The first thought I had was justice.

Justice is generally considered good.

And yet justice is not...

...a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers. — god must be atheist

because sometimes justice must deal with rule-breaking. So while it is disadvantageous and unpleasant and unhelpful nor accommodating to punish people for breaking the rules, it's a part of what makes justice just: That the rules are fairly applied, even if inconvenient.

I think most rule-bound notions of justice would go against your definition, insofar that the rules were justified because of their fairness. (of course, rule-bound utilitarianism would go with what you said, it's just stating utility in terms of rules though -- that's not what I mean)

What is fair is not always pleasant. And, truth be told, we waste a lot of money on pursuing justice while failing to attain it, so its advantage is at least questionable. Sometimes it's advantageous to just let things go, fairness be damned. And sometimes it's good to be unhelpful and unaccommodating, such as when a group of people let their grievances be known publicly.


But even more directly, to get at what began the thread -- we can always sensibly ask, no matter what definition you provide, if the definition you provide is a good definition.

So if the good is defined by happiness, we can ask "But is happiness really good?" -- does that question make sense to you?

If we double down and say, yes, happiness really is the good, then the question falls flat.

But if you agree that the question makes sense, rather than it being a tautology, then there must be a distinction between happiness and goodness such that we can ask the question and make sense of it.

...but it wouldn't make sense if it were otherwise... — Banno

I'm not sure about the general case, but in the case of this paper I agree. I think I'm just marking where things are becoming strange for me. At this point I realized I wasn't sure what Kripke really meant by object.

One way in which this makes sense is that he's speaking to people who emphasize predication as how a person picks out an identity, at least explicitly in the talk. So in that way of looking at the logic I think I agree -- certainly every object is necessarily self-identical, insofar that necessity can be quantified over propositions at all.

However, the belief that non-existent objects have properties is at least unintuitive. Not that it's wrong, I'm just not sure what objects are now. Also, there's something funny about applying negative predicates to names, I think, even though logically there's no difference given negation is always a primitive.

... Yeah, just marking things that seem different -- not just to criticize (though maybe at some point), but to figure it out.

In my second re-read right after the molecular motion is heat part. So I'm sort of just thinking out loud here in quoting, I'm not sure if I have a point yet:

So, in this sense, the expression 'the inventor of bifocals' is nonrigid: under certain circumstances one man would have been the inventor of bifocals; under other circumstances, another one would have — pdf, page 10

What do I mean by 'rigid designator'? I mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds — pdf, page 11

...in talking about the notion of a rigid designator, I do not mean to imply that the object referred to has to exist in all possible worlds, that is, that it has to necessarily exist.

!!!

This one has turned all about in my mind.

So the property of necessary self-identity -- even if the object does not exist, the object is necessarily self-identical, that is, self-identical in all possible worlds -- is kind of trippy.

I'm wondering what on earth an object is at this point, other than somehow distinguishable from statements given Kripke's previous distinction.

Well, I think it is. That is, I'm now reading Kripke as suggesting that heat and the sensation of heat are somehow different things. Not too sure about that. — Banno

I'm good with distinguishing the sensation of heat from heat, even if Kripke doesn't. At least, a lot of my hesitation I think comes from knowing enough about heat to say it's a conceptual web that's slippery, if what we're trying to do is philosophy.

So my preferred notion of heat is "that which a thermometer measures". And I'm fine with a certain amount of loose use of "thermometer" (like, thermocouples and mercury thermometers are measuring the same thing).

And, from that, we can specify many ways of talking about heat.

One way is the kinetic theory, which is apt in the case of gasses at particular Pressure-Volume ranges we commonly interact with.

"molecular motion", however, would not pick out the very same atom in all possible worlds. It doesn't refer to any particular atom. It's an aggregate property.

So I suppose I'd have to say -- if molecular motion is a rigid designator, then it's at least picking out an unintuitive object -- a collection of particles that could have been different particles (and yet retained the same aggregate properties, i.e., it could be composed of oxygen atoms that come from Venus and still have the same properties) and yet is the same aggregate in all possible worlds.

Does it? What if the gasses are at thermal equilibrium? Where does energy transfer take place in mixing?

