You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

...there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence. — noAxioms

Pegasus exists as a material thing in the form of a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain.

...EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. — noAxioms

Scope-limiters applied to existence by definition get over-ridden by the symmetries and their conservation laws. For example, if you define Pegasus as a winged horse of the mind, then Pegasus exists as a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain. All of the activity of the brain and mind are emergent from a pre-existing fund of conserved physics. The imaginative cognition of mind can configure Pegasus however it wishes, but that cognition is an emergent temporal form drawn from the pre-existing fund of conserved physics.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

I'm not putting myself at odds with physics because my point is based in the belief abstractions - although platformed by temporal neuronal circuits of the brain - signify their meanings in terms of atemporal samplings of multiple instances of a state of a system condensed to a generalization.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

I've established my allegiance to mind independence through social consensus based upon empirical evidence that similarity of human behavior as a reaction to stimuli denotes similarity of stimuli independent of one observer. I acknowledge my belief what is real depends, ultimately, upon the mind in conversation with other minds.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms

Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock. This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it. It doesn't matter if you see the rock with your physical eyes, or with your mind's eye. Either way, the empirical reality of the rock you can experience always involves your mind.

...I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity. — noAxioms

Directly below your words show that you, like me, believe a stop sign holds existence apart from its predication.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other. — noAxioms

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q. Moreover, causation implies correlation. If A makes you sick, removal of A from your presence cures your sickness. This is to say that as A becomes zero, so S for sickness becomes zero.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals. — noAxioms

The point is that correlations, like causal relationships, involve correspondents. P alone doesn't imply Q. Given P → Q, there's a correlation because of correspondence. Red, as an adjective, by definition, implies a subject it makes predication about. Predication, with no existing subject to make a predication about, examples nonsense.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q. — noAxioms

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R. — noAxioms

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

Coordinate systems map to material things local.

E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence. — noAxioms

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted. — noAxioms

I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities: — noAxioms

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

E2 Existence is what is known

Mind → E

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...}

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

( ∃ x ) ( | x | > 5 )

Your stipulation prohibiting assumption of EPP en route to evaluating to EPP is invalid. A clarifying parallel goes as follows: Stipulation 01: Evaluate to math given: for m = math, ( ∃ m ) ( | m | m < ∞ ∧m > 0). This statement quantifies the existence of math such that math has a positive value and therefore math exists. Stipulation 02: Evaluate to the existence of math without using math logic. Since math is essential to math logic, you cannot evaluate to math existence using math logic without assumption of math. Likewise, you can't evaluate to mind exists if you stipulate no assumption of MPP (Mind Precedes Predication) because without MPP you can't make the predication of "Math exists." without presumption of (and use of) the prior mind that makes the predication.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor. — noAxioms

I conclude your multi-verse attack on the pertinence of the symmetries and their conservation laws of our universe fizzles into irrelevance. The symmetries and their conservation laws connect all material things as emergent forms temporal. There are no empirical non-existences, whether directly observed or logically inferred.

Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent
number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions. — noAxioms

Parsing existence into separate categories is a falsehood. All material things are emergent forms temporal. Existence cannot be analyzed. Avoid confusing analysis of emergent forms temporal with analysis of existence general. You can analyze the attributes of yourself as an emergent form temporal. You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Pegasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist. — ucarr

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous. — noAxioms

Your division of existence into separate categories has no bearing on the symmetries, so, WRT general existence, your categories merge into general existence. I expect you to counter-narrate this, so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding. — noAxioms

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The issue of measurement within QM adds complexity and uncertainty of interpretation WRT the subject-object binary. There's evidence supporting the view they're entangled. The Schrödinger Equation allows us to infer super-position, but we never see it. Does the wave function collapse under observation? The measurement issue links directly to your ability to examine mind-independent existence. It fogs over your clear vision of its measurement.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. — noAxioms

We've already discussed the scope of existence within my definition; it includes mind-dependent abstractions of the mind and also presumed mind-independent material things understood by inference from social interactions revealing similar responses to perceived stimuli.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about. — noAxioms

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds, or do all human minds assemble Pegasus internally from their memory banks? I'm familiar with E1-E6. What is D5?

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist. — noAxioms

Your opening clause, independent, is inconsistent with your second clause, dependent. Your use of "mind-independent" as a modifier for real things shows their independence is only rendered as fact through the activity of the mind that asserts mind-independence. Mind-independence can't be conceived without mind, and thus it is encompassed within mind, a fact making it clear "mind-independence" is never apart from mind.

My statement specifically addresses mind-independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind-independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experiencing mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence. — ucarr

So don't access it directly. — noAxioms

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. — noAxioms

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms

This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Saying, "So an apple is red only if the apple exists..." examples our inability to refute the existence of something without first assuming its existence. In the situation of the true non-existence of a thing, no thought of its refutation would occur. We can think of things not known to exist independent of mind, and the language here says the important thing, we can think of things only extant within the mind. Indeed, within the mind they do exist, so likewise in the mind, we can think about refuting their existence. Yes, mental-only things have a type of existence that can be made the object of refutation. Truly non-existent things cannot even be thought of.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms

Santa is not non-existent. Santa exists as a mental simulation of a mind-independent man.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

What is your response?

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it. — noAxioms

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. — noAxioms

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist. — ucarr

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there. — noAxioms

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

realism | ˈrēəˌliz(ə)m |
noun
Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence. The theory that universals have their own reality is sometimes called Platonic realism because it was first outlined by Plato's doctrine of “forms” or ideas. Often contrasted with nominalism.
• the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to
universal mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent. Often contrasted with idealism (sense
2). - The Apple Dictionary

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. — noAxioms

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things?

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. Specifically, I equate metaphysics with the grammar, viz., the foundational rules governing the complex (as in multi-part entity) of material reality and its emergent forms (cognitions of the mind-scape).

I think metaphysics an emergent property of material things. As such, it's part of the sub-domain of material things labeled cognition. Within cognition, metaphysics is the grammar governing both material things and cognitive things.

The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. — noAxioms

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics.

I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.[/quote]

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its
subject-object complex.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number? — noAxioms

You seem to be asking whether math is encompassed within The Standard Model. Yes, it's contained within cognition.

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. — ucarr

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is. — noAxioms

For proper understanding of my intended communication, my quote needs to be presented and evaluated in its entirety.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

The main point of my argument points to the generality of existence in terms of its grasp of all of the forms taken by emergent material things. Saying existence has no properties is like saying variable x doesn't signify a specific number because its range encompasses all numbers (when you add (a+bi) to the mix).

