarr

No, as mentioned before its the set of all causations within that universe up to the point in which we ask, "What caused that universe?" — Philosophim

It's not clear to me if the universe contains things that are causations mixed with things that are not causations. Is it the case that whatever is not a causation is a first cause?

Regarding: 'up to the point in which we ask, "What caused that universe?,"' it's not clear to me when this point is reached. Is this the point when: "It entails eventually putting it into a set." Does this evaluation of all causations into a set occur in time as we know it?

It's not clear to me where the first cause is in relation to its chain of causations. Is first cause inside or outside of the set of all causations?

Do you have a point... — Philosophim

Keep trying Ucarr! — Philosophim

What do you want me to understand from these two comments?

It entails eventually putting it into a set. — Philosophim

The infinite causal chain equals members populating a set?

No, the chain is not the first cause. — Philosophim

Every causal chain inevitably arrives at a first cause. — Philosophim

Is first cause a member of the causal chain?

The first cause of the chain occurs after you take all other causality within that universe. So you have mapped out that it is eternal and infinitely regressive. What remains after that is, "What caused the universe to be?" — Philosophim

At this point, you have evaluated down to two things: first cause; causal chain as members populating a set?

In the case of the formula of an infinitely regressive universe, because there is infinite time and we are capturing all possible causations within infinite time, there is no 'first causation". Essentially the first cause comes about after we capture all possible infinite causations in that universe, then ask the next question, "What caused it to be this way?" — Philosophim

Am I correct in understanding you to be saying the procedure for comprehending the value of an infinite causal chain entails looking at the infinite causal chain as a whole?

Moreover, am I correctly inferring that by looking at an infinite causal chain as a whole, I'm drawn by a sequence of reasoning to the necessarily logical conclusion that an infinite causal chain is a first cause?

Could you rephrase that question in more conventional terms? — Gnomon

What I presented comes from Deacon. I thought I'd try to articulate an important chain of causation: non-life to life. As for everyday causation:

After going to the doctor with mild symptoms, you're told your spinal column is infected with pneumococci bacteria. Since it's believed this infection causes spinal meningitis, you're advised to immediately undergo an aggressive program of antibiotics within the intensive care unit. — ucarr

Here's what's presently of interest to me:

For the record, I don't deny Causation; but I do think it's a mental inference... — Gnomon

Is it correct to say you see causation -- structurally speaking -- as a generalization in parallel with the specific energy-and-change relationship with respect to an invisible agent that causes transformation from one state-of-being to another state-of-being?

What does Y stand for in your equation? — ucarr

Total number of causations within that point of time on the chain. — Philosophim

Given a first cause, is it correct to say the next thing following the first cause -- the first thing caused by the first cause -- appears as the first causation? Subsequent links in the causal chain are, likewise, causations?

Regarding your equation:

Why is it 2t + infinity = Y and not 3t + infinity = Y? — Philosophim

Does Y have an infinite value?

Now here's the question which you have to answer Ucarr. Why is it 2t + infinity = Y and not 3t + infinity = Y? Is there anything outside which caused it to be one way over the other? — Philosophim

What does Y stand for in your equation?

Ironically, modern science postulates several causal features of reality that are logical inferences instead of sensory observations. For example Energy is the universal cause of all changes in the world, but we never detect the Energy per se, we only infer its logically-necessary existence from after-effects in material objects. Likewise, the notion of electric or quantum Fields is a logical inference from observation of changes in the material world*3. How that universal or local field came to be --- "popped into existence" --- is irrelevant for pragmatic Science : it just is, and it works. — Gnomon

I'm recalling from memory you citing Hume re: causation. The gist of your point is that causation, in his view, is an inference from observed patterns of apparently connected changes in states of being within the world. His conclusion, as reported by you, states that the concept of causation stands upon empirically-derived impressions of the world. In closing, you said these impressions are generally understood to fall short of a proof of the concept of causation.

Do you reject the belief causation resides within dynamical systems of self-organization phase-shifted across ascending levels of organization towards effects?

So, it's correct to say your core proposition within this conversation goes as follows:

Every causal chain inevitably arrives at a first cause. — Philosophim

Your goal is to demonstrate that a first cause is not necessary. You are not going to win by challenging the definition of the first cause, if the definition is logically necessary. The only way to do that is to demonstrate that logically a universe can exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause within its causal chain. — Philosophim

By making a small change to your last sentence, I get a proposition: Logically, a universe cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause within its causal chain.

