Why are these two statements not a contradiction? — ucarr

Map-making does not "contradict" using[/u] a map for navigating terrain..

Why are "regularities of nature" not concrete matters of fact?

The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact from which physical laws are generalized (i.e. abstracted) physical. I haven't claimed or implied otherwise.

How are "matters of fact" concrete but not empirical?

Where are you getting this? This question has nothing to do with what I've argued.

If self-descriptions ("formalisms...do not refer beyond themselves") have nothing to do with the world (nature), instead being interested only in themselves, how are they meaningful and useful?

Incoherent strawman. Formalisms, like numbers, do not have "interests", persons who use them in specific contexts of meaning have "interests".

...that physical laws are computable does not entail that the physical universe is a computer.
— 180 Proof

Does this argument cast doubt on whether we can know reality beyond its human translation? — ucarr

No.

Are the disciplines of epistemology and ontology merely products of human translations?

Idk what you mean by "translations".

Is Platonic Realism correct: humans dwell within a (cognitive) dark cave, sealed off from direct and complete experience of reality?

No. The senses don't lie, only how we mis/interpret (mis/use) our senses lies to us (vide Epicurus et al).

Can we hope to eventually reason beyond the current state-of-the-art observations limited by imprecision of measurement and incompleteness of decompression? Or is it the case the limited measurements of the wave function and the limited decompression of axiomatic systems reflect existential limitations embedded in [of] nature?

I do not know. Either outcome is possible.

Now perhaps we come to a crux of the faceoff between the sciences and the humanities. If the observer is always entangled with the observed, does that mean the two great modalities of discovery: the what and the what it’s like of the what are linked by the biconditional operator?

Possibly.

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy)... — 180 Proof

rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

Why are these two statements not a contradiction? — ucarr

Map-making does not "contradict" using a map for navigating terrain.. — 180 Proof

Premise - Formalism = (a technical term for) narrative

Question - When you write a map, do you simultaneously read it? If so, then reading and writing are merged as an identity. Also, they are symmetrical, which is to say, if writing and reading are merged, then reading and writing are merged (when you read something, it doesn't enter your understanding directly; you read what's written, and then your comprehension of what you've read writes what is written onto the plane of your memory).

Symmetry cannot be contradictory, but if the distinction between writing a map and reading a map is erased by symmetry, then there is contradiction, thus pointing up the illogic of your two sentences taken together.

Why are "regularities of nature" not concrete matters of fact? — ucarr

The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact from which physical laws are generalized (i.e. abstracted) physical. I haven't claimed or implied otherwise — 180 Proof

Above you say formalisms $≠$ concrete matters of fact; above you also say formalisms $=$ regularities of nature. Next you say matters of fact and regularities of nature $=$ each other. How is it your statements about formalism are not contradictory?

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact...rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

Why is it the case that formalisms, when they measure_describe the regularities of nature, do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact_the regularities of nature?

How are "matters of fact" concrete but not empirical? — ucarr

Where are you getting this? This question has nothing to do with what I've argued. — 180 Proof

empirical | imˈpirək(ə)l |
adjective
based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic: they provided considerable empirical evidence to support their argument.
The Apple Dictionary

The empirical includes matters of fact verifiable by observation. Since logic doesn't do any observing, instead it being done by humans not theorizing abstractly but observing real things, logic, through humans, connects with the world of empirical experience, and thus my question is pertinent to your statement.

If self-descriptions ("formalisms...do not refer beyond themselves") have nothing to do with the world (nature), instead being interested only in themselves only self-referential, how are they meaningful and useful? — ucarr

Are the disciplines of epistemology and ontology merely products of human translations? — ucarr

Idk what you mean by "translations" — 180 Proof

...that physical laws are computable does not entail that the physical universe is a computer. — 180 Proof

By your own words, we see that scientific measurement (at least sometimes) is a translation from the empirical to the cognitive.

:roll:

you also say formalisms do = regularities of nature. — ucarr

False. Stop shadowboxing with your strawmen, you're further confusing yourself.
.

...you also say formalisms do = regularities of nature — ucarr

False. Stop shadowboxing with your strawmen, you're further confusing yourself. — 180 Proof

Here's your own language:

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are... used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

Yeah, makes my point. You''re confusing yourself.

