That's animal communication not language. Conveying information is not a high enough bar for language.
— Baden

What is language for if not conveying information ? — RussellA

Exactly. No conscious individual in possession of information needful of communication exits without simultaneous possession of language.

:smile: :up: :100:

...if we are to take it that language evolved over time, we ought to make conceptual room for a theorised primitive proto-language. — Baden

Okay. Here's your recognition of upwardly developmental language across a continuum.

there is no serious consideration given in academic linguistics to incorporating crow behaviour or tea-making behaviour under even the broadest umbrella understanding of language. — Baden

lin·guis·tics | liNGˈɡwistiks |
plural noun [treated as singular]
the scientific study of language and its structure, including the study of morphology, syntax, phonetics, and semantics.

__The Apple Dictionary

One of the foundational reasons I'm making my claims herein is the desire to make the following change to the above definition,

the scientific study of ^ verbal ^ language

So, yes. In reference to the non-homo sapiens animal kingdom, language is more properly the study of psychology than academic linguistics.

I don't know whether ucarr is saying that logic or language came first. — RussellA

I think language and logic are contemporaneous co-functions. I intuit this because, in my experience, a healthy, functional brain cannot long operate illogically. Environmental forces soon put illogical behavior in check along the axis of survival. The purposeful individual, being conscious, must proceed under guidance of some degree of foundational common sense, otherwise death. There is no viable intent apart from a foundation within logic. Translated broadly, this means an individual must move about with purpose within his-her environment. Within the crucible of survival, logic and language are forged jointly as co-equals. As such, both logic and language emerge as non-random animation.

Homo sapiens differs from the rest of the animal kingdom not in terms of a quantum leap forward from non-language to language, but rather from non-verbal langue to verbal langue.

In its broadest generality, langue_logic is motion organized by need_intent_purpose.

It's the degree of supportable abstraction that separates non-verbal langue from verbal langue. The animal kingdom, although linguistic, is non-verbal, therefore non-literate. It uses the language of purposeful animation within the immediate context of personally physicalized expression of intent. Unlike homo sapiens, it cannot record complex, intricate motion-with-intent as a continuity of abstract signification i.e., a book. It cannot take a book and, via internalized motion (which is a good definition of the operation of intellect) reanimate, via the imagination, complex signification of same.

I'm trying to articulate supporting arguments for (2) claims : a) grammar introduces all speakers to logic; b) spacetime is the ultimate conjunction.

My conceptualization of logic is based on this premise: logic is a synonym for continuity and, moreover, logical operations (such as language) are concerned with the parsing of continuity. Logical operations, therefore, express themselves as systematic analyses of a whole for the sake of manipulation-with-intention. This said manipulation, ultimately, must gravitate back to its source. Analysis always has a gravitational orientation back to its source, the whole. Language, viewed thus, expresses itself as a systematically modulated medium of derivatives in search of a whole.

Let me illustrate with a parallel. When a prism parses the visible light spectrum into a rainbow of colors, white light, the whole, gets parsed into a language, as it were, of color derivatives in search of the whole from whence they came.

All of this is to say that the grammar of language, no matter how cognitive & cerebral, remains rooted in the physicality of spacetime.

Now I can present my foundational premise: logic = continuity = (literal, physical) motion.

As a general statement about logic (and therefore about language), I claim that it is a concomitant of motion.

Of course my above claim is subject to cogent refutation.

Baden, RussellA and alan1000 have made responses of essential importance.

So, American Sign Language, for example, is a perfectly valid language but me making a cup of tea or physically showing you how to do that, more analogical to your crow example, is not. — Baden

Our views differ in terms of the quantum vs. the continuum. Baden says the boundary between linguistic and non-linguistic is quantum; I say it is continuum.

There are two main theories as to how language evolved. Either i) as an evolutionary adaptation or ii) a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. — RussellA

Is the human brain hard-wired for language, or did it reconfigure itself for language in response to environmental prompts? Since the entire animal kingdom encounters environmental prompts, I lean towards believing the high-cognition version of language that is human is hard-wired.

I think he (ucarr) would agree that the perception of logical connection is essentially non-verbal, and language follows later as an attempt to communicate the logical connection to others. — alan1000

Yes. Language arises directly from the physical environment of animation, and remains rooted there, no matter how refined into abstract cerebration it becomes.

I quote these important observations of correspondents in order to acknowledge their impact upon my arguments which, given the cogency of the observations, must presently remain tentative.

Causal understanding of water displacement by a crow

It seems that the crow is using cognition. If the crow has no language, then it is using cognition outside of language. — RussellA

I infer you've concluded the video shows no practice of language by the crow.

In this context, I note that language is expanded in scope to include all of the sensory forms of signification (sight, sound, touch, taste, smell). — ucarr

If you can say it, you can think it — ucarr

With my two above quotes of myself I lay foundation for making the claim that a broadly inclusive definition of language allows language production via the five senses. Bearing this in mind, I claim the crow understands and practices the visual language of water displacement towards making the desired object reachable.

From the evidence of the crow's purposeful behavior, I infer the claimed visual language was learned through observation. The visual objects within the frame are the syntax of the visual language and the displacement effect (with acquisition of desired object) is the semantics of the visual language.

In making my claim, I'm stretching the common usage of "language" in an effort to make it suitable as evidence and support.

