In the case of the formula of an infinitely regressive universe, because there is infinite time and we are capturing all possible causations within infinite time, there is no 'first causation". Essentially the first cause comes about after we capture all possible infinite causations in that universe, then ask the next question, "What caused it to be this way?" — Philosophim

Am I correct in understanding you to be saying the procedure for comprehending the value of an infinite causal chain entails looking at the infinite causal chain as a whole?

Moreover, am I correctly inferring that by looking at an infinite causal chain as a whole, I'm drawn by a sequence of reasoning to the necessarily logical conclusion that an infinite causal chain is a first cause?

Could you rephrase that question in more conventional terms? — Gnomon

What I presented comes from Deacon. I thought I'd try to articulate an important chain of causation: non-life to life. As for everyday causation:

After going to the doctor with mild symptoms, you're told your spinal column is infected with pneumococci bacteria. Since it's believed this infection causes spinal meningitis, you're advised to immediately undergo an aggressive program of antibiotics within the intensive care unit. — ucarr

Here's what's presently of interest to me:

For the record, I don't deny Causation; but I do think it's a mental inference... — Gnomon

Is it correct to say you see causation -- structurally speaking -- as a generalization in parallel with the specific energy-and-change relationship with respect to an invisible agent that causes transformation from one state-of-being to another state-of-being?

What does Y stand for in your equation? — ucarr

Total number of causations within that point of time on the chain. — Philosophim

Given a first cause, is it correct to say the next thing following the first cause -- the first thing caused by the first cause -- appears as the first causation? Subsequent links in the causal chain are, likewise, causations?

Regarding your equation:

Why is it 2t + infinity = Y and not 3t + infinity = Y? — Philosophim

Does Y have an infinite value?

Now here's the question which you have to answer Ucarr. Why is it 2t + infinity = Y and not 3t + infinity = Y? Is there anything outside which caused it to be one way over the other? — Philosophim

What does Y stand for in your equation?

Ironically, modern science postulates several causal features of reality that are logical inferences instead of sensory observations. For example Energy is the universal cause of all changes in the world, but we never detect the Energy per se, we only infer its logically-necessary existence from after-effects in material objects. Likewise, the notion of electric or quantum Fields is a logical inference from observation of changes in the material world*3. How that universal or local field came to be --- "popped into existence" --- is irrelevant for pragmatic Science : it just is, and it works. — Gnomon

I'm recalling from memory you citing Hume re: causation. The gist of your point is that causation, in his view, is an inference from observed patterns of apparently connected changes in states of being within the world. His conclusion, as reported by you, states that the concept of causation stands upon empirically-derived impressions of the world. In closing, you said these impressions are generally understood to fall short of a proof of the concept of causation.

Do you reject the belief causation resides within dynamical systems of self-organization phase-shifted across ascending levels of organization towards effects?

So, it's correct to say your core proposition within this conversation goes as follows:

Every causal chain inevitably arrives at a first cause. — Philosophim

Your goal is to demonstrate that a first cause is not necessary. You are not going to win by challenging the definition of the first cause, if the definition is logically necessary. The only way to do that is to demonstrate that logically a universe can exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause within its causal chain. — Philosophim

By making a small change to your last sentence, I get a proposition: Logically, a universe cannot exist that does not inevitably arrive at a first cause within its causal chain.

Does this alteration produce a proposition you endorse? Furthermore, does this proposition lie within the core of what you're saying in this conversation?

A first cause exists, it does not negate itself. If it did, it would be gone. I'm not understanding how you see a first cause implies its own negation. — Philosophim

There is the question whether a first cause, lacking a precedent, must be eternal. Also, there is the question whether or not an eternal existence is self-caused rather than uncaused.

I'm not claiming something comes from nothing. A first cause doesn't come from anything. I'm just noting that prior to a first causes inception, there is no prior causation... — Philosophim

Following from this we have: a) there is no something-from-nothing, so, no first cause from nothing; b) there is no other thing in the role of a precedent for first cause. Given these restrictions, first cause cannot pop into existence from nothing and it cannot come from a precedent, thus it must be eternally self-caused. But here we encounter a contradiction: causation separates the causal force from the thing it causes, however, in the case of self-causation, this separation evaluates as self ⟹ ~self (self implies not-self), a contradiction. This therefore leads us to claim existence (of the universe) is eternal and there is no first cause.

I first establish what a first cause is, something which is not caused by anything prior or else. The consequence of this logically means that prior to the inception of a first cause, there was no reason why it should, or should not have formed. And if there is no reason why a first cause should or should not have formed, there is no limitations or rules that shape what a first cause should, or should not be. — Philosophim

Given: No should and no should not, we have equilibrium as nothing. Given: No restrictions and no intentions, again we have equilibrium as nothing.

I'm not seeing how this is any different from claiming: "First cause popped into existence from nothing."

