As soon as a lifeform demonstrates intent as a consequence of being self-aware, conscious and intelligent, rather than a creature driven via pure instinct imperative only, then at that point, intelligent design reduces evolution to a very minor side show for such individuals. — universeness

I think you exaggerate the difference between advanced intelligence and baseline intelligence. Instinct is not pure in the sense that humans, no less than comparatively more simple organisms, possess instincts that are essential to survival. When we recoil from the fast approach of a flying object, the autonomic system is processing info no less than when we reflect deeply upon, say, a complex moral dilemma. The difference, I believe, consists in the resolution of the cognitive processing per unit of time. Deep reflection is high-res processing whereas instinct is low-res processing.

If evolution, during the simple organisms period of an environment, involves instinctual info processing, albeit low-res, then intentionality permeates this period of evolution no less than it does when higher organisms appear.

This state of affairs will lead logically to an ever, upwardly-evolving teleology that, after enough time, will resemble a cosmic teleology that can, with reason, be called a creator.
— ucarr

Not sure what you mean by "a creator" here. It certainly can't mean "the creator of the universe". — Michael

Do I figure God-like consciousness is inevitable? I'll give you a qualified "yes." My addition to the evolution_teleology debate, as I see it, takes recourse to the Touring palliative regarding possible sources of consciousness. If an A.I. looks, acts, achieves and feels like organic consciousness to natural, organic consciousness, i.e., humans, then humans should, upon advisement, regard it as such. — ucarr

"Creator," in my context, means perceived "close simulation of 'creator of the universe.'"

As you may surmise, there's a lot of english-within-the-english within my context.

Indeed. But I do think there is a troubling tendency to try to divorce evolution from all intentionality. I had to spend a very long time explaining to someone reviewing a paper I wrote why it is that natural selection, as applied to corporations, languages, elements of states, people groups, etc. can absolutely involve intentionality. It's like, somewhere along the line, to avoid mistakes about inserting intentionality into places it doesn't belong, a dogma was created that natural selection necessarily can't involve intentionality. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

There's a lot of substance coupled with sagacious thinking packed into your statement. I won't try to address all of it.

Intentions and teleology are internal and essential to all forms of life. — ucarr

I find all teleological assignments to lifeforms implausible.
A wolf did not get sharp teeth because it needed them. The sharp teeth evolved not because of evolutionary intent, but due to the process of natural selection, working over a very long time. — universeness

The key word in my above quote is internal. It's the gist of my thesis. Intentions and teleology, essential to being alive, establishes them as being cognitive entities. Where there's life, there's intentions and teleology essential to the cerebration of the living organisms. The presence of this couplet runs the gamut from viruses to super-intelligent sentients.

This gamut, then, is the collective of intentions and teleology. Survival of the fittest within the circumambient environment demands ongoing adaptation. Ongoing adaptation, oftentimes improvisational, embodies and enacts what we refer to as intelligence. Intentions and teleology, therefore, are essentially cognitive. This means that cognitive intentions and teleology and environment are linked inextricably.

The wolf did not give himself sharp teeth; the collective gave him sharp teeth. The wolf, however, by using his sharp teeth, adds directed energy to the collective. This directed energy is better known as selection. The presence of wolves with sharp teeth selects those other animals who can survive the onslaughts of sharp teeth.

Useful genetic mutations, considered in isolation may appear to be random. Placed in context of a constantly changing environment, with a collective of intentions and teleology embodied in the animal kingdom, genetic mutations are contextually useful, and the process bringing this about is not random.

We know this process generating useful mutations is not random because living organisms, required to think to survive, do not indulge random behavior.

↪ucarr I'm interested and forgive me if this is obvious, do you subscribe to any form of theism? Do you beleive that the universe is a created artefact by some kind of deity?

So by your argument above, a 'god' figure is an inevitability, built into the fabric of reality? Does this not mean that god is contingent and not a necessary being? If we temporarily set aside your argument, have you got a tentative backstory for why this is the case or what the meaning of all this might be? — Tom Storm

Good job, Tom. You're getting right down to cases.

I do subscribe to theism, although I'm in terrible standing with theists due to a variety of my positions as, for example, this particular claim overall. As you might see in my response to Banno, I posit intentions and teleology within nature instead of positing same within super-nature.

Do I figure God-like consciousness is inevitable? I'll give you a qualified "yes." My addition to the evolution_teleology debate, as I see it, takes recourse to the Touring palliative regarding possible sources of consciousness. If an A.I. looks, acts, achieves and feels like organic consciousness to natural, organic consciousness, i.e., humans, then humans should, upon advisement, regard it as such.

Central to this rationale is the POV of the supplicant vis-a-vis the higher power. If we humans should suddenly be confronted by sentience billions of years beyond us, cognitively speaking, would we fall down in worship? Probably. The smartest humans would, however, resist this. Over time, this resistance would build to a rebellion and claimants would begin telling tales wherein they pulled the curtain on the midget wizard (of Oz) falsely intoning commands as if a giant.

Does this not sound like Tevye shaking his fist up at (silent) God? Does this not sound like Galileo called before the Catholic tribunal?

Imagine that eons ago, an advanced race of sentients developed the self-sustaining technology we now, eons later, understand to be nature and the natural world. Also imagine that back in antiquity, when the self-sustaining technology was first introduced, there was a prior natural world now replicated by the nature-appearing technology of the advanced race of sentients. The replication wasn't exact, however. The gap, easily detectable, was scorned by the mavens of the prior natural world. How was this friction resolved? It was resolved via the Touring palliative. The elder mavens settled into an edgy acceptance of the new quasi-nature. Eventually these elders died off and succeeding generations only saw a natural world.

Some implications of my position here, because they suggest God is inevitable rather than seminal, sustain my abominable standing within theist sensibilities.

