Comments

  • The Economic Pie
    ↪Mikie
    I think I'm resistant to the notion of responsibility really applying.

    In a particular case sometimes we can figure out, through political analysis, who is the most likely person to be able to influence a particular decision.

    Responsibility is with all of us, in the sense that this is how we live with one another.
  • The Economic Pie
    I don't recall Marx claiming that shareholders care solely about profit at the expense of everything else?
    ...
    To be clear: in my view, a shareholder cares more than simply profit above all else.     — Mikie
    I think so too: Namely, the “class” of owners. The capitalists, really. Today that’s mostly owners of particular property, like stocks. — Mikie

    I disagree.

    It's not the owners who decide, in this more general sense. It's the property relationships themselves which form an environment that motivates the collective to behave in a particular pattern. So, seeing as there's an over and an under class -- as Marx said, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" -- the "decision" is made between two competing factions which, depending on how well they are organized, will set the price-point in a labor market.

    Whether a particular shareholder cares more about profit is irrelevant to the effects that the state-enforced property relation which creates an environment which we creatures operate within with enough predictability to say "yeah, that company pretty much just wants to make money, and the laborers they employ pretty much just want as many benefits for as little as possible".

    And why wouldn't you want more for less, after all? Doesn't that sound like a rational, self-interested desire?

    Basically, I'd say that the structure of property over-rides any commitment a shareholder may have. They may look like they have power, but I'd say it's ephemeral.
  • Evolution and the universe
    We have a dog. What is the first member of its ancestor that is just like it such that our perception recognizes it as a dog.?Now that dog came from non-dog parents? That's not possible my friend. Who did it mate with? If you know how this works then explain it. This is all about philosophy and has nothing to do with how scientists see the world. — Gregory

    So if this is all about philosophy and nothing about scientists, why are you arguing that species cannot be related to one another through mating?

    The way this works -- that's what the scientists have laid out. And, if you don't feel like buying a book, there is a free version ;). I just like the Coyne book because it's easier to read.

    ↪Banno

    Yeah.
  • Evolution and the universe
    ↪Gregory
    Fair point.

    I'll address the actual argument later. To treat it fairly, I'd have to do a bit more work -- and I'm not feeling like doing that now ;).
  • Evolution and the universe
    ↪Gregory
    I agree.

    I didn't, for instance, say that it's a true book. I just said I like it, and it'd be useful for you to read because it'd develop your philosophy better -- you'd be better able to appeal to people who disagree with you.

    Now, to be honest, I believe evolution is true. But that shouldn't matter for all the points I'm making.
  • Evolution and the universe
    I like Jerry Coyne's Why Evolution is True

    It's an easy introduction to the theory that covers the physical evidence.

    Now, probability or God -- that you will not find in the book. But evolution -- yes.

    And I think, even if you disagree with evolution, it'd be useful for you to know what those who do believe in it believe and why they believe.
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    ↪Mww
    I pulled out the old Pluhar to look and see what I was talking about -- and I think you're right. I'll just post the quote that was in my head upon finding it to offer clarification on what you quoted:

    In this treatise I deliberately refrain from offering definitions of these categories, even though I may possess them. I shall hereafter dissect these concepts only to a degree adequate for the doctrine of method that I here produce. Whereas definitions of the categories could rightly be demanded of me in a system of pure reason, here they would only make us lose sight of the main point of the inquiry. For they would give rise to doubts and charges that we may readily relegate to another activity without in any way detracting from our essential aim. Still, from what little I have mentioned about this, we can see distinctly that a complete lexicon with all the requisite explications not only is possible but could easily be brought about. The compartments are now at hand. They only need to be filled in; and a systematic [transcendental] topic, such as the present one, will make it difficult to miss the place where each concept properly belongs, and at the same time will make it easy to notice any place that is still empty. — CPR Pluhar translation, A83/B109
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    Maybe; dunno. Specific in what way? — Mww

    Just in the way that multiple people can work with it, understand it, communicate about it, and even -- sometimes -- use it. Speaking about Kant we don't really use his categories as much as argue whether or not they are necessary for all the other stuff we do. It's a confusing logic, even if it is ultimately correct. With Kant's categories he is so certain that we know what he's talking about that he says we already know what he's saying.

    Yet, here we are -- reading a transcript of a talk about different interpretations of modalities.

    Not that one couldn't work this into Kant's project, necessarily... that's why I posited the as-such/transcendental distinction between different notions of logic. Especially because @Banno was emphasizing how this is just a way of talking, rather than a metaphysics. I think transcendental logic gets close to metaphysics in the wider sense of the philosophical tradition, while demarcating what is and isn't metaphysics by Kant's philosophy.
  • Was Socrates a martyr?
    ↪Fooloso4
    :up:
  • The Economic Pie
    (3) Who decides (1) and (2)? — Mikie

    (1) and (2) are decided by class, I think. It's not an individual which makes a labor market. Markets and profits and money are made possible by the modern nation state. And nations are ruled by class interests, first and foremost. Once those are satisfied then other projects can be taken on, and are taken on (usually as a way to demonstrate how one's nation is superior to another), but the ruling class will get theirs first (or the nation will collapse).