It's okay to claim: "First cause popped into existence from nothing." Maybe so. I'm only claiming this declaration is not the conclusion of a logical sequence of reasoning. This is an issue because of what your title for this conversation claims: "A Logical first cause is necessary." You can't fulfill the claim of your title until you present a logical sequence of reasoning that necessarily concludes with: "First cause popped into existence from nothing." When you say you establish what a first cause is, you merely define first cause. That's okay to do. However, it's a claim of truth based on words asserted without a logical sequence of reasoning to justify them. Proceeding from here, you claim no reasons for or against existence of a first cause and no restrictions or intentions as to what the identity of first cause shall be. That's okay to do. However, again, it's a claim of truth based on words asserted without a logical sequence of reasoning to justify them.

...we're taking the entire set of the eternal regressive universe and asking, "What caused this to exist?" The answer is nothing besides the fact that it exists. Thus a first cause. — Philosophim

Okay. You're saying a first cause is uncaused. I think we agree this is a definition for which logical proof is impossible. An uncaused first exists without explanation. Fine. But don't claim your observation of the unexplainable equals proof of logical necessity. As I cautioned in my previous post, don't confuse the logical decision to merely observe and accept the existence of the unexplainable with the logical explanation of the unexplainable.

If first cause refers to an eternal universe, there follows the question whether anything is caused because everything has always existed, whether actually or potentially.

When looking at a regressive infinite universe, we're going up the causal chain until we get to the point in the chain where we ask, "What caused an infinitely regressive universe to exist?" — Philosophim

Going up an infinite causal regression does not conclude with arrival at a point; the points continue without arrival being possible. For this reason, there can be no logical assessment of what constitutes a first cause. All you can ever do, given the definition of first cause, is declare it without logical proof. Each time you declare a first cause, you're logically concluding its a concept the existence of which can only be accepted without an explanatory sequence of reasoning. Again, don't confuse your logical conclusion about what you can know and explain regarding a first cause with a logical explanation of the inception of a first cause. Perhaps your conversation title should be: Concluding A First Cause Simply Exists is a Logical Necessity. Isn't this what you've been saying over and over? If you had used this title in the first place, most folks would've agreed with you and this conversation would've ended long ago.

If you're postulating an infinitely regressive universe that contains local first causes, then you're constructing a contradictory universe because if there comes into existence something causeless, then it's necessarily another, independent universe. — ucarr

No, its another separate causal chain inception. A first cause is the inception of a causal chain. — Philosophim

If something is part of an existing universe, how can it be without precedent? No, a first cause, by your oft-repeated definition: "Something which is not caused by anything else." cannot be other than a new and independent universe. An existing universe cannot spawn a first cause.

Anything within a causal chain caused by something prior cannot be a first cause. But this does not prevent something outside of that particular causal chain from appearing and starting its own causal chain. — Philosophim

There might be a first-cause-as-universe within another separate universe, but an existing universe cannot spawn something not related to itself. So, this appears to be a restriction upon what a first cause can be: it must be its own universe.

You're making the mistake of looking at the universe instead of the causal chain of that universe. — Philosophim

Since I reject logical first cause I look at something similar in terms of uncaused eternal universe.

If something negates itself, its gone. A thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. — Philosophim

. That's why there's the question whether or not self-causation is fatal:

"...causation separates the causal force from the thing it causes, however, in the case of self-causation, this separation evaluates as self ⟹ ~self (self implies not-self), a contradiction."

I'm asking you to give me an example of a universe without a first cause in its causation chain. — Philosophim

An eternal universe is an example because it has no beginning and no causation. I can't prove existence of such a universe logically. I can only declare it as an axiom from which reasoning follows. This axiom cannot be derived logically. It is, however, logical for me to conclude that this axiom is a necessary start point for reasoning. Since an unexplainable axiom is a necessary start point for a sequence of reasoning, it's clear the axiom stands beyond the reach of logic.

"Assume it is false, what do we arrive at?" The frustration Ucarr is your inability to demonstrate it is false so far. Which is fine, keep trying. If it were clearly false, we would not be still having this discussion. — Philosophim

Below I reprint an argument you haven't responded to:

...you cannot talk rationally about nothing (or anything else) causing the universe to exist because it's impossible to ascertain any logical reason for its existence. This is so because reason_cause imply sequence, but infinite value cannot be specified and therefore cannot be [logically] sequenced. — ucarr

Here I'm talking about infinite-causal-chain-as-universe. I'm claiming you can't posit a first cause start point of an infinite-causal-chain-as-universe because any sequence -- once identified as infinite -- has no specifiable start point or end point. My logic is simple: if you can't find something, you can't claim it's either a start point or an end point. If this is true, then your claim a first-cause start point (for an infinite causal chain) is logically necessary is false because the math logic of infinity denies existence of start points and end points within infinite sequences.*

I wonder if you'll oblige my explicit request for you to counter-argue the specific points I've raised here.

*This is even true for infinite sequences that have boundaries. Such infinite sequences lie within specified start and end points, but the volume of the members is a separate thing (infinite) from the extent of the members (finite). Consider the sequence from 0 to 1.

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

This is not a sequence of reasoning. If it were, you would include a list of possible reasons for only one type of universe. All entries but one on this list would be crossed out and a sequence of reasoning provided to explain and justify the exclusions. Instead, it's an axiomatic statement about space and matter used as a premise for claiming there is but one type of universe. It's okay to do this, but it's an axiomatic claim, not a logical explanation.