I argue that my use of the stretch is not pettifogging and foolish because it's of a piece with claiming that language is not limited to verbal practitioners. I claim, instead, that the distribution of language capacity is not binary: humans linguistic; remainder (of animal kingdom) non-linguistic. The distribution of language practice comprises a range that possesses no sharp and distinct boundary between linguistic and non-linguistic. From here I proceed to claiming perception_cognition_language are not discreet.

You might argue the crow had no intention to communicate a method for acquiring the desired object via water displacement, and thus makes no practice of language on behalf of the observer. I acknowledge the range of language practice has discernible levels of sophistication, especially as it pertains to intentional communication.

...logic is not a language, but a component of language... — Hanover

Logic, then, being an attribute of language, stands subordinate to language. This feels intuitively like something useful to my argument, but, first, I must ask how symbolic logic can stand alone (which it can) without being its own language?

Language and formal logic are no more synonyms than language and fortran. — Joshs

As I see the above, it's not a refutation, but rather, a call for greater precision. Suppose I revise my claim to say, "grammar, the inferential platform and medium of language, is synonymous with logic"?

Language is a human extension of perceptual interaction with the world, and is continuous with perception, which is already conceptual and cognitive prior to the learning of a language. — Joshs

Let's look at a piece of what you've written above.

...perceptual_already conceptual and cognitive prior to_language. — Joshs

Let's look at definitions of three of your important words.

con·cept | ˈkänˌsept |
noun
an abstract idea; a general notion: structuralism is a difficult concept | the concept of justice.

• Philosophy an idea or mental picture of a group or class of objects formed by combining all their aspects.

cog·ni·tion | ˌkäɡˈniSH(ə)n |
noun
the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses.
• a result of this; a perception, sensation, notion, or intuition.

per·cep·tion | pərˈsepSH(ə)n |
noun
the ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses: the normal limits to human perception.


__The Apple Dictionary

Do you deny that perception and abstraction are opposites?

Do you deny that perception does not imply knowledge?

Do you deny that the pre-language period of a toddler invokes the hard problem of communicating what it's like to be an experiencing individual with an innate POV?*

*Toddlers intentionally modulate their cries, grunts, moans, chuckles etc. in service to parents trying to decipher the wants and needs generated by their child's innate POV. This, I claim, exemplifies the child's linguistification of the crude "words" listed above.

How does the child, untaught, know how to modulate his crude "words" into intelligible signifiers? I claim such knowledge derives from the child's hard-wired, deep-speech aptitude, articulated by Chomsky.

If you claim that deep speech aptitude in pre-language toddlers shows that perception is conceptual and cognitive prior to language, then I claim that it simultaneously shows that its power of linguistification establishes perception, cognition and language as not discreet and thus temporal priority goes out the window.

'To deliberately inflict and prolong, willfully ignore or derive pleasure from suffering' is my quick & dirty idea of evil. — 180 Proof

Your definition, as I see it, exemplifies anti-empathy.

Is not the genre of Dystopian Sci-Fi essentially nationalistic?
— ucarr

Is it? — Tom Storm

The citizen of civil society maintains a dual interest: a) individual interest; b) group interest. The two interests stand locked within a yin-yang of creative conflict and, as such, are the rich ground of drama. Dystopian Sci-Fi examines the decline into toxicity of an empire_civilization under the adverse influence of a systemic imbalance between the individual interest & the group interest. Usually, it's a case of the individual interest overbearing the group interest such that a consortium of power brokers enslaves the masses to a system of values that upholds & enhances their power while condemning multitudes to servile self-denial & misery. Metropolis examples this configuration. The opposite configuration, not as common, has the masses imposing their benighted will upon a lone wolf alarmist whose narrative of impending doom they scoff at & dismiss. Superman examples this configuration.

Not sure why complaining came up or even matters. I dislike Marvel films for their shrill, derivative banality. The point is that they are not Eisenstein or Lang. But this is a matter of personal taste. — Tom Storm

the fascism is in the aesthetics, the fetishisation of weapons, uniforms and the body beautiful, posed and choreographed mawkishly the way Leni Riefenstahl posed her Nazi superheroes. — Tom Storm

I this isn't a complaint against the narcissism & overweening of fascism, then I don't know the meaning of the words.

Consider this. Not to think about Herrmann doesn't mean he isn't a primary reason for the film's success, as Hitchcock himself felt. The genius in a score is that it is felt and often remains undetected... — Tom Storm

The issue here is determination which is more foundational: a) the audio-visual narrative; b) the musical narrative. While it's true both narratives can stand alone as satisfying artistic experiences, when examining the merits of a movie, an audio-visual narrative whose themes & plot points are enhanced by the score, clearly, the audio-visual narrative is the principal & the score is the subordinate. Being that it occupies a support role, it's merely appropriate that the score's impact be mostly subliminal. Therefore, in this context, being subliminal is not a good yardstick for being sublime.

It's not power as such; the fascism is in the aesthetics, the fetishisation of weapons, uniforms and the body beautiful, posed and choreographed mawkishly the way Leni Riefenstahl posed her Nazi superheroes... — Tom Storm

Human nature being such as it is, what with the individual intimately concerned with issues of power and, moreover, each individual, living within a civil society compartmentalized by specialization, also interested in the power of the group, allowance must be made for the celebration (if not exaltation) of state power within the arts & entertainment.

The people's will to power will be honored. The aesthetics of fascism is power in another mode: the fetishizing of weapons (predominantly phallic), the pageantry of full military dress, the dash & storm of athletic soldiers, these attributes are the golden gleam of martial might. They are the essence of the rhetoric-cum-propaganda that wins the hearts & minds of the masses.

