This might make the point better --

Consider "The set whose elements consist of sets without properties which is a member of itself" --

Well, I'm trying to describe the concept of set in some intuitive terms. You may say that the concept of set is extra-logical but I wouldn't be able to make sense of logic without it. Like, why are the conclusions in syllogisms necessarily true if the premises are true?

The set is an object that somehow unifies different objects without negating their different identities. One over many. — litewave

The concept of a set could be extra-logical, yes. If I'm talking about a chess set, for instance, I'm not using "set" to talk about logical sets. So in a way what I'm asking here is to say "How does this notion of unification fit within a strict logical definition?"

Intuitively I understand what you mean -- I just think that we can drop this business about sets having properties at all if we can always substitute the members of a set for whatever the property picks out. The abstract property which picks out the nearest pebble and the first sentence I say five miles from now just is that these are in a set, and there is no more to it than that.

It's a set because we decided to treat these elements within a logical structure, not because there's some property which the set has that we pick the elements out with.

It's very unintuitive, I'll grant. But the intuitive statements can easily run into paradoxes which is kind of where I've been coming at the question from: with Russell's Paradox in mind which I tried, in my lasts reply, to reframe in terms of your use of "unificiation" -- it doesn't quite work because to be more precise the set would have to both contain itself and not contain itself, hence the paradox -- I was going for something like "Here's a set which has a property which is unification, and that property for this set is that they are all not unified, in which case the set is both unified and not unified".

Does that make any kind of sense, or is it just boring and not worth investigating?

"unification" -- I'd say this is an extra-logical notion. We may posit the set consisting of ununified elements, for instance -- is this then not a set because the elements are ununified? Is it possible to posit such a set?

Even the extravagant set that Moliere has mentioned above is something in addition to the pebble and the sentence, and this something is a property that the pebble and the sentence share. It is an unimportant property for which we have no word, and being in that set means having that property. — litewave

If there are abstract properties which define sets without a known common property -- such as the set I proposed grouping an abstract and a concrete individual -- just how does this unknown property come to define the set? What is it that this property does that makes sense of saying sets are defined by properties if there are an infinite amount of abstract properties (considering there's at least an infinite amount of abstract objects this shouldn't be a stretch)?

Is it to say anything more than this set is a collection of these two members? What is this extra "unspoken property" doing for us in understanding what a set is?

Good. I like Sartre as an "in" to this approach to consciousness and I'm not particularly bothered by the critique in this context (also, my relative lack of knowledge of Husserl means I can't effectively argue the point anyway). — Baden

Same for me.

I now wish I had more patience for Husserl -- but I do need to recognize him as a giant that could provide interesting input if @Joshs is willing to give his take.

I'm trying to fill out above a context (more to come) that I'll try to loop back into a fuller application to body image disorders (including body dysmorphic disorder and eating disorders). — Baden

Cool :)

One thing that comes to mind for myself is something less intense: even the idea of "I need to lose weight" is a (mild)* form of wanting your body to be elsewise, and in a literal sense it's something that goes on in the mirror -- not just the mind's eye of the self, but the reflection one sees and judges of oneself.

I don't know Husserl well enough to say, but what I want to say is that this relates to the pluperfect tense of consciousness -- this is something I only recently picked up from Sartre so I could just be throwing it out there as the thing I've been thinking about -- but his notion of time seems to require a pluperfect tense in language which seems to indicate a structure of consciousness.

To use the mild example above: One cannot say "I need to lose weight" without being able to refer to a before-during-after that is not the current before-during-after -- more specifically the "pluperfect" tense is the tense one takes after having referenced either a past or future point of time and then, with that reference assumed, refers to another point of time relative to that reference.

In terms of "wanting to lose weight" it seems to me that right now I have to think about what my body once looked like and imagine what it could look like which requires a double pluperfect scenario to make sense of the desire.

Which kind of goes into the slogan, at least, of "consciousness is what it is not" -- not strictly in terms of being-in-itself/being-for-itself, but at the level of meaningful sentences.



*Started to think and realized that this isn't quite true -- it could be mild or intense, depending on the person, but it's mild in the sense that is relatable to lots of people and possible to conceive as a mild disappointment.

:up: Thanks.

Yes. So what, if anything, would we want to say about identifying such a set with some property? I take it you don't want "being in set X" to count as a property -- nor could it, on the OP's proposal. — J

I'm open to 'being in set X' because I think Russell's paradox is legitimate, and generally I like the paradoxes of self-reference as a point of thought -- stuff like the liar's paradox seem to sit here.

But, yes, it could not count on the OP's proposal which is why the paradoxes of self-reference came to mind.