Do you beleive that the universe is a created artefact by some kind of deity? — Tom Storm

In the above quote, I think you intend to talk within the theist mode. I think, however, by positing God as as an artist who makes the universe as artifact, you parallel the rebellious mentality embodied within my little fable herein.

Is it for humans, or for viruses too?

The thesis remains unclear, and prima facie incoherent. — Banno

Humans are my primary focus regarding internalized intentions & teleology. However, yes, I claim all living organisms exemplify internalized intentions & teleology (surviving, eating, excreting, reproducing). The spectrum of this internalization therefore runs the gamut from humans (and, of course, possible beyond-humans) down to viruses.

Internalization of intentions & teleology by sentient life is a core component of my thesis. I'm claiming the intentions and the organized designs to make specific things happen according to a plan, i.e., according to a premeditated purpose, gets instantiated within the universe by means of living organisms.

An important difference between my thesis and theism is the fact I posit intentions and teleology within nature, whereas theism posits this rational couplet beyond nature as in the super-natural.

I don't think my thesis makes a claim about super-natural teleology one way or the other.

Each premise is potentially falsifiable.
— ucarr
No, they are not; for instance, "For every organism there is some purpose" is a classic all and some, neither falsifiable nor provable. Failure to locate a purpose for some particular organism does not imply that it has no purpose, nor does locating a particular purpose for some organism entail that all organisms have a purpose. — Banno

Clarification: in my context here, teleology mainly means self-advancing intentions coupled with designed behavior governed by goals.

The core of my thesis takes teleology and puts it inside of sentient beings, human beings specifically.

Intentions and teleology are internal and essential to all forms of life.

In a universe both eternal and mechanistic, probability plus evolution makes it inevitable life will appear.

If a universe has as one of its essential features the inevitability of life, then it has as concomitant essential features internalized intentions and teleology.

If a universe has, in addition to the above essential features, evolution, then it’s inevitable life will evolve therein. This state of affairs will lead logically to an ever, upwardly-evolving teleology that, after enough time, will resemble a cosmic teleology that can, with reason, be called a creator.

Show me how the above four premises are not falsifiable.

↪ucarr :roll: Compositional fallacy. Just because some individual organisms might be "purposeful" does not entail that a population (or global process like evolution) is "purposeful". — 180 Proof

That's right. But upright apes, like snails, are not thought to have populated the earth one billion years ago. If evolution, generally speaking, has no purpose, doesn't that force us to conclude, logically, that evolution meanders about at random? If this conclusion is correct, then why didn't humans exist on earth one billion years ago? Or did they? If all of the organic compounds necessary to life have been on earth for, say, one billion years, why didn't a meandering, purposeless evolutionary process raise up some humans? Perhaps you say it was, at that time, a possibility, albeit one fantastically improbable.

Doesn't probability, even when fantastically improbable, point us toward a teleology-resembling selective evolutionary process governed in a manner probabilistically organizational i.e., loosely teleological? The animal kingdom of today, like that of a billion years ago, is not a case of anything goes, genetically speaking. A useful mutation organizationally advanced a billion years beyond its surrounding animal kingdom is extremely unlikely, right? Might this indicate evolutionary change is controlled probabilistically in context?

A mathematics-bearing universe puts up gnarly resistance to exclusion of teleology, likewise a consciousness bearing universe.

Actually, I am not sure how mainstream this view is anymore since a good deal of popular science seems to challenge it, — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I understand you think my argument old school.

On the other hand, you're pondering the possible comeback of metaphysics [?]

"argument"
— 180 Proof

Like the quote marks.

There are a few arguments on the forum at present that start by assuming that such-and-such is irreducible, and then pretend to discover that it must have some ontological priority - Bob Ross does this in his threads, as do others.

Sad. — Banno

Each premise is potentially falsifiable.

↪ucarr Evolution – adaptive variation via natural selection – is not teleological. — 180 Proof

I contest the logic and reality of your above claim on the basis of its inclusion of "adaptive" and "selection." I acknowledge my contextual use of teleology might be on less than solid ground because, per my usage herein, I'm talking about a sentient individual who possesses self-advancing purpose and self-advancing designs for achieving its purpose. Even so, teleology in the conventional sense of understanding purpose as a functional role played by something within the larger scheme of its environment which, in turn, moves with direction towards some still higher manifestation well serves my argument.

What could be more pertinent to purpose that adaptation to present conditions? Can evolution even proceed without purposeful adaptation to a changing environment? It doesn't require a biologist to know that living organisms unable to adapt to changing conditions, like the earth's dinosaurs, will perish rather than adapt.

Likewise, regarding selection, what could be a more purposeful action on nature's part to select for those living organisms best able to adapt to her environments? To select (as opposed to passively accept) possibilities is an excellent way to demonstrate the meaning and value of purpose, whether personally or systemically.

The topic title is about cosmology, not evolution. Cosmology concerns a description of the universe, not about the origin of the species. — noAxioms

I acknowledge the correctness of your distinctions of classification.

My thinking herein follows from an assumption that, with respect to my premise saying intentions and designs are inseparable from living organisms, regardless of their degree of sophistication, the universe i.e., the cosmology of living organisms, is the theater in which both evolution and, as I argue, its concomitant intentions and designs play out. In short, whenever the evolution versus creator debate arises, cosmology and evolution are, in my opinion, next door neighbors. This is clearly the case because, as I think, discussion of the origin of life naturally finds its place upon the ultimate stage of cosmology.

Then you ignore evolution altogether and talk instead about abiogenesis, which is neither cosmology nor evolution. — noAxioms

Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I think it logical to include abiogenesis within the category of evolution. Without its inclusion, evolution falls prey to arguments declaring it's limited to pre-existing life made possible by a supernatural creator. Isn't this a weakness supporters wish to shore up by such an inclusion?

You also seem to assume that any atheist will take up this oscillating view of the universe pushed by Sagan. This is hardly the case, and it is a fringe view in the scientific community. — noAxioms

I take note of your limitation. For my purpose, however, this particular form of cosmology supports my arguments without precluding their application to other forms of cosmology.

