I'd be happy if these considerations induce a small doubt as to the ubiquity of pragmatic epistemology. — Banno

I agree.

With your bolded bits too. But that should not be a surprise.

Mostly using this as an opportunity to say that in spite of my various misgivings I'm not a pragmatist, and not even tempted by it.

...the dialogic nature of philosophy means that one should... remain open to what they might teach us, and to the possibility that there may be questions without answers and problems without solutions. — Fooloso4

Please forgive the requote, but I think this a sound bit of advice worth highlighting. "Remaining open" is key!

but perhaps the way to understand is to read through first, and then go back and worry at the terms when you have a grasp of the 'idea of the game'. and all this 's' and 'c' is just a way of talking about


The idea of the game, at first, anyway, is that the stop light is on when the train is in the tunnel and off when the train is not in the tunnel. Mark, or no mark. And that game is what comes next. — unenlightened

Yeah that makes sense, given how chapter 1 didn't even begin to make sense without chapter 2. I'll keep along. I'm still figuring out the accounting, and how to make the crosses pretty.

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a+b \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

$\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|$



$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, * \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

*Been messing with it to try and figure out how it works, but updating the quote to reflect the code I'm using -- right now I'm uncertain why there's a gap between the top line and the cross-line in the embedded cross I Think I got it now.I'm going to respond to this post to make it appear more user friendly though. See the post below for better instructions.

I notice that if I do not put anything but a space where the "*" presently is that I get a negative symbol popping up, and also I'm still uncertain where that gap is. My hope, in the long run, is to offer strings which people can simply copy-paste with clear delineations for plug-and-play. If I'm running across a limitation rather than just messing up then perhaps "*" could serve as a blank space? But that kind of ruins the effect too.

Cool! I think I'm actually following so far then from what lookedlooks* like a very intimidating book.

*EDIT: I shouldn't get cocky, I just started.

Some more on chapter 2 --

For 2 I think we could use brackets, thus:

[ ], [[ ]], [[ ] [ ]], [a], [[[a] [[b] [c]] [ ]] Not very clear, and it might be better to alternate square and curly by depth, thus:

[{ } { }], [{[a] [{b} {c}] { }] — unenlightened

So, following along with the axioms in chapter 2...

[][] = []

and axiom 2

[{}] = .

?

I tried messing with 's bit of code and looking for tutorials but got lost in the information web. If there's a easy link to figuring out how to embed multiple crosses, @jgill, I'd be happy if you could pass it along because it does look prettier, and if I can figure out the syntax it's probably not that hard to embed multiple crosses.

Part of me is wondering if we can read Axiom 1 as the line above, and axiom 2 as the crossing of the line above. So when we, while using the form of the meta-language to parse order, draw a segment from left to right that is the law of calling. And when we draw a segment perpendicular to the calling that is a crossing. So if we cross again we negate, but it's easier to see that when we embed the original cross within a series of crosses rather than a series of lines coming off of the original calling.

This makes sense at a purely formal level because they complement one another -- the calling and the crossing are perpendicular but simultaneously need one another in order to be a calling or a crossing. In a sense the perpendicularity of the crossing removes some of the form of space of the meta-language, but not quite because the space of this formal system is defined by the cross rather than by a set of axioms describing space. Perpendicularity can be defined by reference to the cross, rather than the other way about, and from that we can name the space "Cartesian" if we take space to have an infinite series of crosses. (not Euclidean, that would be harder, or at least different, I think) (a bit speculative here.... just trying to think through the ideas towards something familiar) ((Also -- it'd probably have to be two orthogonal and infinite cross-spaces to define the Cartesian plane))

Then Chapter 2 is the use of the axioms to draw a distinction -- a form taken out of the original form of calling-crossing. Which, from chapter 1, is perfect continence.