These glorifications within the arts date from Homer to Tolstoy to Riefenstahl. Regarding toxic hero-worship of warfare, I measure culpability of Nietzsche greater than that of Riefenstahl.

Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkim & Lang's Metropolis are celebrated classics. Well, both pictures have nationalism folded into their aesthetics. Has anyone complained about this?

Is not the genre of Dystopian Sci-Fi essentially nationalistic?

Heath Ledger & Joaquin Phoenix have done excellent work as the Joker. The Dark Knight & Joker, however, are dramas about a super-villain, a genre distinct from the militarism of the superhero genre.

The protagonists hit each other until one side can't. — Banno

And thus the popularity of the boxing match. Humanity will never resist entirely the hot blood of the slain bull.

The reality is that most movies would be utterly diminished without the sound effects and music - the cues which give the visuals their power. — Tom Storm

With your statement, you have tossed me a dilemma. I see a lot of truth in what you say, however, personally speaking, I don't feel it all the way down.

I understand Hitchcock is the director the cognoscente love to hate. I hope you're not denying he was a genius filmmaker. Boy, if I had a choice between being a rarely seen darling of the critics vs. being a perennial favorite of the masses, I'd side with Hitchcock immediately.

When the title Psycho is uttered, does anyone first think of Bernard Herrmann?

As for the fascism of the American superhero movie (does anyone else make them?), you never get a thrill of power and preeminence when USA unloads a heep of whoop-ass onto the enemy?

You make an important point about the essential role of music scores. Where would Jaws be without those periodic, bowed bass notes? And that's why I think the eardrum-threatening splendor of the music of world-crunching mayhem is important catharsis for gadget-crazy America.

You can only assault someone's ears if they have other senses remaining. — Paul

If I can't see, touch, smell or taste, then my hearing is desensitized? I've heard that lack of sight, for example, increases aural sensitivity.

Just wild guessing> Did you mean for your statement to be a negative, but you forgot to include the negative?> You can only assault someone's ears if they don't have other senses remaining?

I need help understanding this.

It's true of 99% of post-1930 movies that you'll get more out of listening to it with your eyes closed than watching it with your ears plugged and captions off. — Paul

Interesting. Are you saying that verbal learners outnumber visual learners by a wide margin, or that movie sound design surpasses movie graphic design by a wide margin?

For the sake of clarification,

Audio design - the audio prelap which is so popular right now; recurring musical theme>the bowed notes on bass violin in Jaws

Graphic design - some basic graphic design grammar of the movies: a) wide angle for establishing; b) reverse overs for conversation; c) singles for deep emotions

Yes, it is reasonable to infer that the procedure and proof of the essay is necessarily that of temporal relations (sequences in succession of one another). The important thing is that, as of now, I find such a conclusion (i.e., derivation or the principle of regulation is temporal) to only be found by importation of other axioms (or, in my terms, superordinate principles which are not apart of the standard terminology nor proof explicated in the essay. — Bob Ross

I don’t find time to be a consideration necessary to prove PoR as a sine qua non and, furthermore, any assertion of atemporality, temporality, spatial references, etc. is via PoR (thereby dependent on it). As I alluded to earlier, I think for the sake of the essay it may be best to conceive of a sine qua non as neither in time nor not in time. — Bob Ross

I asked my questions about time vis-a-vis PoR because I want to know who does PoR as sine qua non have as his neighbors? I was conjecturing that time is one of PoR's neighbors. As such, time does not prove PoR as sine qua non. Instead, time is one of PoR's neighbors, which is to say time & PoR are a matched set. One always implies the other.

I haven't forgotten your explanation to the effect that, by definition, two sine qua nons are mutually exclusive and thus cannot both belong to one set.

Some other candidates for neighbors of PoR might be superordinate & subordinate rules? This would mean PoR's neighborhood is divided by class, with the superordinates as elites & the subordinates as commoners? PoR, totally aloof, sits on high & reigns over both? Even if this is the case, the lowliest subordinate rule nonetheless stands a comrade alongside PoR. This is so because, by force of the premise> universe is the limit of system, without which, not is, in fact, bi-directional. In other words, no object inhabits absolute isolation. Therefore, speaking extremely broadly, all things are equal.

With the following, I will try to show why I suspect sine qua nons cannot be mutually exclusive.

If PoR has no neighbors, then for me a fundamental question arises pertaining to relationship. Derivation & meta-derivation, as I presently understand them, imply inter-relatedness i.e. relationship.

If PoR has no neighbors, how can it fulfill the role of sine qua non in total isolation?

Moreover, if PoR has no peers, that is, no other sine qua nons as neighbors, how can he be an unbounded infinite? Haven't you established a causal agent confined to a single set as a bounded infinity?

As I alluded to earlier, I think for the sake of the essay it may be best to conceive of a sine qua non as neither in time nor not in time. — Bob Ross

I'm wondering if the above assertion (that sine qua non WRT temporality is undecidable) raises a question of foundational metaphysics> When the temporality of an object is undecidable, is not the location of said object also undecidable?

If the answer is yes, then how can sine qua non fill the role of foundational cause of derivation?

My underlying premise here is that even a purely cognitive "object," holding a priori status, by force of causality (inter-relatedness) obtains location. In this example, location of sine qua non is first member of a sequence.