I don't want to say anything about identifying a set with a property for this very reason :D

What was the question? — Banno

" My understanding is that "classes" can include rules, but I don't understand how to do that formally while I do understand naive set theory at least. "

I suppose I was looking for reassurance of this distinction between sets and classes -- either in the right or wrong way. I've thought of sets as any collection of individuals whatsoever and classes as collections of individuals with inclusion rules. Is that bollox in my head that I'd need to defend or let go of, or something sensible from your perspective?

Does that avoid Russel's paradox?

If so, does it do so by delaying the question? :D

I'm good with forming sets in stages either way. Defining sets in a technical manner is something I still think on and think I don't understand, really.

A set is a single object. — litewave

That single object is the collection, but the thought here is that there's nothing more to that than being the collection of the individuals in the set.

We can name a set, so it can be an element -- and is an element of the set that is itself -- but a set need not be a single object (or name) at all. The empty set comes to mind here.

Relations are different from sets in that they are somehow connecting one set to another, but sets have no "rules" for inclusion.

My understanding is that "classes" can include rules, but I don't understand how to do that formally while I do understand naive set theory at least.

I think covered this well in that "object" is ontologically loaded. I'd include "property" there.

A set is a collection of individuals. They need not have anything related to one another, or share anything at all -- the individuals are the set and there's nothing else to it. The pebble on the ground and the sentence I say 5 miles away can form a set.

I've expressed it as "a set is a collection of objects -- where objects are logical objects (any name whatsoever) -- that need not share anything in common other than being in that collection of objects"

Not sure how right I am as I still think on these things.

That's my understanding, at least given Russell's paradox. (which the OP reminds me of)

It feels plausible that a set can be identified by a property or even a set of properties.

But, no, they're different -- a set is its' elements, rather than a property which all the elements share.

I am the one fighting to make it okay to use AI — Athena

I think that the way you are using AI is okay to use.

Our antipathy isn't directed at what you've described what you use it for, at least. You're not copy-pasting directly out of it, and you're willing to hear other sources rather than rely upon it as a source -- it's a tool for seeing something you may not have heard about, but you're not parading it about like an authority.

Saying that I hope you don't feel like we're fighting you, while still answering your question as to "Why not AI?"

I was surprised how much I liked it, but jamming along and thought to share it because it's unique and new.

something new I've never heard before, but am captivated by:

So, for the sake of clarity, the Boltzmann brain comes in because our experiences and memories are consistent with both our living in the world we think we do and with our being Boltzmann brains that might dissolve at any moment. The evidence we have doesn't determine our embracing one theory over the other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this different from the Cartesian scenario, in your mind?

Actually, given some multiverse formulations, it seems that we are vastly more likely to be Boltzmann-like (there are many similar variants) brains than citizens in a lawful universe. Or, even if we are in a seemingly lawful universe, it would be vastly more likely that we are in one that has just randomly happened to behave lawfully by sheer coincidence for a few billion years, and will turn chaotic in the coming moments. In which case, while the case is underdetermined, we might conclude that our being Boltzmann like is vastly more likely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Heh.

I'm a "Copenhagen interpretation" dude, but only by habit and because it made more sense than the others.

In my mind, at least, Boltzman brains can be treated the same as Evil Demons.

Now, if we are hardcore Bayesian brainers, what exactly is the wholly predictive mind supposed to do when available data forces it to conclude that prediction is hopeless? It's in a pickle! — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not, and would be surprised to hear you express that I am.

I've not pushed it, but have been against Bayesian epistemologies.

Not Bayesian analysis, tho. Bayes' theorem has many relevant truths and uses.

I just don't think it does much to explain knowledge or inference. It's a bit of a "just so" theory, in which case why not phenomenology?

(This flaw in multiverse theories that fail to place any real restrictions on the "multiverse production mechanism" (e.g. Max Tegmark's view that all mathematical objects exist) is, IMHO, completely fatal to attempts to offer up the multiverse as a solution to the Fine Tuning Problem, but that's a whole different can of worms.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given that I've said I'm an absurdist it probably isn't, or shouldn't be, surprising that "The Fine Tuning Problem" is something I'd "pass over" as a bad problem, though would only address it in a thread on that problem because, holy moly, you've been gracious to me (which I appreciate) but that would take us way off track.

This sounds to me a bit like post hoc rationalization, as if one is going to decide on a theory and then allow their theory to be "a selective pressure on which evidence is relevant to consider."

The difficulty here is that you seem to be redefining "theory" to be something that precedes rather than follows after evidence, and such is a very strange redefinition. For example, on this redefinition someone might say, "I have a theory...," and this statement would be indistinguishable from, "I have a prejudice..." The basic problem is that 'theory' and 'prejudice' do not mean the same thing. We distinguish between reasoning and post hoc rationalization, and yet your definition seems to have made such a distinction impossible. It seems to have made impossible a distinction between "following the evidence where it leads," and, "engaging in selection bias in favor of some a priori theory." — Leontiskos

I think this is the scary part of underdetermination.

I was taught that evidence leads to conclusions.

That's still true! They do!