Let's take the air in your room, which is mostly a mixture of nitrogen and oxygen at thermal equilibrium with each other (albeit different concentrations). We know that they almost certainly won't spontaneously separate into regions of all nitrogen and all oxygen (thank God - or entropy - for that!) This spontaneous separation won't happen even if thermal equilibrium is maintained throughout. Indeed, bracketing out energy transfer makes it especially easy to see why spontaneous separation does not happen: the number of combinations corresponding to a state of separation is negligibly small in relation to the number of all possible combinations under the same conditions.

(Gibbs free energy is closely related to entropy, and it will decrease as a result of mixing, just as it does as a result of spontaneous energy transfer.)

Or consider mixing in reverse. You need to do work in order to separate mixed substances, transferring energy into the system - but not the other way around. In this sense, mixing does involve an asymmetric energy transfer. — SophistiCat

Just to make sure we're on the same page here, this is the wiki link to the phenomena I believe we're discussing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enthalpy_of_mixing#:~:text=In%20thermodynamics%2C%20the%20enthalpy%20of,from%20a%20substance%20upon%20mixing.


So when you note that you don't need to do work to mix the substances -- that's what I'm saying is an energy transfer. I'd say that the energy transfer is between the system and the universe. Which is a funny way to really just say a beaker and the lab. So we have a beaker with a barrier between two different gasses, say, and we open up the barrier the mixing takes place within the system, there's a change in enthalpy and entropy -- and because Gibbs is negative it is a spontaneous process. We don't have to input work to have the process occur. But that still means there's a transfer of energy -- the mixed state is an energetically favorable because of the increase in entropy. In the case of gasses mixing you'll note in the equation for Gibbs:

ΔG=ΔH-T*ΔS

Since there is no change in enthalpy with mixing, the only change is in entropy. And since entropy is increasing the gibbs free energy is negative, and hence mixing is a spontaneous process.

Just to make sure we'll hate one another, that last paragraph sounds Hegelian. ;)

But your first paragraph gots me rethinking the paper. Guess I'll have to read it more than one time. Shit! :D

I feel like it's a problem, but then I see the demonstration.

I think I'm tempted by @unenlightened's approach. It's necessary, yet our language of logic is what makes it so more than what is the case. We can say what we like, and define what we like, and while that will change how we talk about things that won't change whatever "stuff" is.

Fair.

Was it a misquote, or an interpretation? I thought it was the latter.

Cheers. — Banno

I realize now I kind of went off on my own tangent in interpreting the whole text, which is different from the intent you've set out. I don't think you mind given the cheers, but I'm just noting it now.

Still reading along with the interpretations, though. Slow lab days these days post holidays :D

That's a nice way to put it. Although there is also such a thing as entropy of mixing, as when two dissimilar gases mix with each other, in which no energy transfer needs to occur. — SophistiCat

Thanks :)

Yeah it gets more complicated. What you're talking about, I think, is Gibbs "free" energy. Energy transfer still occurs, it's just not in the simple terms I set out.

I was mostly hoping to deflate the notion that entropy increase is somehow opposed to natural selection.

In general, I would describe entropy as the tendency of some macro-scale processes to be strongly time-asymmetric. That is, under the same general conditions we will almost never see their spontaneous reversal. Thus, ice cubes will melt at room temperature and never form out of room-temperature water; cream will mix with coffee and never spontaneously separate from it, and so on.

Heh, that's pretty good. But I'd counter the experimental definition. "macro-scale" already says too much, in this notion :D

I like the definitions which relate to the experimental apparatus and observations more than the conceptual ones.

Heh yeah we cross-posted.

Good thread. Got me to try Kripke again.

If I read it right, at least, you're missing the "but that if this were so it would be a different lectern".

So it could be, but then it's not the lectern we're talking about right now.

This might be the first time I've somewhat followed along with Kripke. I've tried him before only to give up.

The molecular theory of heat part of the discussion had me really interested. I don't think I'd say that the case of molecules is the same as the case of the lectern, though, or the sensation of heat. One of the most obvious differences is that "H2O" does not pick out any particular molecule -- that's something that's always interesting to me about chemistry is that it looks at physical systems in aggregate, and if aggregates have names then there are as many aggregates in a sample of water as there are the factorial of molecules (EDIT:I might have that technically wrong -- it's been more than a minute since statistical mechanics, but the factorial of the number of molecules will get you in the ball park of the number of subsets. I can't remember when substitution is and is not allowed), and "H2O" could pick out any one of the groups within. So it doesn't really name any one of the molecules but rather says "of the molecules that are here they are composed of two hydrogen and one oxygen" -- but that, too, is funny because we don't really "see" molecules. If we're defining heat in terms of sensation, then molecules should be the same and what we actually interact with are properties of matter, and molecules are used to explain the properties of matter.