Facts describe real things. As you describe formalisms:

...they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

The regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact — 180 Proof

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact.

Thus,

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy)... — 180 Proof

falsely denies that formalisms refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy).

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/929583

Formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) are abstract and therefore do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters of fact (e.g. entropy), rather they are used as syntax for methods of precisely measuring / describing the regularities of nature. — 180 Proof

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

This is how I read your statement.

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

This is your argument supporting your claim I mis-read your claim.

You seem to be implying that guidelines for best arrangement of signs (syntax) for the sake of effective communication are exclusively generalizations.

You propound your implied characterization by pointing out how your statement presents the critical verb "measurement" in the passive voice, whereas my statement presents it in the active voice. This emphasis on the passive voice is your effort at distancing formalisms from regularities of nature_matters of concrete fact.

Obviously, by definition of formalism, there is a chain-link of narration linking the meaning of formalisms (axiomatic or otherwise) with how they're applied directly by their agents to things in nature. The degree of elaboration of the components of the narration (and the narrative "distance" accreted) never breaks the chain-link of narration connecting the formalisms to their objects.

sine qua non | ˌsinā ˌkwä ˈnōn, ˌsinē ˌkwä ˈnän |
noun
an essential condition; a thing that is absolutely necessary: grammar and usage are the sine qua non of language teaching and learning.
ORIGIN
Latin, literally ‘(cause) without which not’.
The Apple Dictionary

In my understanding, axiomatic system = sine qua non. If something is essential to a following thing that is the consequence of the first thing, then the first thing refers beyond itself specifically to the following thing.

There appears to be an idea floating through the zeitgeist of the scientific age that generalizations, i.e., abstractions, run parallel to the concrete and specific creations of nature. In my understanding, a generalization is a thinking process that utilizes cognitive compression of multiple applications of the generalization. This cognitive process produces the axiomatic system.

Although the cognitively compressed idea, while occupying its compressed state as an abstraction, seems not to be directly tied to any one of the many objects of its meaning, this in fact is a falsehood.

Claiming formalisms do not refer beyond themselves parallels claiming the distinction between a verb in the active voice and a verb in the passive voice has no connection to the grammar specifying a distinction between the two voices.

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

.

Your above quote makes it clear beyond doubt you're using the distinction of the passive voice of the verb from the active voice of the verb to defend your denial of the following:

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr

So, our debate over formalisms referring to things beyond themselves comes into focus here as a specific argument point you make in which you do the very thing you deny the possibility of doing: basing your defensive argument upon a grammatical formalism: English verbs have both an active and a passive voice, such that, per your argument, the grammatical formalism about the voice distinction, when it refers to that distinction in application, defends against :

Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr

The premise behind your defensive argument is the following: formalisms (English verbs have both passive and active voice) do refer to concrete matters of fact, with the purported supporting fact in this instance being: "Because I wrote my claim with the verb in the passive voice, my claim 'formalisms do not refer beyond themselves to concrete matters' stands."

As you assume (in contradiction to what you say), formalisms do refer to things beyond themselves. So, by your own assumption (and debate maneuver), your claim to the contrary is false.

:roll:

I have revised my understanding of a formalism. If I can use the form of an equation as a formalism, then I can say $a+b=c$ is an example of a formalism.

What is its relationship to the concrete numbers that plug into its variables?

There is a difference in degree between refer to and specify.

Refer to can connect one thing to another generally.

Specify connects one thing to another with a concrete exactness (precision).

A formalism can refer generally to its powerset. $a+b=c$ in reference to only itself is useless. We only know how to use an equation when we know its powerset, which tells us the range of specific (precise) numbers (referred to generally by the formalism of the abstract equation) that can plug into the abstract form of the equation.

An abstract equation might be a set; it might be the set of all possible numbers that can plug into it meaningfully.

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

If formalisms refer generally to their powerset of possible concrete numbers that can plug into the abstract form of the formalism, then they do measure the regularities of nature, which is to say they are generally and existentially involved in concrete measurements of regularities of nature because they constrain the range of concrete numbers that can do the measuring.

Abstractionism does not break the chain of causality connecting, existentially, formalisms to regularities of nature.