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me. — noAxioms

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — noAxioms

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist. — noAxioms

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things. — ucarr

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction. — noAxioms

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states.
So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

I read your two above quotes as evidence of you talking about abstractions towards examining whether EPP can be eliminated without causing a problem. I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp. — noAxioms

Let's establish that here we're examining: a) a material red stop sign that's mind-independent; b) a concept of a material red stop sign that's mind-dependent.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

You address the core issue of this conversation when you say, "I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way."

Can we go beyond the bounds of mind in our observations of nature? We've already agreed we get beyond our own solitary mind through social reality. By observing the behavior of others, when we compare it to our own behavior in similar situations entailing similar stimuli, and when we see similar reactions, we infer other minds are perceiving what our mind perceives.

Perhaps we disagree on the interpretation of objective reality inferred from social interaction. I think the subject/object couplet is a fluid dynamic associated with entanglement of subject-object. With your talk of mind independence, and your frustration with my adherence to mind dependence and perception in application to observation of nature, you suggest to me a striving for clearly articulated separation of subject and object, as if somehow observation can be done without subjectivity.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14. I was not talking about the conception of it. — noAxioms

You were talking about it because whenever you talk of mind independence, that's just more neuronal circuits in your brain allowing you to entertain another concept. You've acknowledged this by saying, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time? — ucarr

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates. — noAxioms

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstractions, a set that predicates belong to. Abstractions, being mind dependent, don't inhabit the realm of mind independence. Given this limitation, predicates are contingent things. Their position within the causal cone of material things establishes them as contemporaries of material things but logically subsequent to them. This argument establishes EPPL, viz., Existence Precedes Predication Logically.

EPPL establishes (E ∧ P) as a two-part complex. It precludes predication without existence because ¬(E ∧ P) = (¬E ∧ ¬P) = { }.

If predicates do have temporal coordinates, then they exist as abstractions derived from multi-part sampling of observations of individual material things linked thematically and collected into a set expressed by the abstract concept. They are materially encoded within the brain as neuronal circuits.

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through its attachment to its material referents (14 stones). This attachment gives 14 existential meaning and presence as a position on the number line. Detached from its material referents, 14 becomes graphic markings without ontics or physics.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates sans existence. — ucarr

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow. — noAxioms

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them. You're never independent of time, so your cognitive claims about things timeless are always based upon your temporal neural activity. You cannot set aside your material subjectivity. No material existence, no claims about immaterial things. Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event.

X = 1. Where is the elapsing time in this measurement?
— noAxioms

The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P? We only know correlative relationships through pairing. Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

...There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. — noAxioms

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

If non-events equal non-existence in your context here, then all events - including predications - expressed in terms of non-events, are category errors.

...this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them. — noAxioms

This topic, and all others, must necessarily be concerned with knowledge as facts. There is no mind independence paired with subjectivity.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles. — noAxioms

Inference from calculations applied to experimental data detected phenomena now labeled QM. Math analysis of QM phenomena translates to the technology enabling our online dialog. QM is the basis of the information age.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The white horse exists relative to the mind and also to other material things. Pegasus only exists relative to the mind.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers. There's a presumption of mind independence within the context of mind-inter-dependence, something that reduces to individualized mind dependence.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe.

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”
— ucarr

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist.

Consider: You're teaching numbers to your child. In your backyard you've laid two stones set apart. You walk your child to the first stone and place his hand upon it. You say aloud, "one." You coax your child to say aloud, "one." You repeat this action at the next stone. You then put the two stones close together and place your child's hand on each stone, one after the other. At each stone the little person says aloud, "one." You then say aloud, "two." While speaking, you put your hand onto one stone and then onto the other. Finally you coax the child to say aloud, "two." The child picks up a stone in each hand and runs around the yard excited, yelling, "two!"

Does the child, completely ignorant about numbers, see the difference between one stone and two stones?

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence. — noAxioms

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Peagasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist.

This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. — noAxioms

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. Your assumption doesn't specify which domain he occupies, and thus his absence from Moscow has no bearing upon the fact of his existence. Can you demonstrate predication sans existence without paradoxically assuming the existence of the non-existent thing?

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings — ucarr

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise. — noAxioms

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence. There's no logical refutation of EPP via demonstration of predication sans existence if it's assumed (or presumed).

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. — noAxioms

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, — noAxioms

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes.

modify | ˈmädəˌfī

|verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft. — ucarr

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one. — noAxioms

predicate

noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

verb | ˈpredəˌkāt | [with object]
1 Grammar & Logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word that predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
2 (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject.

I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr

I already commented on that definition. — noAxioms

If you're talking about my sentence quoted below, it expresses an implication of existence by predication. The definition of existence comes just before it.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible — ucarr

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again. — noAxioms

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.

What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me. — noAxioms

A finite series of negations doesn't equate to non-existence because the material universe is infinite.

The meaning of negation-to-non-existence by infinite series examples language approaching what cannot be arrived at: non-existence. Existence is an insuperable context. Talking about non-existence, implies existence doing the talking. The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence.

Yes, negation of existence is a predication, this fact being more evidence you can't arrive at non-existence while existing. The answer to the question, "Why existence?" is the fact of it being asked. Such fact means existence of the questioner. In the unspeakable reality of non-existence, there can be no questioner and no question, "Why existence?" This lets us know that when the question is raised, the fact of it being raised answers the question. It cannot be asked unless existence obtains.

Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence. — noAxioms

Of course my definitions are based upon perceptions and, later down the line, upon abstract reasoning from the info and understanding made possible by empirical experience. We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. There's no disputing the entanglement of sentient beings and their environments.

...you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. — ucarr

Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP). — noAxioms

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experience mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. — ucarr

I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.

Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence. — noAxioms

The currency of our debate is thought expressed in words. With the expression ¬A, we understand not A or no presence of A. An infinite series of negations is likewise words expressing erasure of an infinite series of existences.

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time. — ucarr

None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)? — noAxioms

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. Furthermore, I'm saying the Newtonian physics humans know empirically is linked by symmetry and conservation to the Standard Model. If these two premises are true, then predication of existing things is governed by symmetry and conservation within the context of the Standard Model.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.