Is it right to read "construction" as what's happening in the rest of the chapter? That's the impression I get -- if distinction is perfect continence then drawing a distinction will accord with what is given -- distinction and indication. (interestingly, comparing 1 and 2, we can interpret the cross as a kind of circle, but with the space-properties of this formal, rather than a geometric, system)

But what we get is the space cloven by the first distinction is* the form, and that all others are following this form. The space is cleaved by a cross indicating/distinguishing, but distinction is the form by which we can indicate an inside or an outside. In a way we could look at the cross as a mere mark rather than an intent. It would have content but it would not be a* used signal.

The notion of "value" is really interesting to me. The value is marked/unmarked, at the most simple. The name indicates the state, and the state is its value insofar that an expression indicates it. And then with equivalence we are able to compare states through the axioms. At this point I think we can only hold equivalence between the basic axioms, which turns out to have an inside and an outside, and gives a rule for "condensation" and "cancellation". So in a way the value is just what is named at this point, but there's still a distinction to be had between marked and unmarked due to the law of crossing canceling rather than reducing to the original name.

Then the end of the chapter is what follows from everything before. "The end" as I'm reading it starts at "Operation" -- this is where we can now draw a distinction, having constructed everything prior, and it entails some properties about the system being built such as depth, shallowness, and a need to define space in relation to the cross.

*added in as an edit, was confusing upon a re-read

Re-reading Depth I think I'm getting it this time. (I'm doing this in bits -- in the morning I like philosophy to wake up my mind, and in the afternoon I like philosophy to take a little mental break to something totally different)

This is talking about the

$\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|$

So s(sub"0") is the blank page surrounded by an unwritten cross. So in this example there are 2 crosses which pervade a which is then named c. In this case that would be the pervading space.

'Let' is a command from on High. This how it shall be henceforth. 'Let x be the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. 'Let' happens outside the formal system to create it. 'Call' is an action that happens inside the the system. You can call the distinction into being by making the distinction, that is by writing the sign. and If you write it twice in a row you call and recall. — unenlightened

Alright, that helps. So we have our meta-language which we're speaking now, and that differs from the formal system being created with the use of the meta-language.

Reading Chapter 1-2 (for some reason I'm finding them linked as I read this the first time -- like I can't talk about chapter 1 without chapter 2, and vice versa) again I can see the opening of 2 as a re-expression of Chapter 1, like The Form needed to be explicated before talking about forms out of the form, and the form takes as given distinction and indication which it also folds together as complementary to one another.

But then I get stuck right after "Operation" is introduced. "Cross" is a name for an instruction. Instruction, from just a bit before, leads to the form of cancellation. But what is the connection between states and instructions? Reading "Operation" again I'm reminded of the First canon "what is no allowed is forbidden". The name operates already as an instruction.

And then I get stuck on "continence", even though that was part of the opening. "Continence" is the name of the only relation between crosses, and that relationship is such that the cross contains what's inside, and does not contain what is not inside of it.

But this is where I really got lost entirely: What is going on from "Depth" to "Pervasive space", or are these concepts that, like the first chapter, will become elucidated by reading chapter 3? Like a puzzle unfolding?

The anarchist in me is determined :D.

Which I hadn't thought about until now -- but the question "How to learn philosophy at all?" is not innocent specifically because Plato continued the project of Socrates to corrupt the youth by the powers of reason, but more safely than him. So teaching has kind of always been a part of philosophy's practice.

I have to suggest that silence might at least be as good as declarations of not needing to convince, and so on, back and forth, and that this application might go some way to explaining the frustration that is commonly the result of enquiries into the nature and definition of philosophy. — unenlightened

Fair point. You hooked me with your application of the book to this problem ;)

And yup I don't think we're disagreeing. Maybe that's what's hard about distinguishing philosophy, too -- we're so used to the engine being disagreement that continual agreement upon things that look disparate seems to run counter to what we usually call philosophy, and it may just be a case of the snake eating its own tail and becoming incoherent.