It's just more complicated than that. It's not like I can just gather the evidence and then know the conclusion -- that's because we're limited, we're human, and can only form provisional thoughts which are justifying themselves and present them to others to critique.

I agree that "theory" and "prejudice" are different -- but i'd say that this is the difficulty being presented by the under-determination of a scientific theory by its evidence.

At the point of scientific revolutions empirical justification is what decides things.

But at the secondary education level the theory is what decides things, since it's very likely the student is wrong.

What's the argument here: "There is no problem with identifying pseudoscience because in these examples scientists came around to calling out the pseudoscience?"

Why exactly will science always tend towards correctly identifying pseudoscience? Will this always happen? What's the mechanism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good questions. I gave three characteristics, but they are generalizations which aren't always strictly true in the universal way.

Also, I don't think scientists will always do so -- it could have been the case that, for instance, Jewish Science "won" vs. Nazi Science, at least hypothetically, and my suspicion is that it could uncover true things but it'd be because they waited until a person of the right designation said it rather than because the first person who noticed it said it.

But I'd argue that since reality is wider than these races' thoughts, at least on the philosophical level (which a fascist would not allow), maybe we should listen to the other people who had the thought first rather than wait for one of our "master race" people to pillage the thought and say it?

I don't think there's a mechanism in scientific practice, though -- not like a bike with a chain or a conveyor with a gear etc.

It could be the case that in the future it falls to some stupidity. At times I feel like it's still doing so, given science's marriage to Capitalism, but also -- that's what we have to do now to live, and "pure" knowledge still gets funding sometimes.

The 19th century was rife with pseudoscience, and I think developments in scientific methods and the philosophy of science played a significant role in curbing this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree here, too!

I'm beginning to wonder if "underdetermination" is wider than I think on it. "Boltzmann Brains" aren't something I'd even associate with "underdetermination" -- I largely think of "underdetermination" with respect to the philosophy of science. So a (scientific) theory is underdetermined by the evidence it references. That doesn't make it false it just means that an observations doesn't determine the theory, not even in a large set of observations.

Eventually the theory determines what you're looking for once it's a good scientific theory. It's starting to point out patterns we can talk about, predict, describe, and agree upon.

But that, in turn, means that one must -- to make scientific progress -- ignore many irrelevant facts.

And sometimes those deemed irrelevant happen to be relevant.

****

So, again, I feel we're agreeing on the basics but disagreeing on the interpretation. I'm still wondering why or where.

And, still -- I also wonder if it's just not "for me" -- I'm an absurdist who accepts causation isn't real. Many people baulk at that and wonder about what you're wondering.

Both can be good philosophies, but it's hard to find a bridge.

You can "use" AI to learn material, particularly if you verify it elsewhere. That is, if your friend teaches you something where you then know it and you can write your own understanding of it, then you're fine.

It is hard to enforce, of course. We're mostly relying upon an honor system except when it's blatant because of that -- some people will be people and break the rules because they can get away with it, but for the most part it's discouraged because the point of the site is to think on your own in some manner.

Call me a luddite ... — 180 Proof

With respect to AI I'm fine with being a luddite. For many reasons.

Yes, people will use it. But if we see it's AI slop (which I'm sure people are aware of) then out. We encourage it because we're all probably luddites in this particular way too.

And:

Because it's a forum for people to talk with other people. — Outlander

If I wanted to talk to an AI I could just go do that, but this is a forum for people to talk to one another.

I've slowly come to accept that this is the way the world is, but I don't like it. Perhaps it's because I'm prejudiced against AI.

Sorry for double posting @Count Timothy von Icarus but I wanted to make sure you saw this thought:

I ought say that underdetermination, to my mind, is at odds with a strictly empirical epistemology -- it's more of a rationalism of empiricism. "Yes, we have to go and see, but..."

It highlights that the mind is at least partly responsible for our knowledge -- we don't have a blank slate which is imprinted upon by reality, ala Locke.

:up:

I think you're misunderstanding by "extreme forms" here. I don't mean anti-realism, but rather those sorts of "Boltzmann brain" type arguments that conclude that it is more likely, or just as likely, that the world will dissolve at any moment or radically alter its behavior, as to maintain in its reliable form. This implies that science isn't even likely to be predictive or "useful" on any consistent timescale, and I don't see how that doesn't make it a waste of time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't propose radical skepticism, but also it's not a possibility I feel the need to deny. It is, after all, logically possible -- it's just entirely irrelevant to the task at hand.

Generally I treat radical skepticism as a special case rather than a case we generalize from, except for the cases where a philosopher is purposefully arguing for or utilizing it towards some other philosophical question (so, Descartes and Hume are the "good" kind of radical skeptics; The Freshman philosophy student who just heard about the possibility of solipsism isn't -- rather, that's a sort of "right of passage" that all people interested in philosophy bumble over)

Basically I think such arguments are sophomoric, in the literal rather than pejorative sense, and someone would have to present a radical thesis to make it credible, to my mind; i.e. the "default" position isn't radical skepticism, to my mind, and so isn't so worrying. Sure it's logically possible, so are a host of irrelevancies just like it. Where the bite?