Does this alteration produce a proposition you endorse? Furthermore, does this proposition lie within the core of what you're saying in this conversation?

A first cause exists, it does not negate itself. If it did, it would be gone. I'm not understanding how you see a first cause implies its own negation. — Philosophim

There is the question whether a first cause, lacking a precedent, must be eternal. Also, there is the question whether or not an eternal existence is self-caused rather than uncaused.

I'm not claiming something comes from nothing. A first cause doesn't come from anything. I'm just noting that prior to a first causes inception, there is no prior causation... — Philosophim

Following from this we have: a) there is no something-from-nothing, so, no first cause from nothing; b) there is no other thing in the role of a precedent for first cause. Given these restrictions, first cause cannot pop into existence from nothing and it cannot come from a precedent, thus it must be eternally self-caused. But here we encounter a contradiction: causation separates the causal force from the thing it causes, however, in the case of self-causation, this separation evaluates as self ⟹ ~self (self implies not-self), a contradiction. This therefore leads us to claim existence (of the universe) is eternal and there is no first cause.

I first establish what a first cause is, something which is not caused by anything prior or else. The consequence of this logically means that prior to the inception of a first cause, there was no reason why it should, or should not have formed. And if there is no reason why a first cause should or should not have formed, there is no limitations or rules that shape what a first cause should, or should not be. — Philosophim

Given: No should and no should not, we have equilibrium as nothing. Given: No restrictions and no intentions, again we have equilibrium as nothing.

I'm not seeing how this is any different from claiming: "First cause popped into existence from nothing."

It's okay to claim: "First cause popped into existence from nothing." Maybe so. I'm only claiming this declaration is not the conclusion of a logical sequence of reasoning. This is an issue because of what your title for this conversation claims: "A Logical first cause is necessary." You can't fulfill the claim of your title until you present a logical sequence of reasoning that necessarily concludes with: "First cause popped into existence from nothing." When you say you establish what a first cause is, you merely define first cause. That's okay to do. However, it's a claim of truth based on words asserted without a logical sequence of reasoning to justify them. Proceeding from here, you claim no reasons for or against existence of a first cause and no restrictions or intentions as to what the identity of first cause shall be. That's okay to do. However, again, it's a claim of truth based on words asserted without a logical sequence of reasoning to justify them.

...we're taking the entire set of the eternal regressive universe and asking, "What caused this to exist?" The answer is nothing besides the fact that it exists. Thus a first cause. — Philosophim

Okay. You're saying a first cause is uncaused. I think we agree this is a definition for which logical proof is impossible. An uncaused first exists without explanation. Fine. But don't claim your observation of the unexplainable equals proof of logical necessity. As I cautioned in my previous post, don't confuse the logical decision to merely observe and accept the existence of the unexplainable with the logical explanation of the unexplainable.

If first cause refers to an eternal universe, there follows the question whether anything is caused because everything has always existed, whether actually or potentially.

When looking at a regressive infinite universe, we're going up the causal chain until we get to the point in the chain where we ask, "What caused an infinitely regressive universe to exist?" — Philosophim

Going up an infinite causal regression does not conclude with arrival at a point; the points continue without arrival being possible. For this reason, there can be no logical assessment of what constitutes a first cause. All you can ever do, given the definition of first cause, is declare it without logical proof. Each time you declare a first cause, you're logically concluding its a concept the existence of which can only be accepted without an explanatory sequence of reasoning. Again, don't confuse your logical conclusion about what you can know and explain regarding a first cause with a logical explanation of the inception of a first cause. Perhaps your conversation title should be: Concluding A First Cause Simply Exists is a Logical Necessity. Isn't this what you've been saying over and over? If you had used this title in the first place, most folks would've agreed with you and this conversation would've ended long ago.

If you're postulating an infinitely regressive universe that contains local first causes, then you're constructing a contradictory universe because if there comes into existence something causeless, then it's necessarily another, independent universe. — ucarr

No, its another separate causal chain inception. A first cause is the inception of a causal chain. — Philosophim

If something is part of an existing universe, how can it be without precedent? No, a first cause, by your oft-repeated definition: "Something which is not caused by anything else." cannot be other than a new and independent universe. An existing universe cannot spawn a first cause.