Saying Santa is nonexistent is a simplification and distortion that terminates in falsehood. The neuronal circuits of the brain, physical realities, support imaginings about Santa and the like. It's wrong to think abstract cognition is divorced from material reality.

You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area. — ucarr

Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something. — noAxioms

It does break something; it makes the curvature disappear. Since the city of Columbus lies within the border of Ohio, we know every part of Columbus is also a part of Ohio. If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally. In a parallel, curvature is a part of the sphere; it's a part of the definition of sphere. If the sphere disappears totally, its curvature disappears totally.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container. — ucarr

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere — ucarr

This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of. — noAxioms

The preposition subordinates predication without reference to location of the thing predicated. Consider: "I see the red car." One of the predications in this sentence is the description of the car as having red color. This predication, like all predications, is about something. Break the connection and the predication, by definition, disappears.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

The last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied. — noAxioms

Does this statement beg EPP? In defending EPP, I'm allowed to reason from the definition of predication since it's fundamental to EPP. In saying, "When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." I'm articulating the definition of modification. I assert nothing that explicity assumes existence being prior to predication. If the definition of predication implies its subservience to existence of what it modifies, then denial of EPP is blocked by the definition of one of its fundamental parts.

predicate
noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.[/quote]

In making your effort to pivot away from my argument, you appear to have taken recourse to E2 and its reliance upon language. In doing so, you appear to be contradicting your purpose in this conversation:

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.

I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology. — noAxioms

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right?

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

If this is correct, then you acknowledge proof is limited by mind-dependence. Given these points, the first part of your claim is inconsistent with the second part.

You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction. — ucarr

Still not demonstrated, only asserted. — noAxioms

My assertion, without the negation of existence, is consistent with existence. All assertions, save one (negation of existence), are internally consistent WRT existence. We can only make an approach to non-existence. We cannot arrive there. We cannot even describe non-existence without speaking paradox.

Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that. — noAxioms

Although your sentence is understandable, non-existence cannot be the subject of a predicate.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — noAxioms

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

modify | ˈmädəˌfī |verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be all of the states of the apple within its entire history and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

In your example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts. — noAxioms

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things.

Regarding change of states of material things, explain how a infinite series of negations (non-existence) of the existence of things with states of being allows such states to be changed.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass. None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions. — noAxioms

There's no simple division of mind-independent reality and mind-dependent reality. EPP, whether accepted or discarded, articulates an inter-weave of the two realities. Were that not the case, there would be no controversy about it. This inter-weave is the foundation of your conversation and our debate. E1-E6 are distillations from a fluid inter-weave of noumena meets phenomena. There will be no perfectly discrete separation one from the other. E1 is mind-independent reality. E2 is mind-dependent reality. Without their inter-weave, no philosophy possible.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. Do you suppose you'd be making statements without them? Can you show something non-physical not tied to the them?

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time — ucarr

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time?

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above. — ucarr

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked. — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge. — ucarr

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology. — noAxioms

The distinction is partial. What we know must have an referent external to itself. The Incompleteness Theorem of logic demonstrates math axiomatic systems' inability to justify all their true statements. This is proof of the entanglement of E1 with E2.

Without this entanglement of ontology and epistemology, knowledge, if it could exist, would be nothing more than a vacuous circularity. Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

...you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not. — noAxioms

Here's the distinction between something directly observable and something not directly observable.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5. — noAxioms

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived. — noAxioms

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain. — noAxioms

If it's Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. in London, and not some ontic Baker St. in physical London, then there is no example of non-existent Baker St. with predicates. Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. has predicates in the world of fiction; ontic Baker St. in physical London has predicates in the real world of objective reality.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it. — noAxioms

I understand you to be saying I can't show EPP is necessary because the lack of it evaluates to a contradiction. I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. — ucarr

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others. — noAxioms

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr

If you want to see the original post of this definition with full context, use the link below.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/976808

This definition is more that axiomatic language because you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. This is proof that for humans existence is insuperable. Therefore, all thought and talk of non-existence is just more naming of existence. This leads us to understand that talking about non-existence as humans confined to existence is a contradiction. This is my short route to the lack of EPP necessarily leading to a contradiction.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe. — noAxioms

You say, "'E1- Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality' has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws." Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. We agree on this point. However, because you are cementing the fact numbers exist with the example of the eight planets, your example is of the type predication about two existing things. Haven't you been rebutting me by arguing predications about non-existence are possible?

As a factor, zero negates the presence of all other things, and yet that's still not non-existence because the evaluation to zero has a number as its conclusion.

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. — noAxioms

All numbers can use base 10, but not all number bases are 10. Some other number bases include base 2, base 8 and base 16.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. — ucarr

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it. — noAxioms

If two wings are a part of Pegasus, given that Pegasus doesn't exist, then also given that two wings a part of Pegasus don't exist. If we stipulate two wings exist with no existing Pegasus, we can't prove they're a predication about Pegasus. If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past with two wings, inferring two wings are a predication about Pegasus is an historical claim about a prior state; it is not a predication about a non-existent Pegasus.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings, unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible — ucarr

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again. — noAxioms

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical. — noAxioms

...the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

My interpretation of your statement quoted above understands that when you say, "'has wings has an object to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence," you're saying that something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence. These two states combined into one thing: a) an object that can be modified; b) an object that lacks the property of existence examples a paradox.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist.

When you claim something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence, you argue for predication outside of EPP, but you do so by resorting to paradox. If you don't resort to paradox, you evaluate to 2 { } = 0.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure — noAxioms

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

..it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything. — noAxioms

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. — ucarr

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. — noAxioms

Eternal universe precludes "nothing."

Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all. — noAxioms

Don't confuse necessity of matter with necessity of existence.

If there are meaningful distinctions between E1-E6, then existence supervenes on all of their applications.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

The conservation laws establish and maintain the noumenal substantiation of the ontically-supported abstractions - as opposed to the ideals - you stipulated in your quest for a metaphysical definition of existence.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms: — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either. — noAxioms

The wave function in quantum fluctuations at the singularity stands as a good candidate for eternal matter.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? — ucarr

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way. — noAxioms

Even to desist implies the existence of a subject carrying out the action described.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time.

preposition - of | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun - attribute | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature… a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

The part/whole relationship connecting functions to the dynamic system (material thing) they describe examples an indivisible unity. The emergent system, a temporal form, encloses the defining characteristics within its perimeter. You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

This overview of the insuperable container by the thing it contains insuperably equals the thing contained being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere and observing the whole sphere with itself as a part. This is an example of the curvature of the surface area of the sphere being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself, a contradiction.