I'm starting to suspect that sine qua non, as absolute solitary, without neighbors covering peers & subordinates alike, in parallel to the singularity of the Big Bang, cries out for conceptual revamping that addresses the deeply problematical boundary ontology of origins.

WRT = with respect to

I think that the two biggest cruces are (1) whether the individual at hand can transcend their own context…

Context ≅ Environment. In my thinking, environment suggests state of affairs, which suggests reality.

In your usage here, is individual… can transcend their own context an action symbolic or literal?

(2) whether the idea of the essay preceding “logical languages” (or theories of logic)…

My thinking proceeds from foundational assumptions that bump up against some foundational assumptions employed herein by you.

• An essay is, at bottom, the logical language of argumentation

• The stuff of logic is a continuum of conditionals that unfold sequentially, thus implying a temporal process

• Although logical expressions can be conceptualized as atemporal mental objects, continuity is always empirical & temporal

…a sine qua non has no prepositions…

…a context that is universal I really wouldn’t constitute as a context…

If, as I interpret you to be saying with the above two claims, sine qua non is not of anything, and, moreover, is not at all contextual, then I get the impression the whereness of sine qua non is more mysterious than the position of an orbiting electron at any given moment. Is that the case?

Firstly, a sine qua non is “without which, not” (where “not” is an unbounded infinite negative) and, therefore, the possibility of “without PoR, not derivation” invalidates “derivation” as being a sine qua non. Secondly, this is exactly why, derivation not being a sine qua non, produces the possibility that someone can completely remove it within their derivation (no matter how irrational it may be, as someone else could easily mention that I just literally said “someone can remove derivation from their derivation”), whereas they cannot remove PoR without utilizing it.

The above section of paragraph is wonderfully clear and thus it makes me hope I’m beginning to get some real grounding within your essay.

I now have an impression of your essay’s essence via use of a helpful metaphor wherein your sine qua non holds status akin to the singularity that precedes the Big Bang.

If there’s even a particle of truth in application of my pre-Big Bang metaphor to your metaphysical claim, then hopefully I can proceed to an understanding you’re wrestling with the boundary ontology of origin.

Boundary Ontology of Origin – continuity via hyper-logic across the super-position of a non-localized QM event.

The above definition is my best-to-date exposition of a hairy beast of a concept that is one of my works-in-progress. I won’t elaborate it’s possible pertinence to your essay because that would entail an inappropriate digression from your work. I will say I expect it to inform some of my commentary upon your work henceforth.

Likewise, time is by no means something one can posit as sine qua non, as “without PoR, not time” and, honestly, there are many principles that are required for it to be affirmed in the first place (i.e., faculties of reason which allow one to determine that time is enveloping of oneself, or that there is a non-temporal true claim, or neither true nor false, etc.).

Since you reject time_sine qua non, I think it imperative you state (If you have not done so) whether PoR_sine qua non is temporal, or atemporal.

I’ve been understanding regulation in the everyday sense of a transitive verb that controls & shapes an object under its influence. I don’t presently see this function as being atemporal.

Answering the question of sine qua non’s relationship to time entails whether or not your universe is static or dynamic. Does a universe without motion make any sense?

Likewise, you may have also noticed that it isn’t logically…coherent…to claim multiple sine qua nons as true—for if there existed two then they are thereby not sine qua nons (that’s a contradiction). In other words, if a sine qua non is “without which not”, if we allow ourselves the importation of useful logical axioms, then only one can be true by definition (otherwise we have a situation where two principles are supposed to be negatable in relation to one another, but yet the source of an unbounded infinite of negations respectively).

Your above statement, speaking potentially, has a lot to say to the project to bring the rules of inference into congruence with QM.

Please elaborate how regulate & modulate compare.

By “modulate”, what are you referring to? I am not completely following.

My Apple Dictionary tells me regulate & modulate are synonyms. I’ll buy that. However, I sense that modulate, more so than regulate, gets into the deep interior of language.

Language -- a collective, or gestalt of the systematic boundary permutations of a context or medium; a record of the systematic boundary permutations of a narrative medium.

If the above claim contains a particle of truth, then your sine qua non, as presently perceived by me, embodies something akin to the Original Utterance, itself, in turn, akin to the pre-Big Bang Singularity, itself, in turn, akin to God’s “Let there be light!”

I hope you’ll forgive the tincture of theism_Jungian psychology pooling into my assessment of your essay.

Might sine qua non, per your essay, be your Logos?

Can I posit a context sans PoR? No, and that is my point. — Bob Ross

I entertain hope that your above claim expresses a/the crux of your essay's purpose. In line with this assessment, your premise says,

PoR can never be excluded from context. Proving this logically renders PoR as sine qua non WRT context.

Does this imply the concomitant> Derivation can never be excluded from context.

Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (2) sine qua nons: PoR & Derivation

Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (3) sine qua nons: PoR, Derivation & Time

If you can prove this, do you have a set foundational to logic?

Since these questions are whoppers, let's focus on PoR.

Please elaborate how regulate & modulate compare.

Please elaborate how PoR & PoM compare.

How does one do Gnosis and can you provide an example of it in action? — Tom Storm

I have an example that comes from literature. It's a short story that places you into the ballpark of gnosis.

I have one distillation of the technique of gnosis that might be enlightening. Literature that conveys gnosis to the reader oftentimes makes use of metaphor in a very specific way. Via metaphor, it elaborates a link between the everyday world & the uncanny dimension of creation. The result is a narrative ambiguity that imparts awareness of duality of being of existing things.