Anything within a causal chain caused by something prior cannot be a first cause. But this does not prevent something outside of that particular causal chain from appearing and starting its own causal chain. — Philosophim

There might be a first-cause-as-universe within another separate universe, but an existing universe cannot spawn something not related to itself. So, this appears to be a restriction upon what a first cause can be: it must be its own universe.

You're making the mistake of looking at the universe instead of the causal chain of that universe. — Philosophim

Since I reject logical first cause I look at something similar in terms of uncaused eternal universe.

If something negates itself, its gone. A thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. — Philosophim

. That's why there's the question whether or not self-causation is fatal:

"...causation separates the causal force from the thing it causes, however, in the case of self-causation, this separation evaluates as self ⟹ ~self (self implies not-self), a contradiction."

I'm asking you to give me an example of a universe without a first cause in its causation chain. — Philosophim

An eternal universe is an example because it has no beginning and no causation. I can't prove existence of such a universe logically. I can only declare it as an axiom from which reasoning follows. This axiom cannot be derived logically. It is, however, logical for me to conclude that this axiom is a necessary start point for reasoning. Since an unexplainable axiom is a necessary start point for a sequence of reasoning, it's clear the axiom stands beyond the reach of logic.

"Assume it is false, what do we arrive at?" The frustration Ucarr is your inability to demonstrate it is false so far. Which is fine, keep trying. If it were clearly false, we would not be still having this discussion. — Philosophim

Below I reprint an argument you haven't responded to:

...you cannot talk rationally about nothing (or anything else) causing the universe to exist because it's impossible to ascertain any logical reason for its existence. This is so because reason_cause imply sequence, but infinite value cannot be specified and therefore cannot be [logically] sequenced. — ucarr

Here I'm talking about infinite-causal-chain-as-universe. I'm claiming you can't posit a first cause start point of an infinite-causal-chain-as-universe because any sequence -- once identified as infinite -- has no specifiable start point or end point. My logic is simple: if you can't find something, you can't claim it's either a start point or an end point. If this is true, then your claim a first-cause start point (for an infinite causal chain) is logically necessary is false because the math logic of infinity denies existence of start points and end points within infinite sequences.*

I wonder if you'll oblige my explicit request for you to counter-argue the specific points I've raised here.

*This is even true for infinite sequences that have boundaries. Such infinite sequences lie within specified start and end points, but the volume of the members is a separate thing (infinite) from the extent of the members (finite). Consider the sequence from 0 to 1.

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

This is not a sequence of reasoning. If it were, you would include a list of possible reasons for only one type of universe. All entries but one on this list would be crossed out and a sequence of reasoning provided to explain and justify the exclusions. Instead, it's an axiomatic statement about space and matter used as a premise for claiming there is but one type of universe. It's okay to do this, but it's an axiomatic claim, not a logical explanation.

You know this isn't correct at this point. This is frustration. Don't let that win. I've laid the reasoning out clearly at this point. — Philosophim

You think claiming as fact "there is but one type of universe" is reasoning? Give me a logical explanation for your belief. See my statement above (infinity cannot be sequenced) for an example of
reasoning toward a conclusion.

Don't confuse the logical decision to make an unexplainable observation axiomatically with logically explaining the content of that observation. You're doing the former, not the latter. — ucarr

If you're going to assert that, you need to demonstrate that. Otherwise this is just not wanting to accept a conclusion. — Philosophim

Imagine I don't know that a certain plastic, being a non-conductor, acts as an insulator against the flow of electric current. After repeatedly trying to get current to pass through the plastic to another conductor that completes a circuit that makes a motor run, I run a series of tests and see that whenever the plastic is excluded from the circuit, the motor runs. I therefore conclude, logically, that completing the circuit requires bypassing the plastic. I've made a logical conclusion about a state of affairs I've observed. Indeed, this is logical thinking. However, I shouldn't go forth to other people claiming I have a logical explanation for why the plastic keeps the motor from running. I'm merely observing what is happening as an axiom of unexplained truth that the motor doesn't run when the plastic is included in the circuit.*

*A chemist might enter the narrative with an explanation why the motor doesn't run with the plastic included in the circuit: it lacks the loosely bonded electrons needed to supply the current necessary to complete the circuit.