Numbers are abstract, we use them to quantify – map – (both concrete and abstract) objects or their discrete properties (e.g. observed fact-patterns such as regularities of nature) – terrain. Maps (i.e. formalism) =/= terrain (i.e. empiricism); conflating them as you seem to do, ucarr, incoherently reifies abstraction (i.e. misplaced concreteness). In this context, I'm a nominalist-pragmatist.

You indicate numbers are immaterial.

What are numbers abstracted from? Is an abstraction a derivative of its antecedent? Does a number have any type of connection to matter? Can a number have an application to matter and yet have no connection to matter? Can abstract numbers measure material things without establishing any type of connection to the material thing measured?

When we use numbers, do we make some type of contact_connection with the numbers? Is there a sense of “use” that involves no type of contact _connection?

Does a map have some type of relationship _connection with/to terrain?

Map in the sense of formalism is distinct from map in the sense of a graphic showing a Cartesian coordinate grid of intersecting streets?

No doubt, rhetorical non sequiturs. :confused:

I’m not trying to make a point indirectly with rhetorical questions. The questions are sincere, and I want
you to answer sincerely.

At this time, I’m not trying to contest your assertions. You see I’m in error re: map/terrain.

Maybe you can pick one question — the one whose answer you deem most helpful — and answer it.

Can a number have an application to matter and yet have no connection to matter? — ucarr

As I've pointed out already ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/926546

Does a map have some type of relationship _connection with/to terrain?

In this sense, I think so: a map is an abstraction from aspects of the terrain (e.g. regularities of nature) that is instantiated in some other aspect of the terrain (e.g. observers' brains-discursive practices).

In your post to hypericin, you say math structures are an instance of info strings. By Webster’s, that means math structures are a concrete representation of info strings, as a freedom fighter is a concrete representation of freedom. I expect you to deny Webster’s definition is your intended meaning, unless you’re drawing from Aristotle’s hylomorphism in the following way: an info string is a substantial with potential, and a math structure is an actual form immanent in the substantial potential.

What do you have to say?

:zip:

Speaking of looking through lenses, someone who studies humanities would likely disagree with the idea that science deals with "what" and humanities deal with "how". From a certain perspective, if humanities is the focal point, then it is the what, and science is just about understanding the universe in which events happen.

Personally, (and I think this might be a common ground on this site) I am more concerned with Why, specifically. Science is about understanding the universe, humanities are about understanding our past (generally) and philosophy is about understanding where we, either as individuals or as a larger group, fit into that universe. There are discussions that don't aim to answer that question, but I feel as though that particular "Why" is the main reason people try to create or improve philosophies, or feel drawn to it.

This response was a little weird just because I didn't really know where to go with my elaboration, but I have expressed my main thoughts.

Does a number have any type of connection to matter? — ucarr

Information is connected to matter.

For example, a pendulum is able to swing back because it physically stores the information necessary to do so. An explosion does not store the information necessary to implode again. Storing the information to do so, is a necessary condition for reversibility. That is why an explosion is irreversible.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7433
Schlesinger (2014)

Irreversible phenomena – such as the production of entropy and heat – arise from fundamental reversible dynamics because the forward dynamics is too complex, in the sense that it becomes impossible to provide the necessary information to keep track of the dynamics.

Numbers can represent some but not necessarily all of the information in the physical world required to reverse physical processes.

If some claim is information-theoretically impossible then it is also physically impossible.

Speaking of looking through lenses, someone who studies humanities would likely disagree with the idea that science deals with "what" and humanities deal with "how". From a certain perspective, if humanities is the focal point, then it is the what, and science is just about understanding the universe in which events happen. — Igitur

I do like the lens metaphor - it seems to me to be very useful and I shall use it at every opportunity.

There are clearly hidden depths to the definition that @ucarr gave. Whether it is somehow about self-reference or formalisms, there are interesting and important issues at play. But I have a sense that this is a definition from the perspective of science. So here is a perspective from someone who studies humanities (if the term can be applied to at least some of philosophy).