You know this isn't correct at this point. This is frustration. Don't let that win. I've laid the reasoning out clearly at this point. — Philosophim

You think claiming as fact "there is but one type of universe" is reasoning? Give me a logical explanation for your belief. See my statement above (infinity cannot be sequenced) for an example of
reasoning toward a conclusion.

Don't confuse the logical decision to make an unexplainable observation axiomatically with logically explaining the content of that observation. You're doing the former, not the latter. — ucarr

If you're going to assert that, you need to demonstrate that. Otherwise this is just not wanting to accept a conclusion. — Philosophim

Imagine I don't know that a certain plastic, being a non-conductor, acts as an insulator against the flow of electric current. After repeatedly trying to get current to pass through the plastic to another conductor that completes a circuit that makes a motor run, I run a series of tests and see that whenever the plastic is excluded from the circuit, the motor runs. I therefore conclude, logically, that completing the circuit requires bypassing the plastic. I've made a logical conclusion about a state of affairs I've observed. Indeed, this is logical thinking. However, I shouldn't go forth to other people claiming I have a logical explanation for why the plastic keeps the motor from running. I'm merely observing what is happening as an axiom of unexplained truth that the motor doesn't run when the plastic is included in the circuit.*

*A chemist might enter the narrative with an explanation why the motor doesn't run with the plastic included in the circuit: it lacks the loosely bonded electrons needed to supply the current necessary to complete the circuit.

My example parallels:

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

This is an observation, not an explanation. You have no argument towards claiming logically only one type of universe exists. On the basis of your information-scarce observation, there's no logical reason to conclude there exists only one type of universe. You insist people believe your claim because you say so.

First comes the logical necessity of a first cause, then comes the conclusion that this means the inception of a first cause cannot be explained by anything else, thus there is nothing prior which could cause a limit on what or would not incept as a first cause. — Philosophim

You merely state as fact: "logical necessity of a first cause." There's no explanation why logical necessity of first cause. Your state an observed what; you don't state an explained why.

Maybe you're right that its axiomatic, but can you break it down how you arrive that its merely a declaration? — Philosophim

What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being.* No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence. — ucarr

I've put in bold letters what's at the center of our debate: "There is nothing that explains the being of a first cause."

Here we have your fatal mistake in mostly your own words. By definition -- not by a sequence of reasoning -- you state without explanation the truth about a first cause: it's an axiom by supposition. Moreover, it cannot be explained logically because, as you say, "There is (by definition) nothing which explains its being."

:up: :100:

My thanks to you for this persuasive argument.

The Set Theory Argument

“When we say that a set is finite or infinite, we are referring to the number of elements in the set, not to the "extent" (putting it roughly) of those elements.”

Set Theory: Bounded Infinity

Note - To find my source linked above, scroll down the page to "4 Answers," and then read the paragraph directly below.

This is a distinction made in observation of a set of numbers. Consider the set of numbers between 0 and 1. The number of elements in this set is infinite, yet the set has boundaries, so it’s an example of a bounded infinity. It’s important to note that no part of the set can possibly go to infinity. This limitation pertains to the extent of the set.

In a parallel situation, an eternal universe can be a bounded set of infinitely many existing things. So, the number of elements in this set is infinite, yet the set has boundaries, so it’s an example of a bounded infinity. Likewise, no part of this set can possibly go to infinity. This means the set of existing things, in parallel with the set of numbers mentioned above, has a limitation of specifiable content always short of its infinite extension. This precludes logical discussion about a start for the infinite extension. In consequence, it’s logical to talk axiomatically about what cannot be explained logically.

The critical question pertinent to our debate is whether or not you can talk logically about the before or after of a bounded infinity. When talking logically about the start of a chain of causality, you’re talking about the beginning of a continuity. That’s talking about the extent of a series. Since the infinite number of elements populating the series precludes you from ascertaining a start point, you can’t claim logically that before the start point there were such and such necessary conditions because you cannot specify a start point.

It's illegitimate to do so by simply making the declaration: "This is the start point, and before the start point there was nothing, thus the start point examples an uncaused start point, i.e., a first cause.” Doing this examples arbitrarily marking a start point by decree. That’s okay to do. Science and math oftentimes make decrees about a certain premise being an arbitrary start point for a sequence of reasoning that follows. These arbitrary start points are not arrived at logically. In this situation, an arbitrary start point is called an axiom.

What’s not okay to do is to claim you can progress through a chain of reasoning from nothing to an arbitrary start. Just as there is no specifiable start, there is also no specifiable continuity leading to an unspecifiable start. This is another way of saying no part of the set can go to infinity. Doing so is therefore incoherent because the illegitimate continuity jumps from nothing to an artificially specified unspecifiable start point.

He [ucarr] doesn't like the idea that there was nothing, then something. — Philosophim

I don't accept the claim: "Something from nothing" declared without explanation proves logical necessity of a first cause.

