This answers the OP, "Are there analytic statements?" — RussellA

I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention.

Yup.

I think fallacies are most useful in self-reflection. It's good to point them out in that spirit -- rather than in an attempt to prove something.

I think this an interesting fallacy in that it is at least a dialogic dialogue-centric? fallacy -- it's explicitly in terms of a conversation, unlike most fallacies which mention either counter-examples (in the case of informal fallacies, like this one) or rules of validity.

Less archaically though -- We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. I'm guessing that we roughly agree that analyticity is when a concept either "contains" another concept or somehow necessitates it or, maybe in the weakest sense if analytic/synthetic are exclusive categories, analytic statements are those which are not synthetic.

The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.

Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.

Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge. — RussellA

Cool.

So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres.

Unbrimbled when one removes a brimb from one who has been brimbled, and Tembre's being the Brimbled Brambles.

There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.

There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.

Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind. — RussellA

Heh, the whole reason I liked "I-language" was because I thought it side-stepped the whole mind thing :D.

Where do concepts exist? I'm not sure. Or if it's even quite right to say they exist, or if this is a reification.

If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.

But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.

As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence. — RussellA

It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy -- conceptually rendered it's nothing like a neural net, for instance.

Starting to think that the speculation of multiplicity is off topic, though. The reason I thought I-languages might be interpreted analytically is because neural nets are, at base, a bundle of computations. Suggesting something like analyticity in a mathematical sense, at least -- in the sense of there being a sequence or an order of some kind which eventually sets up some kind of relationship to full-blown symbolic meaning.

What it seems we'd agree upon is that I-languages are not spoken like normal languages (which actually speaks to why I tend to deny mentalese -- it's like a homuncular fallacy for meaning). I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. Or, at least, while I-language remains unclear it follows that E-languages are a clearer category for including things we can make sense of.

True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.

But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".

Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B". — RussellA

This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically.

It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge.

I often wonder about the relation between machine-learning and human learning. I don't think it's clear what the token of meaning is in terms of an I-language. Neural nets are a model of neurons, but no one knows that human-learning happens at the level of neurons -- it's just a thing we can measure and we make guesses about it. But it could be something else that we haven't been able to measure yet. Say proteins, or codons, or base pairs, or ratios between those -- they could potentially be an I-language in the sense that it's measurable and makes sense of at least a generative grammar.

I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept. More charitably, because I don't think mentalese makes sense ultimately, I'd say an I-language is public, in principle. Something like neural nets comes to mind, but instead of machine learning it's whatever our learning is that sits in analogue to neural nets. Perhaps different E-langauges have different I-languages, but the I-language would be formed from our social environment as we learn our first language so just by virtue of sharing an E-language an I-language could not be private in the public/private Witti sense. I just wanted to flesh that out a little more rather than assuming it.

Even then, I think I'm taking back some of what I thought before. If the language is public then it is subject to revision and then analytic statements will only be known in a post hoc manner (I am usually skeptical of a priori knowledge). We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity (which really only goes against attempting to define analyticity according to formal characteristics*)

*Defining it formally with E-languages at least. But I'd include logic as within the E-language category.

Heh, I was starting to think the same, in terms of being off topic. Somehow I do that...

I think that's what I've been saying?

Though I'm acknowledging this more general notion of economy, where people did in fact trade goods and services and used currency outside of the rise of capitalism. But that is a sort of trans-historical mega-theory of economy that isn't really related to neoliberalism.

OK, so... it seems we're agreeing as long as we acknowledge that TRULY free markets, in the general sense, can exist without a state -- but when talking about neoliberalism, those markets cannot exist without a state.

And you can see how that requires a state?

Alright, fair. It's just wrong. So not a truism.

I want to restrict the domain of discourse for "market", with respect to neoliberalism, to capitalism. So capitalist markets are what we are talking about, rather than some general theory of economy.

I believe my response to @frank covers this. Is neoliberalism an ideology that connects itself to the bronze age?

I simply wouldn't talk of "markets" when it comes to the bronze age. Currency and trade aren't the same things as capitalism.

I guess I don't know what you're referring to then. — frank

pointed out some of the events I was thinking of. There's a list on wikipedia, but some of those I wouldn't include because they're obviously of the global sort like the IMF, where I'm attempting to put together something like a ideology enforced by states. Or, perhaps a better way to put it, this is the story when you zoom in to the national level, where the ideology is instantiated.

Yup, like them too. They trade in money, after all -- legal tender, and all that.

Yup. Unfortunately so. It should be an obvious truism.

Maybe what's needed is a good distinction between Keynesian state intervention and neoliberal state intervention to make the case... I mean from my perspective there's no such thing as a market without state intervention. Markets are instantiated by states. So the notion of governments not assisting private entities is, from the standpoint of political economy, simply not possible. They make the very conditions of markets by enforcing legal claims of property.