IDK, my reading would be that denials of any knowable human good ("moral/practical anti-realism," which is often aided by other forms of anti-realism) have tended to be destructive to politics, applied science, and ethics. That a key concern of contemporary politics, and a constantly recurring motif in our media is that our technology will drive our species extinct or result in some sort of apocalypse or dystopia because it is "out of anyone's control," suggests to me a fundamental problem with the "Baconian mastery of nature" when combined with anti-realism about human ends and the ends of science. If the aim of science is to improve our casual powers, but then we are also driven towards a place where we are largely silent on ends, that seems like a recipe for disaster, the sort of situation where you get things like predictable ecological disasters that will affect generations of future people but which are nonetheless driven on largely by unrestrained and ultimately unfulfilling appetites. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Heh, this is something we're wig-wamming our way about here because it seems we both believe things like "it's a good idea to talk about ethics, especially with respect to what science does" and "Jewish science is a pseudo-science", but we keep on reading these bits of evidence towards our respective views :D

All to be expected, but I want to say that I think it possible to be a skeptic towards scientific realism and realize it's important to direct ethically -- in fact, because there's no Architectonic of Science that one must follow, we are free to modify our practices to fit with our ethical demands.

I think there's a fundamental problem with reducing reality to science, and with prioritizing the mastery of nature in our understanding of what science does. But then this might be something of an aside with respect to underdetermination. (heh, the rhetorical side of me thought: In fact, because underdetermination is true we should see that science's activity is a direct result of our ethical commitments rather than an arche-method of metaphysical knowledge that's value-free.

It's descriptive, but not value-free, if that makes sense. Science is always interested for some reason, even if that reason is "I just think snails are cool and like to study their behavior because they make me feel happy when I'm around them"

Phrenology was discredited because it was thought to be false. But if "true" and "false" are themselves just social endorsements, then truth cannot arbitrate between racist, sexist, etc. scientific theories. So, sure, both forms are open to abuse, but only one can claim that abuse isn't actually abuse, and that all science is about power struggles anyhow. If science is really just about power or usefulness, then there is strictly speaking nothing wrong about declaring sui generis fields like "Jewish physics" just so long as it suits your aims and gets you what you want. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Phrenology was always a pseudo-science. It has all the characteristics -- the theories follow the form of confirmation and don't try to disconfim them. They held some social significance which allowed people to justify their position or actions to others. They were vague and easy to defend in light of evidence.

Now I'll go this far: If underdetermination, as a theory, leads us to be unable to differentiate between science and pseudo-science, and we believe there is such a thing as pseudo-science (I do), then we're in a pickle.

But like you have a theory which takes care of underdetermination, within realist parameters I'd be able to defend our ability to spot pseudo-science on the social model of the sciences -- i.e. it's not just me, but all the scientists that say what science is. "Jewish Science" wasn't even as clear as phrenology; it was definitely a racist category for expelling Jewish scientists from the academy. That it resulted in expelling people who we still consider scientists -- like Bohr -- is an indication that it's not a science even if "Jewish Science" happened to get the aims desired after.

I.e. though underdetermination complicates the question, it's still addressable by my lights without a realist science.

Arguments from underdetermination is extremely influential in contemporary philosophy.

They have led to many radical, and seemingly skeptical theses.

These theses are perhaps more radical than we today recognize, when seen from the perspective of Enlightenment and pre-modern prevailing opinion.

These types of arguments were not unknown in the past, and were indeed often used to produce skeptical arguments.

The tradition most associated with these arguments, ancient Empiricism, sought skepticism on purpose, as a way to attain ataraxia.

Thus, we should not be surprised that borrowing their epistemology leads to skeptical conclusions.

Hence, if we do not like the skeptical conclusions, we should take a look at the epistemic starting points that lead to them.

Indeed, if an epistemology leads to skepticism, that might be a good indication it is inadequate.

The Thomistic response is given as one example of how these arguments used to be put to bed. I use it because I am familiar with it and because the Neoplatonist solution is quite similar. (But the Stoics also had their response, etc.).

I do think that solution is better, but the point isn't to highlight that specific solution, but rather the genealogy of the "problem" and how it arises as a means of elucidating ways it might be resolved or else simply understanding it better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, fair. It may just not be for me, then -- here I'm saying "but I like the skeptical conclusions", and so the rest kind of just doesn't follow. The motivation isn't there for me.

But you were talking about a lot of the things I think about which is why I replied. I see I missed a good chunk of the essay just because of what grabbed my attention, though.