The effect is environmental as the reader is partially transported out of the everyday world into a complex position with one foot on solid ground & the other foot landed within a dreamscape. Once inside the realm of duality, created things assume a high vibrational energy that perplexes the whereness of reality.

One genre label for this type of dual narrative is magical realism.

Our recently concluded Short Story Competition 3 includes such a story.

Dream of the Flood, by Tobias. Use the link below.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13187/dream-of-the-flood-by-tobias

There are also questioning sorts of interests that are hard even to formulate as simple questions. For instance, language seems to work, but what it even works at is not clear, what it even does is confusing. And there are ways of conceiving of language that suggest it cannot possibly work at whatever it's doing, which we still don't know. I don't think I'm ever going to shake my fascination with that little knot. — Srap Tasmaner

Writing in everyday, imprecise English, I advance one proposed answer to what language works at and does. Entertainment.

Lots of folks have experienced pleasure when imbibing a narrative that arouses & holds their interest with personal truths, dazzles their imagination with vibrant revelations, expels their breath with uncanny yet logical surprises and elevates their understanding with useful information.

I don't know if language has its own intentions apart from its impacts via application, but I trust many will grant the above as true description of their experience of good storytelling.

axiomatized logic — Srap Tasmaner

The juxtaposition of the above two words is an example of my experience of a bit of language as entertainment.

Firstly, how do you pronounce the participle? Secondly, is it a neo-logism of the writer? Thirdly, is the two-word phrase paradoxical?

As to the thirdly, how do you arbitrarily make inferential statements?

An asymptotic relationship requires a function g(x) where Lim f(x)/g(x) =1 as x becomes infinite. Or something similar.

The “gravitational” force of an infinite volume curves its own graphic progression to such an extreme it never achieves “escape velocity” to the next whole integer.
— ucarr

A reference for this would help an awful lot. — jgill

There's no reference for my line above. It was produced by my act of imagination that attempts to parallel your elaboration of asymptotic relationship in line one above with Einstein's General Relativity. I'm trying to say that infinite volume, like infinite gravitational field, warps neighboring spacetime (in this metaphor spacetime = the number line) into a field so curved neighboring objects cannot achieve escape velocity from its grasp. "Material" evidence of this warpage herein is the asymptotic graph of numerical progression rendered as "curved numbers."

Re: g(x) where Lim f(x)/g(x) =1 as x becomes infinite. Let's suppose this to be numerical time dilation, with the progression of the value towards infinity being "time." This numerical dilation grounds an intentional maneuver that makes an equation start rendering an infinite value. We might think of this maneuver as the act of dropping a graviton into an equation in order to intentionally make it go infinite.

Foraging around for an application of the numerical graviton maneuver, I come up with using the graviton maneuver to effect a numerical time dilation that facilitates topological examination of boundary equations for First Causes.

Note -- Curved numbers have some type of relationship to imaginary numbers. I sense this because imaginary numbers, being displaced from the set of real numbers, exhibit something in common with curved numbers, extreme warpage.

If someone can further distill this relationship into clarity, I trust it will prove to be mathematically lucrative.

The set [0,1] is uncountably infinite with no asymptotes. Clueless what you mean.

Perhaps curiously, an infinite value "warps" a (conceptual) boundary into a "curved space" that functions as an unspecified boundary in that it is a boundary that is never reached.
— ucarr

Give an example, please. — jgill

Regarding {0,1} graph {x = 0.1 + 0.01 + 0.001 + 0.0001 + 0…nth.1 < 1}.

Above is my attempt to show a counting series from 0 towards 1 for values of x that graphs as an asymptotic progression.

The “gravitational” force of an infinite volume curves its own graphic progression to such an extreme it never achieves “escape velocity” to the next whole integer.

If by “key elements” you mean key terms being used in the essay, then I think that most of your list is fine. Except:

{Infinite Series} bound, unbound, indeterminate

There is no “indeterminate” category proposed for infinities: it is indefiniteness—which I wouldn’t hold means the exact same thing (but if you just mean that in the sense that the bounds in undetermined, as opposed to indeterminate, then I think that is fine). For me, I am defining “indeterminate” as not able to be determined, whereas “undetermined” simply means it hasn’t yet been determined. — Bob Ross

I differentiate indefinite from indeterminate thus, the former means not specified whereas the latter means cannot be specified.

It may lie outside the scope of your project, but I want to broach the topic of infinity as it is conceptualized by you vis-a-vis how it is conceptualized by me.

I define infinite as volume unspecifiable. This is a way of saying infinities cannot be made explicit. I believe this truth persists even in the instance of hierarchies of infinities.

If {x_?} = infinity and P = {x_?} and IFF_not = if and only if negated and if {x} = bounded set, then P ⇒ IFF_not for {x}.

The above argument is predicated upon boundary = territorial limit.

Positing an infinite value (unspecifiable volume) within bounds is tricky because, in my opinion, territorial limit takes on a special meaning such that limit transforms into asymptote.

Perhaps curiously, an infinite value "warps" a (conceptual) boundary into a "curved space" that functions as an unspecified boundary in that it is a boundary that is never reached.

Is an unreachable boundary really a boundary?

In the instance of a bounded infinity, whose unspecifiable volume is quite free to expand forever, can we truthfully claim that it is contained?