I'd say any of the offered lists here, and even the reactions to the lists, could be considered methods of the sort I'm thinking. There are philosophical methods, like the Socratic and the Phenomenological method, but I was thinking more pedagogically -- how to learn philosophy at all?

Interesting use of the first chapters.

Something I'm stuck on, from a first reading of the first two chapters, is the distinction between letting and calling. I think I have to read "Let" as "Call a function" or something like that. It's naming an instruction rather than naming a distinction.

EDIT: Actually, thinking that through -- calling a function, more generally, a relation, would just be a distinction with a map.

The art -- also betrays some of what I think of philosophy, that it is more an art than a science. Which is why I think it's a social activity found with others. The art is made between artist and audience, and in theatre this is particularly so as even having the same actors and the same audience on a different night gives a different performance.

I think of philosophy as a kind of art, though it's a unique one worth distinguishing.

One of the advantages of method is that it's something written down which allows others to test it. And then the method can be refined by others. In a sense what a method does is de-personalize the philosophy so that anyone can run with it -- it's a work on the self, but the self is not isolated.

If philosophy is a knowledge of the self, and a work on the self, and further the self is not an isolated, simple subject but is instead found in others', and further that this self cannot be elucidated by the modern methods of psychology (the self doesn't exist there), then acting theory is the most worked out theory of self-generation that I know of. Which is why I keep going back to Stanislavski as a kind of guide. Further he's even more appropriate for philosophy because Stanislavski wrote dialogues with the express intent that he didn't want to become the law giver of acting, but wanted to write some things that would help actors learn, reflect, and grow -- and in turn to add to what was written. That is he was a kind of philosopher of the theatre, and a natural teacher.

Though mentorship is naturally built into the theatre. It's impossible to do theatre without others, though you certainly practice your lines at home.

One of the downsides of mentorship, though it may just be a necessary downside, is that it makes the art more exclusive. Much of the time the arts of various kinds have been reserved for the children of the well-to-do, just like philosophy. Mentorship is possible within an institution supported, but many of the masses don't have that opportunity. I myself really just lucked out in meeting up with a mentor who was kind enough to help me in spite of not being a part of his institutional program (and, for all that, it's still coming under attack by the powers that be...). But I wonder to what extent is it possible to spread out the wisdom of philosophy to people who aren't so lucky?

So I land back on method in spite of myself.

There are percentage of certainty attainable in accurate maths value if the data was available. — Corvus

And what would the data for certainty be?

Cool :). Then I think I know what you mean, and I've answered the question with that thought in mind. It seems that if you follow what I've said, then, we can be 100%99.99%* certain of a lot of things, but that this doesn't have a relationship to our knowledge of whether or not our beliefs are infallible. Which on the face of things shouldn't be that surprising given that "infallible" is a pretty hard standard to reach, but we are certain of much more than what we are infallible about.

*I would say 100% certain, but the terms laid out made that the wrong expression.

Seriously, I'l start with a point of clarification: by cultivate I mean manage, that is, not allow it to grow or increase uncontrolled. — Fooloso4

Ah OK. I thought, because you had said your nature that you were affirming it as a positive thing, which would certainly not get along with any sort of methodical approach (at least, a method which sets out step-wise, even loose steps, what to do). Whereas you're saying that it can be worked with, though the goal to ensure that it grows in a managed manner, is cultivated towards what is good. (Also, I want to note that I read "anarchy" in a positive light at first, furthing the confusion)

Which brings my mind around to the other way to counter method -- mentorship. Which @Tobias mentioned as well, and would get along with your closing. At least this is where my mind goes, but now I want to ask, since my first guess was wrong and so this one could be as well: Can one learn philosophy at all? And if so do you care to say more about that?

