Can you cite your source? — Leontiskos
I'm not sure I understand you. What is different, Nature versus Mind or science vs a Nature/Mind distinction? — Count Timothy von Icarus
See A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour and primitivism. Plenty of people thought – and probably still do, particularly if they are not taught science – that fire engines are red in the dark and that the presence of light simply "reveals" that colour. — Michael
What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin
What seems confused to me is this strange instance that seeing is this primordial thing, resistant to all analysis, such that "I think we see what the objects are" is somehow remotely adequate. Never mind what we actually understand about perception, that is
scientism
— Leontiskos — hypericin
Perhaps you could explain how to properly interpret the parts in bold.
Under any ordinary reading, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" the photo. The photo is just a photosensitive surface that has chemically reacted to light.
And by the same token, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience is just a mental phenomenon elicited in response to signals sent by the body's sense receptors.
So given the above account of direct/naive realism, direct/naive realism is false. — Michael
I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul
I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA
I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green"... — RussellA
..."I am conscious of tasting something bitter"...
..."I am conscious of an acrid smell"...
..."I am conscious of a sharp pain"...
..."I am conscious of hearing a grating noise"...
...Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing.
I wrote that I can never know what someone else is thinking. However, sometimes I can guess. Though, I can never know whether my guess is correct or not. — RussellA
You look at the world. Do you see a mkondo?
You obviously cannot know whether you are seeing a mkondo or not until you know the meaning of "mkondo".
IE, you have to know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" before knowing whether you can see trees lining the banks. — RussellA
You can only know that you are looking a a mkondo in the world if you already know the meaning of "mkondo". It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "mkondo" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this mkondo wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon the elementary particles and elementary forces that do exist in space-time.
So what are we perceiving?
On the one hand we are perceiving a set of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, meaning that we are directly perceiving the world as it is, and on the other hand we are also perceiving a mental concept, meaning that we are also indirectly perceiving the world as we think it is.
Perception needs both aspects, something in the world and something in the mind. — RussellA
In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is. — RussellA
Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.
— creativesoul
Exactly, it is a question of linguistics. — RussellA
The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate. — Michael
there is ample evidence of perception and thinking being entangled. — wonderer1
Good. I was going to lump you with Michael, so I'm glad you agree. — Leontiskos
<Machines make inferences from sense data; humans are like machines; therefore humans make inferences from sense data> — Leontiskos
Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position? — Leontiskos
Well, if you plop a child down in front of a Disney movie, do they require special skills of interpretation and inference to enter into the story? — Leontiskos
A word is a sound, and so without the sound there is no word, but it does not follow that (conscious) interpretation or inference is occurring. It is the same, I say, for images and other sensory inputs. — Leontiskos
Okay, and so it is not a window, but is instead a set of data that, if interpreted correctly, can lead to knowledge of the real? — Leontiskos
Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position? — Leontiskos
That it is the position prior to actually thinking about the subject, I agree. — hypericin
The idea is that there is some alternative vantage point which is more fundamental than phenomenal experience, and which makes inferences based on the phenomenal experience. Of course there are ways in which reason can (and does) correct for perceptual distortions, but I don't find the schizophrenic separation that accompanies indirect realism tenable. — Leontiskos
We are indeed not aware of the bulk of the inference and interpretation we do. But that doesn't mean it's not happening. — hypericin
You tend to do these oblique attacks instead of swapping argument for argument. I'd rather you set out why indirect realism is necessarily dualist (property dualism? substance dualism?) rather than imply it as a concern. Maybe it's just a difference in style.
Both hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism — Leontiskos
If "direct knowledge" is aphenomenal knowledge, it wouldn't seem to make sense as a concept. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So, humoncular regress concerns aside, — Count Timothy von Icarus
If brains and sense organs perceive, and they are part of the world, wherein lies the separation that makes the relationship between brains and the world indirect? — Count Timothy von Icarus
If knowledge only exists phenomenally, calling phenomenal knowledge indirect would be like saying we only experience indirect pain, — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?..............I'd like to read your answer to the question above — creativesoul
Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right. — creativesoul
You need not know that your belief is true in that case in order for it to be so. — creativesoul
A capable creature need not know that they're seeing a Cypress tree in order to see one......................I'm making the point that to see the green apple as "a green apple" requires language use, whereas seeing the green apple does not. — creativesoul
We do not perceive mental concepts. — creativesoul
That looks like special pleading for elementary particles. What makes them different from Cypress trees? — creativesoul
in agreement on direct perception — creativesoul
We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept. — RussellA
So, humoncular regress concerns aside, I think there is a more general concern that the "indirect" term is smuggling dualism in.
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