But something is different from the times of Keynes. I agree the term is somewhat ambiguous, but there's a real phenomena there too.

But in general, government assistance to private entities is not in line with neoliberal ideas. . — frank

But it happens a lot. 2009 was not unique. And it seems to be needed when those ideas are implemented.

Chile was the first test case for the imposition of neoliberal ideas. Neoliberalism will tend to make an economy run hot, so when this happened to Chile, this was touted as success. — frank

So that'd be a reason to include it. But was the USian government assistance of Pinochet a result of neoliberalism? Or was it the result of one nation doing what nations do -- enforcing claims on resources, while picking on an ideological enemy? Or was that the result of Henry Kissinger just being himself?

In making neoliberalism more clear it seems like it's more of a prevailing ideology? So that'd indicate that these sorts of interventions are not the result of neoliberalism -- as a way of clarifying when it's appropriate to attribute something to neoliberalism. Neoliberalism came as an ideology which was later enforced by the government.

You should check out Harvey's book about it. I stayed outraged for about a week straight after I read it. Ahrrr! — frank

Yeah that's definitely the sort of thing I like to read. :D I should.

Yeah, though I want to clarify I mean historical events rather than from the nature of an entity so this is a perspective drawing from historical knowledge (or, at least, stuff I read) -- but that's definitely a theme of these historical events. If such and such fails then the net suffering is greater than if such and such does not fail is one form of market intervention I'd count. I'm not sure all of what I'd count. The relationship of unions to capital is another perspective I'd highlight.

One thing I wonder about including are international actions. I am uncertain that neoliberalism is international in the same way that, say, capitalism is international: Whereas capital has a way of connecting nations together into a higher order system, I'm not sure neoliberalism is quite like that -- it seems more like an ideology and its enactment, and less like a transnational system.

This being relevant because I'm not sure if one should include the various interventions in Latin and South America on the part of the US as an example, or if that's just the nature of the beast at the international level and neoliberalism is something which can only take place within a capitalist economy.

Well, that's what I mean by neoliberalism, anyways.

LIke any good leftist I blame Nixon. ;) Not really, Carter did it too. And I agree that it's in reaction to Keynesian economics. My reading is always eclectic so I might have missed some event prior in USian history, but the Lockheed bailouts:

Drowning in debt, in 1971 Lockheed (then the largest US defense contractor) asked the US government for a loan guarantee, to avoid insolvency. Lockheed argued that a government bailout was necessary due to the company's value for U.S. national security.[22] On May 13, 1971, the Richard Nixon administration sent a bill titled "The Emergency Loan Guarantee Act" to Congress requesting a $250 million loan guarantee for Lockheed and its L-1011 Tristar airbus program.[23] — wikipedia

really do look similar to many of what I'd term neoliberal interventions on behalf of the market. I know what you mean there, which is what really distinguishes neoliberalism from classical liberalism and the limited state types and is a reason to call it something different.

I'm wondering if analyticity is required for a generative grammer? I'm potshotting after reading the entries and @invicta's thread -- but I think that the I-language approach more implies that there'd be analytic I-sentence's (or whatever the token of meaning is in an I-language -- also worth noting that the I-language couldn't count as a private language up front, just to steer clear of that confusion).

I'm thinking something along the lines of the formal approach, of a sub-natural-language process which generates natural languages seems like it'd have analytic properties.


However, I tend to believe that the distinction is pragmatic rather than some feature of thought. Even if I grant some kind of mentalese or sub-natural-language generative process I would tend to favor the natural language expressions over this I-language, however it's parsed. (neat distinction though between E/I-language I hadn't encountered before)

Yup.

Especially when you consider, in the USA at least, how much these issues are pushed to the side. Consider, for instance, Roe v. Wade. Who won on that one?

EDIT: I think the reply might be something like universal healthcare -- but, in terms of capital, who won on that one?

In general that's a lesson I've noticed could be taught more -- communist or otherwise, politics doesn't begin with the party, the idea, the nation -- it begins with the people around you. It's an important perspective that's often lost in thinking about politics in theory, and is especially lost in the representative systems we have in place now where so much is done by appealing to an expert or an authority.

It's only by actively organizing that the ideas even begin to make sense as anything other than a philosophical exercise.

Communism is political, and material. Even if it be unfeasible or unrealistic it isn't a religion. It deals with power, and specifically power distribution over the economy. If there is a path to communism it is certainly not the path of being the change we wish to see in the world -- that's the sort of thing people in charge would say, to get you to pursue some personal project or spiritual journey rather than pursuing power, which for people without it basically comes from the numbers of people who can unite together in common cause -- hence why I've emphasized throughout that it's the relationships with the people you know that matter, rather than some idea, or a particular history.