You always get percentage of certainty. Some certainties are more certain than other certainties.
Therefore I suggested "All life on the earth will die eventually." was one of the 100% certainty. Because it is a conclusion derived by billions and billions of examples in millions of years of historic records, the biological facts of lives + the on-going processes happening right now. There maybe other 100% certainty cases, I am sure. — Corvus

I can understand what people mean by "100% certain" vs "99.99% certain" -- the former means they know it to be true and it's impossible to be wrong, and the latter means that the believer understands that their feeling of certitude is the same as in the former case but they have a reason to believe that the belief's false value could be wrong (though they don't believe that).

But notice how this is just a binary between two kinds of certainty: one which is infallible, and the other which feels just as good but is not infallible, or at least we have a reason to believe that it's not infallible. Rather than a percentage of cases we're just using two different meanings of certitude, and the percentage is there more as an adjective than a mathematical relationship.

After all what could the domain even be for percent certainty when we're being as vague as all our knowledge or all our beliefs? Those aren't exactly easy to count sets, which is what you'd need to be able to do to set up a percentage -- something like the ratio between certain beliefs and all beliefs held.

In the long run I tend to believe that methods are for training, and not for production. There's no method for making methods, right? So someone has to be the method-maker, if methods are applicable at all, and that person will simply be doing creative exploration as to what's best rather than following a method to generate methods. (or, if we're incredibly method-phillic, the buck will stop somewhere with the original method writer who wrote the method on writing methods on method writing :D)

And you're right to point out that we must begin somewhere, and sometimes that somewhere is rebellious, anarchic, or anti-methodical. In which case offering methods would preclude a kind of philosophy from the outset, and that kind of philosophy would be perfect for those of a rebellious, anarchic, or anti-methodical spirit given that philosophy deals with knowledge of the self. (more or less you'd be turning away the openly inquisitive from the outset by insisting upon methods as discipline)

How would you answer your own question? How best to work with and cultivate a rebellious, anarchic, and anti-methodical temperament?

I'm not so sure. For instance what if the belief was truly certain and it only turned up false because the world changed?

I am certain that my fridge has pickles in it. I open the fridge to find there are no pickles -- someone must have eaten them in between, and so what I was truly certain of turned out that I could no longer be certain of. But I was certainly justified, even epistemically, in my belief since I put the pickles in the fridge.

A lot of the time I think our desire for certainty falls to this -- we're certain of things, but things are subject to change. And so the desire for certainty is to somehow overcome change so that no matter what happens I'll know what I believe is true and infallible. But this is an entirely different kind of certainty to the more mundane one I presented: it's changing what's required of certainty not just so that we're certain, but so that we'll always be certain.

In my opinion the attempt to start with a method is antithetical to philosophy. It raises a whole host of questions, including - Why a method? Why this method and not some other? If a method guides and shapes the inquiry then how confident should we be that this method does not occlude free and open inquiry? — Fooloso4

There we go! That's the stuff. I had Against Method in the back of my mind in writing this, and began to wonder about the place of method in science (as pedagogical tool, as research program), and especially as pedagogy I think method has a place. Not The Method, but A Method among methods among non-methods. And in that looser sense I began to wonder about a method in philosophy, more along the lines of Stanislavski's method than an algorithmic or programmatic method.

Your final question is why I appended "Add a rule" -- because eventually one can add the rule that methods aren't everything, and let go of method entirely -- thereby building into the method an ability to let go of it when the training wheels are no longer needed.

In that case I'd say I'm completely certain of many things. But importantly, I've been completely certain of beliefs which have turned up false. So I'd draw a distinction between certainty and knowing that my knowledge is true and infallible.

If it is possible to be 100% certain of anything then it must be the case that we can be 100% of something.

If it is possible to be 100% certain of something then we must know what "100% certain" means.

I do not know what "100% certain" means.

Therefore it is not possible to be 100% certain of something, and therefore it is not possible to be 100% certain of anything.

Yup. Though I'll re-iterate that being a master of philosophy isn't the point so much -- learning how to paint is a good thing even if you don't become a Picasso.