So anyway, are we talking about why the creatures are the way they are, or about why the universe is the way it is? — noAxioms

I cite my claim the two topics are neighbors as reason for addressing them simultaneously.

I support eternalism, but that's probably a different kind of eternal universe than the one you seem to be thinking of. — noAxioms

You can inform me about the variety of eternal universes. For now, I'm inclined to think any eternal universe that includes evolution by logic also includes the science of probability and thus the inevitability of life.

My first premise says intentions and teleology are essential to all forms of life. — ucarr

Kind of begs the theistic view now, doesn't it? How are you going to disprove the alternative view if your first premise is that the alternative views are all wrong? — noAxioms

I want you to direct my attention to a life form that has been verified to be devoid of all intentions to survive and all designs (teleology) towards effecting survival.

My second premise says that in a universe both eternal and mechanistic, probability makes it inevitable life will appear.
— ucarr
Demonstrably false. Most mechanistic universes lack the complexity required for life, or even an atom. The whole ID argument depends on this premise being false. — noAxioms

Firstly, I'd like you to give me a tour of the contents of a universe without atoms.

What is the ID argument?

I don't see where this attack addresses itself to a universe specifically endowed with eternity and the mechanization of evolution.

My first premise says intentions and teleology are essential to all forms of life. — ucarr

This anthropomorphic projection renders the premise incoherent at best. — 180 Proof

My claim is based on thinking living organisms all the way down to unicellular forms move, eat, excrete and reproduce. These behaviors, according to my present understanding, exemplify intention (to live and thus to avoid destructive forces when detected) and to design (follow patterns detected as successful routes to essential goals such as eating) and to will (pay life forward to the next generation via reproduction).

My third premise says that if a universe has as one of its essential features the inevitability of life, then it has as concomitant essential features intentions and teleology. — ucarr

Your "argument" doesn't work, ucarr. — 180 Proof

I'm using our human existence on earth as an example of the inevitability of life in our universe. In my thinking, I'm using evolution (which, as you know, is defended and promoted as a means for appearance of life without a divine creator) as a probability embedded within the organic chemistry of earth. Also, I'm using Sagan's supposition that the universe is uncreated and eternal. My logic is that since the building blocks of life are embedded within earth's organic chemistry, given an unlimited amount of time plus given the possibility of organic chemistry upwardly evolving into living organisms, that the building blocks of life on earth actually upwardly evolve into living organisms is inevitable.

This leap is unwarranted. Assuming that "life" is an "essential feature" of the universe, on what grounds – factual basis – do you claim Intelligent life (ergo "intention and teleology") is inevitable? — 180 Proof

Assuming life is an essential feature of the universe per the above argument, I claim that intelligent life is inevitable because, firstly, evolution has been validated by some respected scientists and thus, it can be reasonably expected that living species will upwardly evolve into sentient beings with ever more powerful intentions coupled with ever more rationally designed plans for achieving said intentions.

And, to repeat my upshot, such evolution will inevitably evolve to a lofty position wherein it becomes virtually indistinguishable from the God-Creator teleology of theism.

The above description conveys a precise, scientific measurement of the unit of time known as "one second."
— ucarr

Where are the terms "past", "present" or "future" used in that description? — Luke

Everywhere. The science elaborated in the quotation supplies the means for their state-of-the-art measurement. Readers incapacitated in the use of inference will, however, fail to perceive them.

I think this is the science underlying what MU has been debating with Luke. — ucarr

As far as I'm aware, "past", "present" and "future" are not terms that have any technical scientific meaning, and are not terms that are commonly used for any precise scientific measurements. — Luke

With your above statement you cast yourself in a role that parallels an early twentieth century commentator responding to Einstein's Theory of General Relativity: "As far as I'm aware, 'space,' 'time' and 'gravity' are not terms that are commonly understood to be conjoined and therefore subject to scientific measurements.

In my opinion, the status quo of conventional wisdom is not (and should not be) an obstacle to discovery and new understanding.

Moreover, your claim can be refuted. You say, in part, that the "past", "present" and "future" are not terms commonly used for any precise measurements:

Caesium atomic clocks are one of the most accurate time and frequency standards, and serve as the primary standard for the definition of the second in the International System of Units (SI) (the modern form of the metric system). By definition, radiation produced by the transition between the two hyperfine ground states of caesium (in the absence of external influences such as the Earth's magnetic field) has a frequency, ΔνCs, of exactly 9192631770 Hz. That value was chosen so that the caesium second equalled, to the limit of human measuring ability in 1960 when it was adopted, the existing standard ephemeris second based on the Earth's orbit around the Sun.[2] Because no other measurement involving time had been as precise, the effect of the change was less than the experimental uncertainty of all existing measurements.
-- Wikipedia --

The above description conveys a precise, scientific measurement of the unit of time known as "one second." By inference it follows that the details elaborated above bear upon the transition from one second of time to the next and so on. The duration of measured units of time and the transition between these measured units have been under discussion and debate here for more than a month.

Regarding my application of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle to MU's claims about the everyday experience of the present as a positive duration rather than as a theoretical and dimensionless point, it should be clear to the observant that it is self-evidently true (from MU's proffered claims and my proffered scientific support for them) we are, acting individually, attempting to do the work of science and philosophy. Such efforts at this website should come as no surprise.

In your role as guardian at the gate, protector of the integrity and authority of the scientific and philosophical establishment, your work is important. By warring against the specious claims of eager aspirants, you render a service to them. It won't do, however, to merely recite boilerplate from the pages of conventional wisdom. You must search those pages and discover cogent arguments that refute with specificity the attempts made by would-be theoreticians.

What is the "referent" for the term "noumenon"?
Can it have a referent? — jancanc

if it is a concept, is it not then an object of thought? but if the noumenon is not an object, then we have contradicted ourselves... — jancanc

When Carl Sagan claims the material universe has no origin, he takes us into an environment wherein the analytical-reasoning mind needs a foundation of support for its compulsive pattern-recognition activity. That foundation is the noumenal.

