It's not such a bad bargain. — Vera Mont

Simply, there is no virtue in being un-fallen - innocence is the natural condition, and virtue arises from the fall along with vice as "knowledge of good and evil" - What philosophers call "moral knowledge". If you don't know good from evil, there is no virtue in doing good and no vice in doing evil, you just do what you do.

(When I were a lad this stuff were taught in school; kids these days don't understand the language and tradition properly in the first place, and then get all superior and dogmatic in their ignorance, mistaking it for virtuous rationality and freedom from superstition.) — unenlightened

True. Fair would be that once you have fallen there is no redemption. Without guilt, there can be no virtue. — unenlightened

And so we fall into self-improvement, social improvement, and global improvement, as though through our internal conflict we can outthink that nature from which we spring. Yet one does not really have to go all the way to China; in our own Christian tradition, the individual conscience also reigns supreme. If you follow that internal voice, you cannot go wrong. (But on the other hand, you might well get crucified.) — unenlightened

But then again, I agree that the only truly rational solution to the problem is medication. — Tarskian

To stop willing is to cease to experience difference and becoming, since desire is just another word for difference. — Joshs

Antidepressants, anti-anxiety medication, and opioids are the rational solution to a spiritual problem. There simply is no rational reason for life itself. Therefore, the only truly rational solution for the rational meaninglessness of life is to medicate it away.

It is not just that the unbelievers do not want children. They are even actively self-deleting. In the meanwhile, we pray to the spiritual Lord, and carry on, with or without the unbelievers. — Tarskian

THERE is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is
not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest— whether
or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—comes afterwards.

If some people feel incapable of going on, unable to convince themselves that things might improve for them in the future, then there would seem to be little scope for argument against suicide in those kinds of cases. — Janus

The reason this isn't a principle is because its not a rule, but a definiton. Maximising ones experience is to improve said experience according to some set of values. To ought to do something is to do so because it has increased value. Hence, you ought to maximise your experience, by definition, since it would improve said experience according to your values. It's like if I was to say "One wants to listen to songs that one enjoys", this isn't a principle, its definitional. — Ourora Aureis

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no? — schopenhauer1

Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc.. — schopenhauer1

Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations. — schopenhauer1

Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit: — Leontiskos

As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible. — Leontiskos

The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.

(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one. — Mww

I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way? — Leontiskos

If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means? — Leontiskos

So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. — Moliere

Does anyone know of any dating apps or places to be, where people seeking a deep, long-term relationship with an intellectually substantive partner go? — Bob Ross

That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.

All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out. — schopenhauer1

All things being equal, certainly feeding the hungry is recognizing dignity. But if you save a person after putting them into harm, that would not be recognizing dignity. So, if you could have prevented the harm to someone, but instead did things that allowed harm, so that you can justify it by taking care of the problem afterwards, that would not be respecting someone's dignity. So it is a matter of preventative over palliative if possible, not bypassing preventative with the justification of palliative. — schopenhauer1

Most deontological ethics revolve around dignity. I think autonomy, non-malfeasance, non-paternalism, etc. fall under this ethic, and leads to one that is negative ethics. A positive ethics, "We must live for X cause/objective", becomes a violation of the respect of someone's dignity. — schopenhauer1

But my point was that maybe one cannot discern this is "a good thing"
...
Now, this EXTREMELY minor, but that's the point.. Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. — schopenhauer1

In fact, his notion that people should do things to maintain a society because then we wouldn't be alive to enact our free will in the first place, assumes a certain goal that doesn't seem to itself have justification. "Well don't you want to live in a society so you can carry out your ends?" can be answered, "No, not if it means that suffering exists!" — schopenhauer1

Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. Just following one version of an imperfect duty might override another version of an imperfect duty. — schopenhauer1

Now, it looks like you are prepared to say that Kant thinks that as long as we are following this imperfect duty out of respect for universal law, then it is all good. But then, how is the universalizable principle useful to tell us what to actually do? It becomes impotent. — schopenhauer1

You may think being an asshole isn't universalizable, but I might think it is. — schopenhauer1

...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict. — Leontiskos