No, not really. No mention of underdetermintion or realism. You're basically assuming that the OP is about something that it doesn't claim to be about, hence the ad hominem nature. The OP is about underdetermination and realism. That's the core. — Leontiskos

And the medievals are the ones who have a better solution to underdetermination and realism, yes? Is the outline that I gave of @Count Timothy von Icarus 's argument entirely wrong, just unrelated whatsoever?

They acknowledge it, as Tim put it, but don't draw the radical conclusions.

I'm sort of saying "Well, what if the radical conclusions are true, after all? Maybe it's the realist philosophy of science which is wrong, then" -- I'm a realist, but not a scientific realist, exactly. It's too provisional a discipline to draw metaphysical conclusions from, even if we'll want to pay attention to its limited conclusions while thinking about nature.

I would want to actually look at some of these arguments you are alluding to. For example:

1. We don't just see the object as it is
2. We frequently make mistakes
3. We frequently go about looking for reasons to justify our first beliefs
4. We have only a tentative grasp of the whole
5. Therefore, Underdetermination explains why we go through all the hoops we do in making scientific inferences — Leontiskos

Underdetermination is the theory that theories are not determined by the evidence, but rather are chosen in order to organize the evidence, and in some way are a selective pressure on which evidence is relevant to consider.

1-4 are observations of human beings attempting to generate knowledge which fit with this belief -- basically an IBE, or really just a set of reasons for why I think underdetermination is a good default position. I.e. I don't have a deep quandary with denying causation as a metaphysical reality. That's because causation isn't real but how we decide to organize some body of knowledge.

Closer, or does that just read as more of the same to you?

Well, if extreme forms of underdetermination are successful, the scientist is wasting their time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hrrrmmm, I don't think so. But fair that I misread you, then -- in part at least. There's still something here that I can see that wasn't conveyed on my part.

Basically my thought is that if anti-realism is true that has no effect on the value of science. It'd be like saying because dancing is not really a thing dancing is not valuable: no, the value question is separate from the descriptive question. If science doesn't "reveal reality", but rather makes us aware of which parts we are interested in manipulating it will still chug along regardless of the philosophical interpretation of the science.

I didn't say they must lead that way, or even that they are designed to. I said that, historically, they absolutely have been used on both the right and the left to push such agendas. And yes, this is normally in a sort of corrupted, naive form, but some propagandists, radicals, and conspiracy theorists have a very good grasp on this stuff and have become quite adept at molding it to their causes. On the left, it's tended to be used more for things like casting doubt on all findings related to sex differences, or often the entire field of behavioral genetics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Mkay. Then I suppose I'd just say that if it's been used by both sides so has the "realist" side been mis-utilized by the same actors.

All the various phrenologies which basically justify social hierarchy are what I have in mind there, or "race science" or eugenics.

So I'd rather put the bad actors to one side since they'll use either argument that they see fit, but this does not then reflect upon the philosophy if we are treating it properly.

Still thinking on a return to your OP, this is just what leaped out for now.

Likewise, there are a lot of people who bemoan how scientific anti-realism and arguments for science coming down to sociology and power relations has been used to pernicious effect on public debates on vaccine safety, global warming, GMO crops, etc., and are looking for solutions to underdetermination here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is a mistake to draw these philosophies towards some sort of anti-scientific agenda. At least, not when I speak on them they're not -- more like I'm very interested in the truth of how science actually works, and I don't want the cartoon version but to really understand what's going on (and, in that pursuit, noting how the goal is itself almost infinite, if not fruitless, in that we never really finish philosophizing about science where we finally have The Answer, but it still provides insight)

That is, there are many who see these primarily as problems to be overcome, hence, old solutions should be interesting.

I mean, that's fair. I said above my position is to default "the other way", so it may just be that the article isn't addressed to me. I like digging out old ideas and trying them in new ways -- that's a time honored philosophical practice. I suppose it just doesn't appeal to me is all.

Which part?

Is it enough to say

"Modern philosophy has problems. These medieval thinkers didn't have these problems. This is because modern philosophy invented this problem for itself by stripping out all the thoughts which earlier thinkers relied upon in making such inferences. Therefore, we should adopt these earlier approaches, given the incredible progress knowledge has made -- there is a disconnect between ability, and these supposed modern problems that we can pass over by reading the older solutions" ?

Does that demonstrate having read the OP?

My thinking is with respect to underdetermination and its value -- what I read were some solutions to underdetermination based on a generalization of a few select authors rather than what I might say in favor of underdetermination, for instance. So I wanted some sort of reason why these are even appealing at all?

For myself I don't feel a deep need to argue for underdetermination because to me it explains why we go through all the hoops we do in making scientific inferences -- we don't just see the object as it is, we frequently make mistakes, and go about looking for reasons to justify our first beliefs while discounting possibilities not on the basis of evidence, but because they do not fit. This is inescapable for any productive thought at all -- but it has the result that we only have a tentative grasp of the whole.

