Didn't Kant make the point that we experience phenomena but cannot know the noumena, the cause of the phenomena? — Art48

We experience phenomena.

We cannot know the noumena.

But since we experience cause -- causation is one of the Categories which organize experience -- phenomena are governed by causality.

We're tempted to say that the noumena causes phenomena because that makes sense of the noumena, but it's only a temptation. Once we have causality we are no longer talking about the noumena.

Yes, I agree that you could render a proposition like that. However, Aristotle's point was about judgement. So if we judge Truman's hair to be "Truman-blonde," and "Truman-blonde" is just whatever Truman's hair is, then we cannot be wrong in our judgement. Supposing we don't call it "hair" but "Truman-hair,' we also cannot be wrong that it is "Truman-hair" that is Truman-blonde. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I can follow along with this, though I'd add a temporal dimension -- so that every word ever said is always different from moment to moment.

In some ways that's true, though the process' rate of change is such that we need to reference texts hundreds of years old to see the change. In some ways names can become predicates and vice-versa, and we can be as specific as every moment.

What I'd say is that since here we are talking about it, and understanding it together, why would this undermine communication at all?

When a question is particular enough I need the pluperfect tense to specify time-dates-names-tools, etc.

When it's a family event the pluperfect can be a remembrance of good times.

Though I remember the same time with my family at each event -- that memory we re-remember last Christmas won't be the same next Christmas when we revisit it again.

And yet, despite all these rapid changes, we are able to communicate. Language remains useful. That's the mystery**. (not in principle, in my opinion, but just right now)

So, Aristotle would also say that we cannot simultaneously judge that Truman's hair is both Truman-blond and not-Truman-blond, at the same time, in the same way, without qualification. Indeed, if Truman-blond is just whatever Truman-hair is, and nothing else, no evidence can ever suggest to us that Truman-hair is anything other than Truman-blond.

As respects the negation, we can speak such things in the discourse of spoken words, but not in the discourse of the soul (i.e., it does not make sense to say that someone earnestly believes and doesn't believe the same exact thing at the same exact time).

Would it surprise you that I disagree with Aristotle on this? :D

Sartre's Being and Nothingness is pretty much about this ability to earnestly believe contradictory things -- to lie to oneself you have to both believe the lie as truth and that the lie is a lie.

I think the human soul is contradictory, generally, and its only the rationalists who manage (or lucked out to be born with?*) souls which let go of contradiction. (Well, and the saints, etc.)

*EDIT: Or, really, cursed to be born with when I think about saints, martyrs, and the ends of some of our favorite philosophers.

**EDIT2: In lots of ways this mirrors the arguments for the problem of consciousness. That does not mean they are related, but I do think it's harder to deny that we mean things than it is to deny we are conscious.

But don't babies without language and people with aphasia who cannot produce or understand language (or both) still perceive? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and yes!

I don't think perception necessitates language -- I do think language effects perception such that a linguistic separation is suspect, at least, though.

I'm skeptical of such a fusion, not least because the Sapir-Worf hypothesis is supported by very weak evidence, normally very small effect sizes and failures to replicate, despite a great deal of people having a strong interest in providing support for it. For instance, different cultures do indeed divide up the visible color spectrum differently, but the differences are not extreme. Nor does growing up with a different division seem to make you any better and spotting camouflaged objects. But moreover , aside from disparate divisions remaining fairly similar, no culture has a name for any of the colors that insects experience through being able to see in the ultraviolet range, and for an obvious reason.

Likewise, disparate cultures have names for colors, shapes, animal species, etc. They don't pick any of the vast range of options that would be available to a species that largely creates their own perceptual "concepts." I know of no cultures that mix shape and color for some parts of the spectrum, and then shape and smell for another part, etc. or any of the innumerable possible combinations for descriptions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think of becoming enlanguaged as a process which changes how one thinks and perceives the world. That we can refer at all is linguistic. The conventions come out of histhis ability to mean.

I don't believe this would necessitate a belief in Sapir-Worf. That's not the sort of thing I have in mind here. Rather it seems to me that we can't treat the phenomena of language as we do other things in the world. That we can refer to language already requires us to be able to refer or mean things.