Our sense that science and the humanities are different arises from the fact that there are different ontologies (which are defined by their practices and languages) in play. However, ontologies and practices don't necessarily line up neatly with the standard catalogue of subjects - or even with each other. Academic departments are, presumably, formed on the assumption that each subject/discipline is an interest group and/or a collegial group. That is not false, but it is well to remember that each subject/discipline/academic group is itself riven with battles of all sorts, in which the definition of the group itself may be at stake.
It's an intellectual mess - but then, that's a field of special interest to philosophy. From my point of view, we do well to ask, before getting embroiled in this marsh, what, in Wittgenstein's terms, our real needs are. To understand that, we need to go back to the historical (and legendary) time when the distinction was formulated, when the intellectual and framework and space for what we now call "science" was developed. This was also, at the same time, an intellectual and social battle.
Since then science has become dominant in our lives, and it is the intellectual and social space for the humanities that is at stake. (I won't mention cuckoos and eggs). The issue has not changed much. But I wonder if we would find it easier to make progress if we stopped amalgamating a complicated and multi-dimensional issue into one, and treated the various sub-issues piecemeal, leaving the grand distinction to fall into place (or to fall into disuse) as it may. That may seem boringly familiar, but I would have thought that analytic philosophers would find it of interest.

Science is about understanding the universe, humanities are about understanding our past (generally) and philosophy is about understanding where we, either as individuals or as a larger group, fit into that universe. — Igitur

It would, surely, be more accurate to say the science is about understanding the universe conceived of as a machine, or the universe insofar as mathematics can be applied to it. Philosophy certainly includes how we fit in, but also includes the question how far the scientific project fits in to the universe. Are you assuming that the study of literature and history are essentially philosophical? That's an interesting thought. I think there's a case to be made.

There are discussions that don't aim to answer that question, but I feel as though that particular "Why" is the main reason people try to create or improve philosophies, or feel drawn to it. — Igitur

You may be right. But, surely, in the end, the question why people are drawn to philosophy is empirical.

Formalisms measure regularities of nature. You say (above) regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact. Since formalisms measure regularities of nature, and regularities of nature are concrete matters of fact, formalisms measure concrete matters of fact. — ucarr

No they don't. As I wrote: formalisms ARE USED to measure or describe the regularities of nature (e.g. arithmetic IS USED to count apples in a barrel). — 180 Proof

Are you both sure that the difference between you is not just a question of language. I can't see what is at stake here.

The present state of my general descriptions of the two great modes: science/humanities goes as follows: science asks: what is existence? Humanities asks: how is human?

For science the focal point is on measurement. For humanities the focal point is on consciousness.

When you measure something you contain it. Containment of existing things drives toward understanding.

When you experience something you assemble a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into a narrative of an enduring point of view, your personal history.

Every human individual is both scientist and artist. The human individual needs both the understanding of measurement and the knowing-what-it’s-like of a personal history in order to live. No understanding? No personal history? No life.

The scientist measures, i.e., she sounds the dimensions of a thing, thereby revealing the what of a mysterious thing that mystifies her own knowledge of the what of her being until she finally surrenders her understanding to a radically new picture of the what of the state of being of herself.

The artist assembles a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into an arc of change and discovery that is a personal history through the start of adventures, the middle section assessing battles won/lost and finally reaching the summit/plateau of a new state of the how of her being.


Logic and math cover the two great modes thus: scientifically they mark and track the what of the position of the state of being; artistically they narrate a continuity of the direction of the how of being towards a conclusion of the what-it’s-like to reside in validity-as-truth, or not.

In each mode, one of the greatest mysteries is the location of the inflection point linking the immaterial and the material. This linkage and its circumambient mystery establish the wholely picture of life: substance grounding immanent form endlessly variable, albeit grounded within the ambiguity that animates the what and the how.

You’re focused on the great conjunctive adverb: why?

Where does human fit into the universe? Why are we here? I think a big clue to answering that question is consciousness. Are we alone? Is our presence the universe arrived at a new plateau: the universe looking at itself?

Everyone sees the difference between one rock and two rocks. Do the solo rock and the rock duet, respectively, physically store number within themselves?

Regarding reversible dynamics becoming irreversible phenomena, is there an inflection point linking a containable volume of physical information with an uncontainable volume of physical information?

Might that inflection point be described by the Beckenstein bound?