Basically we don't need Hume's rendition of causation to point out that underdetermination is part and parcel to scientific practice: hence all the methodological hurdles one must overcome to be justified in saying "this is a scientific conclusion"; if it were something we could conclude without underdetermination then the scientists would be wasting their time, to my view.

Nevertheless, I still think plenty can be said with careful analysis. And note, the topic is not super broad. We can have a quite good idea about how people thought about arithmetic in the past because they both wrote about it in detail and it's not a super broad subject. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Plenty can be, and has been, and ought be said in the future.

I think it's broad in that you're talking about any and all arguments from underdetermination and using the ancients to say they have solutions to the arguments for underdetermination.

Specific when thinking about the pre-moderns, yes -- there's a great dialogue there to engage with, and I think medieval and ancient philosophy ought be given more time. i.e. i favor the historical method -- but that does not then mean that those of a previous era who did not see the modern problems as interesting thereby solved the contemporary problems.

Yes, we can focus on what they were talking about, but if Sartre is who we're interested in then all this remembrance of another philosophy, another tradition which :

I think another ameliorating factor is that there has been an unbroken, and fairly robust/large Thomistic and Neoscholastic tradition dating all the way back to that era. And so, even if we cannot say what the medievals would have thought, we can say what people steeped in their texts have generally thought, and it has generally been that underdetermination, while interesting and relevant in some areas, shouldn't support the radical theses that have been laid on it.

says such a thing, then "radical theses" are what are being pursued. The wondering isn't about what is generally comfortable for thought, but about problems for thought.

Yes, there's a connection through the tradition of Thomism, at least. And, honestly, it's an amazing connection in that it's a line of flight that has managed to develop in spite of the historical contingencies.

It's cool, but if it doesn't address what others are thinking then it's not a panacea. Ultimately I don't see the world as a harmony, for instance -- I think it's absurd.

Your ameliorating factor ameliorates some doubts, but what if I think that Hume, Quine, Wittgenstein, Feyerabend, et al. , have a point? Do I just need to read more Thomas Aquinas to see the errors in my ways?

• David Hume’s argument against causal inferences and explanations, as well as his hugely influential “Problem of Induction;”

• Ludwig Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument, as well as Saul Kripke’s influential reformulation of it;

• W.V.O Quine’s argument for the inscrutability of reference;

• Quine’s holist arguments for the underdetermination of theories by evidence, as well similar arguments for forms of theoretical underdetermination made by J.S. Mill and expounded upon by Pierre Duhem;

• Thomas Kuhn’s arguments about underdetermination at the level of scientific paradigms;

• As well as many others, including Feyerabend’s “epistemological anarchism,” Goodman’s “new riddle of induction,” etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I want to nitpick these examples on the basis that they're underdetermined -- or, the flip side of "underdetermination" is confirmation bias. There's some reason for the selection of examples, and that selection of examples may justify what you're saying as "this is where I'm coming from", but how are we to know that these are good examples of underdetermination such that Aquinas or Aristotle or the pre-modern mind had answers to these questions if we just dropped the questions and read Aquinas, Aristotle, and the ancients only?

This is something I thought while reading MacIntyre. Yes, I see what you're saying, but like Heidegger you're sort of inventing a whole mindset that is "pre-modern", and justifying it with many quotes -- but at the end of the day if you haven't spoken to people from the pre-modern era then, my brother in christ, you cannot make claims about how pre-modern people think no matter how many texts you read from that era.

It elucidates how we think, but it may not be the panacea of problems contemporary philosophy faces.

It looks soothing -- but ultimately when someone says that if we go back to some ancient or medieval thinker as the person who saw it all I think that we're kind of fibbing to ourselves.

Perhaps with good purpose, and definitely with good thinking -- but it's more imaginative than the statement reads. We're attempting to reconstruct the thoughts of people we can't talk to, yes. Especially in the history of philosophy -- that we even have a moon-shot chance of doing so is itself amazing. But something I've learned from doing Epicurus studies is that humility is important in approaching anyone pre-Gutenberg. Aquinas may be so well read because it was just before the Gutenberg press rather than because he had the insight into the real nature of things, and he provided a soothing picture of the world as a harmony.

But I'm curious if any of this makes sense to anyone else on its own terms. — Baden

In a rough way, yes. I'm wanting the eating disorder example to be filled out in a general manner which might apply elsewhere -- but that means the idea is interesting.

Yeah, we don't need Sartre -- but in my ignorance at least I prefer Sartre ;)

Not with all that implies**, but the notion of not knowing yourself through immediate self-reflection is something I'd keep -- i.e. what you talk about when saying we only know ourselves through our acts rather than some attachment to being which we can reflect upon, and that, in turn, requires a certain sociality before "the subject" is able to even reflect upon "the subject", in the manner of Sartre's notion of consciousness being that which it is not.