This contradiction is inevitable whenever a subordinate attribute attempts to describe the insuperable whole encompassing it.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.

If philosophy wants to use "predication" in a sense other than "part of a surrounding whole" then it needs to establish a separate philosophical sense of "predication." Let's suppose you're six feet tall. Do you define yourself overall as six feet of length? Do you, instead, think of your height as a part of a larger, more inclusive identity?

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence.

If A ∈ {A,B,C} and {A,B,C} ≠ {¬A,¬B,¬C}, then A ≠ ¬A.
— noAxioms

So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP. — noAxioms

By this argument, EPP is allowed as the causal history of Sherlock Holmes as rendered in the socially-verified mind-scape. E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1. Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1. This is the argument for EPP protected by contradiction if EPP is denied.

The issue herein concerns the relationship between E1 and E2. Can anyone verify a distortion factor in the translation between the two too large to render a functional translation?

...all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v. — noAxioms

Causal relationships are not temporal. When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before. Speaking reciprocally, when you were conceived, you became effect to their cause, and not a moment before. This relationship will always be true.

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.

Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that. — noAxioms

The inter-relatedness you describe here is parallel to the inter-relatedness that general existence, as the quintet funding physics, holds in relation to all temporary physical forms emergent from it.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained. — noAxioms

The part/whole relationship connecting spacetime_universe might be emergence of universe from spacetime. If so, then the two are fundamentally connected. The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. — ucarr

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration. — noAxioms

Deformation of flat spacetime resulting in shorter time-like worldlines between two events isn't warping of spacetime around a massive celestial body?

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously? — ucarr

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

From your quotes here it sounds like you're describing a worldline dimension warping around a massive celestial body.

Gravity and acceleration causing the passing of time to slow are well known, long established predictions of Relativity. Do you deny the validity of the experimental verification of these predictions and do you deny their truth content?

The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion. — ucarr

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe) — noAxioms

Are you saying passing time is contained within the universe and applies to its parts but doesn't apply to the universe as a whole?

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states. — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be a whole apple and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged. — noAxioms

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws. My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time. The dimension of time applies to both modes. My saying your "analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field," does not establish an either/or binary governing the two modes.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds. — noAxioms

Observer entanglement raises doubt about cognition having no impact upon E1, E3, E4, E5, E6.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence. — ucarr

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception. — noAxioms

I don't argue with the claim all of our human perceptions of existence are mind-dependent. My "inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence." stands as my argument inference from observed behaviors of other persons gives us reliable information about their cognitive states as objective reality. No reasonable person disputes one person's ability to predict another person's behavior on the basis of inference from past observed behavior.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric. — noAxioms

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2. Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality. — ucarr

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless. — noAxioms

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics. E2 "I know about it," refers to cognitive things of the mind-scape. E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe," as I understand it, refers to a flying horse defined by physics as rendered through a cognitive thing of the mind-scape.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the [referent of] predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there. — noAxioms

From our consensus-based social reality, we know the stop sign is red because we infer from the similar behavior of others reacting to it their mental content in reaction to it. This means the mind-independent physics we call "stop sign" lies in the causal history of the socially verified public reaction to it. Why should we, the perceiving society, think the causal history of the referent might be, WRT language, an intentional deception or an unintentional distortion of the mind-independent state of the stop sign? This type of supposition presents itself as likely being a capricious frolic of a wayward mind.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote. — noAxioms

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. It's like multiplying 'has wings' by zero with a total non-existence result.). Next you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." Your first sentence posits an object. Your second sentence denies its existence. The two sentences describe a paradox.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.

Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.

There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. — noAxioms

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

If numbers exist as a concept, then they exist. Zero does not equal non-existence because it's an unsigned number that's a placeholder and, as such, it can add great positive value to other numbers. For example,

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

in base 10, the difference between 1 and 10 is a factor of ten, a big difference of value.

In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether. Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. It negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence — ucarr

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong. — noAxioms

Everything in the sentence has existence as a concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur. — noAxioms

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. — noAxioms

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.”

preposition | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 … a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle [EPP] is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature. — noAxioms

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? It's quite distinct from what you argue below:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

Things that exist/don't exist simultaneously are paradoxical. — ucarr

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms

No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist." See your own quote below.

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. — noAxioms

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim. If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio. Although a human-level mind is required to know this, a chimp in Cincinnati is also simultaneously in Ohio, and this is an existential truth independent of whether or not the Chimp knows it.

So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept. — noAxioms

You and Meinong, when talking about predication sans existence, navigate the mind-scape of abstractions including paradox. At the level of practical English, and everyday conversation, if I say, "Yesterday, I looked at the red..." In response, you would probably say, "You looked at the red what?" My statement is either an incomplete thought with a adjective dangling, or it is a complete thought about a noun expressed by the word "red." An example of the latter is "red" used to designate a radical leftist.

These two predications, assuming existing things, make declarations about them. The scope of predication always includes existing things. Our declarations fall into two categories: a) claims about the behavior of an existing thing; b) claims about the state of being of an existing thing. We can wax fanciful and make claims about non-existing things - such as a winged Pegasus of the mind non-existent - but such talk inhabits the realm of paradox.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If “existence” and “predicate” are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.

If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective. — ucarr

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.

Regarding your example sentence, in your prepositional phrase, "about the homeless." the modifying adjective "the" attaches to the noun "homeless." If you remove "homeless" from the sentence, the sentence disappears and becomes an incomplete thought with the article dangling.

Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse. Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic. — noAxioms

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality. — noAxioms

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent. — ucarr

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition. — noAxioms

Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.

If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others? — ucarr

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. — noAxioms

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway. — noAxioms

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction. — ucarr

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? — noAxioms

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition. — noAxioms

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? — ucarr

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property. — noAxioms

Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. — ucarr

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'. — noAxioms

So-called emptiness ≠ emptiness.

When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? — ucarr

It has a temporal dimension. — noAxioms

Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me. — noAxioms

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying,

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them. — noAxioms

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else. — noAxioms

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2. — noAxioms

Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. — noAxioms

I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.

This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration. — noAxioms

I think here you have a good policy.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — ucarr

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. — ucarr

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'. — noAxioms

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism. — noAxioms

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. — ucarr

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers. — noAxioms

Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them. — noAxioms

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes? — ucarr

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood. — ucarr

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so. — noAxioms

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming? — ucarr

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.