It occurs to my visualization that a bounded infinity is a configuration wherein an unspecifiable volume has PoR as a neighbor who speaks another language and thus, there is no dialogue between the two. In this situation, can we truthfully say PoR acts as modulator of unspecifiable volume?

The ultimate problem is that I believe you have not shown that the PoR is something true universally. As noted above, I'm not sure its something you can either. — Philosophim

That being said, it may be that there are things I still don't understand, so please correct me if I'm in error. — Philosophim

I also think the PoR is a fine principle within bounded contexts, and see nothing overtly wrong with it within these bounded contexts. I just don't think at this time that you've provided what is needed to show it is true universally, and not just within the contexts you've been thinking in. — Philosophim

To far greater extent than Philosophim, there's much I neither know nor understand, thus I might be egregiously wrong when I use my argument above to expand Philosophim's doubt to include bounded contexts.

Having said that, I admit I do, now, have the audacity to entertain nascent doubt about the PoR's ability to modulate a bounded infinity.

Note – The core logic of my argument is the following premise,

Premise – the inherent unspecifiability of an infinite volume implies its expansion towards a boundary is necessarily asymptotic.

It is really a question of whether derivation is arbitrary (i.e., axiomatic) or grounded in a sine qua non — Bob Ross

With a view towards answering the above question, I'm making an attempt to get my general bearings within your project by elaborating the overview below. Let me know if it's sufficiently accurate to be helpful.

Schematic of Foundational Metaphysics of Derivation

A scheme to establish an algorithm for expressing & establishing a causal chain of derivatives culminating in a conclusion. This algorithm will be expressed in terms of the widest generality.

Some key elements that hold priority within the scheme:

• The principle of regulation

• The sine qua non

• Superordinate rules

• Subordinate rules

• {Infinite Series} bound, unbound, indeterminate

• {Ground} not subjective, not objective

By convention, the derivatives are configured in accordance with the established rules of inference.

The upshot of the scheme is elaboration of a plan applicable to the entire edifice of derivation to a conclusion.

Successful execution of the scheme will, by design, entail the establishment of a foundational metaphysics of derivation to a conclusion.

This foundational algorithm will embody a logical imperative for all derivations to conclusion.

My principle interpretation of your essay says>examination of derivation-of-derivation means establishing continuity between phenomenal experience and first causes.

An example is Aristotle’s unmoved mover as the cause of all motion.

A close second to my principle interpretation of your essay says>analysis & derivation share important common ground to the effect that derivation is a type of analysis.

Let me assert a premise – All origins are paradoxes.

Your narrative ventures into paradox.

“1” and “1” are identical but not indiscernible. This implies that “1” simultaneously
is/is-not itself, a paradox.

You support the above with,

It must also be regarded, briefly, that law of noncontradiction can possibly be negated by the individual at hand by means of this principle of regulation and, therefore, the principle of regulation can be regarded as the most abstract form of the law of noncontradiction.

At this point, principle of regulation has expanded its scope to encompass the super-position of QM (in cognitive mode). Importantly, in so doing, it contradicts itself super-positionally.

Now your essay seems poised to utilize higher-order logic henceforth. However, instead of this, its progress appears to snag on some basic questions.

{Infinity} bound/unbound/indeterminate are solely objects of a priori cognition. As such, they exemplify ideals along the lines of Plato’s Ideal Forms. I question placement of ideal objects at the foundation of metaphysics as it is supposed to examine the real, not the ideal.

Maybe you can refute some implications of my following questions.

What’s the difference between a bounded finite & a bounded infinity? I ask this question because, at one point, you say,

“… the content of an indefinite could possibly have bounds (thereby be finite)…”

This statement declares that bounding entails being finite, so how bounded infinity?

You also say,

“Now, the bounded infinite noted before should be clarified as not pertaining to the content of the infinite but, rather, its form and, therefore, does not constitute as indefinite.”

Is content sans form intelligible? Is there a type of form that has no boundaries? What’s an example of boundaryless form? If there can a content without boundaries, how is it differentiable from other contents? How is a set composed of boundaryless contents intelligible as a set of discrete things?

The existence of a thing = all attributes of a thing, including its content & form. In separation from each other, content & form are unintelligible.

Can you visualize content that is discrete & perceivable and without form?

Can you visualize form that is composed of nothing?

Any intelligible description of infinite volume i.e., set of infinite volume>bounded infinity is merely reification to (asymptotic) sample as infinite is a cognitive abstraction that, when paired with a boundary, signifies a paradox> the limited limitless.

Consider the set of all natural numbers. Imagine the set is a bag & the natural numbers are colored balls being thrown into the bag. This can be but an asymptotic approach to bounded infinity, as any specifiable boundary cannot hold or bind an unspecifiably large volume.

First causes, I assert, possess transcendent boundaries, which is to say, non-local boundaries. As such, these boundaries of first causes require examination by higher-order analysis.

Metaphysics necessarily concerns itself with examination of the paradoxes of non-local boundaries.

If it’s true that all origins have paradoxical boundaries, which is to say, all origins have non-local boundaries, then derivation from origins (sin qua nons) is trans-logical, and thus epistemic, logical & ontological disciplines are only axiomatically justified by local origins (sin qua nons).

There is a gap separating local origins from analysis_derivation to phenomena. Theories that support analysis_derivation to phenomena must rest upon unanalyzable axioms.

Axioms are the metaphysical boundaries of 3-space phenomena.

If the above is true, then analysis, in the instance of derivation from non-local origins, must be higher-order analysis, which means a multi-dimensional matrix above our 3-space matrix. This higher-order matrix is the tesseract, a 4-space matrix + time.