Which is to say, I highly doubt that "molecular movement" is a rigid designator -- same with water and heat and H2O. Not only could it have been otherwise, it's still possible for water to not be H2O. We just happened to build our theories like that and like them this way.

But, that doesn't speak against the general argument, only that particular example (and, I actually wonder, given that particular example -- would the analysis go the same for the mind-body problem as Kripke lays it out?) I just think that particular example is much too complicated -- the lectern example seems to work for me. And, in general, I think there's something to names being rigid designators, and I agree with Kripke that there's no reason to give predicates a priority over names -- that's just putting rigidity on the other side of the predication, so would fall to the same sorts of doubts.

((EDIT: As an afterthought, now -- might be a good example to set out "equiprimordial", but in analytic terms -- seems to have a similar meaning))

Entropy really "clicked" for me when I understood it as nothing but the direction we observe energy to move -- without the 2nd law of thermodynamics, there's no reason why water spills to the ground -- if you reverse the 2nd law, then the water would fall up and into containers.

Calling it "disorder" or "order" is a bit misleading, I think -- or, at least, has the tendency to evoke images that aren't exactly what the law is saying. Really it's just describing the movement (dynamics) of heat (thermo) -- and less archaically, the 2nd law says "heat goes from hotter object to colder object", and hotter object happens to have a relationship to energy, so more technically "energy goes from object with more joules to object with less joules". This is confusing in the water example because there's not really any heat involved, but it's that relationship between temperature and energy that makes it more generally applicable -- we generally observe energy to go from a higher concentration to a lower concentration within the universe. Without Reverse the 2nd law, rather than a heat death we would predict a heat compaction.

And, as already pointed out, life increases the entropy of the universe. So rather than being at odds the theories are actually in harmony.

But it's still just what we observe. I'm pretty leery of cosmological claims because I tend to think of the 2nd law in empirical, experimental terms more than a fundamental law.

Well, at least, I don't know how.

Correlations I think I'd say is Relations. Except maybe with a phenomenological twist. A relation from a certain point of view. At least right now I remember you noting how correlations are central, I think that's how I'd interpret that now. Some actor/thinker has a belief about a relation between two names is equal to an association.

But that doesn't tell me why all these marks we're making mean anything. Meaning feels both ephemeral and shared. You and I count these characters made through our keyboards as English, and are able to communicate because of that. In some way this goes towards @Banno and @Dawnstorm 's points about language being an institution. And I think that the internet makes these features easier to observe. How else could we relate to one another? I still believe I've had the face-to-face encounter on this forum, yet they are both right in noting that we couldn't have that encounter without the institution of English. Well, with my quibble, I might say that we couldn't have that encounter without the institution of philosophy.

Hrm. I'll wait to see, but that might be a good point of difference to jump from.

Only way to find out is at 800 more posts.

I am a strict phenomenologist. (at least I like to joke that way)

I think it's sort of like taking the limit. The more you talk about it the closer you approach the ineffable. At 2k posts we'll be certain to at least glimpse an asymptote.

I don;t have any strong opinion here. I suppose that if alienation is not compatible with the broader notion of institutions, we could re-think alienation. But it's not clear to me that this is needed. — Banno

Cool.

I was saying alienation couldn't be represented in Searle's language of institutions but... more specific to the thread on Searle you pointed out I'm realizing, and therefore absolutely necessary to cover in figuring out ineffabillity ;)

The broader notion I agree with, here:

as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. — Dawnstorm

and here:

the difference between a grunt and an utterance is exactly that the utterance makes use of an institution... it counts as a warning or an admonition or some such. It has a normative role. — Banno

I think I was getting stuck on the nitty gritty within the Searle thread.

Heh, even in seeking disagreement... :D

Though one thing that occurs to me that might still be an object of disagreement is group size.

To me, I'd be inclined to say two people who use a joke twice, or who have noticed whose "spot" it is on the bus, have created an institution, by our understandings provided. It may not be a long lasting or massively significant one, but I'd say it fits.