My example parallels:

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

This is an observation, not an explanation. You have no argument towards claiming logically only one type of universe exists. On the basis of your information-scarce observation, there's no logical reason to conclude there exists only one type of universe. You insist people believe your claim because you say so.

First comes the logical necessity of a first cause, then comes the conclusion that this means the inception of a first cause cannot be explained by anything else, thus there is nothing prior which could cause a limit on what or would not incept as a first cause. — Philosophim

You merely state as fact: "logical necessity of a first cause." There's no explanation why logical necessity of first cause. Your state an observed what; you don't state an explained why.

Maybe you're right that its axiomatic, but can you break it down how you arrive that its merely a declaration? — Philosophim

What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being.* No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence. — ucarr

I've put in bold letters what's at the center of our debate: "There is nothing that explains the being of a first cause."

Here we have your fatal mistake in mostly your own words. By definition -- not by a sequence of reasoning -- you state without explanation the truth about a first cause: it's an axiom by supposition. Moreover, it cannot be explained logically because, as you say, "There is (by definition) nothing which explains its being."

:up: :100:

My thanks to you for this persuasive argument.

The Set Theory Argument

“When we say that a set is finite or infinite, we are referring to the number of elements in the set, not to the "extent" (putting it roughly) of those elements.”

Set Theory: Bounded Infinity

Note - To find my source linked above, scroll down the page to "4 Answers," and then read the paragraph directly below.

This is a distinction made in observation of a set of numbers. Consider the set of numbers between 0 and 1. The number of elements in this set is infinite, yet the set has boundaries, so it’s an example of a bounded infinity. It’s important to note that no part of the set can possibly go to infinity. This limitation pertains to the extent of the set.

In a parallel situation, an eternal universe can be a bounded set of infinitely many existing things. So, the number of elements in this set is infinite, yet the set has boundaries, so it’s an example of a bounded infinity. Likewise, no part of this set can possibly go to infinity. This means the set of existing things, in parallel with the set of numbers mentioned above, has a limitation of specifiable content always short of its infinite extension. This precludes logical discussion about a start for the infinite extension. In consequence, it’s logical to talk axiomatically about what cannot be explained logically.

The critical question pertinent to our debate is whether or not you can talk logically about the before or after of a bounded infinity. When talking logically about the start of a chain of causality, you’re talking about the beginning of a continuity. That’s talking about the extent of a series. Since the infinite number of elements populating the series precludes you from ascertaining a start point, you can’t claim logically that before the start point there were such and such necessary conditions because you cannot specify a start point.

It's illegitimate to do so by simply making the declaration: "This is the start point, and before the start point there was nothing, thus the start point examples an uncaused start point, i.e., a first cause.” Doing this examples arbitrarily marking a start point by decree. That’s okay to do. Science and math oftentimes make decrees about a certain premise being an arbitrary start point for a sequence of reasoning that follows. These arbitrary start points are not arrived at logically. In this situation, an arbitrary start point is called an axiom.

What’s not okay to do is to claim you can progress through a chain of reasoning from nothing to an arbitrary start. Just as there is no specifiable start, there is also no specifiable continuity leading to an unspecifiable start. This is another way of saying no part of the set can go to infinity. Doing so is therefore incoherent because the illegitimate continuity jumps from nothing to an artificially specified unspecifiable start point.

He [ucarr] doesn't like the idea that there was nothing, then something. — Philosophim

I don't accept the claim: "Something from nothing" declared without explanation proves logical necessity of a first cause.

What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being.* No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence. — Philosophim

Generally, I accept all of this. Specifically, I don't accept an axiomatic declaration as a rational explanation of the logical necessity of first cause.

*With this statement you prove I'm correct in saying your declarations about first cause are not logical, your stated purpose.

What caused space to always exist? Nothing. — Philosophim

"Nothing" in this context can be read in multiple ways: a) nothing as in no cause of space; b) nothing as in nothingness, a something that caused space, in which case the infinite regress towards a true first cause is under way; c) nothing as a category which includes logic, so first cause cannot be logically necessary.

If first cause is logically necessary, then logic is contemporary with (if not prior to) first cause.

My central point continues to be the claim no causation precludes any type of sequence, including something from nothing. Also, it should be noted that a causal chain exemplifies logical continuity as expressed: A ⟹ ~A = False. In English this sentential logic statement translates to "An existing thing does not imply the negation of itself." Following from this, claiming causeless first cause tries to equate sequence with the negation of sequence, the definition of first cause. Herein lies the heart of the incoherence of your claim.