Normal human beings though need introduction to the practice just like they need introduction to the practice of law and of scientific enquiry. That was what the OP asked for, a method to do philosophy. Is sitting in your cave all by yourself adequate? No, unless you are the philosopher Hercules. — Tobias

Exactly!

I hadn't expected the "What is philosophy?" question in setting out my method. I was hoping to avoid categorical questions in favor of something which is a little more helpful for people who are interested, but might benefit from some program or something like that. Not algorithmically, but just some guidance that sets someone on the right path to actually doing philosophy rather than things that look like philosophy but are not.

Philosophy is a social activity, but who do you keep company with? Even keeping company with books can be a social activity. More often than not, an author writes in order to be read, even if they are selective with regard to who the intended audience is. The dialogic nature of philosophical writing is not always apparent. Even if the author is not able to respond, a text can be interrogated, and the best philosophers often anticipate our questions and objections. The circle extends to other readers as well, and takes different forms including teacher/student relations, secondary literature, and more recently online forums. — Fooloso4

True. I mean I consider what we do here to be a kind of relaxed philosophy, so even sharing here makes it "count" as philosophy in my way of thinking. It's not the venue as much as that it's shared at all.

As to the question of whether books are necessary, I know of no prominent philosopher at any time who did not read or hear the work of other philosophers. They do not simply read in order to know what others think but in order to think along with and against what they read.

That's a good point -- so there's at least two ways we might read a text: one in which we're reading it as a historical document, and the other in which we are reading it as a philosophy text to be thought through.

Gregor Mendel's studies on genetics were never published until after he died. Would you say he was not a scientist? Emily Dickenson's poems were never published while she was alive. Would you say she was not a poet? — T Clark

Now you're getting it! :D

I'm not sure what you mean by "spirituality." Is Taoism spiritualism? I'm willing to say it includes mysticism -The belief that direct knowledge of ultimate reality can be attained through subjective experience (such as self-awareness, intuition, or insight). It's fine if you decide that kind of philosophy is not your cup of tea, but it's unreasonable for you to claim it is not tea at all. — T Clark

In its religious form, yes. Though you seemed to indicate that there's a philosophic form to Taoism which wouldn't. I'm not putting out necessary/sufficient conditions here because both categories are vague categories which require some amount of judgment to the particulars, and noticing that there are times when there's some amount of overlap between both. I stuck to Augustine and Martin Luther because I'm more familiar with them, and I'm more comfortable with dissecting my own religious tradition than others'. Taoism is something I really only know in passing, so it's easy to make mistakes with respect to how to categorize.

But surely you can see that just because the categories are vague that doesn't mean they are the same, yes?


I'm guessing that we could probably, just to make things even more confusing, even take what's considered a philosophical text and treat it in a spiritual manner. We could hold to the text as a truth because we find something deeply fulfilling about the text's relationship to our own life. That is we would no longer be doing philosophy then, either, though pinning down when is what will be a matter of judgment and some amount of drawing lines in the sand.

“You are describing dialogue and calling it philosophy as an argument that philosophy is defined by dialogue.
THAT is logically unsound.” — DingoJones

Obviously it's unpersuasive, given your response.

I wouldn't go so far as to say it's logically unsound. Where the form of argument ends and the example or explication begins isn't easy most of the time. I'll go back to the differences between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to make the case for the publicity of philosophy. Socrates invented philosophy as we know it, Plato invented it as an academic discipline to corrupt the youth in the long term, and Aristotle realized how good a life being an academic is and dived into justifying his position through Reason alone. (a clear fable that ought be perfected, but I hope that it makes sense)

Dialogue is a part of philosophy because there's always been this call and response, or back and forth, between those we consider philosophers.

I just fall asleep at the fire and wake up cold and sore before going to a proper bed ;)

But that says more about me than your notion of philosophy.

Staring at fire in the dark is a good source of calm and inspirational thoughts.