None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them. — noAxioms

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. — noAxioms

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.

The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime. — noAxioms

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. — ucarr

E{B} says E (Winged) changes B (Horse) into Winged Horse. 0{B} says 0 (non-existence) changes B (Horse) into { }, the null set, which is the empty set, or non-existence. This is the crux of my argument supporting EPP. Non-existence, like zero, negates infinitely all that would seek to be in its presence.

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction? — ucarr

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is. — noAxioms

All of this, speaking in terms of logical consistency, revolves around definition, grammar and syntax. Object by definition ≠ non-existence. Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence. If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. — noAxioms

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. This is a sentence logic (SL) statement representing your sentence verbal statement:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier and it modifies an object that doesn't exist. Since the adjective, defined as a modifier of an object, exists, then its object exists. If the adjective also modifies an object that doesn't exist, you imply that the object simultaneously does and doesn't exist. The contradiction of something simultaneously existing and not existing is expressed in sentence logic as: Let C (existence) = {D | D ∉ C}.

You think a modifier can modify an object that exists, and you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist. I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists. If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state, and thus its state can't be changed, and thus it can't have a modifier that changes its state.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions. — noAxioms

How can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? — ucarr

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence;
D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. If E, a modifier, can modify E[B} so that it evaluates to 0{B}, then you show how E changes the initial state of B to a final state of B = to 0{B}. This statement says that B = Object, when modified by E, becomes 0{B}. The translation for this says, "B = Object, when modified by E becomes { }. This means that E modifies B = Object such that it becomes B equals an expression of the null set, the set of nothing. So modifier E changes Object B into non-existence. Only non-existence can practice infinite negation so that there is never any existence that can get started. Non-existence admits no presence of existence. They cannot intersect. This tells us that E{B} ≠ { } because something existing, such as E, cannot modify non-existence because E itself cannot exist within the presence of non-existence. Only zero can evaluate to zero, a non-modification. This tells us that modification only applies to existing things acting upon other existing things, and thus there are no attributes modifying things that don't exist.

If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing. — noAxioms

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

Pi = the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter.

My mind tells me one of the main revelations of pi is the picture of the straight line of the diameter surrounded by the encircling circumference. This juxtaposition shows concisely that the rectilinearity (straight-lining) of science is only partially commensurable with the curvilinearity (curving) of nature.

The straight lines infinitesimal of the analysis of calculus can only approximate nature's reality.

Science is nature-adjacent rather than natural.

As technology diminishes and displaces nature, humanity rejiggers itself out of mysterious existence into self-reflection. The trick of AI and SAI is baking in a component of mystery and a component of error. Mystery and error support otherness, a component essential to forestalling the cognitive suffocation of an enclosing self-reflection.

Intentional mystery and error preserve the irrationality pictured by pi.

We must pull on and push against the idea our natural world is full mystery and error because some prior race of sentients understood the essential importance of forestalling cognitive suffocation. Having original sin in the mix is better than the damnation of perfection.

Against utopia!

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used. — noAxioms

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? Since an adjective is defined as a modifier (of a noun), how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? Consider a parallel question, "How can red exist if there's no thing that's red?" Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. Clearly, if redness doesn't exist (the state of being red), then red doesn't exist.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself... — noAxioms

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions. — noAxioms

My answer here is the same as directly above: unicorns and prime numbers exist within language, and language is a real thing, so they are real linguistically. As we say in common speech, a real person differs from a fictional person in that the former exists in both flesh and blood and language whereas the latter exists only in language.

A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing. — noAxioms

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. — noAxioms

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

...there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. — noAxioms

This explains our conversation; it's hard to define and rationalize totality.

if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A'). — ucarr

Think of a fraction in math. If the numerator and the denominator are the same, then, as you know, the value of the fraction evaluates to one. In the first statement in parentheses, it's merely saying noAxioms is noAxioms, a circularity we don't waste our time on. The second statement, an equation, translates to A/A. Then we can treat A as a variable that let's us add a coefficient, such as 2. So 2A/2A = 1A = A. The third statement is a logical deduction from knowing that if a fraction has a value other than 1, then the numerator and the denominator are not equal.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. — ucarr

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies). — noAxioms

I think the implication you describe is a true implication. If D(istance) = A, and A > 0, then any length beyond a dimensionless point is meaningful in terms of the definition of distance. We know this because the dimensionless point (0 distance) is the negation of length which, in our context here, equals distance. Our conclusion, then, says both thinking about and experiencing distance becomes meaningful as a journey either of the mind or of the body.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. — ucarr

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object. — noAxioms

Math → emergent from brain; Greed → emergent from brain; Shadow → emergent from massive object. The bi-conditional IFF connects them necessarily to physics.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding? — ucarr

Space expands over time... — noAxioms

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere; b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology. — noAxioms

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist? — ucarr

I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance. — noAxioms

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. That journey, being as it is a relation that costs time and energy to traverse, expresses itself as a physical relation between the two locations. Moreover, this concept of distance as an abstract thought has a referent of two locations separated by time and energy. No referent no thought/no brain no thought and thus abstract thought is also physical. Yes, abstract thought is emergent, but it can't exist without its material ground, and thus it belongs to the world of physics.

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic? — ucarr

In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.

2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible. — noAxioms

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way. There's nothing we perceive that doesn't become anthropocentric.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially? — ucarr

No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'. — noAxioms

Since, as you say above, "...the universe may arguably contain material things... the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe..." Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. If you can't do that, then you must consider whether our universe is a case of material inter-relating with material. Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

If "...treating the universe as an object that 'does things (like expand)'." is a category error, then does it follow that pairing immaterial universe with material things is also a category error?

How do immaterial things relate to material things?

Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation. — noAxioms

Photons possess energy, force and momentum, material properties.

Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation. — noAxioms

I read this as alpha equal to an unchanging value. The value I take to be a measurement of something material, given my belief you can't measure immaterial things directly, but only indirectly in relation to material measurements.

If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes? — ucarr

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

I don't see how these two sentences are consistent.

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.

If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points. — noAxioms

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints. Intervals are important in many areas of math, including algebra, calculus, and statistics.

There are 3 types of interval notation: open interval, closed interval, and half-open interval. The interval with no infinity symbol is called a bounded interval. The interval containing the infinity symbol is called an unbounded interval.