I haven't forgotten your argument that before first cause a potential first cause can be anything, no restrictions and then, after inception of first cause, logical sequencing and its limitations are in effect.

This is an incomplete narrative of how first cause incepts because a declaration stating first cause can be anything in no way explains and justifies inception of first cause. First cause via something from nothing might be true, but such a declaration is an axiomatic presumption; logical necessity has no part in it.

Can you accept a paraphrase of: "A logical first cause is necessary" as follows: "Everything must have a beginning"? — ucarr

No, they're not the same thing. The point of the theory was to show that even in an infinitely regressive universe, a first cause is still logically necessary. — Philosophim

If, as you say, even an infinitely regressive universe entails logical necessity of a first cause, that's merely saying in different words that: Everything, even an infinite universe, must have a beginning. In this situation of the causeless eternal universe, you're building a contradiction because there's no nothing for first cause to incept from.

If you're postulating an infinitely regressive universe that contains local first causes, then you're constructing a contradictory universe because if there comes into existence something causeless, then it's necessarily another, independent universe. Anything contained within the causeless universe cannot be first-caused because, being a part of a causeless universe, by definition it cannot be separate from said causeless universe. Furthermore, the independent universe as first cause is building a contradiction because -- again -- in the situation of an eternal universe, there's no nothing for a first cause to incept from.

You still haven't addressed the issue of the paradox of an eternal existence being self-caused. If a thing causes itself, then simultaneously it is and is not itself. This is a logical argument against existence of first cause.

An eternal universe has nothing prior. It has no prior cause for its existence. — Philosophim

You are therefore traveling the road to self-causation. On the other hand, if you accept that in the situation of an eternal universe, there is no causation because everything has always existed, with only the variation of forms giving the appearance of change, then the problem is solved. However, I know you don't accept this because causation lies at the core of what you claim.

Also, in the situation of an eternal universe, the start point cannot be ascertained; it's impossible. Well, if a start point is impossible to ascertain, then logical necessity of a first cause it likewise impossible to ascertain. It can only be supposed axiomatically.

Lets imagine an eternal universe where water exists everywhere. It has always been, and will always be. Why? What caused the universe to exist in that way? Nothing. — Philosophim

In the case of an eternal universe, you cannot talk rationally about nothing (or anything else) causing the universe to exist because it's impossible to ascertain any logical reason for its existence. This is so because reason_cause imply sequence, but infinite value cannot be specified and therefore cannot be sequenced.

Your crucial mistake in your thesis is thinking one can reason back to the beginning of an infinite sequence. By definition an infinite sequence, i.e., infinite value, has no beginning_ending. Beginnings and endings are specific whereas infinite values are undefined as with 1/0 = undefined.

Are you noticing how I always support my assertions with potentially falsifiable arguments? I never claim that such and such is so because my words say they are so. You do this over and over again. Your claims in this thesis always terminate in claiming it is so because the words you write say it is so. Your central claim is not potentially falsifiable. It is circular reasoning true by definition.

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

It is not a presupposition, its a conclusion that we arrive at... — Philosophim

In your example, there is no arrival and no conclusion; instead, there is an observation and a declaration without any reasoning toward it:

There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

The argument here isn't about the legitimacy of your observation; it's about whether or not you followed a chain of logic in making it. You haven't.

You see Ucarr, the argument's conclusion is logically necessary. — Philosophim

Don't confuse the logical decision to make an unexplainable observation axiomatically with logically explaining the content of that observation. You're doing the former, not the latter.

...time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas_ucarr

Is there anything time is connected to? — ucarr

Don't quote a stetement cut off from its immediate context. It's a very bad and unacceptable habit, ucarr. — Alkis Piskas

I have enough with all that, ucarr. You are a bad interlocutor. Please don't bother me again. — Alkis Piskas

You accuse me of intentionally quoting you out of context for the purpose of fatally distorting your intended meaning, all of this towards setting up a misrepresentation of you as a straw man easy to defeat in debate.

Of course I respect your demand I no longer attempt to dialogue with you. However, I have a right to rebut your accusation. My defense herein is for the public record; it's not an example of my ignorance of your demand.