I suppose in making my distinction between the mystical or the spiritual versus the philosophical I'd say that this method won't quite do. But then you're something of a counter-example, because you think about the thoughts and express them with others and such without actually expressing a Gnostic spirituality -- you stick to the philosophy.

Is that how you began?

If there's a distinction to be made between Taoist philosophy and Taoist religion then I think I'm still safe in the distinction between spirituality and philosophy?

Yup.

Though there's funny cases, too -- not just tofrom Eastern religions, either. Consider Augustine and Martin Luther as interesting cases that will test our notions about what these human activities consist of.

But generally I believe spirituality and philosophy to be different, especially because it seems to me that any religion should be able to engage in the practice of philosophy, whereas to be a member of a religion you usually have to leave any other religion behind. They're kind of total ways of life which won't get along too well (unless you're a Universalist Unitarian, dedicated to the notion that they can get along).

Stoics like Marcus Aurelius provide a good example of non-public philosophy, given what we have is basically his journal to himself. But then he was an emporer, so his philosophy was in a way more public than most.

Good point that the distinction between spirituality and philosophy isn't found in its publicness, and that spirituality is frequently pursued in a collective fashion as well. There's a difference between the activities, I think, but it's not whether it's a social activity.

Before Socrates what was philosophy? It's difficult to say, but the fragments seem to indicate that there were schools, that people talked with one another about ideas, that they disagreed with one another frequently and posited all kinds of different ideas and explanations to one another. And then Socrates changed the face of philosophy by bringing it into the public square -- it was a social activity prior, but Socrates brought those ideas into the public life of the city and began to use them to corrupt the youth for which he was condemned to die.

So there's even a precedent based upon one of the indisputable examples of a philosopher to claim that philosophy is performed in public. Though there's certainly the dialogue writers, they are written for people to read and contemplate.

To avoid too many layers of interpretation, I'll let @Banno speak for himself.

I'll take the extra step and say it's more than useful, and actually necessary. Not at all points, but at some point if you want your thoughts to qualify as philosophy then you have to share it with others. Further, even if you do not want it to qualify as philosophy it's that sharing which makes philosophy what it is. Think Socrates here -- by our records he only wrote in public. Surely that's important?

I love that Kafka quote. It points out that you have to bring something to the philosophy game. You have to have developed a world view, a perspective, before you start. You can't just pick a philosopher at random and start believing what they say. You see that a lot here on the forum - people quoting philosophers without really understanding the implications and consequences of those beliefs. Other philosophers can help you find the way, but it's your path. — T Clark

I agree it's your path. I wouldn't like the existentialists if I didn't think that there's something true to that.

I'm not sure if you do need to bring something, though here I'm thinking about Socrates Cafe style meetings as a possible counter example. It was a social setting where people who were interested enough in philosophy to listen could listen to people discussing questions in a safe public environment.

I'd say that philosophy can help in developing a worldview, and there should be more public access to philosophy for that very purpose.

Still: I quote philosophers all the time and may miss implications. I think it's an important part, but you're right to say it's not everything.

I guess I feel in philosophy there is so much to know and understand and so little time, that the situation is almost hopeless for someone like me who hasn't read significant texts and fully understood the ramifications of key concepts. — Tom Storm

Then for you I think both @unenlightened and @Srap Tasmaner have outlined better methods, if you're interested. If not, then that's fine too. But I'll echo @T Clark in saying that you're very open minded and seem to have something of the philosophical desire in you :)

"So little time" is probably the biggest problem with my method. I happened to get bitten by the bug at a relatively early age, mostly due to my upbringing and my weird way of just wanting to know things. But it's not like you need to read all these books to have a solid grasp of philosophy. Look at Wittgenstein! (Or Socrates)

Not exactly.

