@AmadeusD confirmed w/ me that he hopped on early and left some 30 minutes in, and I joined about 30 minutes late and nothing was going on.

I'm down for a retry. The time was fine for me, but if there are other times that work internationally then I'm down for that too -- it was just a first attempt, but not the last.

Pardon an intrusion into a discussion about past philosophers. — jgill

:D

I can't help myself sometimes.

Lots of quoting old dead philosophers…. Which isn’t much of an existential reply if you think about it.

I meant that defining things is nomenclature. It’s a tautology. Including existentialism of course. A polite joke.

It’s just fodder for thought…. Existentialism is notoriously hard to define, at least the definitions and explanations always seem strained even from those brilliant long dead philosophers.

All the old references are Interesting of course but maybe - just maybe - existentialism fits better as a state of mind than anything else. — Metaphyzik

I think there's something to be said for this. Contrary to my impulse to define everything by its history it's not like that history is gone or somehow stopped with the authors I listed. One could be an existentialist and in this sense I think you're right to say it's a state of mind, or a mood, or a temperament -- the unity between existentialists or existentialisms is more along those lines.

Ingmar Bergman comes to mind as a non-philosopher existentialist in The Seventh Seal and Winter Light -- I'm sure he does elsewhere too these are just the ones that came to mind as good examples of existentialism that's not defined by concepts or dead philosophers (though it is a dead film maker :D )

I'm a little late but I hopped on.

I’ve always found the concept of existentialism to be an exercise in nomenclature. Let’s all decide to define something. Welcome to the forum ;). Or should I say to the machine? For all you pink Floyd fans. — Metaphyzik

Existentialism is an activity or state more than a concept, related to a stream of consciousness type of awareness / feeling somehow that is often fleeting - but can endure as a default… until you get too pedantic for even yourself. Forcing a modus operandi is almost always fatal to good humour ;).

When are you abstract and aware? And when are you lost in a pattern? Both are useful pursuits.

Everyone is an existentialist. Sometimes. Else you are only counting half (or so) — Metaphyzik

Given what I said before about N and K, I disagree -- existentialism can certainly be an activity or state, but it's also a concept -- and not less than an activity or a state.

Olive branch: "Everyone is an existentialist sometimes" -- I certainly think activity is important, but it seems to me you're saying "existentialism" is nothing but nomenclature. I'd disagree with that.

Seems to me this is the most existential answer -- you were inspired and made a decision and don't even care if the other interpretations are "more right".

Maybe you could claim to be an existentialist.

I went with "no" because the only existentialist philosopher I know of who could and has made that claim is Sartre, and I tend to think of "existentialism" more as a historical category than a thesis. I'd group Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, and Levinas in the historical category of "existentialism" through their themes, though I agree that there's a difference to be had between Sartre's existentialism and Camus' absurdism, and really between all of them, when we get into the details between them.

Historically I'd group these together in spite of most of them rejecting the label because they are all dealing with individual choice in a world without ethical answers. Each proposes a kind of meta-answer that's not a direct answer as much but a way of reflecting upon how we choose without objective value: Heidegger proposes authenticity, Sartre proposes good faith, Camus proposes heroic pursuit, and Levinas proposes the face-to-face encounter. (at least to put them each into a catch-phrase)

A world without answers: The background proto existentialists I think through are Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. The broadest theme that unites these writers is Nietzsche's notion of the death of God, interpreted as a loss of collective meaning and purpose, which seems very obvious to me that Kierkegaard is struggling with that same question but from a more theological side, with the additional interpretive difficulty of creating characters to speak different viewpoints.



But in spite of all that I'd say I'm influenced by these writers, and often try to think of how to put a softer form of existentialism out there because it often resonates with me, but feels too harsh.

I do not believe that I am directly aware of a distal object. I believe that I am directly aware only of my sensations. Therefore, my perception is not of a distal object and so therefore perception is not direct. — Michael

I'd say that this all well and good, but it's only because we have direct access to reality -- like a direct realist might hold -- that we can distinguish perception from distal object and say true things about them.