You're monologuing (with yourself) again. Nothing to do with anything I've written. :yawn: — 180 Proof

What I've Learned

The song advises us, "Don't surround yourself with yourself."

The gift of attention holds a high rank. It's good to take in distinguishing details that mark individuality. Each person is endlessly specific. The dizzy array of personal features hits with the excitement of centrifugal adventure.

Noticing people, and engaging with them socially, beyond concerns about the pecking order, kicks against the barrenness of solitude.

I am not evading anything here, I'm replying to what I think you're asking, by giving you answers that approximate what happens in my experience, that and trying to be as clear as I am capable of being, is all I can do in these conversations. — Manuel

I see you are a diplomatic person who shows consideration for others.

As I go forward, let me check my language lest it become rife with combative ambition.

What I've Learned

If inquiry doesn't include signature procedures including math models, research, testing of tangibles, compiling of data & analysis, it may not be science proper. Orthodox science is specific to the degree it has limitations of application.

A spectrum of human experiences are resistant to scientific investigation and sensible persons, including scientists, have no problem with that.

One shouldn't be a geeky extremist.

We enter into semantic territory here. — Manuel

Do we really?

I suspect you invoke "semantics" here in order to lay a foundation for evasion.

You can use the word science, to mean "good" or "useful", as in "that person has his cooking down to a science" or "that politician has his negotiation tactics down to a science", but I don't take these claims to be theoretical. — Manuel

In your interpretation of the above examples, "good" or "useful" are not sufficiently specific, and I think you know that. Your examples are a way of saying someone achieves their goals by following a process or set of rules in calculations or other problem-solving operations. The emphasis is upon logical, focused efficiency in getting to the goal. This definition is much closer to the scientific method, and thus the examples are not loosey-goosey applications of what "science" denotes. Moreover, your examples are clearly about applied science, not theoretical science, so, of course, such claims are not theoretical, thus denying such fails to add additional distance between the examples & science.

You give no reactions to two important words I used. "Claims," formally speaking = proposition. "Inquiry," formally speaking = experimentation. The formal versions of the two words, as you know, are firmly rooted within science. My hunch is that you wish to avoid committing to a position that says humans conduct inquiries culminating in claims that are emphatically non-scientific.

I make the above conjecture in relation to

I do think there are things which science cannot tell us much about, namely, international relations and inter-personal relations (among other topics), they are simply too complex — Manuel

in order to argue that international relations and inter-personal relations et al are, as you know, studied with methods not easily characterized as non-scientific.

Physics works so well, in part because it deals with the simplest structures we can discover. — Manuel

If you think elementary particles & their interrelationships are simple, it must be the case you've merely glanced at studies of these phenomena.

I believe you are using "naturalism" in a sense that excludes things like "selves", "identity", "free will" and so on. I don't think so. — Manuel

By assuming humans are direct products of the natural world, along the lines of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution... — ucarr

I don't see how you arrive at your above interpretation from my claim directly below it.

The gist of my current inquiry into your understandings about the limits of science re: understanding the world into which we humans are born i.e. our natural, earthly world, takes focus upon what I suppose to be a necessary break in the connection of human to natural, earthly world.

I've been supposing this gap between the two explains the scientific limitations you describe.

My underlying premise is that human, as a product of natural earth, has no gap separating it from natural earth, unless human, in addition to natural earth, has another source for its identity.

I say this to make clear I assume all attributes of human identity (including "selves", "identity", "free will" and so on) have their source in nature.

My other underlying premise is that science is the only judge of truth.

I don't think there is an unbridgeable gap between human identity and the natural world. — Manuel

Are you claiming science is one type of inquiry amongst a multiplicity of types of inquiry?

Do you believe some humans, via inquiry, know things about themselves & the world that cannot be examined & verified by science?

Do you believe there are types or sets of claims that are non-scientific?

Do you believe there exist humans who make non-scientific claims about themselves and the world, and, in so doing, make claims that possess truth derived from inquiries correctly vetted & verified non-scientifically?

If your answer to the above is "yes," then I believe it's a radical claim that draws a boundary around the scope of science WRT searching out & discovering the truth about our natural, earthly world.

In this thread, do you propound a premise that claims something like saying “the natural world contains parts inscrutable to science”?

Furthermore, is it your view that science is a distinctly human contrivance involving more than simple observation & imitation of natural processes?

I ask these questions because, if so, then there is an unbridgeable gap or break between human identity & the natural world.

By assuming humans are direct products of the natural world, along the lines of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, I don’t see how this unbridgeable gap could exist, unless humans, in your ontology, are NOT entirely products of the natural world.

If it is your view that human is only partly derived from the natural world, then explaining the unbridgeable gap, as opposed to merely declaring it, requires an elaboration of that human source of identity that is not a part of the natural world.

Is it your belief that human identity is a combination of natural and not-natural parts?

I think there is an unfortunate trend to associate the word "nature" and "naturalism" to mean whatever science says there is. — Manuel

When I write "natural world," I'm not referring to science & what it claims. I'm referring to earth as humans find it upon the awakening of their consciousness. Earth, our home, as I understand it, is a given. As such, it is, axiomatically, what is there to be perceived, experienced and, if possible, known.

Science, as I understand it, consists of a highly organized collection of procedures for perceiving what is given i.e. the natural world.