Intervals in Math

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr

You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added. Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes. — noAxioms

Thanks for the correction.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? The color read exists, but it doesn't colorize anything, not even empty space?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from. In line with my thinking, existence is the reality of faces uncountable.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing. The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind. Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

How does a mind-enclosed sentient describe mind-independent reality with any authority? I take recourse to Kant's noumenal realm for guidance. My mind instinctively goes to a conception characterized by unlimited, undiminished stimuli that resembles a computer screen displaying raw data unformatted by a software program. Therefore, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, it doesn't make a sound. Instead, it makes a proto-sound, which is the totality of all possible sounds unformatted by an observer. This seems to support the notion from QM that the observer's identity is entangled with the environment it perceives. Working backwards from here, we go to a scenario wherein no observer is present within an unlimited, undiminished reality that examples hyper-presence, viz., presence unmeasurable. Reverse direction again and I'm backwards engineering from mind-independent reality to mind-dependent reality that fraternizes with solipsism. We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable. — ucarr

If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Since perceive means to become aware of something; to realize or come to understand something, it's reactive rather than proactive. If it's impossible to measure something not present, and if, therefore, presence precedes measurement, then measurability and measurement are reactive rather than proactive.

If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library. — ucarr

This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something. — noAxioms

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named. So life is a part of existence; existence contextualizes life as an encompassing container in parallel with a library encompassing a book.

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr

Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means. — noAxioms

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.

Whether or not non-material things exist is a deep topic with many believers who have important things to teach us all. I'm not going to make a conclusive statement of judgment about what I think is the correct answer to the question because I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?" without making such an announcement within this conversation. Instead, I'll make a short argument for using physics in my attempt to answer your question. Our minds, our language and most of our empirical experience trade in the currency of physics, viz., the quintet WRT what we experience as the world around us. If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?

No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word. — noAxioms

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?

Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition. — noAxioms

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

How do immaterial things relate to material things? The purpose of this question is to get from you a description how immaterial things connect to your body. If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?

Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime... — ucarr

One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime. — noAxioms

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B. This is a description of distance and interval being framed between two different states.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr

I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not. — philosch

If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. The concept of the number two is perhaps more complicated than two stones side-by-side, but it is material. The argument for this claim says, “No brain, no mind.” The mind, like the brain, is emergent. Both emerge from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. As we know, no mind works without consuming energy. Mind is the material dynamism of the everyday world internalized. Consider: You went to a racetrack in the afternoon. That night, while asleep, you dreamt of horses rounding the track and entering into the final stretch. You heard the thundering of the hooves through the dirt. All of this mental activity is the motion of the world internalized within your brain_mind. No brain, no memory, so it’s physical.

People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics. — philosch

Have you ever watched a good movie and experienced a stirring emotional ride through the journey of the story? Maybe it was an adventure tale. When the hero carefully inches out onto the string bridge suspended over a deep valley where a rushing river crashes over boulders far below, with close shots of the frayed strings of the bridge unraveling, and the girl in distress screaming in fear, afraid he won’t reach her in time, you may have felt an ache in the pit of your stomach. If the movie is truly a classic, you might’ve reached a point where you forgot you were in a theater watching a movie. It was as if you were living in the world of the story.

The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind.

E1 - "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr

This is one of my premises.

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist?

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations? Consider: You're planning a trip to another city. The distance from your home to the other city has no meaning for you in terms of the cost of gas, the amount of time for travel, and the best route to take? Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

E4 - "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms

This is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.

Your meaning here is unclear. All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material." Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality." Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.

BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime, there is an empirically detectable change of state regarding your position, whether or not you know math.

Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms

The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms

I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property. Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused." It possess two fundamental properties that it attaches to material things: symmetries and their conservation laws. These two fundamentals support all properties emergent from uncaused existence.

Arvin Ash_Symmetry Fundamental

I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."

Here's a very basic example of the error you are making;

A = B
B = C
Therefore A = C.

This is logically valid in all cases.

It's sometimes true and most of the time false as a truth claim.

For the above argument to be true, A has to actually be equal to B and B has to actually be equal to C .

This is true in all cases. If A is related to B but not exactly equal to B then the conclusion is false even though the logic is valid. If B is related to C but not identical, then the conclusion is false. — philosch

The logic is valid. The conclusion is still false. The reason is that the premise's are false. There's nothing more to it then that. Your interchanging of the meanings of words has lead you down this fallacious path. — philosch

I acknowledge what you have written above is the truth and moreover, your technique of examination is both sound and correctly applied to my reasoning.

If A = Existence; B = Life, and therefore A = C is the claim being made, then, as you say, the conclusion is logically sound but factually incorrect because, again as you say, Existence ≠ Life.

This is where we differ. You evaluate my argument to the conclusion that A = B. I do not believe Existence and Life are one and the same. It follows, therefore, that I do not intend to conclude Existence equals Life. It may be the case, however, that my statements logically evaluate to this conclusion. If that is the case, then my error lies somewhere in how I evaluate to my intended conclusion.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named.

Let me try to show you that I do not intentionally evaluate to A = B. Consider: {0,1}. This is a set that examples a bounded infinity. The bounded infinity enclosed within this set is the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. 0 and 1 are the limits of the infinite series of numbers lying between them. The series goes on forever in both directions without arrival at either of the limits.

Here's the distinction between Existence and Life: Existence equals the scope of numbers from 0 to 1. Life equals the scope of the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. The scope of Existence is greater than the scope of life even though the latter is infinite.

I know not all existing things are living things.

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things. — ucarr

I get what you mean by your example (bounded infinity) and I was mistaken. — philosch

Now we're looking at an opportunity to have a good exchange of ideas.

Logically speaking, if your parents cease to exist, you cease to exist. That’s the logical truth of a child being contingent upon their parent. — ucarr

In my quote above, the critically important words are "Logically speaking..." and "...the logical truth..."

As you say, a logically valid argument doesn't always correspond with what's true in life. I was trying to say the same thing with my statement:

Empirical experience is different from pure logic because when a parent leaves human form, they do not cease to exist. — ucarr

Whether its true or not -- I know my idea is way out there and feels wrong -- my statement has me recognizing, like you, that evaluating logical symbols on paper lies a great distance from the flesh and blood frailty of real human lives.