I'm guessing some sort of sweeping changes would be needed, perhaps cultural/ethical, but that's just conjecture on my part. — jorndoe

I am sympathetic to communism, but I think we're too selfish right now, and that the limits of human organization are unknown. That we're too selfish, though, isn't a surprise given what behavior is rewarded -- and I should say we're collectively too selfish. I should say by selfish I don't mean individual selfishness, but more like a clannish selfishness -- we care for ours first, just behaviorally, because that's our responsibility and no one else will. Our society is set up in such a way that you kind of have to put you and yours first. Selfishness is a necessity for family life, and family life is usually the concrete place where people encounter the economy: through a paycheck and the power which comes from that paycheck and how the economy effects whoever earns that paycheck is where most people have contact with the economy's rules. The other time is as the buyer of goods.

I don't know about "sweeping" changes. In a way since how we live together is ultimately up to us it's us that would have to change. But it couldn't be a spiritual change for it to count as political, it'd have to be a material change -- a change in the way we relate to the economy. Given that the limits of human organization are unknown, though, we don't know how much would need to change to get there. Beyond a dream we don't even know what "there" is. If you ask me I tend to believe there is no end of history, really. People will always have issues to work through -- but that's not a bad thing. The bad thing is how we work through issues, now, and its results. A realistic communism would have to have a process by which human issues could be worked through, because we'll never reach a society where conflict just doesn't exist at all. It'd just be better than, say, recruiting soldiers through the usual means of propaganda to maintain border claims to ensure stability within a physical geographic region.

Further, while dreams and thoughts have their place, we need others for any material change. So it all kind of goes back to building relationships with people -- the limits of what's socially possible depend upon all of us. As such communisms realism and feasibility are more like social facts that could change in light of how we decide to behave, given that our personalities nor our cultures are static entities.

Do you view the United States as a one-party system, or do you reject this view, in favor of some other description. What might a "real" two party system look like? — BC

I agree with the sentiment. We live underneath the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. And the ballot box won't change that.

What parties are good at is producing identities for people which motivate them to vote for the right side, and then pushing those identities they created aside when it comes to actually governing. They facilitate the democratic dance so that the government can continue to claim legitimacy even though it's clear to anyone whose looking that money, followed by a support for the military, is what matters when it comes to politics.

That's because I'm attempting to remain at least realistic :D.

Often times talk of "the state" in relation to even socialism is muddy. For some "the state" is roads, military, police, courts, and everything else is excess -- the liberal state as an ideal. For others the post office is an example of socialism, even though it's funded by the capitalist mode of production -- taxation is somehow socialism even though the capitalists require the liberal state to enforce the norms of capital.

I think it's important to emphasize that it's really just the people around you who matter with respect to politics. In a way that's a radical idea that's certainly inspired by communism and anarchism: it's not the talking heads, the books, the ideas or ideals, or even the leaders of social organisms that matter as much as the people who show up.

Booo! More infighting and misunderstanding! :D

I think I'm tracking -- you're not a dualist in terms of substance or properties. Maybe a simpler way to put it: some entities which we speak about exist, and some entities which we speak about don't.

And upon coming to find out strange things like the dress, or the various other phenomena which have been mentioned to point out a difference in individual experience, one has a reason to doubt that our experience is like what we thought it was before, whatever that may have been.

My question to the Direct Realist is, if all observers are directly observing the same facts in the external world, then why do different observers make different judgements about the moment when one fact changes into a different fact. — RussellA

Because they're seeing different parts.

Suppose our senses are represented by a circle on a plane -- everything inside the circle is our mental-bodily-insides, and the outside surface of the circle is our sensual limit. This is a world defined by shape, line, space, and relative position. As the surface conforms to other geometric shapes we'll get a different description. In fact, one would actually have to be me the same circle to get the exact same description. But because all reality is perspectival, an unfolding surface, that's impossible. I'm tempted to claim that a phenomenological direct realism predicts that we'll see things differently, but that's not right either (because if it were a transcendental phenomenology, it'd be the opposite)

It's kind of hand-wavey, I'll admit. A loose notion of human nature to explain patterns, but I don't think we must be this or that way. The actual limits of social organization with respect to human nature are unknown, I'd say. which is why I think "feasibility" isn't the right way to look at it -- the right way is to look to one another, because that's how social organisms change is through collective action (rather than theorizing about plausible futures). Especially if we're interested in a realistic communism, or some other system that fulfills the good parts of that idea.

Is the claim that human nature is not fixed the same as the claim that there is no human nature at all? — Jamal

For myself, no. If pressed I'll say human nature leans bad, but contingently so. For one, it's not always easy to determine what is good, so there will be bad from ignorance, and for two, the societies that have tended to survive so far are intentionally built upon selfish desires which tends to make people, unsurprisingly, act more selfishly.