On the more continental side: you are not aware of an object beyond the object, an in-itself that holds a secret, but the plane of reality is just as real as the real. "Sensations" is a locution that is only meaningful within a web of some kind -- semantic, historical, phenomenological. The "real" which indirect realists posit cannot be meaningfully posited: it borrows a metaphor from the direct/indirect contrast (a distinction embedded within a world).

Science and metaphysics are different from one another, but they bleed over into one another all the time. The first time I heard of "emergent properties" was in a molecular biology class, not a philosophy lecture. Metaphysics and ontology tend to touch science on the theory side.

So, any book on quantum foundations is going to discuss metaphysical ideas. Any discussion of "what is a species and how do we define it," gets into the same sort of territory. "What is complexity?" and "what is information?" or "is there biological information?" are not uncommon questions for journal articles to focus on. Debates over methods, frequentism in particular, are another area of overlap. This isn't the bread and butter of 101 classes — although in Bio 101 we were asked to write an essay on "what life is?" and consider if viruses or prions were alive, a philosophical question — but it's also not absent from scientific considerations either.

The two seem related in that both inform one another. Physicists have informed opinions re the question of substance versus process based metaphysics for example, or mereological nihilism — i.e., "is the world a collection of things with properties or one thing/process?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I'd say that these are questions within the philosophy of science -- it requires knowledge of both to reasonably perform philosophy of science.

By contrast I think your distinction between two positions is philosophy distinct from science:

we don't want a strange world of nothing but particles arranged x-wise or one undifferentiated process either. We'd like to say cats exist on mats (and just one at one time and place), that lemons are yellow, that rocks have mass and shape, etc. I am just unconvinced that these can be properly be dealt with fully on the nature side of the Nature/Geist distinction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The acceptance of the Nature/Geist distinction is what would be open to philosophical question which wouldn't require knowledge of science in the same way that your first questions which demonstrate where the two disciplines seem to get along or resemble one another.

Likewise, so goes the indirect/direct realist distinction. The direct and the indirect realist can accommodate their position to some accepted scientific body of knowledge; or, they could even make it falsifiable, but then it might just be science at that point.

What I think makes the task difficult in distinguishing these is that knowledge in both can help both, yet I'd still maintain their distinctness -- and that the series of questions you ask shows how the connection between metaphysics and science is at least difficult to trace :).

Cool. I'll join in 2 weeks then when I can.

The general structure I'm coming from is Marxist.

Marx's description of capital points out that there are owners of workplaces and people who work for the owners of workplaces.

I want to, by analogy at least, say this is similar to knowledge of the law.

You can know the law, you can know the previous decisions and know the likelihoods based upon the judge you're talking to. But you cannot know what the judge will say, even if you have a good idea.

I'm thinking from a general description of how economies work -- so of course I cannot say how a particular instance should cache out while being fair. Just like the law this is an understanding of what you can say, what people want, and knowing the likelihoods of being hired or, if you're on the other side, the likelihoods of who gets hired is more in direct control for you, like a judge.

This analogy is the strongest thing I can think of right now.

And, yeah, I was excited that you got a Zoom link! I understand overcommitting :D

I'm not sure I understand you. What is different, Nature versus Mind or science vs a Nature/Mind distinction? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I tend to think of science, at a minimum, as what science textbooks say.

The science textbooks I am familiar with never talk of properties in the abstract like philosophy talks of properties.

As a for instance: there are chemical properties of salt, but these are not the same as "properties of objects" -- it doesn't approach the universality that metaphysics requires because it's mostly a mixture of thorough bookkeeping with attention to detail, but (since it's just done by us) not universal, or even looking for universal relationships.

Metaphysics looks for universal relationships in reality, or at least discusses reality, and as such no matter what metaphysical belief you hold you have to accommodate the science to be credible, at least in our world. If your metaphysics contradicts understood science, it's a hard road to go to justify why anyone ought to believe it.