Now, if we focus on the other critical words "bounded infinity," we arrive at another clearing of the fog shrouding my message. Math tells us something important through the concept of bounded infinity. The difference between both life and existence and non-life and non-existence is always infinity. This is why you see me seemingly conflating existence and life.

The child born remembers nothing of the journey to earth from the quintet that funds the general existence of the world. We can make a near approach to our beginning of life, but we never arrive. You can’t ease your way from non-life into life. No, it’s instantaneously alive for the screaming newborn just pulled from the womb. Likewise, you can’t ease your way from life into non-life.

You ask how do I know these things? I only know them by inference from my statements.

At the beginning, and at the end, there is the forever approach to the bounded infinity that nurtures life. What does this mean? The meaning is simple. Life can only be life if it is everlasting with neither beginning nor end. The beginning and the ending of our lives and our semi-verse can be represented by a bi-directional number irrational in both directions.

It's the passage from and return to "forever" that makes us alive. Existence imbues individualized things possessing defining attributes with the fundamentally unexplainable uncontainability of existence that knows itself, life.

Example: You can't dig up earth without creating a pile of earth and a hole that shake hands symmetrically. — ucarr

This is not an example of a definition. If I didn't know the meaning of the word 'symmetrical', I would not know how to use the word after reading that. — noAxioms

This is my definition of symmetry, i.e., transformation without net change.
— ucarr

That wording sounds more like a definition, even if it's not one that is in any dictionary. But that one is not worded as a premise. — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr

This is one of my premises.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms

I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."

Empirical Experience Vs Pure Logic

Your partition between the two modes: a) pure logic; b) empirical experience presents artificial. The same pure logic – your stock in trade – applies in both situations. Logically speaking, if your parents cease to exist, you cease to exist. That’s the logical truth of a child being contingent upon their parent. Do you see that this is more evidence that we are neither born nor eventually become dead. With pure logic symbols on paper, we say that if B is contingent upon A, then destruction of A logically demands destruction of B.

Empirical experience is different from pure logic because when a parent leaves human form, they do not cease to exist. Instead, the parent changes form from individualized person to general stock in the quintet (mass, matter, motion, space, and time) funding general existence. Human individuals are emergent from this fund.

Since the parent A does not cease to exist, the contingent child B also does not cease to exist, even after the parent A changes form from individualized human back to the general stock of the quintet.

The fallacy obscuring the bounded infinity of human existence eternal is that we are born and eventually become dead. No. We emerge from the eternal change of form into the individualization of personhood for an interval of time, then we change form back into the general stock of existence eternal.

You have an understanding that puts "subjective" brackets around knowledge. Why do you not put these same brackets around your birth and your death? By your own words, you cannot know the "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. — ucarr

Well now that is true. I stand by the fact you cannot know anything for absolute. I have held dear friends as they took their last breath and all I can say with absolute certainty is they are no longer present in my subjective reality. Something has dramatically been lost or changed state. We collectively call that transformation death. It is real in so far as anything else I can know is real. No amount of conjecture changes that level of real experience. The rest is the poetry of our collective reality, never to be fully grasped or understood, as I've stated, we cannot escape the limitations of our context. (Not withstanding any altered states of consciousness of which just deepens the conjecture and mystery that we are.) But these statements do not invalidate the practical aspects of reality, birth and death and so forth. — philosch

:up:

That B never knows C is not due to non-existence, but rather due to the bounded infinity of individualized life. — ucarr

Na, I don't buy anything you say here. Bounded infinity doesn't make any sense at all, it's not infinity if it is bounded....again by definition. — philosch

If you're willing to enter "bounded infinity" into the Google Search Engine, you can start learning about it. Take for example: {0,1} This bounded infinity accommodates an unlimited number of values between 0 and 1, the boundaries of the infinite series.

Individualized life? Again just some words strung together in poetic fashion. Writing and speaking do not specifically enjoin you to alter the common words of language to suit your own sensibilities unless you are writing or speaking poetically, in which case anything goes. Philosophical and scientific writing and argumentation and debate demand the coherence of accepted meanings to allow for meaningful information exchange. — philosch

When Einstein's associate Minkowski coined the word "spacetime," he gave the world a easy label for The Theory of Relativity. Do you approve of the word?

I'm going to assert; "No light bulb ever knows darkness". Um, I can play around with this statement but ultimately it's of little use. It becomes nothing but an exercise in semantic gymnastics. It is poetically useful and that's it. I believe that is what is driving your writing. — philosch

Do you read poetry?

Again this may be poetic but it's not true rationally. Normal, logical, philosophical discussion and argument demand a consensus, a shared or agreed upon set of definitions. I was not "alive" 400 years ago. If you want to change the definition of what "always" means or what "alive" means then feel free, that's all you've been doing in your arguments......mixing, fuzzing and altering definitions in a poetic way to make grandiose un-provable assertions which is not philosophy. — philosch

You've stayed in this conversation in order to teach me things?

Your understanding of the conservation of information is un-informed. The notion that your individuality is preserved is a gross misunderstanding of that law. It's quantum information that is theoretically preserved in that law, not macro scale emergent properties such as consciousness and memory. You may pose some other theory about the preservation of consciousness after death but the conservation of information that has been proposed as a physical law does NOT do it. — philosch

Do you think the sub-atomics of atoms in humans are categorically different from the sub-atomics of atoms in stars?

"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial. — philosch

The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. — philosch

then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:

B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. — philosch

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C. — philosch

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.

I didn't over generalize anything. I specifically stated if the existence of a thing is dependent on the existence of something else and the first thing ceases to exist, then by the rules of logic so des the existence of the dependent thing. In this context of the argument you setup, the dependence is absolute. — philosch

This argument is predicated upon B (Objective Reality) = C (You). You say, as I quote you above, objective reality is inaccessible to perception. Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C.

Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C. We’re not examining exercise of pure reason wherein observation of material events is unnecessary.

The language field of pure reason can practice your logic inside a shuttered room. Our debate, in contrast, has its focus on what we see and understand about ourselves while active in the social world. I apply your cognition boundaries of language to the social world while you apply it to the formalisms of abstract logic. In consequence of this, you bring an apples argument to an oranges claim, and I bring an oranges argument to an apples claim.

You might counter that logic is the same everywhere, and I can then counter with my math logic pertaining to bounded infinities.