I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's section 1 of the PI:

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the
essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language
name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this
picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word
has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the
object for which the word stands.
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between
kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way
you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair",
"bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of
certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as
something that will take care of itself.
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to
the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks
up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it;
then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows
them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an
apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.——It is in
this and similar ways that one operates with words.——"But how does
he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is
to do with the word 'five'?"——Well, I assume that he acts as I have
described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the
meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here,
only how the word "five" is used.

I'd say we'd already have to use language to be able to ask "What is the meaning of the word?"

J mentioned Gadamer earlier, and I like Gadamer, but the idea that all understanding is done through language seems suspect. It seems like the sort of judgement a philosopher focused on language would have. But does an MLB pitcher finally have it all click and understand how to throw a knuckleball through language? Does a mechanic understand how to fix a motorcycle engine primarily through language? Or what of demonstrations in mathematics based on visualization?

My thoughts are that language is a late evolutionary arrival that taps into a whole array of powers. It enables us in a great many ways. But thought also isn't "language all the way down." Nor do I think we need to suppose that non-verbal individuals lack understanding (or else that we have to suppose that they have "private languages" for them to understand anything) or any noetic grasp of reality.

To my mind, part of the problem here is the ol' reduction of reason to ratio (which is maybe enabled by computational theory of mind). But my take is that reason is broader than language and that the Logos is broader than human reason.

Now I agree that language isn't everything, and that creatures not-enlanguaged can have a kind of understanding. I'm not confident that that understanding is based in reference, though, since that seems to me a linguistic act. At least a human-linguistic act, insofar that we understand it ourselves.

I think it changes the way we perceive, though. So while a not-enlanguaged being can perceive once enlanguaged the perception changes. Here I think more about how if I learn new words, if I read a book, this changes how I see the world -- what was once "car" is now "motor-burning-gas-turning..." etc. and all the various distinctions I know about the car that I did not know before, and a mechanic will have an even wider perception of that same vehicle because of their ability to make distinctions.

I think it's wrapped up in how we live, however, so certainly it's not language all the way down in the small-l sense -- but maybe the big-L sense, which is the thing that is the mystery in the first place. (or, in a slogan: "Names are weird")

"Blonde" and "black" are universals. If either we're unique terms that are only predicable of Truman's hair then they certainly couldn't fail to apply. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This isn't in response to the rest of your post, just the first question that popped to mind -- I had that thought, but suppose we allow negation. Then even "Truman's hair is Truman-blond", if true, the negation would have to be false. So even if we aren't speaking in universal terms we can use true/false.

@Arcane Sandwich -- you have thoughts on Miles Davis' Bitches Brew album?

That was the first one that popped to mind when reading @Jamal in describing jazz as harsh.

Though here's the bit where I think I'd disagree with Quine -- I like the idea of a web of beliefs, but I'm not sure they really affix reference, either. Even with Davidson it seems that charity can often fail.

And sometimes even common purpose doesn't help in assigning reference because the reason I want to know what my enemy is saying is in order to thwart them -- so related purposes, in that they are opposed, but not common.

The one thing I'm fairly certain about is that there is no public shelf of meaning from which we can judge others', and that we cannot ascertain how a particular individual is referring by reference to the language spoken and the circumstances they are in alone. Now that we live in an era where it seems writing is more permanent than speaking, where we can look things up that others' have done, I think it's easy to get lost in thinking that language behaves like other things in the world.

So easy even someone as smart as Aristotle has been caught up in that way of thinking ;)

There's a bootstrap problem involved in the sense that we can definitely tell when something does not speak (a stone) and obviously tell when something does speak (you and I), and we believe that somehow the speaking-thing came out of the not-speaking-thing.

Fostering agreement I can certainly get behind -- but I'm not sure convention answers that call. I'd think shared purpose does that more than convention. If you had to survive in a society in which you did not speak the language you could figure out some of what they mean through trial-and-error, where the error is measured by your purposes or by feedback from the other language speakers.

It's because, when we are learning a language, that we want to be able to speak to other language users that we adhere to the conventions. The conventions certainly helps us learn, as well as making it so we are able to grade who is a better speaker.

But those poetic rhythms -- which I tend to think of as the earliest form of writing recognized as writing (though speech is always writing) -- came about as conventions because there was already a meaning.

So, yeah, the old "on its head" move.