What I'm trying to show him is that an eternally self-existent thing is no different. There is nothing which explains its being.* No limitations on what could have been besides the fact of its existence. — Philosophim

Generally, I accept all of this. Specifically, I don't accept an axiomatic declaration as a rational explanation of the logical necessity of first cause.

*With this statement you prove I'm correct in saying your declarations about first cause are not logical, your stated purpose.

What caused space to always exist? Nothing. — Philosophim

"Nothing" in this context can be read in multiple ways: a) nothing as in no cause of space; b) nothing as in nothingness, a something that caused space, in which case the infinite regress towards a true first cause is under way; c) nothing as a category which includes logic, so first cause cannot be logically necessary.

If first cause is logically necessary, then logic is contemporary with (if not prior to) first cause.

My central point continues to be the claim no causation precludes any type of sequence, including something from nothing. Also, it should be noted that a causal chain exemplifies logical continuity as expressed: A ⟹ ~A = False. In English this sentential logic statement translates to "An existing thing does not imply the negation of itself." Following from this, claiming causeless first cause tries to equate sequence with the negation of sequence, the definition of first cause. Herein lies the heart of the incoherence of your claim.

I haven't forgotten your argument that before first cause a potential first cause can be anything, no restrictions and then, after inception of first cause, logical sequencing and its limitations are in effect.

This is an incomplete narrative of how first cause incepts because a declaration stating first cause can be anything in no way explains and justifies inception of first cause. First cause via something from nothing might be true, but such a declaration is an axiomatic presumption; logical necessity has no part in it.

Can you accept a paraphrase of: "A logical first cause is necessary" as follows: "Everything must have a beginning"? — ucarr

No, they're not the same thing. The point of the theory was to show that even in an infinitely regressive universe, a first cause is still logically necessary. — Philosophim

If, as you say, even an infinitely regressive universe entails logical necessity of a first cause, that's merely saying in different words that: Everything, even an infinite universe, must have a beginning. In this situation of the causeless eternal universe, you're building a contradiction because there's no nothing for first cause to incept from.

If you're postulating an infinitely regressive universe that contains local first causes, then you're constructing a contradictory universe because if there comes into existence something causeless, then it's necessarily another, independent universe. Anything contained within the causeless universe cannot be first-caused because, being a part of a causeless universe, by definition it cannot be separate from said causeless universe. Furthermore, the independent universe as first cause is building a contradiction because -- again -- in the situation of an eternal universe, there's no nothing for a first cause to incept from.

You still haven't addressed the issue of the paradox of an eternal existence being self-caused. If a thing causes itself, then simultaneously it is and is not itself. This is a logical argument against existence of first cause.

An eternal universe has nothing prior. It has no prior cause for its existence. — Philosophim

You are therefore traveling the road to self-causation. On the other hand, if you accept that in the situation of an eternal universe, there is no causation because everything has always existed, with only the variation of forms giving the appearance of change, then the problem is solved. However, I know you don't accept this because causation lies at the core of what you claim.

Also, in the situation of an eternal universe, the start point cannot be ascertained; it's impossible. Well, if a start point is impossible to ascertain, then logical necessity of a first cause it likewise impossible to ascertain. It can only be supposed axiomatically.

Lets imagine an eternal universe where water exists everywhere. It has always been, and will always be. Why? What caused the universe to exist in that way? Nothing. — Philosophim

In the case of an eternal universe, you cannot talk rationally about nothing (or anything else) causing the universe to exist because it's impossible to ascertain any logical reason for its existence. This is so because reason_cause imply sequence, but infinite value cannot be specified and therefore cannot be sequenced.

Your crucial mistake in your thesis is thinking one can reason back to the beginning of an infinite sequence. By definition an infinite sequence, i.e., infinite value, has no beginning_ending. Beginnings and endings are specific whereas infinite values are undefined as with 1/0 = undefined.

Are you noticing how I always support my assertions with potentially falsifiable arguments? I never claim that such and such is so because my words say they are so. You do this over and over again. Your claims in this thesis always terminate in claiming it is so because the words you write say it is so. Your central claim is not potentially falsifiable. It is circular reasoning true by definition.

Why did one type of eternal universe exist, whereas another universe does not? There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

It is not a presupposition, its a conclusion that we arrive at... — Philosophim

In your example, there is no arrival and no conclusion; instead, there is an observation and a declaration without any reasoning toward it:

There is no answer besides the fact one type of universe, space and matter, exists. — Philosophim

The argument here isn't about the legitimacy of your observation; it's about whether or not you followed a chain of logic in making it. You haven't.

You see Ucarr, the argument's conclusion is logically necessary. — Philosophim

Don't confuse the logical decision to make an unexplainable observation axiomatically with logically explaining the content of that observation. You're doing the former, not the latter.

...time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas_ucarr

Is there anything time is connected to? — ucarr

Don't quote a stetement cut off from its immediate context. It's a very bad and unacceptable habit, ucarr. — Alkis Piskas

I have enough with all that, ucarr. You are a bad interlocutor. Please don't bother me again. — Alkis Piskas

You accuse me of intentionally quoting you out of context for the purpose of fatally distorting your intended meaning, all of this towards setting up a misrepresentation of you as a straw man easy to defeat in debate.