When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. — ucarr

The dependence of a child's life on it's parent's life is a non sequitur as existence and being alive are not the same thing as I previously argued and a child's existence is not absolutely dependent on the parents continued existence. It's a different argument altogether. — philosch

I doubt you don't fully believe your cognition has its entire grounding in socially-supported definitions of words. The report of your senses, sans words, tells you when an independently real corpse lowers into the ground. As you say, "...existence and being alive are not the same thing..." This equation you ascribe to my words, but I don't agree they state or imply that. The existence of your corpse will be a remnant that is not you, and thus we know you will not see your own corpse. I've been saying this from the start, so you can reason from my words that I've never equated existence with life.

Both arguments focus on contingent things. Both arguments focus on a Venn diagram of common ground connecting two distinct things. This common ground - in the instance of a child, genetic inheritance - continues to shape the path forward of the contingent thing. The conclusion to equivalence is your evaluation, not mine. Ignoring that, the sanctity of life goes forward for the life-in-the-child of the foreseeing parent, and also for the remembering child looking back to its family roots.

You had to have added the following second premise; A = B and C = end of A

You now get:
P1 - A has no beginning or end
P2 - A = B
Conclusion : B has no end (C)

The second premise makes the logic valid but that just render's the conclusion as a partial restatement of the first premise using different labels and it is trivial. However without the second premise the logic is invalid so the conclusion is false. A does not equal B without altering standard, accepted meanings. — philosch

Instead, I get:
A=Existence
B=Life
C=Death
A → ((∞B)∧C)

As far as what we know empirically, we only experience life without beginning or end. We see others born and dead, and we correctly believe these two states apply to us, but we never experience either.

Existence is defined as the quality of being real. Life or living things exist, but so do things that are not alive. Now you might get cute and start question whether or not a rock is alive or real but that's just playing with generally accepted meanings. Also by definition, life is a distinct quality of organic matter and the organic "things" that possess that quality, clearly lose that quality upon death, so "a" life has an end. Take a human being as something that exists. It's aliveness had a beginning and it has an end. The body still exists after the quality of life has ended, as long as standard definitions are being adhered to. Your above quote is in error. — philosch

Consider: a bounded set can include the cardinality of the entire set of real numbers. This is a bounded infinity. Your life is a bounded infinity. It has no beginning and no ending. The life in you was never non-life. The seed and the egg must be alive, or no baby. All of your forebears were alive unto their passing of their living seed forward towards your life never begun and never ended. Life infinite is what existence infinite imparts to your contingent individualizing attributes marking your individuality. Understand your life, young-to-old, is a navigation of the parameters of a bounded infinity of total life. There is no entrance into life from non-life, and no return of life to non-life.

This is the essence of my objection to your arguments. Words matter and the rules of logic matter. If we start letting the accepted meanings of words become malleable or squishy then we get malleable or squishy philosophy. — philosch

The view forward is sharp with hailstones and lusty wind. About face without scanning the looking glass backwards.

As far as being a solipsist, I am not. The assertion that the only thing we can be certain exists is our own consciousness has not been proven. I don't support that position even theoretically. IMO, everything you perceive through your senses is real by definition, including your consciousness meaning everything your perceive exists. I simply stated in so many words that you can only experience a subjective reality, your perspective or context limits you from experiencing (absolute) objective reality. I'm not stating whether objective reality exists or not, only that you cannot experience it if it does, because your conscious experience is filtered through your senses. I can say unequivocally that a rock exists but I cannot "know" the object state of the rock's reality, I can only know the subjective reality of the rock that I experience. — philosch

You have an understanding that puts "subjective" brackets around knowledge. Why do you not put these same brackets around your birth and your death? By your own words, you cannot know the "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. What do you know about them? You know what you experience empirically which, by your discreteness, seals you off from "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. Through your senses, you never saw yourself non-living before birth. You can imagine it now by definition of words in abstraction. You will not see yourself non-living after death; you might see your death approaching, but you will be alive while doing so.

Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. — philosch

There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole. — ucarr

The above quote is wrong (logically invalid) if you stick with the generally accepted meanings of words. You are by syllogism, inferring that "existence" and "life" are interchangeable and that "death" and "non-existence" are also interchangeable, and they are not synonymous. Your first premise, "there is no beginning nor ending of existence" is actually interesting and worthy of the philosophical debate. I'm not sure what my position is on that premise but it's certainly interesting. Your conclusion is "for this reason, no life ever knows death", simply does not follow from the first premise unless you hold "being alive" as equal to "existing". They are not the same thing without bending the rules of language. Your above argument or assertion is of the form... — philosch

Sticking with the accepted meaning of words is one of the things writing and talking is specifically allowed to refuse to do. The reason we of our generation don't sound much like those of Shakespeare's generation is the fact that language is a practice alive with continual variation and invention. Life demands continuous adjustment, and language, more often than, not obliges.

Life and existence are distinct but not disjunct. Consider the Venn diagram linking two different domains by their common ground. I don't expect anyone to claim a living being non-existent. I don't expect anyone to claim a bottle of beer and the man drinking it interchangeable. No, life and existence are not interchangeable, and I'm not suggesting they are. You, philosch, have always been alive, and you've never been dead. How is that not eternity, bounded yes, but eternity nonetheless? The quintet of mass, matter, energy, space, and time, the fundamentals that fund your existence, index you to eternity, the only thing that can create life. It has your back, and will never let you go. Just as you warn me not to make the mistake of confusing myself with it, I warn you not to make the mistake of divesting yourself from it.

It's not necessary to equate life with existence. Rather, it's useful to perceive that life will not persist outside of existence. Life, by its nature, bends the rules as life will not be understood. Rules applied to life populate morals, but life transcends morals. Does life transcend logic? Life transcends present logic. In the presence of living things, there's always an unseen window of nascent possibility nuancing present logic towards a better tomorrow. Synkismetricity (synchronicity+kismet).

Premise 1. "A" has no beginning and no end
Conclusion: From premise 1 (for that reason) "B" never knows "C".

Where;
A = existence
B = Life or being alive (either definition works)
C = Death or the end of A, (either definition works)

It's not valid logic period. The conclusion clearly does not follow from the premise. — philosch

I oppose your interpretation which posits: ¬A=C. The quintet indexes you to the source eternal and therefore ¬A≠C. Our lives emerge from existence general into individuality for a period of time, then return to it. Information is never destroyed, so existence general preserves your individuality.

That B never knows C is not due to non-existence, but rather due to the bounded infinity of individualized life. The banishment of death is life inviting you to plight your trust with the uncontainable. What happens when the uncontainable, your consciousness, meets the insuperable, your existence? Nature happens.