When I think of the difference between Sartre and Heidegger I think of the questions they're posing -- Derrida is probably right that Sartre wasn't Heidegger, but Sartre is still an amazing thinker on his own (and given Sartre's popularity at the time what else is a Derrida to do but look for problems in the thinker? :D)

But the opening of each spells out how different they are, at least by the old translations I read -- one is questioning the ability to articulate the question about the meaning of being and answering it through a phenomenological analysis of language such that he makes claims about "the greek mind" to elucidate how our heritage has, in some sense, lost the original quality of the questions (itself a historical falsehood, but wonderful philosophy as an entirely unique way of thinking)

Sartre is asking, in layman terms, how the seemingly singular subject conscious of itself is able to lie to itself -- and also articulating a theory of consciousness that differs from Husserl in that it is always what it is not (at least, insofar that I understand the differences at all); which is what brings in things like bad faith and an explanation for how an individual consciousness can lie to themself.

__________

On each account I'm fairly skeptical about the ability to spell out abstract notions of consciousness, even in philosophy, that are universal -- but they also seem to capture something of the thinker and the moment better than other attempts at such philosophy, so it always remains very interesting.

I'm just a natural skeptic, what can I say.

**"All that implies" meaning something along the sense that Sartre's subject can be conceived of in the Cartesian manner -- a point-like entity which rather than thinking is deciding, or "acting", and it is always free. I can see that, but I also see a more sympathetic reading which emphasizes the ekstases (the tri-partite divison of time being not-pointlike, but rather constitutive of any consciousness -- a before/during/after that blends together in consciousness)

That helps me a lot in understanding what we've talked about before.

Especially the designation of which names go on which side of "the break" -- Sartre with Hegel/Kierkegaard/James, vs. thems who "understood" Nietzsche (I had to use the scare quotes given the topic) -- that helps me in trying to orient our conversations at least, and so I appreciate it.

Heh, fair.

Obviously, that's not my experience, but also, I don't claim a good understanding of Husserl while recognizing him as the giant that he is. Not enough years of patient reading on my part.

My comparison between B&T and B&N so far is that they're just doing different things, and his interpretations are very much his own interpretations -- but that doesn't mean it's not doing something interesting all on its own.

I'm sympathetic to the notion that Sartre didn't really understand Heidegger, but at the same time that's more because he was also a creative philosopher with a vision which may have attempted to integrate what was into what is, but was also kind of doing his own thing that is, if we take Descartes as a starting point, a very French way of doing things.

Sartre was a philosophical lightweight compared to Husserl, which is why Heidegger called his work ‘dreck’ , — Joshs

Isn't that a bit of an exaggeration, though?

I'm not sure Sartre is a lightweight compared to Husserl, at least (and thereby Heidegger, whom I respect less).

Concerned differently? Mistaken about what his priors were saying? Sure.

Lightweight? Naw.

Yup, that's my intent.

You might say that my re-write is a middlebrow petit-bourgeois deradicalized version. Maybe that describes all of my posts in this group? — Jamal

It could be... though I'm not really too concerned if it is or isn't. In some sense this would be inescapable in the administered state even by Marxist standards. The way he speaks of ideology can only be escaped, I'm guessing, through this negative dialectics, but coming to understand such a thing we can only start with what we are familiar with now which, if we're good Marxists, means that it's going to start with ideology whether we want that to be the case or not.

What I am concerned with is making sure I'm not just fooling myself, though :D -- I want something somewhat coherent to point to if I were to say, "When Adorno says... " blah, mostly because that's how I check myself and learn while reading: I purposefully attempt to restate what I believe I'm reading in my own words, which inevitably are simpler than the philosopher's that I'm reading. It's a good practice.

And given what Adorno said about how language is the only way to objectify thought, and that what is poorly written is poorly thought out, I think it makes a good deal of sense for the student to try and think it out in the manner we're able: we're still trying to figure out this beast negative dialectics, we can't be expected to "think dialectically" before finishing the book!

Alright, this is where we left off last. Because of the pause I reread everything up to Portrayal and it was heartening because it read much faster and more smoothly this time -- which means we're making progress. And I think I've figured out the reason for Portrayal or expression is so important, and different, from the representation. I think I'm reading it like you do here where the representation is the fact itself, whereas the expression of a fact is an interpretation: And how this occurs follows from the previous section on the speculative moment.

I was wondering what he was going on about when talking about how reciting a philosophical text does not make you profound -- there's not a profoundness sitting within The Republic before anyone reads it -- but rather the expression of some text in the proper moment that leads to profundity, or by analogue, the goal that philosophy is aiming at: to express correctly is to move beyond the representation -- beyond the facts as he said in the speculative moment -- and speak freely about this unfree (factual) state of affairs fully dominated by things.