And I think the Searle thread got me thinking.... there's no way that fits. Plus the part I already mentioned about trying to distinguish the mental from the social in a particular way.

Language itself is an institution (at least in sociology). I'm not sure I remember how Marx used the word, but I doubt modern Marxist sociologist would find the idea that language is an institution surprising. There are many different theories, but as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. When you speak of linguistic institutions above do you mean stuff like dictionaries, linguistics, crossword puzzles...? Or the organisations that make them? — Dawnstorm

I think some of what I replied to @Banno makes this clearer. I'm on board with language being an institution in this very broad rule of thumb you put here. I'm quibbling with Searle's notion, which relates to language because that's how it's situated in the thread.

Yeah, the utterance makes the institution: without the utterance, no language. But, generally, people draw on their expectations of the institution to make those utterances. Chicken-egg situation, at that point. — Dawnstorm

Yeah. But there is no "the" institution, at that point, right? The groups are so many...

Hmmm. I read Searle as claiming that the difference between a grunt and an utterance is exactly that the utterance makes use of an institution... it counts as a warning or an admonition or some such. It has a normative role. — Banno

So far so good on this phrasing. I went through the thread on Searle you linked so I'm sort of responding to all the ideas that were in it at once.

If "institution" is just what counts as according to any group then I'm picking on Searle's account of institution more than I am the notion that language is enacted by a group which counts certain marks as meanings. Separately I also doubt that counting-as must be rule-bound (and, further, I wouldn't say that makes language ineffable, regardless of the status of its rule-boundedness). To that end I was trying to use Marx's notion of alienation as a contrast to Searle's notion of institution as status-functions which arise from we-intentions to show how his notion of we-intentions wouldn't be able to handle alienation, which should count as an institution by this rule of thumb:

There are many different theories, but as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution. — Dawnstorm

So if language is an institution which arises from we-intentions of a group counting marks as meaningful then it seems to me alienation isn't really possible.

That is, there are different positions within a group, and how counting-as works.

Well, I'm not sure what "mental" entails. Do we agree that social intent is not private? "mental" stuff tends to be regarded as private. I would like to avoid seeing, say, buying a pizza as a mental activity. — Banno

Social intent is not private. And if we're talking the private language argument, mental is not private either.

"buying a pizza" is a social activity. I bet, however we count mental, the mental will be involved in some sense, but not in the sense of the ineffable or anything.

Much of my thoughts on the ineffable is how I think people prefer to think of the social in mental terms, and then claim that it is somehow private (and, therefore, cannot be criticized). So there's some of my interest in these distinctions.

That certain noises or marks count as utterances, while others do not, shows that language is institutional. — Banno

I'm not sure.

Just looking at linguistic institutions, it seems to me that all linguistic institutions do the opposite of making certain marks count as utterances. They categorize what happened to work before, but it wasn't the institution that made the utterance, but the other way around. Language pre-dates institutions, after all.

We don't know why certain noises or marks count as utterances.

Far as Searle's account is from Marx, they do agree in that the social is not reducible to the mental. In Searle's analysis we-intent is not reducible to I-intent.

And I think he is correct here.

I agree that I-intent does not reduce to we-intent, but I'm not sure I'm following how Searle escapes the charge of reducing the social to the mental. We-intentions are mental, yeah? And status-functions arise out of we-intentions. So maybe not reducible, but still arises out of -- unless I'm completely misunderstanding.

That's pretty much it. — Banno

Cool.

Language allows us to construct institutional facts; see the thread on Searle I presented earlier. These institutional facts are manifestations of collective intentionality; yet they can appear quite tangible - things such as property or incorporation... or word "meaning".

I think the meaning encoded institutionally is always after the fact. But that doesn't mean the words we use right now don't have meaning.

Language enables, and language is social -- but not institutional. Not even as a status-function derived from we-intentions.

Much of my interest in Searle is his clear case of the social being reducible to the mental, and my desire to make the case that the social is independent of the mental.

I'd say the Marxist account of the social treats the social as a distinct entity that is not reducible to the mental, nor does it arise out of a collective will. A monopoly on violence is closer -- only it'd include liberal democracies within that scope. Rather than collectively enacted rules, the social organism behaves in accord with its own patterns which, in turn, shape individuals to follow rules. A proletarian knows the consequences of falling out of line. This creates the status of alienation which goes directly against we-intentions. The worker has a two-fold identity: the world of rules from the boss that he must dance to, and the knowledge that the rules are just excuses for violence if he doesn't behave.