I think this gets at a few things. One is Aristotle's idea that we must use universals to have the possibility of our claims being false. If we just predicate unique terms of unique things, terms that only apply to those things, we can never be wrong. Second, language and reference must always be more general and less determinate than perception to be useful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not so sure we must have universals for a claim to be false. If Truman's hair were black then "Truman's hair is blonde" would be false, for instance, even though we're only talking about that Truman right there and not any other Truman.

I'm not sure I'd separate language from perception, either. Seems to me that language has too much of an effect on perception to think that language even could be more general than perception.

Rather than a sign over here and a world over there, the world is always-already interpreted and the sign folds into reality.

The focus on reference as a gateway to meaning or communication is kind of the target that I have in mind here -- if reference is affixed in a particular conversation, meaning by each of us agreeing that this is what we mean and having nothing to bring up then we've referred successfully.

What this doesn't rely upon is a fact about what we are referring to, or whether or not "dog", or any other sign, has some pre-assigned meaning wrapped up in it.

The focus on convention is because we live in a society which prizes being able to say who does something better than another person, and with language that indicates the need for standards to judge others' in order to give a grade.

But language will always slip away from the conventions recorded in the books. New meanings will pop up, even with old words. Entirely new forms of grammar within the same language will emerge. Shakespeare's English, while readable, doesn't sound like our English on the fora.

Basically what you say I'm doing the "on its head" move -- there are conventions, but we already have to understand how to use language in order to establish them. "Reference" must already be understood.

Does "pooch" refer to the three of us equally? Do you see how if I adopt your methodology we will be unable to communicate? — Leontiskos

You haven't given it enough time yet. That we cannot ascertain, as an individual, what "pooch" refers to before asking our conversation partner doesn't stop us from continuing to ask questions.

So sure -- "pooch" could refer to the three of us equally. It would certainly be a point in favor of there being more than one referent :D.

Which is really the argument I've been making all along against convention: sometimes convention doesn't decide the referent. But we can still successfully refer. So there must be more to reference than convention.

But you've changed the scenario. There is one dog, not three. — Leontiskos

The three dogs are you, me, and the pooch. I'd call you a sly dog in order to demonstrate that "dog"'s referrent isn't fixed by convention, but by our conversation.

I'm going to start with the bon motte and then move to a dry explanation.

The only way that "the dog" refers in this conversation is if it one of the two sly dogs talking to one another right now -- and "the room" would have to be a metaphor for the internet forum known as TPF.

Though I believe I know what you mean when you say "The dog refers to <dog-concept>", sans some sort of metaphysical commitment to concepts.

My thinking is that since there is no dog, and no room, there is no true sentence which affixes "the dog" to "<dog-concept>" -- what it seems to me what's going on is we're engaging in using language in the same way we do when telling stories about Bilbo Baggins or others like that, and we're doing so on an internet forum for the purposes of exploring philosophical ideas.

Though supposing we were in this room and there were three dogs, the bon motte above would still apply -- we'd have to make a choice, in the conversation, as to which of the three dogs in the room we are referring to.

If we make a mistake, given that we speak the same language, we can probably figure out reference in a given conversation -- I'll believe you if you believe me when I say what I'm thinking or referring to. (but it's not like conventions make reference factual -- there are facts about reference after we make a reference, but we have to refer to the reference to get there)

I think what you and some others are trying to say is this: "Reference cannot be fully and exhaustively explained." I would say that it depends what tools we have to hand and what we mean by "fully and exhaustively explained." — Leontiskos

I think this is close -- but there's one thing added. Not only can it not be fully and exhaustively explained, it most certainly cannot be explained by the facts.

Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. If it were not then the true sentence would not be true. — Leontiskos

And, yes! This is much more to my thinking with respect to "reference" at least -- at least, if it is not so affixed, if we listen to one another we can probably figure out what we mean.

It's just not a metaphysical or ontological connection -- only a collective effort, or social dance.

"Moliere understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Leontiskos understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Therefore, Moliere and Leontiskos understand 'chair' to refer to the same kind of object." — Leontiskos

I'm not convinced that <chair-concept> is the object being referred to in using 'chair' -- I'd say that it's the chair being referred to, rather than the <chair-concept>

It took me a minute to get here but I think I agree with Derrida's critique of the sign in Husserl and Saussure.

But in Quinean terms -- I don't think there are such things as <chair-concept>'s, at least. Quine wants to eliminate as much conceptual machinery as he possibly feels he can get away with without denying the truth of natural science.