Of course I respect your demand I no longer attempt to dialogue with you. However, I have a right to rebut your accusation. My defense herein is for the public record; it's not an example of my ignorance of your demand.

Let's begin by noting the ellipsis: the three dots at the beginning of my abridged quotation of your words. An ellipsis is a public announcement to all readers the quotation is abridged. It's a notification to everyone words have been omitted from the quotation. When someone seeks to quote another person out of context for the purpose of distortion and misrepresentation of that person, including an ellipsis contradicts that purpose.

Moreover, here at TPF, what value is gained by misquoting someone when the public record makes it easy for everyone to examine the original statement? Since it's easy for the supposedly misquoted person to copy and repost their original statement and then juxtapose it to the abridged version for public inspection -- something you've done here without causing me a smidgen of difficulty in mounting my defense -- it's clear only a fool would bother with making the attempt.

Actually the concept of "matter" was constructed by Aristotle to account for the reality of temporal continuity. What persists unchanged, as time passes, despite changes to a thing's form, is the thing's matter. So matter provides the basis for a thing's extension in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I presume the above quote from Metaphysician Undercover is the cause of your contempt over my abridgment of your quote. Indeed, I think it a strong rebuttal to your statement.

The question here is whether Metaphysician Undercover's rebuttal loses strength when applied to the complete version of your statement:

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. So time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas

In this particular conversation, I haven't been disputing your claim time possesses neither mass nor material dimensions.

I've underlined your conjunction in the second sentence of your statement. I'm presuming you're arguing the conjunction puts restrictions upon how your claim should be interpreted. I'm further presuming you believe Metaphysician Undercover's rebuttal doesn't apply to your claim without these restrictions.

In my opinion, separating time from mass and material dimensions is central to your claim of its irrelevance to same.

...What persists unchanged, as time passes, despite changes to a thing's form, is the thing's matter. So matter provides the basis for a thing's extension in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to my interpretation, Metaphysician Undercover's quotation of Aristotle carries the message time, mass and matter are married, the exact opposite of your claim.

As I see it, the conclusion of your claim -- as based upon the premise time has no connection to matter -- that time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa, still gets authoritatively contradicted by Metaphysician Undercover.

Replacing the words I removed merely shows more explicitly what Metaphysician Undercover's quote contradicts. The added words do not give your claim defense against the rebuttal. On the contrary, they make the truth of the rebuttal more apparent.

Let me further say this: A thing's extension in time ⟺ Time's extension in a thing.

All of this is to argue my abridgment of your statement -- regardless of my intentions -- does not weaken it.

Instead of trying to demonstrate why the conclusions here are false, try instead to prove that a first cause logically cannot exist. In other words, present to me a logical universe in which no first cause exists. — Philosophim

Along one line of reasoning -- eternal existence -- there seems to be a conditional logical preclusion of a first cause:

If we imagine a structure of existence with only one universe, then I speculate that universe, if eternal (and thus uncaused), logically precludes a universal first cause for the totality of existence. However, on the question of local first causes -- meaning no first cause of all first causes, but only independent first causes -- then it seems to me an eternal universe does logically preclude a universal first cause, but not local independent first causes.

If we imagine a structure of existence featuring multi-verses, then I speculate that multi-verse, in parallel with the single universe structure, logically precludes a universal first cause for the totality of multi-verses, but not for independent universes with local first causes.

Question - Can you accept a paraphrase of: "A logical first cause is necessary" as follows: "Everything must have a beginning"? This is another way of examining logical necessity of first cause through the lens of an eternal existence.

When we substitute: "A logical first cause is necessary" with "Everything must have a beginning," we can ask the obverse of: "prove that a first cause logically cannot exist," which is: prove an eternal universe logically cannot exit."

Can you show that an eternal universe is logically impossible?

Do "A first cause is logically necessary," and "eternal universe" contradict each other?

If they do contradict each other, then what's at stake is whether one or the other question is answerable.

If it's not possible to logically examine an eternal universe -- it can only be assumed -- then the status of its existence -- viewed through the lens of logic -- is undecidable.

At this point in my rumination, I speculate that the critique of "First cause is logically necessary" along the axis of incoherence* leads to the same statement about its status: it can only be assumed; viewed through the lens of logic, its status is undecidable.

If "A logical first cause is necessary," and "eternal universe" do not contradict each other, then they are both axiomatic presuppositions undecidable with respect to logical necessity.

*The incoherence of "A first cause is logically necessary" -- per your "argument" -- is the unexplained leap from nothing to something. This leap unexplained -- foundational to your narrative -- provides evidence your narrative is an axiomatic presupposition; its central function: leaping from nothing to something, has no logical, process-based agency. Well, that absence contradicts your stated purpose: "A first cause is logically necessary."

...time is irrelevant to matter and vice versa. — Alkis Piskas

Is there anything time is connected to?

Do you assess this lack of proof as a metaphysical issue? — ucarr

Only if it leads to false beliefs. — Gnomon

I'm asking if work towards finding a proof is more appropriate for the philosopher than for the scientist.