Let's begin by noting the ellipsis: the three dots at the beginning of my abridged quotation of your words. An ellipsis is a public announcement to all readers the quotation is abridged. It's a notification to everyone words have been omitted from the quotation. When someone seeks to quote another person out of context for the purpose of distortion and misrepresentation of that person, including an ellipsis contradicts that purpose.

Moreover, here at TPF, what value is gained by misquoting someone when the public record makes it easy for everyone to examine the original statement? Since it's easy for the supposedly misquoted person to copy and repost their original statement and then juxtapose it to the abridged version for public inspection -- something you've done here without causing me a smidgen of difficulty in mounting my defense -- it's clear only a fool would bother with making the attempt.

Actually the concept of "matter" was constructed by Aristotle to account for the reality of temporal continuity. What persists unchanged, as time passes, despite changes to a thing's form, is the thing's matter. So matter provides the basis for a thing's extension in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I presume the above quote from Metaphysician Undercover is the cause of your contempt over my abridgment of your quote. Indeed, I think it a strong rebuttal to your statement.

The question here is whether Metaphysician Undercover's rebuttal loses strength when applied to the complete version of your statement:

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. So time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas

In this particular conversation, I haven't been disputing your claim time possesses neither mass nor material dimensions.

I've underlined your conjunction in the second sentence of your statement. I'm presuming you're arguing the conjunction puts restrictions upon how your claim should be interpreted. I'm further presuming you believe Metaphysician Undercover's rebuttal doesn't apply to your claim without these restrictions.

In my opinion, separating time from mass and material dimensions is central to your claim of its irrelevance to same.

...What persists unchanged, as time passes, despite changes to a thing's form, is the thing's matter. So matter provides the basis for a thing's extension in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to my interpretation, Metaphysician Undercover's quotation of Aristotle carries the message time, mass and matter are married, the exact opposite of your claim.

As I see it, the conclusion of your claim -- as based upon the premise time has no connection to matter -- that time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa, still gets authoritatively contradicted by Metaphysician Undercover.

Replacing the words I removed merely shows more explicitly what Metaphysician Undercover's quote contradicts. The added words do not give your claim defense against the rebuttal. On the contrary, they make the truth of the rebuttal more apparent.

Let me further say this: A thing's extension in time ⟺ Time's extension in a thing.

All of this is to argue my abridgment of your statement -- regardless of my intentions -- does not weaken it.

Instead of trying to demonstrate why the conclusions here are false, try instead to prove that a first cause logically cannot exist. In other words, present to me a logical universe in which no first cause exists. — Philosophim

Along one line of reasoning -- eternal existence -- there seems to be a conditional logical preclusion of a first cause:

If we imagine a structure of existence with only one universe, then I speculate that universe, if eternal (and thus uncaused), logically precludes a universal first cause for the totality of existence. However, on the question of local first causes -- meaning no first cause of all first causes, but only independent first causes -- then it seems to me an eternal universe does logically preclude a universal first cause, but not local independent first causes.

If we imagine a structure of existence featuring multi-verses, then I speculate that multi-verse, in parallel with the single universe structure, logically precludes a universal first cause for the totality of multi-verses, but not for independent universes with local first causes.

Question - Can you accept a paraphrase of: "A logical first cause is necessary" as follows: "Everything must have a beginning"? This is another way of examining logical necessity of first cause through the lens of an eternal existence.

When we substitute: "A logical first cause is necessary" with "Everything must have a beginning," we can ask the obverse of: "prove that a first cause logically cannot exist," which is: prove an eternal universe logically cannot exit."

Can you show that an eternal universe is logically impossible?

Do "A first cause is logically necessary," and "eternal universe" contradict each other?

If they do contradict each other, then what's at stake is whether one or the other question is answerable.

If it's not possible to logically examine an eternal universe -- it can only be assumed -- then the status of its existence -- viewed through the lens of logic -- is undecidable.

At this point in my rumination, I speculate that the critique of "First cause is logically necessary" along the axis of incoherence* leads to the same statement about its status: it can only be assumed; viewed through the lens of logic, its status is undecidable.

If "A logical first cause is necessary," and "eternal universe" do not contradict each other, then they are both axiomatic presuppositions undecidable with respect to logical necessity.