Those are three propositions, and if they are a set of three true sentences then on your view they would be called a "fact." If this is a fact, then it looks like there are facts of the matter with respect to reference.

But that there's a fact to the matter doesn't affix the reference, is what I'm contending.

Okay, so now you are saying that reference is inscrutable even to fellow language-speakers. Or more precisely, that there are no fixed referents amongst fellow language-speakers.

But that doesn't seem right. If you and I are sitting in a room together there will be any number of fixed referents available, e.g. "table," "chair," "dog," "television," "photograph," etc. So how does that work? Do you mean something very specialized by "fixed reference"? — Leontiskos

Nothing specialized on my end -- I'm only attempting to formulate my thoughts.

I want to say that there's a difference in meaning between your opening sentences --

"Reference is inscrutable even to fellow language-speakers" does not mean the same thing as "There are no fixed referents amongst fellow language-speakers"

So if you and I are sitting in a room together there won't be fixed referents due to the facts alone, such as any given set of true sentences at a given time. There are too many facts to contend with in thinking that this will affix reference --it's reference is a social act whereby we make a judgment call that could be wrong, some of the time, but if we are willing to listen to one another we are able to refer.

The main thing I'm getting at is the lack of some philosophical criteria which a philosopher can use to tell if something has successfully referred -- no such criteria exist, because reference isn't something done from the armchair.

But that's a mundane claim, isn't it? Almost tautologous? The stronger and more interesting claim is that something is inscrutable in that it cannot be fixed. I hope Quine is doing more than uttering a tautology. — Leontiskos

Let me rephrase because I believe that the inscrutability applies to one's own language as well, so this is a hard point to express-- to get the concept across we have the fable of a made up language we have no knowledge of, and "gavagai" somehow counts as a locution in that language.

The reason for the fable is we are misled by being able to refer in our language into thinking that there is some fixed reference. So we have the fable -- where you say it's almost tautologous -- which is meant to elucidate even our home tongue.

So, yes, reference is inscrutable in our own tongue, as I understand what's going on here.

Inscrutable being defined as I've said about facts here, but I see there's something of a dispute with facts so I'll go to that next:

From the early pages of this thread I have objected to this vague use of the word "fact." What is it supposed to mean? Does it mean anything to say there is no fact of the matter? If it did, then what would it look like if there were a fact of the matter? — Leontiskos

A fact is a set of true sentences.

So when I say Truman is dead that is a true sentence about Truman. That Truman is dead, however, does not affix the reference of "Truman" -- nor do any other true sentences.

Will someone raised apart from language and people be able to identify food, such as berries? And will this be a cognitive identification, such that they might find they are hungry for berries and decide to go out looking for them? Because if so, then it looks like they can refer to berries without two — Leontiskos

You ever read about feral and dramatically maltreated children?

If so, sure. But I am not so sure that it is so.

So, yes, I think it takes two. But that's just my theory in response to the puzzle: if we refer and yet it can't be scrutinized, I.E., there isn't a fact that makes the reference refer, that just leaves the puzzle open. My solution is that if I check in with you and ask "Oh, do you mean this Truman or that Truman" we can refer in a given conversation, rather than that "Truman" always refers to Truman because of this or that theory of reference.

"How we manage to refer is mysterious, but what is being referred to is not indeterminate."

Yes?

Or:

"How we manage to refer is inscrutable, but what is being referred to is not inscrutable." — Leontiskos

"gavagai" is a word without context -- I have no knowledge of the language. When someone says "gavagai" it could mean the rabbit, the time of the year, the soup we're going to make, the teacher's authority over the kitchen, etc. etc.

That is, there's no fact of the matter that I can point to to fix the reference of gavagai: it's inscrutable from the perspective of a person without knowledge of the language.

But if we know the language we can refer with it -- I just don't think that this is somehow a feature of language, necessarily, but one of the many things we can do -- emphasis on it taking two or more -- once we know a language.

But the facts of the world in the moment aren't what affixes the reference -- that is, there are no definite descriptions which pick out a name, and much less an understanding that reference is even what's happening at all when we have no knowledge of the language "gavagai" is spoken in.

My take-away here is that since there's no fact of the matter that affixes reference, but we are able to refer, there must be something other than the facts which makes us able to refer. As is often the case in my thinking where this leads me to is the necessity of us sharing a language -- the things language does is present to more than my own cogito. So there's no theory I can hold to in evaluating whether you have referred separate from our collective interpretation of the language being spoken. It takes two to refer.