    "Theirs", from my vantage, is however much they are able to get away with taking. So, in a backwards way, it's also up to the under-class as well as the over-class, because the under-class can push back and demand more (since the over-class depends on the under-class). But here "decision" and "fair" and "should" stop being efficacious, or at least honest if they are efficacious words. Seeing the labor market as a balance of power between classes changes it from a moral problem to a political one.
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    Logic has changed. Whether it has advanced, is questionable. All the basic conceptions of modern modal logic are already contained in Kantian metaphysics, and have been classified as such since Aristotle. — Mww

    Hrmm... I think I'd say logic has changed considerably since Kant, and I'd say that it's for the better too. While Kant has the modalities as categories I'd say that's a problem with his logic -- Camus even makes a joke about that in The Myth of Sisyphus, so I always presumed it was understood that the modal categories are kind of funny in that they don't really spell out either a relation between objects (causality) or properties of objects (quality and quantity), but rather pick out judgments of a certain kind.

    Modal logic is more specific than Kant's.

    Furthermore, the categories are part of a transcendental logic, right? So we can easily see Kripke as contributing to logic, as such, to use Kant's distinctions. This is a pure logic rather than a transcendental logic. At least, this is how I'd put things. (The difference between logic as such and transcendental logic is... not easy to spell out. If this doesn't click, then this is probably as clear as I can be without more work.)
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪frank
    I paged through The Conscious Mind and found what you're saying about re-arranging neural circuits (while asleep or something) so when you wake up you experience the inverted spectrum.

    I guess I don't think whether you phrase it with one or two people it matters too much. But that probably goes some way to explain why I don't believe experience is private, ala the private language argument.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪frank
    I guess I'd say the inverted spectrum argument fits with your rendition here, from the way I think of things.

    What you're saying is experience causes neural activity.

    The inverted spectrum argument is meant to show how experience can be different between persons, and so it's a legitimate reference. When talking about "my blue", I am making a public distinction. "blue" after all, and "my" for that matter, are public meanings. And I'm noting how our experience of the world could be somewhat different, from a functional perspective. Would it really matter that my orgasm is the same as your orgasm, from the Darwinian perspective? No, it'd just have to be good enough to keep the species alive. And some people's orgasms might be somewhat sub-par, and hence that might be why they aren't as motivated by them.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪frank
    Ach, sorry. Didn't hit the Reply, but the above is what I meant to reply to you.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    I have an understanding of the hard problem.

    I just didn't know how to answer your question.

    I thought I set out my best understanding of the hard problem in my opening post. But you're saying you're not convinced I understand. And your rephrasing of my position was just confusing to me -- that's what I meant.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪frank
    I think? I'm fine with being quizzed, but I don't have a firm answer to your first question.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪bert1
    There's a series of icons above the top of a reply screen. The one on the furthest left is a "B" for Bold. Then "I" for italics. As you go along one of them is an " @ " . If you click it a window will pop up with a field to enter a person's name. When I typed "180" @180 Proof immediately populated as an option.

    This is also the case with @Banno or anyone -- just start typing the person's name in the field, and eventually you'll have an option to click on them.

    So, would you believe me? I'm certain @Banno understands.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    Free-for-all anarchy is my philosophy, so why not?

    Where's the metaphysics of humor angle. :D
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪Banno
    Heh, yeah fair.

    Might as well note that Marxism can lazily take care of this problem through the dialectic. But the solution might be considered worse than the original problem. (still makes me giggle though, even though I shouldn't)
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪bert1


    Would you believe me in saying @Banno and @180 Proof understand the problem?

    At least, such is my belief. I think their contentions come from another philosophical perspective, is all. Both worth considering in thinking about consciousness philosophically.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪bert1


    I think that this is an odd tactic.

    You can state what the hard problem is. And others find it unsatisfying. What are you hoping to get out of these repeated questions?
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪fdrake
    Yes, there is! I mean, the P-zombie argument has an obvious modal angle too, right? And for Chalmer's, again in memory and all that, the very conceivability of P-zombies demonstrates his point. (Actually, this gets to why I'm somewhat suspicious now... notice how close that looks to ye olde ontological argument?)

    But, in terms of being more specific than "yes, there's a modal angle" -- I'd have to actually commit to something. :D

    I just noticed the conversation kinda got into a lull and was still thinking about the hard problem so I thought I'd throw my 2 cents in.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪Banno
    Public/Private, though, are distinctions from a way of doing philosophy that is not the target of the hard problem -- the functionalist account of the mind.