But I wonder if we would find it easier to make progress if we stopped amalgamating a complicated and multi-dimensional issue into one, and treated the various sub-issues piecemeal, leaving the grand distinction to fall into place (or to fall into disuse) as it may. — Ludwig V

I think it’s likely we would make more progress.
Part of the reason why we do this is because many people view the entire point of these subjects is exactly that, to combine them, and so we are as a result, overeager to do so.

It would, surely, be more accurate to say the science is about understanding the universe conceived of as a machine, or the universe insofar as mathematics can be applied to it — Ludwig V

Agreed.

Are you assuming that the study of literature and history are essentially philosophical? That's an interesting thought. I think there's a case to be made. — Ludwig V

I didn’t think I was, but looking back, probably?
There is obviously at least some overlap with attempting to understand the past and the field that works in understanding our present knowledge and answering the deeper questions that elaborate on human nature.

It might be more accurate to say the instead of the humanitarian studies being philosophical, that philosophy is concerned with studies of all sorts, and apart from the study itself, it is also concerned with the subject matter of these studies, given that they often pose questions we try to answer.

I also realize that I am leaving out the connection between philosophy and other fields’ subject matter, but I hope it suffices to simply say that they are useful for understanding the world we live in (and therefore are relevant) but often not as useful for understanding ourselves in that world individually and as a collective. It would simply take too long to talk about fields individually for my patience.

I guess I haven’t asked these questions because I myself look at things from a religious, or more specifically, a Christian perspective.

I do, however, agree that these are important questions either way.

Thank you very much. I can get my teeth into this. I won't complain that you've sent me too much. I just hope that my reply isn't too much and that we don't lose too much in the course of discussion.

The present state of my general descriptions of the two great modes: science/humanities goes as follows: science asks: what is existence? Humanities asks: how is human? — ucarr

So that's why you posited "What" and "How" at the beginning! (I'm still wondering where "Why?" fits in).

For science the focal point is on measurement. For humanities the focal point is on consciousness. — ucarr

I like the first sentence, because it explains why mathematics is so necessary to science. It is the methodological decision at the start of what we now call science.
I'm less happy with the second sentence, for reasons that may appear later.

When you measure something you contain it. Containment of existing things drives toward understanding. — ucarr

H'm.

When you experience something you assemble a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into a narrative of an enduring point of view, your personal history. — ucarr

That's true. But is it relevant? I suppose we'll see.
I may be naive, but I thought the whole point of "knowing-what-it's-like" is that it can't be turned into propositional knowledge and hence not into a narrative.
I would have thought that if you were going to ask this kind of question, you would have looked at the existentialists. That's exactly their point - that the start of understanding is the lived world into which we are thrown. But I hope you are not going to turn the Humanities into a matter of personal history.

Every human individual is both scientist and artist. The human individual needs both the understanding of measurement and the knowing-what-it’s-like of a personal history in order to live. No understanding? No personal history? No life. — ucarr

In a sense, that's true. As a matter of history, it can't be. Or are you saying that no-one before the Egyptians invented arithmetic had a personal history? I don't think so. So it needs a bit more explanation.

The scientist measures, i.e., she sounds the dimensions of a thing, thereby revealing the what of a mysterious thing that mystifies her own knowledge of the what of her being until she finally surrenders her understanding to a radically new picture of the what of the state of being of herself. — ucarr

So if you assemble enough measurements, you'll develop a new understanding of yourself? I would have thought you need more than that.
Why and how did you start measuring in the first place?
Where did your pre-measurement picture of the what of the state of your own being come from?

The artist assembles a continuity of knowing-what-it’s-like into an arc of change and discovery that is a personal history through the start of adventures, the middle section assessing battles won/lost and finally reaching the summit/plateau of a new state of the how of her being. — ucarr

I can see how you are developing your starting-point. But this is perilously close to a stipulated definition. I have a feeling that it would not correspond to the actual life and practice of actual artists, never mind what they might say if you ask them.

Logic and math cover the two great modes thus: scientifically they mark and track the what of the position of the state of being; artistically they narrate a continuity of the direction of the how of being towards a conclusion of the what-it’s-like to reside in validity-as-truth, or not. — ucarr

I'm glad you are locating logic and math as an exception in the what/how dualism and sad that you're just combining the two. I think that what you say boils down to the idea that logic and math underpin both "what" and "how", defining the permanent framework of possibility for both. Is that what you are saying?