Yes, but if something is not linguistic then it does not constitute a reference of any kind, scrutable or inscrutable, no? Or rather, if we do not recognize something as a linguistic sign, then it cannot be inscrutable, for we would never say, "That non-reference is an inscrutable reference," or, "We will never figure out what that thing is referring to, namely that thing which we do not believe to be referring to anything."

In fact I want to say that in order to identify something as referential one must already have a foothold of one kind or another. Without such a foothold there is insufficient reason to posit a referential reality (i.e. an intentional sign). — Leontiskos

You tempt me into the quagmire of the sign! Back, foul demon! :D

What I'd commit to is the idea that though reference is inscrutable we can still communicate. If we somehow connected "reference" as a necessary condition of communication then that's pretty damning for the notion of reference always being inscrutable, or whatever.

What this leads me to is the notion that proper names function differently, at least in English, than nouns. There's no description which "picks out" a reference, yet we are able to refer. I can't tell if it's the nose or the drink or the carpet, at least when talking about the facts before me, but I can tell by "Robert" you're referring to the man on the carpet with a drink. I remember his name and everything!

So I think the target is more various philosophical notions of reference rather than the whole ability to communicate.

At least, that's a more interesting thing to think about.

Or "dinner time, whatever is near!"

Just to emphasize that inscrutability falls within common sense uses.

But isn't is possible to learn the Native's language? And if I do learn the language, then haven't I learned the "fact of the matter"--which is of course conventional--about how 'gavagai' refers? — Leontiskos

It is -- though I'd rather take the example towards the Rossetta stone than the natives:

With natives it's easy because we can communicate in other ways that are not linguistic, in the sense that we usually mean "linguistic" at least.

But that was the key which enabled us to understand a truly foreign language. We needed some kind of "foothold", which I'm now tempted to call "reference" -- and then we could work from there.

But until you have that it's a nothing, right? If we don't even recognize something as a language, for instance...

With respect to @Arcane Sandwich, I see lots of cool places to talk.

Is there a particular bit you want me to discuss?

I erased a lot of thinking-out-loud in forming that question :D -- decided it was better to just ask.

If Quine is right, then how could we be confident? If we can be confident, then how could Quine be right?

If it doesn't have an exciting result when applied to rabbits, then why did Quine apply it to rabbits?

No one here is taking Quine seriously. It makes no sense to say, "Quine's argument is sound, but we can still communicate our references anyways."

I would submit that just as for Hume we cannot know causes, so for Quine we cannot know references. The presuppositions of the systems ensure the validity of these inferences, and if we want to deny the conclusions we must deny the presuppositions of the systems. We can't just say, "Oh well. We can be pretty damn confident." To do that is to beg the question. If we can be confident about causes or references, then Hume or Quine must be wrong.

@Count Timothy von Icarus is simply avoiding the question-begging. He sees that if "we can be pretty damn confident/justified" then Quine must be wrong. He also sees that if philosophy of language is first philosophy, then Quine is not wrong.
8 days ago — Leontiskos

Do you believe that we are successfully communicating with each other right now? Because it seems to me that if reference were inscrutable, then this would be impossible. And if a foreign word were inscrutable, then we would never be able to learn foreign languages. But we are successfully communicating with each other, and it is not impossible to learn foreign languages, therefore reference is not inscrutable. — Leontiskos

Lots of thick thoughts....


here are 2 of them I'm thinking now: First, the inscrutability of reference applies even to our own language. "Reference", as a philosophical concept, is the target, though -- the example draws from the experience of trying to learn a foreign language when you have no knowledge.

Eventually, through trial and error, you can learn it! Even if you knew nothing of it!

Which is kind of the puzzle.... in a way.

EDIT: Heh, with thick thoughts comes lots of confusion. I want to clarify my expression above.

"Reference", as a philosophical concept, is the target of the "gavagai" criticism -- as well as various metaphysical theses people might have drawn from various notions of reference.

It's not so much that we can't communicate or learn. It's that there's no fact of the matter, in the sense of a true sentence which refers to the world in the same way that "gavagai' refers to the world, which will decide how "gavagai" refers.

Therefore, you cannot draw metaphysical or ontological conclusions from philosophical beliefs about reference.