    They are public distinctions, of course. But I'm not sure that the inverted spectrum argument attempts to argue they are private.

    Different between people, perhaps. But we both understand this, so it's not private.
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    ↪Banno
    In this case I think even one example might be enough. It's not that all of our feels will be different, it's that it's possible, in a functional, physicalist sense, for them to be so.

    It's that sense which is under attack in Chalmer's set up, at least as I remember understanding it.

    When I imagine applying the notion to the other sense, I'll admit the loud-quiet one doesn't seem to fit (except in a mundane sense). The others I could see, though that probably says more about what I'm willing to entertain than reality.

    Either way, though, I hope the above makes sense: the attack is on the set up of a functionalist, physicalist account of all reality, or whatever, and noting how here's a phenomena -- the feeliness of the world -- that doesn't really seem to fit into that picture.

    Or would you say that this still falls to the philosopher's habit of overgeneralizing?
  • Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?
    I read The Conscious Mind over 10 years ago just to figure out what the hullabaloo was. For awhile I was persuaded by Chalmer's property-dualism.

    These days I'm not as confident as I once was in such claims, but not because of the problem or how its stated but more general concerns.

    I think I have a coherent notion of Chalmer's description of the hard problem. I'd say the inverted spectrum argument is probably my favorite because it demonstrates how while it's surely advantageous in a functional sense to be able to "feel" the world around you, it doesn't really matter that my red is your red -- the old "my red could be your blue" line of thought. As long as we are able to distinguish the world similarly enough to use language together that's all that's functionally needed. Yet I have a fairly clear idea about what it would mean for my red to be your blue. So, whatever that is -- why my red is my red -- that's what the hard problem of consciousness is about. It's the feeliness of the world. And the thought, so my memory of what I was lead to believe at least, is that there is as yet no scientific explanation for why my red is my red (or, perhaps another way to put it, there's no scientific way to tell what my red is -- whether it is your blue or not -- yet I certainly see red)
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    ↪Banno
    Right! I think he's more replying to the mind-brain identity theorists there. And, since it's a talk, it's more of a comment to a way of thinking that notes how his approach poses problems for that very particular philosophical theory.
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪ArguingWAristotleTiff
    I remember mayor at least being on this sight....

    and hyena occasionally pops by?


    .... yeah, it was still a shame.
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    Truthfulness -- I favor any skepsis to which I may reply: "Let us try it!" But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of my "truthfulness"; for there courage has lost its right — The Gay Science, B1 aphorism 51
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪Banno
    That just makes it a real religion, by all descriptions at least.
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪Baden
    :lol: lmao,

    and thus baden beget shoutbox 2
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪Banno
    In the dreaming there was the void

    and in the void there was the paul

    a memory within a dreaming of a dream...
  • The ineffable
    ↪Banno
    Sometimes fence-sitting is helpful, though.

    Not always. And I think there's definitely the temptation to become Buridan's ass in the wrong circumstances.

    Only sometimes. So, if that applies to conceptual relativism at least, then it can be useful. (say, if your nethers are at risk in hopping one way or the other)
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪Baden
    I, for one, would not want anyone to be out of the loop. Especially @alan1000
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪Baden
    Really, if we're going to put pig stuff in the shoutbox, then it ought to be in both. ;)
  • The Shoutbox should be abolished
    ↪SophistiCat
    It would be a delicious sort of irony if this thread became the new shoutbox
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    One of the things about the thermometer definition is it explicitly states how to pick out temperature without telling you anything about temperature. I think that's a feature. However, if we're talking in terms of ordinary usage, mine is definitely a specialized definition meant for scientific purposes of theorizing about temperature and heat, or really more specifically, meant to allow people to work together to create knowledge which utilizes those notions which come from that basic theorizing. It's not the ordinary sort of thing that we mean by "Bob" or "that" or, as it's purposefully trying to leave out a description so that multiple descriptions can work, certainly not a definite description. Neither is it quite a pronoun, or even a generic noun like "table", which picks out objects (where heat is harder to think of as an object, except in the logical sense, but that's already set to the side because we're talking about ordinary names)

    I don't want to say that it's specialized, because I really doubt that, I'm just noting that I think it's still worth looking at those examples with some suspicion, upon thinking it through.

    In the case of counter-factuals, when we're talking about "heat is the motion of molecules" vs. "heat is a caloric substance that goes from one object to the other", then I think both must be picking out the same things in the case of the first part, but I'm not sure about the latter part still. Unless I allow strange things like "the belief that "the motion of molecules" means any physical object that cannot be perceived by our bodily senses because of how small it is which is in fact moving somehow" to be picking out objects between participants in a conversation. Maybe! But it's worth noting that we're getting into strange territory here.