But if that's so: it seems science and metaphysics must be different from one another, even though I'm uncertain about the universal relationship that makes science differ from metaphysics.

But we don't want a strange world of nothing but particles arranged x-wise or one undifferentiated process either. We'd like to say cats exist on mats (and just one at one time and place), that lemons are yellow, that rocks have mass and shape, etc. I am just unconvinced that these can be properly be dealt with fully on the nature side of the Nature/Geist distinction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think @Banno and I share a suspicion of all metaphysics, though I welcome correction from him if I'm wrong.

I don't think science parses to Nature/Geist or most philosophies at all.

I think they are different, or if not, it's not easy to trace the connections.

This is the first time I've listened to it, so keep posting I say!

I enjoyed listening.

Cuz life is absurd and ought be better.

Tho for another in memory:

Sounds like heaven.

Do you not, then see that this is an aspect of many work environments which still requires the surrounding details to discuss it? — AmadeusD

I do. I think I just have a general structure to think through those specific problems. By analogy I'd say the law and its practice is another structure to think through the problems, though mine is obviously different.
 

I will do my best to engage back - but I expect this can't be done — AmadeusD

Cool. :)

Tonight.... naw. I said enough and have to think. I suspect, of course, that it can be done, but I'm tired now.

In that case I think the sometimes is enough.

As in, we're both weakening our claims ;)

I'm not claiming universality so much as generality. In the sense of "Generally speaking...", which includes, I believe, some amount of subjectivity. In a way it's like saying "In my experience...." to say, look, I understand my beliefs are informed by my experience and I understand that all of our experiences are wildly different.

But if they are the same?

Then it's pretty easy to talk in terms of working conditions, and the term refers to general things. Time-for-Money being a big one. Even the investor spends time looking at his stocks.

laid out some very good points that should generally hold for all workplaces.

More on the descriptive side: I think the social structure of property is what allows us to coherently speak this way.

Because we have individual property rights that are enforced by a state, and because human beings continue to be what they are, some of the general structures that emerge are: some people must sell their time to people who own things. It doesn't even have to be a bad thing -- I certainly believe that capitalism is better than feudalism, and I'd note an important part of Marx is his fascination with capital rather than his opposition.

So, yeh, that's the theoretical background I'm thinking from, but it seems coherent in practice too -- at least in my experiences. (we need not convince one another here). At a very general level people who own workplaces would like, based on self-interest, for people they pay to produce more value than they pay them for, and people who sell their labor because they have to would generally prefer to work less for more reward. That's just human nature.

heh me either I just felt compelled to add my bit while admitting it's not the old debate.

Cool. "Quantity" is the part that seems hard for me to put into logic, though you can always substitute the empirical ranges known for various properties. It might end up being a 5 or more part predicate, thinking about MSD sheets I've seen and how identity is established in practice.

That's very clear.

I see enough generalities that I think the discussion holds together -- we work for money, we want more money and rewarding work in various ways, the establishment of individual property adjudicated by states and courts gives a general social structure -- between a worker and a peasant, as I alluded to earlier, I'd say there's not much to compare.

But it seems our disagreement is whether one can speak in general about "working conditions" at all, which I clearly think we can.

Makes sense. Though I'm wondering about notions of environment here. "Hydrophobic" and "hydrophillic" relate to general structures of molecules, however those structures change at different Pressure-Volumes: tap water dissolves more salt when it is boiling, for instance, than when it is ice-water.

Does the language of properties map at all to scientific discourse? Would a three-part predicate cover the variability of salt concentration with respect to pressure-temperature? (and what of the other things we may measure?)

EDIT: Tho this is more phil-o-sci than a comment on in/direct realism.

Hmm... Not in this discussion, no, as it violates the premise being asked about (though, i do intuit that this is by way of the OP being very imprecise in its aim). "the work environment" imports nothing to be discussed, ethically. You have to import some detail to get anywhere. You're basically not disagree with me, but still arguing that my position is off.