Your explanation of "thingly" helped me wrap my mind around that sentence. The "thingly bad state of affairs" -- a state of affairs dominated by the thing where expression does not exist but merely converges with science is this thingly state of affairs, and it is bad because there is the speculative impulse of philosophy which is being ignored by such an approach (or, perhaps, it's simply too dominating in the world Adorno finds himself in, where people sort of refuse to speculate on the basis of it not being worthy) ((Though I am also finding myself asking after a better explanation for why it is bad -- I feel like I'm doing some handwaiving to make sense of the text rather than referencing something he said))

I'm still reviewing "Portrayal" and intend on finishing "System" today. But there's something of a report (without an answer to your question you posed)

EDIT:

That final paragraph is a doozy.

To think is, already in itself and above all particular content,
negation, resistance against what is imposed on it; this is what thinking
inherited from the relationship of labor to its raw material, its Urimage. If ideology encourages thought more than ever to wax in
positivity, then it slyly registers the fact that precisely this would be
contrary to thinking and that it requires the friendly word of advice
from social authority, in order to accustom it to positivity. The effort
which is implied in the concept of thinking itself, as the counterpart to
the passive intuition, is already negative, the rejection of the

31

overweening demand of bowing to everything immediate. The
judgement and the conclusion, the thought-forms whose critique
thought cannot dispense with either, contain critical sprouts in
themselves; their determination is at most simultaneously the
exclusion of what they have not achieved, and the truth which they wish
to organize, repudiating, though with doubtful justification, what is not
already molded by them. The judgement that something would be so,
is the potential rejection that the relation of its subject and its predicate
would be expressed otherwise than in the judgement. Thought-forms
want to go beyond what is merely extant, “given”. The point which
thinking directs against its material is not solely the domination of
nature turned spiritual. While thinking does violence upon that which
it exerts its syntheses, it follows at the same time a potential which
waits in what it faces, and unconsciously obeys the idea of restituting
to the pieces what it itself has done; in philosophy this unconsciousness
becomes conscious. The hope of reconciliation is conjoined to
irreconcilable thinking, because the resistance of thinking against the
merely existent, the domineering freedom of the subject, also intends
in the object what, through its preparation to the object, was lost to this
latter.

Mostly in the various justifications and explications rather than the thesis of the statement -- that thinking is negative rather than positive. The analogy between worker and "raw material" as the Ur-image makes sense, though. The part that really throws me is the very end: Where thought does violence upon its subject but with the ability to "restitute" what thought has done to its object.

What is this "hope" about? Does the proper expression always hope to reconcile its violence to its object in order to restitute it? Is this what it would mean to reach the non-conceptual?

Mostly thinking out loud about the difficult parts, though I'm tracking well enough to keep reading.

SVO/SOV and inflection, as the main problems I see. :rofl: And so it would seem that the project is severely hampered and severed from the outset. The translated material we are working with is mostly analytic and not dialectical, as it has been mediated through the english language. This poses an additional challenge, as english readers can't be helped by language, the dialectic is neither immanent nor immediate in it. But I guess this is the whole point, mediation, which even in a highly dialectical language such as german, cannot be avoided. As to our own style and presentation, tone or syntax tricks must be employed, at the peril of making one sound like Yoda. Yet another challenge we brought ourselves against, who wouldn't love a challenge anyway, what else is there? — Pussycat

But what if we formalize dialectics into the one Final System.... :D

Yeah, the language barrier is already there -- though I think there's enough similarity between English and German that with a comprehension of both you can give "the idea", if not the strict meaning of a text. I liked the analogy which the translator had of the photo-negative or the depictions of planets that we see on NASA's website and the like: These aren't the images an astronaut looking from down on orbit would see, but they are also not-false, exactly, but bitmap recreations that have a sort of negative relationship to what would be seen. Whatever this negative relationship between say what the astronaut sees and what a picture of the Moon shows I might term "the conceptual" -- that which can be translated, but only through familiarity with the particulars of both and only in this negative way. i.e. there won't be some easy 1-to-1 substitution one can do between German and English such that "the meaning" would be expressed -- if the original is in German then the meaning, as meant, is German meaning, not English meaning. (but, luckily, there's an absurd world to keep us in check from getting lost in meaning)


Anyways, catching up with everyone now. Summers over, schools back in session, and I'm reading again.

Maybe. I'm not opposed to these notions on their face, at least.

The importance of incoherence, contradiction, and falsity preoccupies much of my thoughts.

Also recall that in Superman III, corrupted Superman physically expels Clarke Kent from his body, who then proceeds to strangle him to death along with the de re/de facto distinction. — sime

:D

We can't disagree about everything...? — Banno

Perhaps not, but I will. ;)

Just to see where it goes.

There's a sense in which I wonder if Davidson is comforting after all... at least for me. I tend to see the incoherent, the absurd, the contradictory as more important than the coherent. Mostly because "the coherent" looks overly imaginative to me in comparison to "the real", but an absurdist would say that.