Knowing the rules like this is simply not a deontic relationship. One follows the rules, in deontology, for the value of the rule itself, because it is what is worthy, and you respect that rule -- and as a freely acting person you choose to obey its strictures.

But workers are not free, in the bosses' language, complete with its deontic promises.

And having a need to be able to express that condition, from time to time -- they don't just break rules, rules aren't even useful. Rules are for bosses and lawyers and people who make a living by parsing written things. Workers aren't trained in that, and so it is to their disadvantage to give into the world of reasons and procedures. Power is at the point of production, and if you can stop that it doesn't matter how you say it. (but note how the very world is different now -- a rule without deontic commitments)

And after the strike, win or lose, the boss won't understand it.

Perhaps, although I don't think so. I agree with much of what you are saying here. — Banno

Heh. Mostly just looking for something that might differentiate us.

We agree that there are rules for language use, and that these rules are regularly broken.

There are two ways of expressing a rule. One way is to set it out explicitly in words. The other is to enact it. Both "stop at the red light" and stopping at the red light express a rule.

Cool. I agree so far.

Well, stating the rule might come after the fact, but it might also come before it, when teaching someone to follow the rule, or when stipulating a new rule - consider the Académie Française. Neither is logically prior to the other. — Banno

Good point. I agree neither is logically prior to the other.

I guess the counter-example would have to be -- a usage that is not state-able in a rule.

That doesn't seem to be possible, to me. We can always append more clauses -- there is no rule limiting how many clauses fit into a sentence, and rules can consist of many sentences on top of that. And even if there was a rule, I would break it :D

We can even invent meanings ex nihilo, so gavagai might fit, or phi, or F of x.

I guess that's the conflict I'm thinking of -- between invented meanings and rules. Is novelty a rule being expressed non-verbally? Is there a difference between meaning and rules at all? I think I was thinking of them as different... but if language is purely a system of grunts for getting things done, then the meaning could "float away".

It just seems a bit too much to me because it seems like words do mean things.

Of course, I might have this all wrong too :D -- but this is where my thoughts are taking me at the moment.

Language is constructed by recursively applying a finite number of rules to a finite vocabulary. — Banno

There might be our difference.

How language is constructed is unknown. The rules come after the fact as explanations for our usage, but even those rules are broken over time -- and whether it's a diversion or an invention I'd posit is more a historical story than a scientific one. Just meaning I'm uncertain that there's a strict functional relationship between some finite set of rules and a vocabulary. Not that we don't follow such rules, we do -- but we also invent things too. Even on the spot. Most vocabulary that's recorded "drifts up" from vernacular, where people invent terms on the spot on the regular.

Yet:

Language consists of units - words and phrases and phonemes and letters- that are re-usable and can be put into novel structures that are nevertheless meaningful. — Banno

That's true.

What I'm not seeing is what this has to do with nonduality. In seeing something as something, it would seem the whole dualistic conditioning of subjects seeing objects, of self and other, is involved. — Janus

I think that's a point under contention :D

As @Banno put it, the subject is a Cartesian hangover which is better gotten rid of. (or, metaphysically, between mental-stuff and physical-stuff) (EDIT: At least, ala this notion that analytic philosophy is anti-dualistic. I still think on it because I think the subject has a way of creeping back up even if dissolved)

The sense-datum theory, as I understand it, is one which is still structured around the subject. A subject doesn't see mountains as mountains (except naively), rather a subject interprets the basics of experience (the sense-datum) which it has learned to call a mountain.

Dissolve the subject, though, and there's not really a place for sense-datum. Or, vice versa, dissolve sense-datum (or the raw experience, or experience as it is, or a film of subjectivity), then what is left of a subject with respect to perception? (since that was the focus of the book)

I mean, it's been a minute since I've read that too, it was just an example that comes to mind of analytic philosophers eschewing dualism, especially of the subject-object variety.

Oh I wouldn't be that harsh on yourself. I was saying, here's the OP! You got there! I found something I could say and respond to in it, at least.

:) Thanks.

One day, I'll be strong enough to do the third reading, where-upon the true and secret meaning I've been seeking will reveal itself to me. :D

I finally realized that if I wanted to go down the route of making sensible claims about what Kant really meant then I'd have to actually become an academic, and I decided against that.