Can you just directly address why you think the abstract concept of 'work environment' without any indication of detail is apt for ethical discussion (and this, specifically in opposition to "a work environment, X")? — AmadeusD

Does "the work environment" import no detail?

I think it's apt for ethical discussion probably because of my own personal history, of course. It seems to me that there are some environments which are better or worse than others, which means there's an evaluative element, which means -- well, if not ethics, at least aesthetics. Value theory.

You are leapfrogging over the discussion into one which I am not having. Though, I have very, VERY clearly stated that once there are details(i.e an example of), that discussion is apt and important. — AmadeusD

Cool.

My guess, here, is that we're just beginning from such philosophically different places that we're talking past one another.

This could be said, and It would be hard to argue against, but there are millions of examples within capitalism where this is not the exchange. Exploitative trade is very much a thing (and imo, a good thing) which doesn't involve any direct relationship with value per se, and instead, value per individual. — AmadeusD

heh. I'm happy to have earned "hard to argue against" :)

Though surely you can recognize that labour-time is appropriate to bring up in a discussion about work environment, in spite of counter-examples?

There is no universal relationship between employer and employee beyond the "fact of" (which doesn't, on it's face, involve any interaction or disposition at all) — AmadeusD

The relationship between employer and employee has no relationship beyond the fact that they have a relationship, and yet that relationship doesn't involve any interaction or disposition -- ever?

I give time for money. Unless you're talking something like feudalism or before then I think it holds: under capital it's a time-for-money system. That structure is what makes "working conditions" coherent.

Surely you're not going to claim to have no knowledge of what people who are employees want? "Less work for more money" sounds like a good reasonable guess to me.

Hah! OK maybe you'd like it!

If you ever get to chance pineapple, I recommend it with spicey things -- my favorite way to have the "forbidden" fruit is with pepperoni and jalapenos. The sweet-acid adds just the rights amount of counter-balancing flavor for me.

I don't like BBQ cuz it's too sweet for bread-cheese, for me -- no matter how much meat is there. If I'm hungry of course I'll eat what's presented, but it's just not what I'm looking for in the combo. (though many of my loved ones like it)

I think I'm fine with a "whose-who" -- cuz I think of art as a collaborative process between at a minimum an artist and an audience (at least 1 person in each category).

I don't think it's Public Relations, though, because it's more like Peer Review -- at least as I imagine it, though of course you can't be held to the standards of my unexpressed imagination. While I know there are counter-examples to this categorical definition of art, I think the notion that there is a creator-audience manages to capture a lot of the examples we'd consider up front.

I think the "institutional" theory serves more as a demarcation of examples than a description -- but I'm trying to extend it from the usual notion of "institutions" to something a bit more anarchic, but still reasonable. (at least I hope)

Pizza - anything from Margherita, to seafood - clam, scallops, shrimp, to goat cheese sun dried tomatoes and asparagus, to chicken tikka masala, to apple — Fooloso4

Sounds like you'd accept pineapple, on some occasions.

White pizza too, I think.

But have you tried Barbecue Pizza?

(to be clear, this is an abomination to me that many people i know love lol)

I prefer Nelson Goodman's suggestion that instead of defining what is art we look at when something is art. — jkop

Re-reading this, I'm not so sure we're off there -- the debate gets shifted to "which institutions?", in a way, although I'm clear at this point, I think, that I'm open to many institutions (some of which I'd classify as "paradigmatic")

My initial guess has something to do with an audience and an artist. "artworld" can sound all-encompassing, but I prefer to think there are artworlds. Ones that dissipate and form and are momentary, but I think they count as art at least.

So that's why I disagree it's an HR theory -- depends on what we mean by "institution" I think, though I'll give preference to institutions for paradigmatic examples, which are also important -- just not categorical.

I disagree!

For instance, I'd say that a person sharing a personal poem at a local poetry reading that won't go anywhere is art.

Your first attempt looks plastic enough that I could make it work somehow. — Moliere

Let's try applying the pragmatic maxim. A short version of it suggests we consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive art in this case to have. Our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of "art."