In each mode, one of the greatest mysteries is the location of the inflection point linking the immaterial and the material. This linkage and its circumambient mystery establish the wholely picture of life: substance grounding immanent form endlessly variable, albeit grounded within the ambiguity that animates the what and the how. — ucarr

Not quite the hard problem, but close.
The urgent questions here are:-
Are these mysteries soluble or not?
If not, how are we to live with them? (There's no question of understanding them, is there?)
If they are, is it the artist or the scientist or both who will "solve" them? Or do we each solve them for ourselves when we construct our personal histories?

The idea that science and art are both necessary for what Aristotle would call a good human life is fine by me. ("No life" is a bit extreme, don't you think?)

My big trouble with this is that you seem to be pursuing a quite different project from the one in the title. The Humanities are not pursuing a personal project. They don't have and they don't pursue what you might call scientific objectivity. How could they? Why should they? But they do have their methods and their standards. You don't recognize that and so confuse the Humanities disciplines with the practices of the arts, which the Humanities study, but do not perform.

The idea that each of constructs a personal history based on our experience has a lot to be said for it.
But it doesn't touch any of the Humanities disciplines.
Historians would likely not call that history, but memoir - because it does not even try to be objective; nor should it. It's fine as it is. An objective personal history would be a biography, and that's a different enterprise. Memoir is a literary form and so is open to study by Literature, but it isn't the study of Literature. You seem to have forgotten that philosophy belongs here, and I'm sure you don't think that is a matter of constructing a memoir.

To be sure, the Sciences start from measurement, but measurement on its own is just data. The sciences develop theories to enable us to understand the data and it is no more than stamp-collecting without it. (Stamp-collecting isn't just gathering stamps into albums either - or at least it can become more, but that's another story).

I think you are being misled by the binary distinction between objective (science) and subjective (everything else) and by the rhetorical effect of ("What is it like to be a bat?"). That question is genius. It manages to persuade us that it can be answered yet cannot be at the same time.

Thank you for the detailed exam of my post.

“Why” is basic to both modes, and this conversation is about their differences, so I haven’t dwelt on it.

The two general meanings of the two great modes are “understanding” and “experience.”

There is much overlap between the two, so how do they differ?

The two great modes have an important difference WRT focal range: “understanding “ has a well-defined focal range coupled with a well-defined goal, where as experience, potentially drawing from all of existence, has a focal range and pallet of goals unspecifiable.

Experience always holds the potential to explode understanding. The two modes, being in creative conflict, animate each other. New experience drives understanding forward and new understanding drives new experience forward.

“What it’s like to be a bat.”

What it’s like to be something is the great question that links consciousness with matter.

As we answer the question “What is matter?” do we discover that our deeper questions on the subject require that we answer the question what is consciousness, thereby suggesting all material road maps lead to consciousness?

Can there be an existence not known to be existence?

Does causality persist in a world without consciousness? If consciousness must filter reality to a small sample of what’s there, then an unfiltered reality might have an unparsed version of relativity that features unlimited temporal differentials super-animated beyond cause and effect into simultaneous everything. That might play as a beyond-sequencing explosion of uncontainable potential. An unspeakable fullness of possibilities.

We can’t answer this question, but it lends a hand with answering the question: Why is there not nothing?

It’s because you ask the question.

You can’t ask “Why existence?” if existence isn’t known.

Perhaps the greatest dialog between the “What” and the “How” is the “What” of the “How” and the “How” of the “What”?

The first question in our jingling duet is What is the good life? The second question is “What is the status of narrative?

There’s experience, but what experience is worthy, and how do you make it your own?

Is narrative merely descriptive, or is it also generative?

The Arts vs The Humanities.

Why” is basic to both modes, and this conversation is about their differences, so I haven’t dwelt on it. — ucarr

That explains it.