Why do you not answer my question: By what means do you sever space and time? — ucarr

I answered it. You just missed it.
... Or maybe you weren't there. :grin: — Alkis Piskas

Although Minkowski writes about time without gravity in special relativity, in general relativity time is tied to mass through gravity.

In the everyday world, the movement of massive objects is tied to time.

When Induction and Abduction also agree on the Deduction, we can be pretty sure that the Cause and Effect are correlated by some transformational Principle, that we call "Causation" --- or in some cases "Agency". And yet, due to the limitations of data and reasoning, mere Correlation of variables does not prove Causation. We could be missing something. — Gnomon

Do you assess this lack of proof as a metaphysical issue?

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then $E=mc^2$ is false? — ucarr

$E=mc^2$is false. This fact is demonstrated by the need for what is called "relativistic mass". — Metaphysician Undercover

I've learned that the concept of relativistic mass is deemed troublesome and dubious by some. Can you elaborate how it falsifies $E=mc^2$?

I have given a look to this Quora... search... [it's] based on personal thought experimentation, like yours. — Alkis Piskas

Wrong. Both Vincent Emery and Robert Shuler use calculations derived from $E=mc^2$ to support their conclusions. This is what scientists do. Either the math is right or it is wrong. You cannot evaluate their arguments as false without doing your own calculations derived from $E=mc^2$ such that they contradict Emery and Shuler.

As to my claim about your proposition and $E=mc^2$ being mutually exclusive, it likewise is not a thought experiment by virtue of the math of Emery and Shuler that I cite for support.

Emery, Shuler and I might be wrong, but our error is not proven until you provide your own contradictory math.

...my simple position that time is not contained in matter. — Alkis Piskas

Regarding your above proposition, consider the cesium atomic clock: a) transitions between the spin states of the cesium nucleus produce a frequency used in the atomic clock's measurement of time; b) the frequency of the transition states of the cesium nucleus involves: energy, mass, motion (and therefore space) as integral parts of the measurement of time.

Cesium Standard

If time is an emergent property of the cesium atom's nucleic transitions between spin states, then, as such, time is part of a networked complex of energy, mass, motion and space.

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. — Alkis Piskas

Why do you not answer my question: By what means do you sever space and time?

Necessity is not important... — Philosophim

That's why you've been working your ass off with this conversation for months running? And by the way, who says "What is is not important?" Just because humans aren't necessary, that doesn't have to mean they aren't important.

If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around, it still vibrates the air molecules. — Philosophim

So, you've been relaxing under island breezes.

Seems fitting after slaving in the trenches for a just cause.

Causality doesn't care whether you observe it or not. — Philosophim

This theory does not care about whether we are accurate in any particular causality, it is about causality as a necessary reality. Human minds are not required. — Philosophim

Describe a situation in nature wherein necessity is important apart from sentients.

I think you missed the point of my philosophical distinction between inferred Belief (certitude) in a Cause, and a scientifically-proven Fact of the Agent (bacteria) of an Effect (meningitis). The footnote gave the context*1. David Hume defined the concept of Causation as an inferred mental relationship, not a physical thing*2. — Gnomon

You and Hume characterize causation as deduction?

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something [matter] either. — Alkis Piskas

Initially, you indicated (indirectly) that my statement "there is no time --contained or involved-- in something either" makes E=mc2 false. — Alkis Piskas

As you say, I indirectly raised a question about the truth content of:

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something [matter] either. — Alkis Piskas

and

$E=mc^2$

considered in conjunction with each other.

Yes. I want us to consider whether the two propositions are mutually exclusive. No doubt your proposition, like Einstein's proposition, involves a complex narrative of related concepts and information that needs unpacking. Given this complexity, I intend to proceed by looking at some of the parts of the whole individually before zooming out to a broad overview of the truth-content question I have raised.

Since I have to move around and look at different aspects of various parts of this complex narrative, it might appear that I'm shifting my ground and evading probing questions.

And is this something, a possibility that you thought of yourself? Because I couldn'f find anything about all that in the Web ... — Alkis Piskas

Please click on the link below to find a supporting narrative for my argument.

How is E=mc^2 Related to Time?

(After reading Vincent Emery, scroll down to Robert Shuler.)

I use this supporting narrative to argue that: a) the equation entails time dilation phenomena interwoven with mass and energy phenomena, and thus it does have something to say about time; b) given the interweave of time dilation, mass and energy, we can raise questions about the truth content of your claim about our phenomenal universe: "There is no time --contained or involved-- in something either. Things are not composed of time."

Here's one of my counter-narratives: Time is essential to the thingliness of material objects. I can use the relativistic shrinkage of length and increase of mass of a material object due to acceleration to argue that time, space and matter are connected.

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then e=mc2 is false? — ucarr

E = mc2 says nothing about time. — Alkis Piskas

The full form of the equation: $E=p^2c^2+m^2c^4$ clarifies its inclusion of time dilation:

Einstein’s equation may be combined with Planck’s to give a relation between time (frequency) and energy:

$E^2=hf=mc^2$

$f=E/h=mc^2/h$

All instances of time dilation, whether due to motion or gravity, are directly derivable from the potential energy difference between two points of observation. Effectively, time dilation enforces energy conservation.