I'm a little doubtful of endless flexibility, but surely the evolutionary picture points out how we're not fixed biologically speaking. And the diversity of cultures shows that we're not fixed culturally speaking either. I think of it as loose constraints and tendencies, some of which are pretty heavily embedded.

But, hey, the Kings don't rule the world anymore either.

I'd separate the question of distinguishing direct from indirect realism and making that choice from the problem of consciousness. I'd also set aside perception from consciousness -- face recognition software perceives in a machine way, but I don't believe it is conscious. Similarly the old P-zombies start coming up the moment consciousness is deemed an illusion of some kind.
****
In order to assert anything about consciousness we must be able to access it. If we have an indirect access to whatever that is that is not consciousness, then it seems we have a direct access to consciousness by comparison. In this set up consciousness is a real illusion which is indirectly related to whatever it is that is outside of consciousness, while consciousness itself is direct.

For what is consciousness direct? What is on the other side of conscious experience such that the real illusion is a direct relationship, and the real whatever is outside of the illusion is an indirect relationship?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_in_a_box

That's the highest I went in terms of classes in physics. Very fascinating stuff.

What I found in reflection is that none of the sentences in QM meant something like what I might mean when I'm talking about anything in my life, such as "I went to physical chemistry class today".

Further, QM equations of systems more complicated than hydrogen using this model are not analytically solvable. So there'd be no necessary relation, at least, between these absurdly complicated systems (when we consider them expressed in scientific physical terms) and, say, me walking to physical chemistry class, or my memory of walking to physical chemistry class.

And lastly, absolutely no one really understood all this stuff in their day to day life. So while it's fascinating and reveals unexpected things about reality, it surely can't be the case that it is all there is to reality because we have to grasp reality well enough to have survived this far.

Not so much a refutation as sharing why I am doubtful of scientific realism.

Epicurus' ontology is difficult to puzzle through. The relevant excerpt, I believe:

Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known. And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made. These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess, a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Mostly noting the similarity between bodies and space, and everything is some small one-dimensional entity traveling through a multitude of dimensions (as the pop accounts would have it --I don't claim to understand such stuff)

For Epicurus he thought there were very fine atoms which made the mind -- so the mind was a composite of atoms, which isn't too far off from the mind being a composite of neurons.

Later:

We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of color and form through the medium of the air which is between them and use or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same color and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion; and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnection which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion when a fact awaits confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed or even contradicted following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented—which is the cause of error.

For the presentations which, for example, are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

A fair interpretation of this translation is that Epicurus is a direct realist, in the sense that our perceptions and senses are directly connected to or apprehend real objects outside of the activity of the brain.

Nothing quite like bundles of properties, though, as I understand that. So different than your distinction where there are different properties, or maybe kinds of properties? Like a property-dualism?

I feel pain when I put my hand in the fire. The pain I feel is "in my head". Do you understand this much? Now just replace "feel pain" with "see red" and "put my hand i the fire" with "open my eyes and look in that direction". It's the exact same principle. — Michael

Yes. Different things have different properties. Pain is a type of brain activity, and apples don't have brain activity so don't have properties of pain. Red is a type of brain activity, and apples don't have brain activity so don't have properties of red. — Michael

So the brain has the properties of colour, shape, sounds, and smells.

The apple, insofar that its properties are one of those, is in the brain.

What are the properties of whatever it is that's not in the brain? And how do we ascertain those?

So it's real, but maybe conscious experiences' properties are different from the properties of whatever is outside of our bodies, and whatever is outside of our conscious experience?


That's the antinomy again. I feel I've already given the best account I can of my side, though I can see it's orthogonal to a lot of the concerns you've presented. I'm trying to puzzle through how you make indirect realism coherent.

Just how you avoid what appears to be the problem for indirect realism: perception is indirectly connected to reality. So how does science get directly connected to reality such that the inference that it is indirectly connected isn't self defeating, and doesn't lead one back to direct perception?

OK. So how do you get to the properties of objects outside of the body when shapes, colours, tastes, and smells are properties that are only inside conscious experience, which is restricted to brain activity?

possible (technically), sure, what about realistic/feasible (in light of observations)? You mentioned "not fixed", which might imply diversity, yes? — jorndoe

In my experience feasibility is an assessment from the perspective of the people in charge. But realistically we only need other people which we unite with, so insofar that enough people unite together for something that they want then you can obtain it. The main barrier to communism is how people don't seem to want it. The cultural antibodies are simply too thick at the moment, and we ourselves are too sick for such a beautiful idea.

But given that the world isn't static it doesn't have to stay that way. That's what I mean by not fixed. The way we relate to each other is ultimately up to us.