    So I agree with your conclusion here for sure:

    I've suggested that this is a misapplication of Kripke's argument, since that argument relies on fairly clear individuation - objects and individuals; but that after Wittgenstein it's not so clear that sensations and states of mind are the requisite sorts of individuals.

    Further, the sensation of cold does not correspond to temperature, as shown in the video, and particular brain states do not correspond to particular states of mind, as shown by the irregularity of neural networks.

    There's much plumbing to be sorted here, it seems.     — Banno

    I think that in his audience those examples were good to bring up because of the popularity, but that they are confusing to me, at least, for all the reasons we've already talked about and that you mention here.
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    But I wonder what you make of the last arguments of the article, concerning the sensation of heat and states of mind — Banno

    Honestly I have to rethink it now. I'm not sure anymore.

    There's a long tradition of examining the ways we're bound to think. I think all philosophers make some use of that kind of exploration, but Hume and Kant are particularly notable for asking about the things we can and can't imagine. Kripke joins them in this for the purpose of showing that if we insist that all necessarily true statements are known a priori, this conflicts with the way we think about counterfactuals.

    So there's no recipe here for speaking in a certain way. We're not identifying elements of grammar. We're analyzing a historic philosophical bias with the scalpel of...

    the way we think. :grin:     — frank

    Okiedokie, if we're talking Hume/Kant then I'm on familiar ground.

    So, compactly maybe: the historical philosophical use of imagination as a sort of ground for thinking about ordinary language's treatment of counter-factuals and contrasting that with the philosophic bias that all necessary and true statements are necessarily also known a priori.

    So we can imagine this lectern is made of metal or in the next room, but we cannot imagine that this lectern was made from ice from the Thames. That's not plausible.

    So, also, it seems that to make sense of this we have to accept Kripke's notion of "possible worlds" too. That, at least ordinarily, we can and do speak of possible worlds that pick out the same objects as the actual world, and so while this is a loose sense of "necessity" it's also one that people use.
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    Keep in mind that Kripke is focusing on ordinary language use. This is not an examination of a logical language, so meaning is truly use here.

    In a case where "this lectern" is a rigid designator, the baptism is likely to have just happened. It's as if I named the lectern "Bob" but Bob equals this lectern.

    The wooden lectern example is pointing to the way we think about objects. Note Kripke's emphasis on what we can and can't imagine. What he's saying should be very intuitive to you.     — frank

    Heh, if so then I'm not understanding it because it is not very intuitive to me. :D

    The bits on what we can and cannot imagine are somewhat opaque to me. Not that imagination isn't involved in thinking philosophically, but I'm naturally hesitant to say that imagination is the limit of philosophical thinking.

    "This lectern" functions rigidly in the paper, I agree. It picks out the same object across possible-worlds/plausible-circumstances. I can see how that's not a name, but I don't think it matters either too much to this part of the argument if I'm reading it right at least.

    Reading over it again now... I think the lectern example is where Kripke is showing how we can derive an a posteriori necessity.

    So we have

    P -> [] P

    From a priori analysis of the lectern we can conclude that insofar that any particular lectern is made of wood, then it necessarily is not made of ice.

    Then, from a posteriori investigation, we infer

    P

    That is, though we could be wrong, the lectern is made of wood.

    Therefore, it is necessarily not made of ice

    So we get a necessary conclusion from a proposition believed due to a posteriori methods.

    So he's talking about, I gather, the distinction he wants to make between a posteriori/a priori, and contingent/necessary -- so that we can have necessary, a posteriori truths. (at least, as you note, within the way we normally use language rather than in some purified logical form)
  • Kripke: Identity and Necessity
    ↪Banno
    I didn't, but I knew about the phenomena. It's why I prefer the thermometer as a basis for theorizing heat :) -- whatever is being picked out by the measuring of thermometers is at least related to heat. And, perhaps in this way, we might say that "heat" is a rigid designator -- we're picking out the same phenomena across different instruments, at least, and seem to be trying to talk about the same phenomena even in positing different descriptions of that phenomena.

    I think that's where my thoughts are coalescing at the moment -- to be able to even talk about a counter-factual, if all names were were descriptions, then by positing a different description of a named object we'd be picking out something different. Counter-factuals would actually just be us talking about different objects no matter what. That's why using "this" (though I'm picking up what you mean by "this" not being a name, now, ala Kripke -- since that's what he's speaking against, is Russel's theory of "this" counting as a name) with the lectern sunk home with me -- if descriptions are really all there are to names, then "this lectern is made of ice" is already picking out another lectern. That's why he's focusing on negative predicates, since the lectern he's talking about is necessarily itself, and it is a wooden lectern. And then the description is not picking out another lectern (another "name"), but the same one, even by the description.
  • Is "good", indefinable?
    ↪god must be atheist
    Eh, no worries, it's not necessary to the point anyways. I was just being shmancy ;)
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