The analytical-reasoning mind shakes hands non-locally with the noumenal each time it discovers an exploitable axiom, real-world referent of the noumenon.

Demanding acceptance on their own-terms-without-terms is noumenal haughtiness kicking subject/object analytic narratives to the curb.

The axiom stands aloof from the parsing of analytical_reasoning. It deals in the currency of things-in-themselves as self-evident proofs.

The universes of cognition kept aloft by the axiom jugglers are unsearchable causes most closely approached as the epiphenomena of necessary axioms.

Example – the singularity that precedes the big-bang.

Your ambiguous model looks like this:

Past-----------------------Future

------------<Present>------------

P----R----E----S----E----N----T — Luke

Here's something to think about. Try to pinpoint the present, the exact point in time, which divides the future from past. Every time you say "now', by the time you say "now" it is in the past. So the present cannot be a point in time which separates past from future, because that point will always be in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument claims the present is a limit towards which we forever approach towards and recede from, never actually arriving there.

Now consider the way you sense things in your existence, or being at the present. We always sense things happening, activity, motions. And all activities and motions require a period of time during which the activity occurs. So if we sense things at the present, and we sense activities, then the present must consist of a duration of time rather than a point in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument claims the present, as experienced by humans in the physical realm of everyday experience, never exists as a point in time, a theoretical abstraction. Instead, the present, as experienced, is always a continuum of spacetime of positive value.

But if the present consists of a duration of time, then some of that duration must be before, the other part which is after. So if the present separates future from past, and it consists of a duration of time, then part of the present must be in the future, and part of it in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument states the crux of MU's thesis: time as we experience it in the physical realm of everyday experience, as distinguished from time understood as a theoretical construction of the mind, presents itself as a tripartite structure: past/present/future. At issue in this thesis is the question how, exactly, are the three parts joined together? What is the nature of the joint, or conjunction linking them to each other?

Any proposed period of time is actually indefinite, having an imprecise beginning and ending — Metaphysician Undercover

The "present", as described, is a period of time, not a point in time. Any, and every period of time has one part before the other part which is after, as explained. In relation to the present, the before is called "past", and the after is called "future". Therefore when we talk about this period of time which we call "the present", part is in the past and part is in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

The above two arguments present a description (with some degree of abstraction) of how, exactly, the three parts are joined. 180 Proof provides a useful clarification:

Only the present is real.
— Art48
A nonsensical statement due to the fact that neither past nor future are escapable in – separable from – the present. — 180 Proof

This year, 2023, is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Today, July 2, is the present. Part is in the past, part is in the future. This minute is the present. Part is in the past, part in the future. Etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

The above argument presents an example from everyday experience that illustrates the connections between the three parts.

My interpretation of MU's crux tries to restate what he states using different words: The human experience of time within the physical realm of everyday experience consists in passing through a continuum of moments that are, roughly speaking, parsed into incidents characterized by a past/present/future inter-related through quantum entanglement.

Of particular pertinence to MU's thesis is Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.

In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle (also known as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) is any of a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a fundamental limit to the accuracy of [sic] the values for certain related pairs of physical quantities of a particle, (such as position, x, and momentum, p). Both values cannot be predicted simultaneously from initial conditions. Instead, measurement is limited to an accurate measurement of one or the other in a trade-off between them.

Such paired-variables are, therefore, known as complementary variables or canonically conjugate variables; and, depending on interpretation, the uncertainty-principle limits to what extent such conjugate properties maintain their approximate meaning, as the mathematical framework of quantum physics does not support the notion of simultaneously well-defined conjugate properties expressed by a single value. The uncertainty principle implies that it is, in general, not possible to predict the value of both paired variables’ quantities with arbitrary certainty beyond a certain limit, in which a trade-off (frequency-position trade-off) between both appears, even if all initial conditions are specified and known.

Introduced first in 1927 by German physicist Werner Heisenberg, the uncertainty principle states that the more precisely the position of some particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be predicted from initial conditions, and vice versa.
– Wikipedia –

I think this is the science underlying what MU has been debating with Luke. Luke’s arguments, consisting of linguistic abstractions pertaining to past/preset/future, exhibit sound logic and should therefore be taken seriously as guardrails limiting MU’s claims. In the end, however, I conclude Luke’s language-based logic, like the abstract point, a theoretical construct pinpointing paired-variables such as position and momentum, do not apply precisely to empirical experience of (physical) time within the physical realm.

Assessment – MU’s thesis has something new to say about time and quantum entanglement within the macro-space of everyday human experience.

In the wake of my weigh-in upon the debate, Luke’s graphic gets modified into the following isotope:

Past------------------------Future

------------<Present>-----------

P------R------E-----S-----N-----T

↕︎ ↕︎ ↕︎

P------A------S------T

↕︎ ↕︎ ↕︎

F-----U-----T-----U-----R-----E


Some people, like Luke, will balk at the implications of what MU is telling us: we humans cannot know simultaneously and precisely where we are and where we’re going in time, as past/present/future, being quantumly entangled like the wave and the particle, individually exhibit simultaneously all three properties.

What I argued is that to put the present within time itself requires that we conceive of the conscious experience as being within time. This produces the conclusion that past and future must inhere within the conscious experience of being present. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want to put the present within time itself. When this is accomplished, past and future are essential parts of the conscious experience of being present.

So to model the present as an independent feature, instead of being a feature of the observer, requires that we find real substantial points in time which can be employed to distinguish past features from present features within the conflated unity of what we experience as "the present" — Metaphysician Undercover

You want to model the present as an independent feature, not as a feature of the observer. Doing this requires points in time that distinguish past features from present features within the conflated unity of what we experience as “the present.”

