Sure, but it's a socioeconomic theory that does not merely not require God, but one which cannot tolerate God, since "religion is the opiate of the masses", and the masses must be awakened from their slumber. — Janus

See, this is why I wanted to mention Liberation Theology.

I grant that orthodox Marxism, which I think Marxism-Leninism is the canonical case of (with an incredible amount of records to boot), is atheistic. But I want people to know there really are other variants.

While there's certainly a kind of architectonic to Marxism, the commitment to science has actually managed to make developments in its theories. Mostly as adapted to localities.

Yeah, fair.

I'm pretty sure we're all confused at the moment. :D

I'm guessing we're using general terms in close enough ways that there's a sense of sense, but different ways that there is confusion.

Heh. OK. I am using "Marxism" broadly. Same with "atheism" with respect to states.

Maybe it's the assertion that I'm OK with, but a causal link I'm not? But I'd probably assert that with both -- a/theism.

Communism, for example, is not an iteration of atheism in the way e.g. Judaism is an iteration of theism. — Baden

True...

But I think I'd say this has more to do with the way we use words. I think the implicit claim, at least, is that since there have never been atheist wars atheism seems a lot more respectable in that way, at least. However, given some iterations of the Marxist project (I'll parenthetically mention Liberation Theology, with special mention to the Latin American variety) -- while I understand that most atheists of the New Atheist variety (like me, and others, at least in a time-bound category sense, if not ideologically) are very much opposed to that and are motivated by calls for religious freedom, I think it's still worth noting if we're making claims about atheism and theism in the broad sense -- atheism won't shield someone from declaring war. Hitchens, in particular, with his statements on Muslims, came to mind for me as an example of New Atheists not being quite tolerant.

I'd say the atheist countries count as atheist countries. So, in a broad sense, I agree with @Hanover

The New Atheists had people in them who were just as eager to punish believers, too.

I have no doubts that atheists can be as faulty as theists. I think it's human.

With respect to neoliberalism -- I can see the connection between economic policy and gun sales, but in addition to Heller (though that certainly could have been a place where gun sales to citizens were lowered, certainly, so it's important to note) I'd cite Citizen's United as a turning point supreme court decision which really opened the political field to the forces of capital, turning what semblance of a democracy that was there into a government for sale.

After Heller, my grim but true estimation of removing various kinds of weapons from the general population would take overturning the second amendment, at this point, and that would take democratic action -- but given how flush the NRA is, it's not a small amount of activity. And I'm not sure you could even get enough people on board with the demand, which is the real reason no one brings it up. It doesn't seem like a feasible political goal.

Or does it only become an issue, if the ritual impacts upon other's lives in some way? — Tom Storm

After attempting to express a place for the atheist, I'm now tempted to preach for Epicurus.

Those who think god's favour is dependent on our actions will have quite different attitudes towards what we ought do, to those who suppose god uninvolved. — Banno

I think that's the extent to which I care. As the tetrapharmakos says:

‘God holds no fears, death no worries. Good is easily attainable, evil easily endurable.’

As you might imagine of a script that's been copied from the ancient world, there's more than one way to think about this. ;)

One way to interpret the first part (God holds no fears) is that there are no magical forces which will make your physical life better upon acting in a certain moral way. The Gods, which I'd say Epicurus seemed to believe existed, are Gods precisely because they are already perfectly happy and self-contained.

Eek. Still a relevant political phrase, that one, and by thems who really love God's Great Country.

Hrmm.. I'm not so sure about this. Unless I get a raise I guess. That seems like the sort of thing the profeist pope would say: "I did it for the money!"

Being team disappointment, I suppose I could take on the profeist role.

Good stuff. I'm particularly intrigued with where you end -- but I'm having a hard time digging in.