I think @Banno is right in that there is something social to philosophy. "Inherent" is good enough for me, but I wouldn't say "necessary at all times". There are times we aren't together, that we think thoughts -- but to make it philosophy I think I'm still on the "gotta present it to others" track. Or, maybe there are some who are just that good, but there is definitely a huge benefit to being a part of a community for growth and knowledge.

Take @Tobias point that eventually you should find a mentor. Isn't that a social relationships there? I don't know if it's necessary, but I can say I've had more than one mentor with respect to philosophy and it's always helped me. That community part of philosophy is a big part of growth, though of course we're supposed to be able to think on our own too.

Make it just a guy instead of yogis and gurus if its easier, that way your not tempted to reference the “spirituality” those folk practice in addition to any philosophizing they might do. — DingoJones

I'd say the same, I think. I've already stated that I have mental reveries on my own. I'd say that's spirituality in a way more than philosophy. Philosophy deals with others.

The “public side”? Whats the other side, the not public one? Isnt that exactly what Im talking about re the guy in a cave contemplating life and the universe? — DingoJones

Yup. But if someone only does that I think I'd be tempted to call that spirituality rather than philosophy. There's something about revealing one's thoughts to others for scrutiny and growth which is part of philosophy, which I didn't include in my initial list.

I think it's great to steelman a beloved thinker. That's roughly equivalent to sharing what one thinks are good beliefs for possible adoption. — plaque flag

What's weird is that I don't agree with him, I just think his philosophy is amazing . :D So in defending him it's really more like "Look, you're not disagreeing with him *in the right way*" which is just the most asinine position to hold, but there it is.

I'm really much more interested in the bubble issue itself, as I said above. Kant is just a symbol for that. But so is Hume. Methodological solipsism was always trying to say something profound. So I haven't abandoned what's good in it. I just believe in progress. — plaque flag

Heh, so this is the downside of the historicist approach -- if they're just a symbol then me bringing up this or that thing about them won't speak to the issue, it'll just bring things back to hermeneutics, which is what I try to avoid -- but it's an old habit.

I agree that the SEP is very much an academics philosophy, and as much as I love the academy I agree with you that the best philosophy isn't a cloistered series of responses and refinements, but actually manages to say something about us living our life.

The bookish nerd historicist that I am I just say "read the books!" :D -- but that's not enough.

I think everything can have a philosophical implication. This might dovetail with my reply below.

Gurus, yogi’s, monks…contemplating the universe and life's deep meanings and questions without a dialogue. Thats not philosophy? What is it then? — DingoJones

Spirituality.

The Catholic and the Buddhist priest have different rituals for contemplating the universe and life's deep meanings and questions within their respective religious practices. But philosophy would hope to be able to be able to appeal to either spiritual practitioner through the power of reason.

That is -- there's the public side of philosophy that would bring back our worshipers and spiritual reveries to the people we live around who we then would engage in dialogue about the answers we might have found to those questions.

I started really learning philosophy in college, by taking a philosophy course for one semester, which was optional for and irrelevant to my studies (*Business Administration"). The teacher was the brother of Iannis Xenakis, the known modern composer, and the whole course was about the stoic philosopher Epictetus. I was very lucky, because I gained so much by learning about a whole system of philosophy (stoicism), and a way of thinking about life and the world, that I was so thirsty to learn more so, in that same semester I read about 10 books from other philosophers of the same period. Then I read, read and read pages after pages, books after books from all kinds of philosophers and philosophical schools ... I also started to have my own ideas about mind, ethics and life. — Alkis Piskas

The bug bit me in college, too, and I just went from one book to the next in a historical list from the pre-socracratics to Marx, skipping the majority of the medievals like a good student of modernism. ;) But I was definitely motivated to do that -- it wasn't even related to my major, which was chemistry! I just loved what I was reading and couldn't get enough of it. Plus it ended up dovetailing nicely eventually with chemistry because of all the phil-o-sci stuff.

And yup. My own ideas which then, upon picking up another book, were once again smashed against the rocks of reason! :D