...there is clearly more to the world than what science says there is (art, morals, politics, human relations, etc.) — Manuel

I don't believe science excludes art, morals, politics, human relations, etc. from its domain. Consider, for examples, ethics_morality studies in philosophy; political science; psychology, anthropology.

I've never heard any scientist attempt to exclude the above from the domain of the natural world.

Do you believe humans to be entirely of the natural world (as I've described it here)?

If you do, then you don't believe humans have attributes that don't intersect with the natural world out of which they are created.

It's true that some humans embrace beliefs inscrutable to science (material/spiritual duality), but that's a very different statement from saying parts of human nature and parts of the natural world do not coincide.

The ability for a thing to move is afforded by Time itself. — punos

Three claims:

The motion of a material object is associated with a positive interval of time.

A positive interval of time supports duration.

When a material object moves across a positive interval of time, it examples duration, and thus you have dimension.

Conclusion:

Time, via duration, supports dimensional expansion WRT space, time, motion.

Questions:

Can time exist apart from the physics of material objects in motion?

If we imagine that it can, does the passing of time in isolation consume energy?

If it doesn't, does it follow that the inertial force attached to material objects is caused by time, a non-energy phenomenon?

Is time an independent, physical phenomenon, or is it a cognitive construct of the perceiving, human mind?

If it is the latter, then, as such, is it an emergent property of material objects?

Four Claims:

Time, within the perceiving human mind, conceptualizes duration that, in turn, organizes material objects in motion as dimensional expansions.

Energy = the ability to move

Energy+motion+duration (perceived time) = the dimensional expansion of our 3D environment

Our physical ontology is rooted in the triumvirate of energy_animation_duration

Do you think their interrelationship important enough to work out a detailed characterization? — ucarr

When possible, the way we are happens to coincide with some aspects of the way the world is, when these interact, we have a possible science. If not, we don't. — Manuel

I think your above response gives a substantial & thought-provoking answer to my question.

If there exist human attributes parallel to the natural world, then, to some extent, humans are not entirely of the natural world, and thus science of the natural world cannot reveal & explain those parts of human. Moreover, human composition is only partly natural. As to the other part, is it super-natural?

Did you intend to imply the above?

If there are parts of the world fundamentally unlike human, then human science faces parts of the natural world it cannot understand.

The two above disjunctions are rooted in the notion that human science can understand variance by degree, but not by fundamental category. I can understand, scientifically, a frog. Like me, it's a protein-based, water-dependent sentient. I cannot understand, scientifically, a conjectured, immaterial spirit.

Note - Human can embrace immaterial spirit, but that entails non-scientific acceptance of a body/spirit duality.

Of what does the self consist?. — ucarr

That's what I've been asking you, since you're the one who brought it up.

I'm saying what the self can't possibly be. A triangle cannot be a circle. Identity is something which, by definition, has to be stable, permanent, or it isn't identity.. — baker

Self – The enduring, discernibly consistent POV of a sentient being. — ucarr

Is the distinction to the effect that manifest ontology = via the senses and scientific ontology = via reasoned understanding based upon experimentation?
— ucarr

No. Although it is tempting to put forth such distinctions, as it looks neat and saves us from doing more work, I don't think it holds up. — Manuel

Sellars claims that the scientific image of man is not able to encompass or comprehend the manifest image but that both are equally valid ways of knowing about man. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I see that your two ontologies, as inspired by Sellars, stand in a somewhat parallel relationship to each other. Do you think their interrelationship important enough to work out a detailed characterization? As Sellars says, scientific imagery comes after manifest imagery, thereby suggesting a conceivably important relationship.

Depends on what you mean by skepticism in terms of scope and depth. A healthy does of skepticism is good, but figuring out what "healthy" amounts to is not easy. — Manuel

Skepticism, as I'm using it here, means withholding judgment on principle until rational examination (and possible experimentation) are conducted. Accordingly, examination evaluates skepticism just as it evaluates truth claims.

My own view, which I've been working out is to use Sellar's distinction between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" as a good provisional distinction, or at least a useful heuristic.

I'd say I have a manifest ontology which includes "everything" and a scientific ontology which tends to be agnostic. What there is in the mind-independent world may well be what physics says there is, but physics is incomplete and is subject to revisions that may make any previous ontology obsolete.

The reason for including a "manifest ontology" is because I think our common-sense world is worth talking about, I want to talk about kings and ships and gods and everything else. Otherwise we would have very little to say. — Manuel

Is the distinction to the effect that manifest ontology = via the senses and scientific ontology = via reasoned understanding based upon experimentation?

Is it true that when you make your cognitive journeys, you lead with skepticism?

If you are skeptical to some degree, do you ever apply it to your manifest ontology?

This question attempts to examine the possible existence of crosstalk between your two sets of ontology. If it exists, then perhaps your cognitive journeys feature an oscillation between the two sets:

Skepticism about what your senses detect sends you to science and, conversely, skepticism about what science detects sends you to sensory experience.

All of the above = my attempt to explain why I ask if you lead with skepticism.

Dimension = Space^2 — punos

Does motion have an elementary role within your ontology?

Do you give credence to the concept of soul? If you do, might that be a candidate for self?

Do you discover what's extant by determining what cannot be eliminated?

Do you align yourself with any position on the political spectrum ranging from radical to ultra conservative?

Of what does the self consist?

Okay. We all know people can change, however, you view self as tilting towards stability & permanence.

Is it correct to characterize you as being conservative?