The example given by Einstein in an early paper (prior to General Relativity) in which he derived gravitational time dilation is matter being lowered into a gravitational field on a tether while extracting energy (like a water wheel), converted to photons, captured back at the top and reconverted to matter again.

If you get the same amount of matter, you can repeat indefinitely producing a perpetual motion machine (or, I suppose, you might be extracting mass from the gravitational object). Einstein reasoned that the frequency of the photons produced by the conversion to energy must be less, and this must reflect time dilation in the gravitational field.

Vincent Emory, Robert Shuler — Quora

Time has no mass, neither does it occupy space. — Alkis Piskas

By what means do you sever space and time?

I am currently unable to understand your ideas, and I am respectfully asking you to clarify them if you want me to remain engaged. — Philosophim

Okay.

How much time does it take for two + two to equal four?

An attack on answering this question can be made through the lens of the Idealization versus Measurement comparison. This comparison scheme is, in turn, part of the Abstractionism procedure.

So, the abstractionism procedure examines multiple empirical experiences and abstracts them from blooming creation down to a thematic pattern:

Syllogism: All humans are mortal; Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Pythagorean Theorem: For any right triangle, the square of the length of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the lengths of the legs of the right triangle.

The two above abstractions are measurements of multiple empirical experiences condensed into approximations of an open-ended volume of thematically linked possibilities. The process of abstractionism is thus an idealization of otherwise unmanageable, blooming creation.

Let’s now look at Idealization Versus Measurement:

Speaking intuitively, we don’t want to say that on the day Pythagoras discovered the Pythagorean Theorem, it became true. Doing so implies that on the day before his discovery, it wasn’t true. This distinction illuminates a parallel distinction: empirical measurement experiences have time locally attached to them; abstract idealizations have time absentially attached to them.

Now we have an argument for opposing the maxim: “The map is not the terrain.” By force of the Idealization Versus Measurement distinction, we can say, “Yes, it is.”

In point of fact, the brain depends upon the condensation to idealization of abstractionism for manageable navigation of blooming creation, i.e., the real world of empirical experiences at every moment leads to sensory overload if it isn’t filtered through the condensation of abstractionism.

QM backwards engineers abstractionism by showing us that the seemingly discrete material physicality of things in the phenomenal world is in reality a sensorially overwhelming networked convolution of non-local events. The Heisenberg Equations help us navigate this experiential plethora by means of statistical analysis of probabilities.

The Heisenberg Equations, being an increase of measurement precision for otherwise undetectable non-locality effects at the scale of human experience, through their advanced circuitry-logic, instruct us against concluding QM is just academic pettyfogging.

QM bolsters fantastically the not-now-but-future-spacetime-distribution design of absential materialism.

Logic embodies the diva Faubourg Saint-Germain elan of highest-form abstractionism.

We want to declare logical truth immaterial and immortal, but, alas, it is an idealization of empirical measurement within the phenomenal world of material physicality.

There is no time --contained or involved-- in something either. — Alkis Piskas

If time doesn't inhabit the material-physicality of our phenomenal universe, then $e = mc^2$ is false?

Ucarr, I'm asking a question to understand what you're trying to say. Returning my question with a another question is just more confusing. :) In fact, all of my questions you just answered with questions. My questions are not statements, I'm just trying to figure out what you're saying. — Philosophim

Perhaps now you can better appreciate my efforts towards independent inferential thinking in response to what you write.

You did okay in your exam of my previous post. Keep going.

...the human mind seems to inherently "conceive" of consecutive Change as the effect of some prior physical input of Energy. It's a Belief, not a Fact. — Gnomon

After going to the doctor with mild symptoms, you're told your spinal column is infected with pneumococci bacteria. Since it's believed this infection causes spinal meningitis, you're advised to immediately undergo an aggressive program of antibiotics within the intensive care unit. Explain why you wouldn't dismiss this diagnosis as uncertain causal-belief-not-fact and go home untreated, or would you go home? Would you go home untreated, betting on fact-based-mind-over-uncertain causal-belief?

Are you saying that all a priori deductions don't take any time to realize? — Philosophim

Do a priori deductions take time to be true? How much time does it take for two + two to equal four?

Deduction does not require empirical observation. But we need to think through it right? — Philosophim

Are we thinking through something already there, or do you suppose thinking logically creates logical truth moment to moment?

Do you imply a something-from-nothing first cause becomes true only as we think about it?

Do you intentionally imply only thinking about first cause in time makes it real and thus pairs time as a contemporary with first cause?

Are you saying that abstract reasoning does not take time? — Philosophim

Are you supposing truth comes into existence in time during the time interval of our thinking about it?

Must two + two = four continually be recreated from non-existence across time by sentients thinking about it?

Can we observe things outside of time? — Philosophim

Are you asking if outside of time we can think through the experience of observing things?

With something from nothing, are you implying spacetime and matter_energy emerge as contemporaries?

Show me how you will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after you die; show me how the universe will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after all sentients die. — ucarr

Sorry. No idea what you are talking about. — jgill

If you are physical, and your mind, being connected to your physical brain, is likewise physical, how do you connect with non-physical math?