So, a medal? Sure. "The medal of loving the critique of pure reason" :D

It's being made of H₂O is essential to water. — Banno

This is a notion that still mystifies me.

And such a good writer! A lot of philosophy is downright miserable to read- have you ever tried to read Kan't CPR, for instance? As in, reading it cover to cover? Pure torture! :vomit: — busycuttingcrap

:D

I understand what you mean, but I actually love reading Kant. It's not literary at all, so that's why I say I understand. But I sort of enjoy the rhythms of a mind expressing itself in the most explicit manner.

To answer your question directly, and humble-brag, I've read the CPR 2 times :D -- first translation by Norman Kemp Smith, the latter read on Pluhar's

I'm not sure...

But, just generically speaking, OLP includes Sense and Sensibilia -- a book I read some time ago on @Banno's mention, and that seems to be a book about a non-dual awareness that isn't mystical, is non-dualistic, and is both analytic philosophy and OLP.

I see that!

At the very least, that makes sense of his various contradictions, and aphoristic style of speaking, and his stance on truth...

I feel you when you describe your fascination with Nietzsche. Love him or hate him, he can't be ignored. He was an incredibly original thinker that also knew how to think.

But then, on the other hand, there are many other passages where he seems to be advancing an anti-realist critique of these things, often in the same work — busycuttingcrap

This was an insight for me, way back when, upon reading Nietzsche -- he contradicts himself, even in the same work.

Maybe it's wrong, but I interpret those contradictions as purposeful.

If it's a dualism, it's a dualism of views, not of substance. My experience has been that when in a non-dual state of awareness, dualistic views are still comprehensible, but their relativivty, their illusionistic nature, is understood.

I don't claim to have attained non-dual consciousness as a permanent state, but I don't deny the possibility. The permanent state of non-dual awareness would be what Eastern philosophers, Advaita Vedantists and Buddhists refer to as "enlightenment". — Janus

Cool.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "philosophically". From the point of view of AP and OLP non-dual awareness and the realization that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation would presumably not be of much use, because analyses and descriptions are always going to be dualistic in character. From the perspective of, for example, Pierre Hadot's 'philosophy as a way of life', practices aimed at realizing non-dual awareness, since it is an incomparably richer form of life, might be advocated — Janus

I don't think I meant any particular philosophy.

Actually, I'd say one of the things I've been pushing against in this thread is the notion that AP and OLP are necessarily opposed to these notions. I believe that's a false belief. I can see, on the surface, how they seem opposed, but I'd say the "seeming" only covers many cases -- but not all.

Yeh, but to be fair -- I like that about this place. I like that it sits in-between, so I don't feel so bad about exploring odd thoughts or things I know will land me in fallacious positions as I think through them.

It's one of the reasons, when I feel I'm able, I like fielding the re-occurring questions that pop up. I, too, make these mistakes, and so it's something nice to be able to point out to those who are wanting to not make them.

That's a big "if" tho :D

Sure.

"functioning", though, isn't the question being asked. I'm wondering about "after enlightenment".

"in tandem" suggests to me the dualism you're denying, but I suspect you'd say more on that upon questioning since you've expressed anti-dualist sentiments.

This seems to me to be the thought that began this thread:

the propositional character of empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation — Janus

I'm going to go out on a limb and say that @Banno and I agree with that. Or, from what I'm reading in the exchanges, that seems to be something we agree upon, in a rough sense. We'll all get particular down the line in our own ways, but roughly this is right.

So, upon recognition that empirical reality is a dualistic collective representation -- what now? Not in a grand sense, just philosophically.

What happens to words?

“Everything matters” is also a harsh truth. — Mikie

Yup.

Almost like "ultimate meaning" is a ruse.

But when you realize your actions matter -- maybe not on the scale of "everything" -- but matter none-the-less, it's a much harsher truth.

:D

OK, yeh, so maybe (and only maybe) "carry water" was metaphoric.

Given my Marxist bent --

After enlightenment, carry water, chop firewood

You only get the bloody nose if you are stupid, and as I say I've never seen or heard of anyone so stupid. — Janus

Just going to note that "what come's next?" is a question for after the trip, when you have to... well, do the things. work, or whatever it is.

What comes next after realizing the world is not dualistic, and propositions are a collective representation?