The end.
 ********************************
^
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added a breaker to notate where I put my edit. The following was part of the original post:

Second: I'd take it that since we're talking to one another we can't ever deny that we're communicating, unless we're communicating about when we're not communicating to correct communication. So if we can connect a philosophical belief that we're not communicating that'd be damning for it -- not that'd it be false, but it'd indicate we're not communicating and thereby, in spite of all of our efforts, we're linguistically solipsistic.

Do you believe that we are successfully communicating with each other right now? — Leontiskos

In quick response to the yes/no question, yes.

Will follow up w/ your link tho

:grin:

I believe I'm mostly on the side of what @Banno and @frank have been saying, though -- reference is inscrutable.

So with "gavagai", to use the example -- I can't tell if "gavagai" references this post, my memory of my bike when 9, the rabbits foot that I'm looking at right now, or some cultural practice.

"gavagai" ought be understood with respect to translating a totally unknown language, at least by the story. If I don't know how the natives speak and yet I know that "gavagai" is a noun, I will not thereby be able to point to something in the world -- what we might be tempted to call a fact -- to say that this noun in a foreign language refers to this or that.

The first point about the mean is that if you think you are identifying it then you must be able to point to both extremes. Many people can only point to one. — Leontiskos

True. At least, the way I'd put it, many people identify a Big Bad without identifying the opposite; and also for the Good, when I think about it.

Still, I stand by what I said -- the golden mean sounds good a lot of the time, but that does not thereby make it true, or false.

Sorry for diverting the thread too much, tho -- this has nothing to do with reference.

We need the mean, but disagree upon what the mean is.

Ari's "golden mean" is something of a fallacy when taken out of context -- the middle between extremes isn't going to be true or false just cuz it's in the middle.

For instance, if one were to take the mean between eating shellfish and not-eating shellfish -- where some shellfish are ok to eat some of the time -- that does not thereby make it true. It makes it reasonable-ish sounding to the two extremes, but reasonable-ish sounding isn't a condition of truth, or even good inference.

EDIT: Ought say this is super off-topic; just sparked a thought.

I hear the goth rock in that song. Also a nice genre-crossing song in that it feels folk, at the same time.

She has that breathy sound that goth bands employ, but she's not doing it for affect -- she's a good singer who happens evoke that sound to me.

You reminded me of The Egalitarian Dharma of Unchiyama Gudo, or Zen Anarchism

But one label, Axiarchism, I had never heard of. The Latin (axio + arche) means Value/Principle & Ruling/Primary. The article says It's “a novel view that pictures the creative power . . . . as a non-personal force that creates the best world . . . but not for us.” {my bold} Also, “Axiarchists argue that only a non-causal force or principle can ultimately explain why things exist”. As an abstract, impersonal, natural, acausal creative principle it seems quite similar to Lao Tse's Tao. Yet, in terms of the value-based “path” or “flow” of the universe, it may be analogous to an algorithm-crunching computer program. And as a general creative causal natural force, it sounds somewhat like my own notion of EnFormAction*1. The article goes on to say : “this view resonates most of all with the Chinese philosophical religion of Daoism”. Or, the Axiarche might be like Hindu Brahman, simply non-specific impersonal ultimate Reality.

The key difference from traditional Creator/creation models, is that this one may help to explain the Problem of Evil : why bad things happen to good people. — Gnomon

Except with different emphases.

Tho if we call something Axiarchism, and somehow are able to differentiate it from other political choices while maintaining a claim on Value/Principle as the rule --

Surely you see where that's going.

@Arcane Sandwich Ask and ye shall receive, knock and it shall be opened unto you







:D

:up:

Well now the task for me is to connect Hippie rock to METAL :D

I already gave Type O Negative tho, so prolly not in this thread. Something to think about.

Just to be clear -- Motörhead sounds more metal than Coven and/or Sabbath?

Cool.

This thread is more metal based so I can see a distinction there now that I think about it. I was seeing the Kraftwerk to Goth line of flight, rather than thinking about the context of the thread, cuz Type O etc.


One of the reasons I tagged @unenlightened in this thread is the cover is from his era, but also they claimed to steal rifts from The Beatles, only played them backwards and with different tempos. So there's a line of flight from the 60's counter-culture to metal counter-culture, tho by a niche sub-genre.