You acknowledge boundaries are necessary to distinguish distinct parts. Conventional wisdom about how to perceive the present introduces a distortion into the conventional perception of time: boundaries marking the separation of past/present/future receive an arbitrary placement. The randomness of the placement of the boundaries proceeds from a false premise: the present is outside of time, and thus boundary placements are inconsequential in the manner of zeroes placed to the right of the decimal point marking the value of a number: 1.0 = 1.0000; the placement of the zeroes, being inconsequential, have no effect on the number. The effect of this false randomness of boundary placement is to render the present an abstraction whereas, per your thesis, the present is an existential flowing of time no less than past/future.

From the "static POV" of "the present", time appears to be a continuous flow., into which we can arbitrarily insert points of separation. From the "active POV", the continuous flow is replaced by an interaction of past aspects with future aspect. The need for "interaction" is the result of a mix of causal determination form the past, and freely willed selections from future possibilities. This implies that within any arbitrarily placed point of "the present", there are spatial aspects which are already determined (necessarily past), and also spatial aspects which are possibilities (still in the future). So the distinguishing features (points) appear to be spatial features. — Metaphysician Undercover

You take us into the weeds of your thesis with some details of exactly how the tripartite structure of time is jointed together, with past/future being akin to the two human arms attached to the present which is akin to the human thorax. The upshot of your correction seems to be your understanding that past/present/future are permanently entangled. This means the present can’t be rendered a mental abstraction without introducing distortion into the perception of the existential reality of time.

I’m wondering if you’re thesis might find support within the concept of quantum entanglement.

How I understand the above quote: We're inhabiting a temporal universe running in reverse. — ucarr

I don't understand this at all. Why do you understand this as reverse? — Metaphysician Undercover

My interpretation of your thesis as a reverse-temporal universe is my reaction to you saying,

Time is flowing from future to past, as the date of tomorrow, which is in the future, will become the date of yesterday. Death is a case of being forced by the flow of time, away from your observational point of the present, into the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we want to give "present" an objective referent, as something other than the subjective point of view, Then it would be the process which is the future becoming the past. This is what we observe at the present, as change. It is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the above you seem to be signed on to the arrow of time having only one direction. For you, per your above statement, that direction is from the future to the past. That claim caused my reverse-temporal universe statements.

a) the present is outside of time;
— ucarr

This is not what I am arguing for, it is what I called the "conventional" perspective, which I am arguing against as a misconception.. What I called "the conventional definition" (which Luke took exception to because it is inconsistent with what he thinks of as "the conventional definition) , puts the present outside of time. It puts the present outside of time as a derivation of the perspective from which the passing of time is observed. I am arguing that this is a misunderstanding of time, and that we ought to conceive of "the present" as a feature of time itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I understand the above quote: One of the main objectives of your thesis is to establish the present within the flowing stream of time.

If you are wondering how this puts the present outside of time as per my response to your (a) above, it is because this separation becomes, in practise, an arbitrary application of a non-dimensional point. The non dimensional point has no temporal extension, and cannot be understood as a part of passing time. So this, what I call "the conventional definition" (disputed by Luke, as not really the convention), cannot include "the present" as a part of time, because anytime we try to insert this observational perspective into the passing of time, whether as non-dimensional, infinitesimal, a short duration, etc., it requires arbitrarily placed points of separation between the present, and the rest of time, past and future. Therefore this "present", what I call the conventional one, is always incompatible with a true understanding of the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I understand the above quote: The crux of your correction of the misconception of present time is the show that the present, being rooted within the flowing stream of time, differs existentially from a notion of the present as a static POV artificially demarcated by non-dimensional points.

I cannot conceive of the present itself as a flowing stream. It would have to be the perspective from which the stream is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position to coincide with the conventional conception of the present as a non-flowing i.e., static perspective. Henceforth, one can only conclude you've renounced you earlier plan to correct the convention.

The changes we see all around us are evidence of the flowing time. Time is flowing from future to past, as the date of tomorrow, which is in the future, will become the date of yesterday. Death is a case of being forced by the flow of time, away from your observational point of the present, into the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I understand the above quote: We're inhabiting a temporal universe running in reverse. If our universe has a finite lifespan, it began (inexplicably) at its endpoint and now runs backwards toward its beginning and, presumably, will continue beyond its conception into non-existence. I'm pondering whether that means our reverse-temporal universe is a one-cycle only universe. Also, I observe that our reverse-temporal universe is rigidly deterministic. Everything populating the present was always assured of existing exactly according to its current manifestation with the proviso that the evolving present keeps transitioning to younger manifestations of all existing things.

If we want to give "present" an objective referent, as something other than the subjective point of view, Then it would be the process which is the future becoming the past. This is what we observe at the present, as change. It is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I understand the above quote: You have flipped your position back to positing the present as a flowing stream, albeit a reverse-temporal flowing stream that, paradoxically, you claim is a feature of the flow of time, yet not the flow of time itself.

Can you explain how the reverse-temporal flowing of present time is not the flow of time itself?

A reading of the Old Testament can present us with a god who screws up time and again. — Tom Storm

The issue with any version of God is that it will always be in relation to a particular narrative account. Gods are always part of a story which humans tell each other and interpret. — Tom Storm

We stand on solid ground when we say God is a narrative. A select few witness miracles first-hand. For most of us, however, knowledge of God comes through narratives.

Gods cannot be separated from human narratives, since gods exist inter-subjectively, not objectively. — LuckyR

Well said.

I would say that if the present is analogous to a flowing stream, then the future is the part flowing toward you, and the past is the part flowing away from you. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the arrow of time has only one direction (forward), as seems to be the case, does it make sense to say the past flows towards (not away from) the present? Time flowing away from the present towards the increasingly distant past, reverse time, supposes the arrow of time has two directions.