Another question (implied by my questions up top): How does a non-physical thing (you dead) connect with another non-physical thing (math)?

Non-existent is a concept. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

It does exist as brain state, — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a concept) — Mark Nyquist

Agree

Brain; (a non-existent entity) — Mark Nyquist

Disagree, unless I distort your intended meaning

Also brains activate muscles so and concept can take affect physical matter. Like the result of a math problem.

That's the only way an abstraction, concept, mathematical construct can affect physical reality. — Mark Nyquist

Agree

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Premise: "If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there." -- Philosophim ⟹ Effects only propagate in time.

Counter Premise: A priori deduction ≠ a posteriori deduction along the measurement axis of time.

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

OR

• If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

NOT

If A causes B, then necessarily along a timeline it was A which caused B to happen.

So,

Question A: Deduction can lead to knowledge only by empirical observation in time?

Question B: Deduction can lead to knowledge both by observation in time and by abstract reasoning?

Interpretation: A = F; B = T

So, by the conjunction logical operator: F & T = F and T & F = F. With this interpretation, the conjunction logical operator shows us that the two propositions cannot both be true.

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Since the above statement is true by definition, we know that we can arrive at knowledge a priori (by reasoning alone) when we apply a definition to a body of information that fulfills the definition.

Conclusion:

Proposition A:

The effect comes from the cause (by definition), so the effect includes the cause. — LFranc

Proposition B:

If the effect hasn't happened yet, its not there. — Philosophim

Regarding the two above propositions: A = T and B = F .

Is mathematics non-existent? Some might say yes. It's certainly non-physical. — jgill

Show me how you will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after you die; show me how the universe will determine the calculation of input values and a binary operator after all sentients die.

...non-existent... — Mark Nyquist

Non-existence is an abstract concept which has an empty content.

...logic says non-existent and non-physical things don't have any cause and effect relation. — Mark Nyquist

Non-physical things abstract things have cause and effect relations via the support of the brain: the brain's memory functions allow sentients to recapitulate empirical experiences and then organize them sequentially and thematically ⟹ logic and sets.

It means the effect already lies in the cause — LFranc

What does this even mean? — Michael

The existence of the cause implies the contemporaneous existence of the effect.

Example: Clouds saturated with water cause rain.

I think you are sincerely trying to grasp an Idealistic worldview*1 that is radically different from your own Materialistic worldview*2 — Gnomon

*2. Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism — Gnomon

Handshakes across the aisle.

On p.1 of this thread back in 2022 (if you've missed it), I had posted very brief logical and physical objections to the OP's incoherent claim of "logical necessity of the first cause" (i.e. there was/is no "first cause"). FWIW, here"s the link to my post (further supplimented on the next few pages of this thread) containing two other links to short posts: — 180 Proof

I'm taking serious note of these links to additional thinking on some implications of the thesis.

In my acknowledgment above, I'm only addressing the error in my reasoning you brought to my attention: In attacking: There's no limit on what a first cause can be, I made the mistake of applying my accusation of paradox to There's no limit on what a first cause can be as if it said: There's no limit on that a first cause can be. This is not something Philosphim has claimed, so the attack -- at least in its present form -- has no bearing on the correctness of the thesis.

Through my acknowledgement I don't intend to imply I now think Philosophim's thesis correct. I'm just clearing away the debris of my erroneous attack.

If you've already assumed the gist of this clarification, please forgive my superfluity.

...prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." — Philosophim

Yesterday, I attacked this claim thus:

Since logical necessity is a strict limitation, by your main argument -- There're are no limitations on what a first cause can be -- a first cause cannot be logically necessary. The necessity of its existence precludes its existence. Why is this not a Russell's Paradox type of contradiction that negates the truth value of your thesis? — ucarr

After writing this, I thought it a pretty good argument. However, proceeding with caution, I decided to ask 180 Proof to examine the argument for flaws. He got back to me quickly with this:

It seems to me your argument misses a significant distinction: 'that there is first cause' & 'what the first cause is'; "there is no limitation on what the first cause is', not in reference to 'that there was a first cause'. — 180 Proof

Correct.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. Philosophim has claimed there is no limitation on what a first cause can be. At the opposite end of the spectrum, he has claimed there is a conclusive limitation on that a first cause can be: logical necessity.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. For this reason, I evaluate the supporting premise as false.

From here it follows that if this supporting premise is false, and therefore not all of your premises are true, then your conclusion might still be true, but it's not a certainty.

I further underscore this point with sentential logic:

Consider: x = the (all of)-existence-is-necessary premise (this is logically antecedent to a first cause is necessary) (T) and y = your roll of the die supporting premise (F)

The binary logical operator takes two input values -- x and y -- and converts them into a truth-content value: with x = all of existence is necessary (T) and y = a roll of a die examples inception of first cause (F), we get

(x ⟹ y) ⟹ (T ⟹ F) ⟹ F

So, truth does not imply falsity.

If you want to arrive at a conclusion that is certainly true, you must develop pertinent, probative premises, all of which are true.