I think I'm attracted to apatheism because it has this "third way" quality -- and around here, where having a blessed day is just a way to say goodbye to an absolute stranger, it strikes people as not quite as aggressive (but, when you think about it, it's almost more aggressive -- because the relevancy of the belief decreases)


I generally think that family life is the economic component of religious life. It's the economy of the home, or perhaps, a community which puts the economy of the home and its continuation as central to its purposes. (But note this is very much a reflection of my background, too -- family life is usually what's emphasized in Morman culture, but there's enough similarity between faith communities I tend to see this same pattern, even though I'm sure there are actual differences)

Family structures and how they work together as a communal unit is where my first guess would take me. (which would also explain why sexuality is so often central to religious communities -- since the family is produced sexually, sexual mores would have to be dealt with in any way of life constructed around the perpetuation of a community of families)

But, even more so, I think this is why I like philosophy so much, at least in part. It allows our minds to breathe more than the cultural categories tend to. Maybe a/theism without historical baggage just is philosophy of a certain (non-academic) kind.

One of the oversights of common-sense atheists is that they reject the existence of the transcendental on the basis of a lack of evidence, and yet they tend not to consider the semantic possibility that the very meaning of transcendental concepts refers to the world. For isn't the psychology and behaviour of a Christian preacher fully accounted for by the physical causes of his behaviour? In which case, what so-called 'claims' asserted by the preacher should the atheist be sceptical about? — sime

This line of interpretation is always super interesting to me. It reminds me of Hegel.

I think I'd say that the atheist is skeptical about all of the claims of the preacher, or at least the important ones. Atheism is a more universal doubt than a particular doubt -- not the single claim by the preacher, but everything the preacher preaches is false. That's because the doubt is with respect to the justification of the whole way of life -- even in material terms, if God is the community's way of making it all hang together, atheism is the expression that none of it hangs together. The community is wrong.

Which means that it's partially defined by the rejection -- atheism is the I-am-not-that. For some that's a very boring proposition, because they've never been that. Their parents were atheists, and they are atheists, and all these debates seem like an inconsequential circus of thought. It's not their own community which is wrong, it's the other people's community which is wrong and they are arguing over nothing at all, like astrologists arguing over what it truly means to be a Cancer.

But for others it's different.

So Socrates, one might say, is the basis for philosophical reflection as an actualization of the process by which we can attain divine knowledge -- if I'm reading you right.

The first thing that comes to mind for me is that while no two sticks are equal to one another, they are equal to themselves. So Socrates is equal to Socrates -- the actualization of the relationship of equality is that relationship which any individual has with itself.

However, it's true that self-relationship is a kind of funny thought -- and you can see how this is an added layer of interpretation on top of an individual, so you can see why there's confusion here: how to account for relationship in an ontological manner seems like the question buried in the argument.

Oh, no.

They aren't materialistic.

It's their spirituality which grants them the right to their bounty.

So, for instance, atheism -- at least as a term -- is significant to me because it explains a difference between how I was raised, and how I am. It's the transition itself which brings meaning to the term.

More and more I'm more attracted to the label apatheist. @Postmodern Beatnik introduced me to the term and it took a minute but now I like it. @Ciceronianus In God's Great Country, as you put it, it has a stronger connotation than one might suspect up front.

But it only has appeal because I think the a/theist terms "make sense" in certain parts of God's Great Country.

People do change teams. — Tom Storm

That was the phenomena I was trying to think of how best to put.

I kept getting stuck on possible uses of arguments for different teams, but I think the phenomena of people switching sides explains a lot of these terms.

I read them! Your interpretations of Plato are always a joy to read, because of your clear depth of knowledge.

I'm not on a crusade to convince you because as I said, the standard neutral view of events says union demands were a factor in the stagflation of the 1970s. — frank

Probably a discussion for another thread at least. I don't mind simply drawing lines or marking positions. From my background what you said just seemed so far out that I didn't even know how to respond, so that's why I was expressing incredulity.

The reason it relates to the topic is that this was the gate through which neoliberal ideas gained broad consent. — frank

Cool.

I'm fine with simply granting the point having expressed my thoughts.

So neoliberal ideas came to power through the consent of various parties, and the parties worth mentioning involved were states, corporations, and unions.

Do I have your thought right?

Cool. Thank you.

I'm hesitant @frank -- the language in those paragraphs is very market-centric. The forces of the market, while I don't deny them (just in an Econ 101 way), aren't as necessity-bound as this seems to indicate (at least, in my estimation -- opportunity-cost and the problem of scarcity are concepts for the economists debating more than politicians). I generally look at the economy more in terms of history, which I've already said some things on.