Knowing God exists means knowing God's superlative attributes exist and are therefore to be shared out to the masses via believers. — ucarr

This is not a given. If the God as described in the Bible exists, than this is a violent mob boss deity who runs a celestial protection racket. — Tom Storm

You have a strong argument. A violent and wrathful God ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac at Mt. Moriah. In our own time, we have diatribes against a seemingly indifferent God in the face of horrific human-to-human violence. Is the sublime, if evanescent, beauty of our natural world also of God?

Is our most vibrant picture of God nonetheless a tragical portrait, elevated in stature but run through with fatal flaws? Forgive the inadequacy in what I say next when I say that human nature, as I know it, will tear down upon itself any sanctuary of perfection and order before long whereas, faced with a sometimes reveling, sometimes marauding Supremacy, humanity, buoyed upon the desperation of a much-assailed faith, keeps re-visiting the testamental narrative in defiance of rational hope.

Life cannot get on for long without order and thus logic and internal consistency are essential to it. Life, however, is neither rational nor orderly. Anyone who keeps the flame of childhood alive senses this.

Only one “stream of time” is required. — Luke

...“the present” indexically refers to the time at which you are aware... — Luke

From your above quotes I understand (tentatively) that the present streaming of time is a directory that gives a person overview of and access to the tripartite structure of time.

If there is only one stream of time, the present streaming of time, must we conclude that the past streaming of time can only stream as the present streaming of the past; it cannot stream as the past streaming of the past? In a similar fashion, must we conclude that the future streaming of time can only stream as the present streaming of the future; it cannot stream as the future streaming of the future?

If these restrictions hold, must we conclude that past/future are tricks of perspective emanating from an insuperable present streaming of time? Another way of saying this is to say past/future exist only within the neural networks of the brain whereas, in the material world outside of the brain, past/future have no existence?

I am going with the traditional interpretation of classical theism with God defined with the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipresence, eternality, aseity, etc. — GRWelsh

Are you willing to examine the possibility that the above attributes of classical theism defining God entail gnarly problems of exegesis pertaining to Venn Diagrams of overlapping boundaries incoherencies, set/subset membership rules of inference paradoxes and origin narrative generative infinite regress conundrums? Moreover, are you willing to examine the methodology boondoggle of analysis-logic in application to axiomatic relationships?

Why would God allow the Devil to convince people that he -- the Devil -- doesn't exist and also that nothing at all supernatural -- including God -- exists? Especially if God's goal is to make salvation available to as many people as possible. — GRWelsh

Does it follow from God's omnibenevolence that God honors Lucifer's free will no less than he honors yours and mine?

"God doesn't force us to believe He exists because He doesn't want to take away our free will," or something like that. It's a terrible response because it should be obvious that one can believe that God exists, yet still have the free will to not follow, worship, obey, or trust God — GRWelsh

If the Gospel of Jesus has for its evangelical mission trumpeting to the four corners of the world the attributes of God named by you above, is it pertinent to ask why a person who believes God exists would refuse to follow God's path? Knowing God exists means knowing God's superlative attributes exist and are therefore to be shared out to the masses via believers. If a person refuses to follow God's path of blessedness, isn't it a logical necessity that such a person does NOT believe God exists? How could any rational person choose the horrors of the fallen world of earth over the beatific attributes you've named above?

Theists may have different explanations for the hiddenness of God and the Devil, but my point is that it seems inconsistent for both God and the Devil to want their existence to be not be believed in, since it doesn't seem possible that this would favor them both. — GRWelsh

Consider that these theists you name above are making a factual error in the advancement of their argument. God does NOT want God's existence to not be believed in. Not forcing someone to believe in something does not equal not wanting that someone to believe in that something. God's hiddenness is not a divine ploy; it is an effect of worldly preoccupation. God is not hidden from those in possession of a pure heart.

Lucifer, in contrast to God, aligns rationally with the argument that he wants to not to be believed to exist. Lucifer's ace card and primary modus operandi is deception. Deception, by definition, seeks to conceal itself as it conducts its business. If a deceiver needs the cover of darkness to be effective, what greater cover of darkness is there than the darkness of the minds of those who are to be deceived. A close concomitant to Lucifer non-existent is Lucifer non-toxic i.e., Lucifer good. Lucifer plays at the top of his game when he beguiles his victims with a credible appearance of being Godly. These effects are the central goals of the hiddenness ploy.

If the present is a flowing stream of time that commingles with the past on one side & the future on the other side, most we conclude logically that past/future, like the present, are flowing streams of time?

...this conception, the conventional one, gives us "the present" as a perspective, a view point, and it does not provide for a "present" which is a part of time — Metaphysician Undercover

...the conventional definition "present" is defined in reference to past and future, but what I propose is that past and future be defined in reference to the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the present does not go by, nor is it yet to come. Both of these refer to time, as what goes by. But the present is the perspective from which it is observed to go by. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand your above quotes to be claims emanating from the core of your thesis.

My preliminary takeaways (subject to revision or rejection): a) the present is outside of time; b) the present is the standard of reference against which past/future are defined; c) events evolve over past/future through the lens of the present which is outside of time.

Don't you experience awakening, that brief period when you're half asleep and half awake? And don't you experience this 'in between period' when you are falling asleep as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

"the grammar of our language" discourages us from claiming that we are both asleep and awake at the same time, it does allow us to say that we are neither asleep nor awake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you accept, as another representational example of your above claims, the lap dissolve, a scene transition mechanism essential to the continuity of motion pictures?

As you probably know, the lap dissolve occurs when one scene, nearing its conclusion, becomes imposed upon by a new scene of translucent density. The ghostly density of the new scene allows the viewer to continue viewing the conclusion of the concluding scene. As the lap dissolve progresses, the concluding scene dematerializes into translucency (and, finally, transparency) as the new scene materializes into an opaquing density that ultimately makes the concluding scene disappear.

Given that the two scenes can be in different places at different times, the temporary simultaneity of the composite image of the lap dissolve in progress presents us with an ambiguity that is existentially intriguing.