*The incoherence of "A first cause is logically necessary" -- per your "argument" -- is the unexplained leap from nothing to something. This leap unexplained -- foundational to your narrative -- provides evidence your narrative is an axiomatic presupposition; its central function: leaping from nothing to something, has no logical, process-based agency. Well, that absence contradicts your stated purpose: "A first cause is logically necessary."

...time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas

Is there anything time is connected to?

Do you assess this lack of proof as a metaphysical issue? — ucarr

Only if it leads to false beliefs. — Gnomon

I'm asking if work towards finding a proof is more appropriate for the philosopher than for the scientist.

Why do you not answer my question: By what means do you sever space and time? — ucarr

I answered it. You just missed it.
... Or maybe you weren't there. :grin: — Alkis Piskas

Although Minkowski writes about time without gravity in special relativity, in general relativity time is tied to mass through gravity.

In the everyday world, the movement of massive objects is tied to time.

When Induction and Abduction also agree on the Deduction, we can be pretty sure that the Cause and Effect are correlated by some transformational Principle, that we call "Causation" --- or in some cases "Agency". And yet, due to the limitations of data and reasoning, mere Correlation of variables does not prove Causation. We could be missing something. — Gnomon

Do you assess this lack of proof as a metaphysical issue?

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then $E=mc^2$ is false? — ucarr

$E=mc^2$is false. This fact is demonstrated by the need for what is called "relativistic mass". — Metaphysician Undercover

I've learned that the concept of relativistic mass is deemed troublesome and dubious by some. Can you elaborate how it falsifies $E=mc^2$?

I have given a look to this Quora... search... [it's] based on personal thought experimentation, like yours. — Alkis Piskas

Wrong. Both Vincent Emery and Robert Shuler use calculations derived from $E=mc^2$ to support their conclusions. This is what scientists do. Either the math is right or it is wrong. You cannot evaluate their arguments as false without doing your own calculations derived from $E=mc^2$ such that they contradict Emery and Shuler.

As to my claim about your proposition and $E=mc^2$ being mutually exclusive, it likewise is not a thought experiment by virtue of the math of Emery and Shuler that I cite for support.

Emery, Shuler and I might be wrong, but our error is not proven until you provide your own contradictory math.

...my simple position that time is not contained in matter. — Alkis Piskas

Regarding your above proposition, consider the cesium atomic clock: a) transitions between the spin states of the cesium nucleus produce a frequency used in the atomic clock's measurement of time; b) the frequency of the transition states of the cesium nucleus involves: energy, mass, motion (and therefore space) as integral parts of the measurement of time.

Cesium Standard

If time is an emergent property of the cesium atom's nucleic transitions between spin states, then, as such, time is part of a networked complex of energy, mass, motion and space.

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. — Alkis Piskas

Why do you not answer my question: By what means do you sever space and time?

Necessity is not important... — Philosophim

That's why you've been working your ass off with this conversation for months running? And by the way, who says "What is is not important?" Just because humans aren't necessary, that doesn't have to mean they aren't important.

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, it still vibrates the air molecules. — Philosophim

So, you've been relaxing under island breezes.

Seems fitting after slaving in the trenches for a just cause.

Causality doesn't care whether you observe it or not. — Philosophim

This theory does not care about whether we are accurate in any particular causality, it is about causality as a necessary reality. Human minds are not required. — Philosophim

Describe a situation in nature wherein necessity is important apart from sentients.

I think you missed the point of my philosophical distinction between inferred Belief (certitude) in a Cause, and a scientifically-proven Fact of the Agent (bacteria) of an Effect (meningitis). The footnote gave the context*1. David Hume defined the concept of Causation as an inferred mental relationship, not a physical thing*2. — Gnomon

You and Hume characterize causation as deduction?

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something [matter] either. — Alkis Piskas

Initially, you indicated (indirectly) that my statement "there is no time --contained or involved-- in something either" makes E=mc2 false. — Alkis Piskas

As you say, I indirectly raised a question about the truth content of:

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something [matter] either. — Alkis Piskas

and

$E=mc^2$

considered in conjunction with each other.

Yes. I want us to consider whether the two propositions are mutually exclusive. No doubt your proposition, like Einstein's proposition, involves a complex narrative of related concepts and information that needs unpacking. Given this complexity, I intend to proceed by looking at some of the parts of the whole individually before zooming out to a broad overview of the truth-content question I have raised.