The "practical effects" art has must be its effects on us, or what takes place when we interact with a work of art--the result of what we see, hear, read etc. when experiencing it. So, art evokes feelings; it doesn't explain or analyze existence, or reality, or knowledge, or indeed anything and isn't intended to do so. As part of its evocation, it may lead to insights about ourselves or the rest of the world, but that isn't its purpose. It's not philosophy, in other words. — Ciceronianus

Found and browsed How to Make Our Ideas Clear -- there's a lot there so I've only skimmed at this point.

We agree that art and philosophy are not the same.

I think I'd push against the notion that art shows and philosophy says, though -- I think both the artist and the philosopher show themselves in their activity, whatever that happens to be.

(EDIT: To be clear -- the say/show distinction was the first distinction I thought of as a possible difference and then decided against it for various examples I thought of)

Cool, then I don't have a ready-made response in that case. :D Your first attempt looks plastic enough that I could make it work somehow.

It's tough to get a grapple on the differences between art and philosophy because both are so large that a comparison/contrast is difficult, and there are some crossovers we can point to, but I think I'm still inclined to say there's a difference.

Are they the kind of questions Wittgenstein spoke of, regarding which we must, or should, be silent? — Ciceronianus

I don't think silence is needed, I just think it's a hard question to answer. I've read a little bit of aesthetics before, but didn't decide much. I'm pretty sure art cannot be defined, but I still think there's room for a philosophy of art.

Another way to think about what art is is its place within an institution. Objects become art through the artworld participating and dubbing them so. Then philosophy of art would be that branch dealing with how we conceptualize art and classify it, but only after art has been dubbed by the artworld for consideration (while recognizing that one of the roles within the artworld, that of artist, is to bring in new works of art)

Now I'm inclined to think of this institutional theory of art as in opposition to theories of art which rely upon defining art by our feelings, at least, but I can't say I'm certain you do -- you're attempting to apply the pragmatic principle in defining art, and then offering "feelings" as a possible effect, but would still include institutional acts and effects?

More directly:

Art is not definable, because it's creative

Even so -- there is at least a possibility, to my mind, that philosophy can be art, and vice-versa.

Camus and Sartre seem like good examples here.

Hah. Yes.

Weird that freedom is opposed in the face of property. I'm hoping my kiddos get better than I.

Oh, sure. Just casually ask the hardest questions there are in philosophy. Why not? ;)

I think Plato counts as art, though, given its dialogic form. That's exactly what makes it timeless -- it can be seen from many angles.

Looks good!

"Hedging" on whether the work environment is subject to ethical scrutiny, is what I was thinking -- that the environment can't be judged on ethics, but the person in the environment is ethically informed. It seems backwards to me to not judge an environment on ethical grounds but to hold a person to ethical standards regardless of the environment. That's surely an important part too?

The fact is the concept presented for discussion differs from case-to-case-to-case in such wildly intense degrees that this is not a coherent concept in and of itself. Not really apt to be discussed other than....

Giving up your biases and personal desires/offenses in response to OP seems to me the exact opposite of what would be helpful to the poster. — AmadeusD

I'm not so sure. There's a structure that holds between jobs: the employer and the employee exchange time for money, and people often want similar things out a job. The specifics, mind, can't be ironed out in the clouds -- but the generalities hold, and they hold in such a way that makes organizing a tried and true method of improving working conditions.

It's the organization that's similar between jobs that make "working conditions" coherent.

1st/2nd/3rd is how the US splits it up, at least colloquially -- since there are also 12-hour, and even more, shifts. Divide 24 by 3 and you have three 8-hour shifts, but they vary quite a bit.

I've learned the shifts I can do and can't do. I'm no night owl.

Those are the sorts of things I like to discuss. Hopefully I haven't poisoned the well too much.

I prioritize money, then insurance (as an USsian), then city, then shift. But I would like a world where these things aren't "individual choices" in light of clear institutional power. (that is, I'm something of a socialist)