If we imagine a lap dissolve from Scene A, the present to Scene B, the future, and if we allow the temporary, transitional composite of the two scenes to be an ambiguous interval neither present nor future but rather, unspecifiable, then we seem to have a temporal-phenomenal puzzle.

The trick consequently resides in working out how this ambiguity expresses itself in three dimensions.

My goal herein is elaboration of some ramifications of your thesis concerning passing time.

I personally think that religious discussion should be confined to religion, and as you should know from my posting history I have no argument with people's personal religious beliefs, but when they seek to justify those beliefs in a public forum then they make themselves fair game. — Janus

In your first part I understand you to mean you think religious votaries should be confined to interactions with other religious votaries. I see this as a partial curtailment of free speech. Free speech is tolerated within a specified context (ghetto). A religious votary speaking outside of their designated free speech context (speaking herein, for example) is guilty of violation of the cognitive segregationism you're advocating.

In your second part I understand you to mean religious advocacy within a philosophical context is tolerable if it's agreed by all participants that such advocacy is fair game for rigorous logical examination and possible thoroughgoing refutation.

I think your second part is an apt description of the understanding that's in force herein.

Are you will to start with your conscious experience of being at the present, experiencing the passing of time, without reference to measurement? — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this the core of your thesis?

How do you counter-argue the claim "experiencing the passing of time," is measuring time?

To me, all this talk/questioning about God is as silly as watching people in India talking about the specific patterns of Vishnu’s tunic. It’s a waste of time. — Mikie

Christian beliefs, myths and stories are no different from Hindu beliefs or animistic beliefs of tribal people. From a psychological, anthropological, and historical point of view, it’s just one more worldview. — Mikie

The argument is simple: because one happens to be raised in a Christian culture doesn’t afford special attention to one’s “questions” about God. Very easy to see if you replace “God” with “Wodin.” — Mikie

I'm currently thinking you present us with two premises: a) Christianity is no less invalid as a factual worldview that all of the many other religious world-views (discredited through the lens of Christianity); Christian votaries, given the truth of this, should either resort to study of (mythical) religious texts or entirely repent of their involvement thereof; b) total repentance of religion entails Christian votaries abandoning the false belief that Christianity is the "last man standing" with credibility within the realm of religious world-views.

Also, regarding the question of your purpose, you're not attacking religion. Instead, you're advising religious votaries with regard to what you understand to be a classification error. Religion requires a different classification than that applied to science and philosophy.

It seems to me that the idea of order is related to unity and intelligibility, rather than microscopic realizations, which were never thought of by classic authors. We see things as ordered, for example, when they are directed to a single end -- e.g., the parts of an organism being ordered to sustaining its life or propagating its species. — Dfpolis

Does agent-intellect have three essential functions? Are they: entanglement, causation, over-arching cognition?

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you say above -- re: attributes -- sounds correct to me. I know, therefore, I've omitted something essential from my statement.

Consider a PC for which you try to upgrade the monitor. Turning on the PC, momentarily you get coherent images onscreen and then the picture scrambles into a messy melange of incoherent shapes and colors. The problem is the new monitor requires a higher resolution video card than the one installed in your computer.

I use this example to posit the phenomenal universe as a field of proto-order. Its order gets "decided" -- resolved into order_intelligibility -- by the agent-intellect operations of a sentient observer.

For clarification by simplified example consider: At the level of automation, a video card with resolution sufficient to resolve data-unformatted does so via sufficient resolution.

In parallel, at the higher level of sentience, agent-intellect “decides” what is the order_intelligibility of phenomenal world present to its senses.

The Missing Essential

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect.

The physicality of space becomes apparent when we conceptualize object/observer as entangled duet. Also, objectivity/subjectivity as integral whole perplexes simplistic and discrete conceptualizations of their difference.

These are claims made familiar by QM, right?

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

This raises an interesting question. With your no-cart-before-the-horse proviso in mind, I don't seek an immediate answer: What degree of variation or change in an ordered sequence crosses the threshold dividing integral change from entropic breakdown? Entropy, a thermodynamic measurement essential to systems theory feels to me like a suitable context in which to pursue a contemporary and useful definition of order.

Assuming that order and intelligibility are coextensive, they still differ in definition. "Order" names an intrinsic property, while "intelligibility" points to a possible relation -- the possibility of being an object in the subject-object relation of knowledge. — Dfpolis

Regarding intelligibility and order, do we have a knarly Venn Diagram as with the form/ substance puzzle? In other words, do we have distinct properties that are inseparable?

Please assess the following conjecture: An apple is an ordered state of being of an existing thing. By definition, its order is active, not potential*.

*With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes.

In contrast, we can say an apple seed has the potential ordering of an apple.

...definition is artificial in the first place. It's a creative attempt to sketch the common roles of words in actual conversation. As I see it, it is not like math where definitions essentially create their objects. Formal systems are so nice because we escape from our own complexity when we play with them. — green flag

Do you think that when we drive over a bridge spanning a body of water, say, The Golden Gate Bridge, we're trusting an application of math language that is an attempt to define numbers within empirical experience?

Sidebar - Your capsule surveys of current thinking on various topics are proving very helpful to me. They're providing ways forward for me in my reading and subsequent reflection. This work by you on my behalf is a very valuable service and I'm now thanking you for it. More power to you in your interactions with others.

How does language refer ? — green flag

This question invokes the realm of Aristotle's {Intelligibility $\leftrightarrow$Agent Intellect}. I've been dialoging with dfPolis in his conversation: The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Standard Abstraction

Here's where we are presently in our dialogue:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/790900

The duet of intelligibility-meets-comprehending-sentience suggests to me something intriguing along the lines of entanglement, with language playing a central role in the mix. You touch on this in the following:

To me the beauty of this is that we only really get to know ourselves by trying to know others. — green flag

Firstly, do you embrace or refute Descartes' ghost-in-the-machine substance duality, with its bifurcation of mind/body? Language signification is deeply embedded within this interweave, I believe.