Unions have an influence on wages, sure, but their influence is limited to a particular contract within a particular firm. At the larger level, like the AFL-CIO, they can exert influence to a degree relative to their financials, just like any organization, but they aren't setting a price for labor at that point. The negotiations for wages have influence across a market, of course, but that's not the same as the picture in the above, in my opinion at least.

A union's function, at the most basic legal level, is to push for it's member's interests because it's the only way workers can even hope to wield influence at the same level as their bosses and the owners of capital. If it doesn't do that, it's basically false advertising, in terms of a firm.

It doesn't have the level of influence which is being attributed -- it has more influence than thems who own the world would like, but less influence than thems who own the world.

At least, these are just the thoughts that come to me.

There was a war on unionization during the Reagan years culminating in the air traffic controllers incident. Are you familiar with that? — frank

Yes.

A corollary of my understanding of history is that the best way to learn history is to keep track of what is said, who said it, and generally see where they are coming from without giving fully into thinking they have the way, the truth, and True true History with a capital H.

Which is a fancy way of saying "read what the other guys like to say"

Asking whose analysis it is isn't calling bullshit on you -- it's just a question, an inquiry to see more.

You could say it's your analysis, and I'd be fine with that, and you could say it's Hayek's analysis, and that's good by me -- but my understanding of history is that it is nothing other than emotional narratives. One needs a reason to tell a story, and even if that reason is "tell the most honest version of what happened given the documents we have" the way the narrative is crafted is dependent upon a theory about how things work, hang together, make sense, or even simply leads coherently enough from one event to another.

There is no neutral place to tell a historical story from, a "way things were exactly as they are". Rather, we have a theory about history which guides our inquiry, such as you positing that the most important things to focus upon are agendas, culture, scene, and the time between these general things.

As such, who tells the story is just as important as the story being told.

A standard analysis by whom?

***
"Unions", for instance, isn't as specific as the AFL-CIO. And even supposing this big picture story is a true story -- why on earth would I lament unions who'd fight downsizing the workforce, or for an increase in wages?

This, to me, looks like that big picture technocratic view that's very popular -- one might even go so far as to say it has a faith in necessity -- but ultimately false. It gives a view of the economy that it is a massive time-bound wealth-machine which, as you tweak it and make it more efficient, so the wealth-machine spins out and raises all ships, even if they be unequal.

But I think this takes the political out of the economic -- the sort of things technocrats and policy wizards like because it professionalizes these decisions, makes them a skill which, itself, fits within the great wealth-machine.
***

If you're interested in labor unions, it's really worth looking at how powerful unions helped set the stage for the Neoliberal take over. It's a lesson in what not to do. — frank

What?

Where is this line of thinking coming from?

The AFL-CIO made way for neoliberalism, how?

Heh. Well, I'll note that I'm also OK with just having different views. You certainly don't need to accommodate my thoughts, I'm only voicing them. Mere thoughts, and all that.

Of course, it’s abhorrent, but it is still a niche below nailing dogs to boards and flaying them alive while saying their cries of agony are like squeaky wheels. I’m beginning to think that it’s an Internet myth. — Wayfarer

I agree, totally different actions.

I wouldn't be surprised if the people inspired by Descartes did something along those lines. (though that's not the same as demonstration, either -- something about knowledge. it's hard to obtain sometimes!)

I'm thinking it's a mixture of things, which is why the details start to matter. I can perceive a through-line of coherency from what Descartes said about animals to how we treat animals now. I'm questioning the specifics, but I'll still say that it makes sense, even if we grant Descartes believing in animal pain. (as I noted -- isn't it actually worse if he believed animals have their own kind of pain, but thought because it's not human pain it's not morally worthwhile? Not named dogs with a relationship, but just "animals", as one might say). I think the thing I've been digging at more is how the choice of Descartes is somewhat arbitrary for the question at hand, and is probably chosen because the thought is that modernity is the cause of our treatment of animals, whereas I'm contending that our treatment of animals has more to do with a deeper history of how we've always treated animals. (trying to take a descriptive approach, here -- not taking a side as much as describing ethical commitments and actions)

Like removing a band-aid, or receiving a shot...

I like your description of this trick -- attachment is as easily removed as it is attached. But that "easy" sometimes, for whatever reason, is harder than it is.