Nope, though I'd say that Bauhaus is Gothic Rock, not Gothic Metal : P

Bauhaus is actually one of my favorite gothic bands, together with Sisters of Mercy. — Arcane Sandwich

Heh I don't have your level of discrimination ;)

But I love both bands, and early goth rock, and their various influences.

I often think of goth music as expressing similar things to punk music, but only in another mode.

People say gothic-punk, but I think there might be a real philosophical aesthetic that connects them.

How would you categorize Kraftwerk?

Though we should probably keep in mind that "Virgin" and "Chad" aren't exactly precise scientific concepts. Like, no one in sociology uses these concepts as sociological variables. Same goes for "Toxic" and "Healthy". It's all just fun and games when we talk like this, using these words. But I don't think that any peer-reviewed journal worth its salt would or even should accept a paper that attempts to use these concepts in a serious, scientific way. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes I agree -- it's a typology invented in the moment, rather than something even close to any sort of academic exercise.

I don't think so, either, unless every masculinity is toxic -- which it may be, given patriarchy, but I don't believe it to be the case.

It could become a toxic masculinity, obviously, but the song is just about choosing to stand alone because of honor and not knowing what else there is. It sounds like they'd rather not stand alone; only noting that sometimes you have to do the man thing -- or are at least compelled to do the man thing -- and do the thing no one understands even tho you're alone because fuckit honor blah blah :D

There are outright fantasies of murder etc. in Type O Negative that are horrific, as well as a good deal of homophobia. It's definitely a product of its times.

I'd say that this is toxicity, at least.

I don't think the song you linked is toxic, tho.

From the dao (Laozi-Zhuangzi) to logos (Heraclitus) to swirling atoms in void (Democritus-Epicurus-Lucretius) to natura naturans (Spinoza) to the absurd (Zapffe-Camus) to the real (Nishida-Nishitani / C. Rosset) ... to the (modern) pandeus¹ is, so far, the least irrational as well as most scientific evidence-compatible (or soundest) speculative path I have found to reflectively explore nature (i.e. surface of the real with which (we) natural beings are inescapably entangled – ergo embodied – and that fundamentally encompasses – enables-constrains – whatever is knowable (by us) including reason itself). YMMV — 180 Proof

I haven't walked as many paths, but it sounds like we're feeling the same.

Gothic Metal is really just about sex at the end of the day. — Arcane Sandwich

Lots of music is, tho I wonder if you'd say the same about

Do you know this other band? — Arcane Sandwich

Nope! Tho by the sound of that song it sounds as if they're an influence -- the sultry deep voice links the bands, and the longing for a gothic girl links the songs.

Sex is a huge topic in Type O Negative, but sometimes its longing transforms into the masculine, even patriarchal, hatred of women who hurt them.

Kind of a gothic inverse of the Madonna-Whore distinction. They frequently go back and forth in their lyrics, if you listen to all of them (as I did in my teenage years ;) ) -- it's not hard to see that the Toxic Chad can quickly turn dark in a material way that the Toxic Virgins don't.

Almost as if every brain were either an Adam or an Eve computing machine and fundamentally identical except in the programming and memory, and consciousness is part of the sameness, not part of the individuality. — unenlightened

"consciousness is part of the sameness" makes a lot of sense of various phenomenological investigations -- how else could we verify if the descriptions of consciousness are true, applicable, good, whatever -- or not -- other than believing consciousness is sameness rather than difference?

First time I've heard of this beautiful soul.

He's wonderful to listen to.

I really enjoyed their interview.

For myself I know that I like Type O for the many reasons people like bands -- found them in my teens and they spoke to me -- but I'm glad to see others getting a kick out of them.

Thinking of them as Toxic Chads vs. Tool as Toxic Virgins gives me a good feel for the Chad-Virgin spectrum.

They're both definitely toxic, at least :D -- part of their attraction is that they express toxic beliefs.

What I like about Type O Negative in particular is that they like double meanings, like Tool, but most of the time they're just making puns as a way of expressing self-denigration -- a lot of the times the puns are offensive and clever, much like "Cast that spell on me -- boo-bitch craft"

The interview captured a lot of what I like about Type O musically, tho. Peter Steele did legit sound and look like a sexy depressed vampire :D

@unenlightened Has long been an excellent interlocutor for myself, for instance.

I'd say we're friends in the normal sense, and phriends in the philosophy sense.