I'm not ready to make comprehensive declarations just now, however, language-as-mind-games-hovering-over-an-abyss sounds to me like thinking rooted in Descartes' substance duality.

Hi. I don't think you are grasping my point. — green flag

I appreciate your persistence with me as I work to understand subtleties of language and meaning you're trying to communicate.

I hope I can claim a measure of legitimacy in my persistence in debating the subtleties based on my always presenting supporting arguments for my counters to your narratives. I think the issue for you is persuading me to understand my arguments are fallacious whereas the issue for me is gradually understanding that: either my arguments are indeed fallacious or, that my arguments, through hardening of tempering by examination, are indeed verifiable.

Definition is a blurry-go-round. — green flag

I don’t argue against this claim. No doubt language has limitations and yet, as you show in your opening line to me, you place a measure of trust and hope in language to successfully communicate. I regard myself as having honored your trust, hope and persistence by always supplying supporting arguments for my obstinacy.

I understand the business of debate to be closely reasoned examination of minute details of intricate cognitive filigree populating sincere and considered belief.

That language is limited is now virtually a banality as no one is seriously considering abandoning language wholesale nor even abandoning linguistic examination of abstruse phenomena physical and mental. If I'm mistaken, then we're wasting our time posting to this website. Attacking from another angle, if anyone took Wittgenstein's apotheosis of silence seriously, philosophy would've ended some time during the twentieth century.

Language, both verbal and mathematical, is undergirded by logic and from its use we see profound differences between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. I cite this difference as evidence that rebuts your claim:

There is nothing that staples this system of references to something outside it. — green flag

The system of signs that can only mean their differences from one another floats rootless above an abyss. — green flag

Whoever publishes narratives making this claim, in so doing, self-refutes said claim. If semiotics is hopelessly self-referential, thus leading inevitably to empty word-games, then why is no one shutting down the global publishing industry? Also, why do you continue reading books, especially the ones making such claims?

saying something like 'being is countable' or 'being is time' is just leaping from stone to stone. — green flag

No. Not

saying something like 'being is countable' or 'being is time' is just leaping from stone to stone. — green flag

That's what the average monkey is still spending a lot of time doing, instead of boarding jet planes to various continents thereafter entering elevators to offices in celestial climes.

Kant makes a powerful argument that being-ness is empty in its function as a predicate.

Here's my argument against claiming futility in manipulating conceptually being-ness vis-a-vis sets:

$∅\Rightarrow∞$ because $∅\Rightarrow ((n^n))$

P.S. Do you have a refutation of my claim: being-ness is an insuperable medium. It's the lynchpin of my application of sets. Its refutation might be the kill shot.

↪ucarr

In order not to repeat myself over and over, I will say it one more time and move on. Being or "beingess" is not an attribute of what is. Something must be in order to have attributes. — Fooloso4

Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. ...

A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars—that is, in the mere conception of them...[/] — green flag

You imply, as per the Kant quote, being-in-general, because it further elaborates no dimensionality of beings-specific, has no countable being and thus, weirdly, being-in-general has no being.*

*Beyond being a tautology, this is a paradox. Many think paradox a theorem killer.

I dispute this logic by claiming being-in-general, like the empty set, is a member of every being-specific and, moreover, being-in-general, like the empty set, is countable via unbounded recursion to all beings-specific and thus being-in-general, beyond being a countable attribute of every being-specific, stands existentially as the countable attribute of general-beingness, an insuperable medium.

It is the insuperability of general-beingness that makes it appear as if it adds no further elaboration to beings-specific and is thus uncountable. The problem here is confusing uncountable with insuperable such that insuperable appears as nothingness. On the contrary, because being-in-general always encompasses the totality of every being-specific, in the effort to add it as a countable attribute, it appears as a nothing because counting being-in-general presupposes the totality of a being-specific due to its insuperability as a medium for the expression of the specific beingness of the specific being.

In short, the totality of being-in-general added to being-specific is a false nothingness.

As I see it, we have to take the risk and talk it out. — green flag

And, proceeding from that welcome note of optimism and generosity, let me ask you, regarding,

In ““Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God,””1 drawn from his Critique, Kant addresses the logical problem of existential import. How do we talk or think about things without supposing, in some sense at least, that they exist? Bertrand Russell expressed one aspect of the problem this way: If it’s false that the present King of France is bald, then why doesn’t this fact imply that it’s true the present King of France is not bald? When the existence of the subjects of our statements are in question, the normal use of logic becomes unreliable. Kant argues that the use of words (or “predicates”) alone does not necessarily imply the existence of their referents. We can only assume the existence of entities named by our words; we cannot prove “existence” by means of the use of language alone.
— Immanuel Kant

https://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/articles/kantexistence-a.pdf

As I see it, he begins by claiming a predicate is an elaboration of a truth pertaining to something whereas a claim of the "being" of something is merely a supposition in abstraction.

A predicate elaborates additional dimensionality to an actually existing thing. A declaration affirming the existence of a thing does not elaborate its dimensionality beyond its already established phenomenal_empirical attributes.

I don't see how correctly denying the phenomenal_empirical reality of existence claims - on the basis of no additional elaboration of dimensionality - leads to correctly denying the "being" of things verified by phenomenal_empirical observation.

I think we can have fun examining some ramifications of Kant's claim predication of existence of a thing adds nothing to its established attributes.. That general being has a { }, viz., empty set relationship with individual beings shows promise of being interesting. For example, we can start with the concomitant claim that being-ness as an empty set is a member of the individual set of every existing thing.

Does this lead to claiming that we can use the John von Neumann technique for propagating all numbers from the empty set in a parallel that propagates all existing things from being-ness-as-the-empty set? That infinite recursion generates conceptually all existing things from being-ness-as-the-empty set feels right.

Maybe that's what Nietzsche's getting at with his infinite return.