I think for me the vivisection example is still enough. That takes one hell of a disconnect from animal suffering to be able to rationally do or observe or some such. I mean, I can see what you're saying in that at least it's for knowledge rather than just some sick display, but eh. I can see the coherency well enough to say there's a possible danger there from philosophy to activity, but it'd depend upon the interpretation.

Unfortunately, the Wiley article was pay-walled for me. Gone are my days from always being able to access anything.

Cudworth is the kind of example I'm looking for, but I'm a bit skeptical about the trace from Descartes to us still. For instance, the article on Cudworth ends on:

Cudworth’s ideas were far more subversive in his time than they might seem to us today. In his intellectual biography of Cudworth, the late John Passmore noted that Cudworth’s philosophy was “regarded with suspicion, as atheistic in tendency” because “he blurred the sharp distinction, on which Descartes insisted, between the human mind and every other sort of natural entity” (Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation, 1951).

So while there were people other than Descartes at the time who'd disagree with his animal experiments -- the people I imagined before who I figured probably agreed with me in spite of the spirit of the times -- it doesn't seem like it was Descartes' philosophy, to me, as much as the influence of the church which made his ideas unpopular.

This isn't a small thing to consider. One of the reasons Descartes may be cited isn't because he gave people permission to do what they wanted, but because he wrote them for other people. If it wasn't Descates that gave them an excuse, it may have been someone else after all. As you note, we have the capacity for both kindness and cruelty.

So I think I'd maintain that while I see the coherency between Cartesian philosophy and our present way of treating animals as a resource (even our pets are just resources for our joy, and have owners), but still maintaining some skepticism with respect to the causal claim.

I think that's part of it, but also I think we can change. In a lot of ways I think we continue to treat animals as a resource more out of historical momentum of doing so. (plus, now that there's a whole industry around meat-production, the usual motives against change are at play)

During the Enlightenment, some scholars were beginning to doubt the divine right of man and the dumb bestiality of beasts. — Vera Mont

This is the part I want more details on. Rather than some scholars, or rather than a most vigorous set of debates held within a 100 year period, I was curious if there's a more direct connection between Cartesian philosophy, including those following along in his path (rather than just the man alone, but actual instances of his philosophy), and these scholars who were beginning to doubt and were then either suppressed by the popularity of Cartesian philosophy or convinced by it.

That paper you shared @Mww is doing something similar to the blog post that I'm trying to highlight. It begins with a clear explication of an interpretation of a prominent philosopher's view, and then moves over to a clear set of examples which fit with the explication.

What this demonstrates is coherency, though, and not historical cause, or even a trace.

For instance, prior to Descartes we also used animals as a resource. As has been pointed out, the Christian worldview from which Descartes was building his philosophy already allowed the mistreatment of animals, at least by our sensibilities (which, I'd note, are far from universal even today) informed by the notion that them feeling pain -- even if it is their own kind of pain rather than human pain -- is enough to warrant them as having moral worth, or are worthy of moral consideration.

Not only that, given that Descartes is being used here as an example of a philosophy that denies pain to animals (though it looks like there's scholarly controversy there, so who knows, we're not in a good position to judge), and we here believe that animals feel pain, and yet we also treat animals as a resource, it's even more unclear that Descartes philosophy is the reason we treat animals the way we do.

Which isn't to say it cannot be demonstrated. There's definitely a coherency there I can see. So, in some way we might say that this is the thought-component which happens to live on for awhile to justify treating animals as resources (to varying degrees, of course, but that general principle still holds) -- but I'm thinking it's not Descartes philosophy as much as a much longer historical practice.

I forgot to add the link before posting, but have since edited it. Here it is on a first post.

I was lucky enough to find a translation of the letter on the internet.

You object that sometimes even in a heart that has been taken from the body and dissected, individual parts of it go on beating although no blood is flowing into or out of it. Well, I once made a rather careful observation of this phenomenon in fish, whose hearts after removal from the body go on beating for much longer than the heart of any terrestrial animal. But I could always judge—and in many cases I could see—that some remaining drops of blood had fallen from higher up into the lower part where the pulse was occurring. — Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638

How could Descartes see the heart of terrestrial animals beating after removing them from the body other than vivisection?