Since I have to move around and look at different aspects of various parts of this complex narrative, it might appear that I'm shifting my ground and evading probing questions.

And is this something, a possibility that you thought of yourself? Because I couldn'f find anything about all that in the Web ... — Alkis Piskas

Please click on the link below to find a supporting narrative for my argument.

How is E=mc^2 Related to Time?

(After reading Vincent Emery, scroll down to Robert Shuler.)

I use this supporting narrative to argue that: a) the equation entails time dilation phenomena interwoven with mass and energy phenomena, and thus it does have something to say about time; b) given the interweave of time dilation, mass and energy, we can raise questions about the truth content of your claim about our phenomenal universe: "There is no time --contained or involved-- in something either. Things are not composed of time."

Here's one of my counter-narratives: Time is essential to the thingliness of material objects. I can use the relativistic shrinkage of length and increase of mass of a material object due to acceleration to argue that time, space and matter are connected.

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then e=mc2 is false? — ucarr

E = mc2 says nothing about time. — Alkis Piskas

The full form of the equation: $E=p^2c^2+m^2c^4$ clarifies its inclusion of time dilation:

Einstein’s equation may be combined with Planck’s to give a relation between time (frequency) and energy:

$E^2=hf=mc^2$

$f=E/h=mc^2/h$

All instances of time dilation, whether due to motion or gravity, are directly derivable from the potential energy difference between two points of observation. Effectively, time dilation enforces energy conservation.

The example given by Einstein in an early paper (prior to General Relativity) in which he derived gravitational time dilation is matter being lowered into a gravitational field on a tether while extracting energy (like a water wheel), converted to photons, captured back at the top and reconverted to matter again.

If you get the same amount of matter, you can repeat indefinitely producing a perpetual motion machine (or, I suppose, you might be extracting mass from the gravitational object). Einstein reasoned that the frequency of the photons produced by the conversion to energy must be less, and this must reflect time dilation in the gravitational field.

Vincent Emory, Robert Shuler — Quora

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. — Alkis Piskas

By what means do you sever space and time?

I am currently unable to understand your ideas, and I am respectfully asking you to clarify them if you want me to remain engaged. — Philosophim

Okay.

How much time does it take for two + two to equal four?

An attack on answering this question can be made through the lens of the Idealization versus Measurement comparison. This comparison scheme is, in turn, part of the Abstractionism procedure.

So, the abstractionism procedure examines multiple empirical experiences and abstracts them from blooming creation down to a thematic pattern:

Syllogism: All humans are mortal; Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Pythagorean Theorem: For any right triangle, the square of the length of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the lengths of the legs of the right triangle.

The two above abstractions are measurements of multiple empirical experiences condensed into approximations of an open-ended volume of thematically linked possibilities. The process of abstractionism is thus an idealization of otherwise unmanageable, blooming creation.

Let’s now look at Idealization Versus Measurement:

Speaking intuitively, we don’t want to say that on the day Pythagoras discovered the Pythagorean Theorem, it became true. Doing so implies that on the day before his discovery, it wasn’t true. This distinction illuminates a parallel distinction: empirical measurement experiences have time locally attached to them; abstract idealizations have time absentially attached to them.

Now we have an argument for opposing the maxim: “The map is not the terrain.” By force of the Idealization Versus Measurement distinction, we can say, “Yes, it is.”

In point of fact, the brain depends upon the condensation to idealization of abstractionism for manageable navigation of blooming creation, i.e., the real world of empirical experiences at every moment leads to sensory overload if it isn’t filtered through the condensation of abstractionism.

QM backwards engineers abstractionism by showing us that the seemingly discrete material physicality of things in the phenomenal world is in reality a sensorially overwhelming networked convolution of non-local events. The Heisenberg Equations help us navigate this experiential plethora by means of statistical analysis of probabilities.

The Heisenberg Equations, being an increase of measurement precision for otherwise undetectable non-locality effects at the scale of human experience, through their advanced circuitry-logic, instruct us against concluding QM is just academic pettyfogging.

QM bolsters fantastically the not-now-but-future-spacetime-distribution design of absential materialism.

Logic embodies the diva Faubourg Saint-Germain elan of highest-form abstractionism.

We want to declare logical truth immaterial and immortal, but, alas, it is an idealization of empirical measurement within the phenomenal world of material physicality.