The two great modes have an important difference WRT focal range: “understanding “ has a well-defined focal range coupled with a well-defined goal, where as experience, potentially drawing from all of existence, has a focal range and pallet of goals unspecifiable. — ucarr

I'm taking you to mean by "focal range" because there is always an object of understanding - the "what" that I'm seeking to understand. Sometimes, I agree, there is a well-defined goal (answer). But is that true of understanding of Heidegger or Wittgenstein or even my dog? I don't think so.
Experience, on the other hand also has an object, which can be quite narrow or very wide-ranging. Experience of life is the latter, experience of frying an egg is the former. So I agree that it's focal range is unspecified. But that's because sometimes it is wide and sometimes it is narrow. So I see no difference here. I'm not at all sure that there is a goal at stake here. What would it mean to say, "I reached my goal in that experience". (Unless just having the experience is the goal, which, I think, is not what you mean).

Experience always holds the potential to explode understanding. The two modes, being in creative conflict, animate each other. New experience drives understanding forward and new understanding drives new experience forward. — ucarr

I can agree with that, at least as a generalization. But I would want to add that sometimes understanding drives itself forward, by asking questions. Is that wrong?

“What it’s like to be a bat.” What it’s like to be something is the great question that links consciousness with matter. — ucarr

Well, I've told you what I think about the question. To be honest, I couldn't give you a straight answer right now. One day I need to write something about it. Still, I don't think you need that question, because matter is inherently defined as "not mind" and "mind" is inherently defined as "not matter". There's no need for any other link, is there?

As we answer the question “What is matter?” do we discover that our deeper questions on the subject require that we answer the question what is consciousness, thereby suggesting all material road maps lead to consciousness? — ucarr

It would be very satisfying if it did. "Return of the Repressed" springs to mind. The talk of the observer as a necessary part of theories in physics promises much.

Can there be an existence not known to be existence? — ucarr

Well, there are certainly many things that exist even though they are not known to exist. So I would have though that the answer to your question is clearly Yes. Or have I misunderstood?

Does causality persist in a world without consciousness? If consciousness must filter reality to a small sample of what’s there, then an unfiltered reality might have an unparsed version of relativity that features unlimited temporal differentials super-animated beyond cause and effect into simultaneous everything. That might play as a beyond-sequencing explosion of uncontainable potential. An unspeakable fullness of possibilities. — ucarr

Off hand, I would have thought that it must. We would not exist if it didn't. But I don't know if that's relevant because I don't understand the rest.

We can’t answer this question, but it lends a hand with answering the question: Why is there not nothing? — ucarr

Do you mean "Does causality persist in a world without consciousness?" I wouldn't have thought so. How do you think it lends a hand?
BTW I don't think "Why is there not nothing?" is answerable, because there insufficient implied context to indicate what might count as an answer.

It’s because you ask the question.
You can’t ask “Why existence?” if existence isn’t known. — ucarr

Your answer is a good one, because it appears to be an answer, but isn't one.
I don't think the reason why one cannot answer either version of the question is that "existence isn't known". After all the existence very many things is known, yet the question is still unanswerable.

Perhaps the greatest dialog between the “What” and the “How” is the “What” of the “How” and the “How” of the “What”? — ucarr

Which nicely illustrates why I can't understand your enthusiasm for "What?" and "How?"

The first question in our jingling duet is What is the good life? The second question is “What is the status of narrative? — ucarr

The first question is certainly a good candidate for its place. I don't see why the second is there. It has its place, but surely not this high up the ranking. Perhaps it's because you think the personal history is so important - which it is, in a way.

There’s experience, but what experience is worthy, and how do you make it your own? — ucarr

Worthy of what, by what criteria? You make experiences your own by being there, awake and attentive. Or have I missed the point?

Is narrative merely descriptive, or is it also generative? — ucarr

I can't answer that because I don't know what you mean by "generative". Narrative, on the face of it, always includes description, but no description is "merely" descriptive. For example, what's left out just as significant as what's included. How things are described are just as important as what is described. "Spade", "Bloody shovel", "Agricultural implement",

Does causality exist in a world without consciousness?

I’m examining whether there’s an essential link between consciousness and causality. Since we can’t know a world without consciousness, might that suggest there is no existence without consciousness?

Perhaps the two are always paired. That would mean matter is always consciousness-bearing, and consciousness is always matter- bearing. The relationship is a biconditional.