Cool find. I've never read the objections before. Thanks for posting.
***

Following the Descartes SEP article embedded within the blog I pulled the following quote:

In mechanizing the concept of living thing, Descartes did not deny the distinction between living and nonliving, but he did redraw the line between ensouled and unensouled beings. In his view, among earthly beings only humans have souls. He thus equated soul with mind: souls account for intellection and volition, including conscious sensory experiences, conscious experience of images, and consciously experienced memories. Descartes regarded nonhuman animals as machines, devoid of mind and consciousness, and hence lacking in sentience. (Although Descartes' followers understood him to have denied all feeling to animals, some recent scholars question this interpretation; on this controversy, see Cottingham 1998 and Hatfield 2008.) . . . — SEP

I think that the parenthetical comment supports @Vera Mont 's and the blogs contention, and I'm curious how those scholars square away their belief with the already quoted portion of the SEP article on Animal Consciousness, part 3:

Although the roots of careful observation and experimentation of the natural world go back to ancient times, study of animal behavior remained largely anecdotal until long after the scientific revolution. Animals were, of course, widely used in pursuit of answers to anatomical, physiological, and embryological questions. Vivisection was carried out by such ancient luminaries as Galen and there was a resurgence of the practice in early modern times (Bertoloni Meli 2012). Descartes himself practiced and advocated vivisection (Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638), and wrote in correspondence that the mechanical understanding of animals absolved people of any guilt for killing and eating animals.

Rarely do we get such a clear cut relationship in a historical document of a person's thought directly advocating something so pertinent to the question at hand. How can you rationally advocate vivisection while believing animals feel pain? (If he believes they feel pain, isn't that even worse?)

**

One thing I'd push back a bit on, though, is that social structures don't need philosophical justification. Treating animals as a resource is something we still do, even if we now recognize that it's wrong to cause unnecessary suffering. Something I'd like to see is the connection between Cartesian philosophy and how we still treat animals. Many people will acknowledge that animals feel pain these days, so it's not obvious that Descartes philosophy is connected to how we treat animals even though there are some Christian traditionalists still about. At least, not as obvious as the above connection that I'm in support of -- at least as I see it.



I don't think anyone has said we should cancel Descartes, only that people feel different about the man. And I'd concur -- I didn't realize until doing this dive that Descartes practiced vivisection. I'd guess that the people of the day who didn't agree with vivisections would agree with me, but who knows. I have no problem judging the people of the past in accord with my ethics -- but certainly, I believe in reading one who is not only influential, and so you can begin to draw traces from his thinking to now (I'm more noting that it's going to take some work), but also an incredibly intelligent mind.

But in cases of judgment on the ethos of a man and his philosophy -- I think actions taken counts as are an important part of the judgment.

That's cool. Feel free to comment along.

I've read a lot of Marx, including Capital v 1, but never the Grundrisse -- it wasn't exactly on my list, but I'm easily nudged ;). Plus the whole free course to keep me on schedule is nice.

Well, the person who told me about it bought me a hard copy of the book, officially guilt tripping me into committing. :D (honestly was probably going to do it anyways)

Glad to have some fellow travelers along. Maybe we can use the thread to post thoughts as we go along.

Another unmentioned: Dick Tracey. I love the visuals of the movie in particular, because of how well they translated old comics to film.

Cool. I think I just have this category I put a lot of movies into -- which doesn't mean they're bad, but rather I have to know what someone else likes before I'll suggest them.

Whereas some movies I'll just put out there as something I think anyone can find something good in, or at least I'll have some cinematic reason (like with Predator on the list I was thinking about how it really encompasses the barely hidden homo-eroticism of 80's action flicks -- even if you don't like the movie, I'd point out that it's a perfect demonstration of a particular aspect of a kind of movie)

OOooo... good choice.

As always, too many choices...

I'm impressed with your ability to just have one :D I also enjoy that trilogy. I'll just try a grab-bag for a list of action movies I love that haven't been mentioned yet:

Mad Max: Fury Road
Kill Bill, v 1 and 2
Terminator 2
The 36th Chamber of Shaolin
Predator

While I like story, I also agree with your general taste for the elements of film that are particular to film.

I love action movies because they are almost exclusively composed of that. And there's a genuine difference between the masters of visual story-telling and the cheesy spin-offs. (although, I'll admit, I like the cheese, too)