Amen. :love:

To go back to the subset relation: if any element is a member of B, and B is a subset of A, then any element of B is an element of A.

But I still don't think that a set is identical to its elements because a single object cannot be identical to multiple of object. So a set is another object, additional to its elements. — litewave

Looking at that rendition I agree.

A set is any collection of elements is a better rendition. It's another (logical) object, to the point that its elements aren't a part of how we infer validity between sets.

heh, well, once you flip your opinion I'll return -- but my work is done :D

So what's your belief with respect to "Identification of properties with sets" now?

I've tried to dissuade you, but are you still committed?

So, to read you here, I'm taking your ideas about each to be:

Concrete:

A collection consisting of a phone located in my house and another phone located in my friend's house would be a concrete object too, although some might resist that because the two phones are separated "too much". A collection consisting of my phone and of another phone in a different universe that is in a different spacetime might be regarded as a concrete object because its elements are located in a spacetime but then again, they are in different spacetimes, so this collection transcends a single spacetime. — litewave

Abstract:

And then there is the general property/universal "phone" (or "phoneness") - that which all particular phones have in common - and I guess this would be regarded as an abstract object by almost anyone because unless we identify it with the set of all phones, it seems to transcend spacetime or be located in spacetime in an especially weird way. — litewave

And you're noting the weird part where it seems they come together.

yes? No?

I'm not sure what you mean by "abstract" or "abstraction" here. Is the phone a concrete or an abstract object? Is it a collection of other objects or not? — litewave

What I mean by "abstraction" is that you can treat the phone in either way without changing anything real.

You can treat the phone as an element -- which is that which is a member of a set -- or you can treat it like a collection -- such that its elements are members of the set "my phone".

It's how you think about it that makes the difference in terms of perceiving the phone as an set element or a collection of individuals. It is both.

Would that mean that "being in that collection of objects [or individuals, per Banno]" is a shared property? Can an object "wander in," so to speak, and partake of that property? This may not be a question about your definition so much as an expression of uncertainty about "property". — J

Yes. So what, if anything, would we want to say about identifying such a set with some property? I take it you don't want "being in set X" to count as a property -- nor could it, on the OP's proposal. — J

I'm coming to notice that I'm pretty much avoiding "property" all together and relying upon "predicate" (to circle back to where I left you off and rethink)

And where I've been reflecting from is the logical side, rather than the metaphysical side. I more or less took "property" to be substitutable with predicate, but if the conversation is going towards the perception of wholes then "property" may be the better term over the logical quandaries I've been raising.

In which case I'm on the side that "property" is something we distinguish within a metaphysical context rather than something anything "has" outside of that context. "Property" is an abstraction, too -- a word which can be used in various ways within a particular metaphysical expression. I prefer "affordance" to "property"

The mainstream view among mathematicians is that sets are abstract objects. You can see them with the mind's eye, but not physical eyes. — frank

I'm trying to say that you're correct about sets abstractness (at least, in my view, while acknowledging possibilities), and that @litewave is correct about the definition of a set with a little tweaking.

The words are right, the interpretation isn't quite there.

So here:

A set is a collection of objects. An average person surely knows what a collection is. Not so surely a universal. — litewave

A set is any given collection of objects.

An average person knows what a collection is and so you can start from there.

But the abstraction begins when we stop considering what is in the collections and consider the relationships between collections and the inferences we can draw given any collection whatsoever.

So we name sets things like A and B to signify that we're not talking about particular individuals, or even particular sets -- but rather the valid inferences one can make given any set whatsoever unspecified beyond being a set.

That jump to the "any set whatsoever" is the part the average person has to learn when we're talking about when learning set theory. Not just a collection, but the very concept of collection and how we can draw inferences from that.

Yeah, I tried to address that in the reply to @litewave -- waiting to hear back.

I'd call that a hypostization, which is an easy thing to do. Similarly so with treating sets like predicates.

Though, if we're Kantians, it'd seem like you couldn't help but to see the world through categories, so maybe there's a position wherein one could see sets -- but treat them in a logical way.

I prefer to think of sets as abstractions which we stipulate, though.

A way to think about set theory --

It doesn't matter what's in the set. The validity that's being explored are the inferences one may draw about sets regardless of their contents.

So supposing two sets, supposing B is a subset of A, we can infer that -- no matter what elements are in B, if they are in B then they must be in A.


Right. That's not at odds with the theory that a set is a collection of objects -- as in, any collection of objects, regardless of what those objects are, even if the set does not have any objects in it or some of the objects are infinite.

I don't think sets exist as much as are ways to think about things.

I don't think that's at odds, per se, with defining a set as a collection of objects, or individuals.

Though...
I'd put it to you that the collection of individuals is an abstract object. To use your cell phone example -- we can think about the cell phone as a collection of particular objects and then name this in accord with set-theory. I.e. we can make sets which refer to concrete individuals, but to treat something as a set is still an abstraction.

We can also treat the phone as an individual, from the logical point of view. Suppose the set of all of my possessions. Then, even though I can break my phone down into smaller parts in the case of the set of all of my possessions, the phone is merely an individual.

Whether something is within a set or not doesn't reflect upon its ontology -- I'd say that's more of a question for mereology (which the logic we choose to utilize may have implications for, but it's still different from the logic of sets)

Why doesn't aporia lead to intellectual anarchy? — J

Sheer stubbornness of the philosopher :D

Oh, sorry. I thought that's what you were looking for in set theory. — frank

Nope.

The intuitive bit I can see is wanting to equate predicates with sets since we can quantify over both. The unintuitive bit is where I'm arguing there's a difference that maybe doesn't look like there is a difference between these logical objects.

Well it's not surprising that we see eye-to-eye, is it? :D

Do you think this a bad interpretation @Count Timothy von Icarus?

:) Thank you.

At this point I'm wondering if the difference in positions is that I think of "underdetermination" with respect to scientific theories, especially -- rather than applying to the radical skeptical position.

For thousands of years mathematicians would have said that set theory is illogical. It flies directly in the face of Aristotle's finitism, but it solves problems that are otherwise unsolvable. Don't look for an intuitive basis for set theory down in your noggin. It's not there. — frank

Oh yeah I don't think logic is intuitive at all. It's part of why it's interesting.


Just thinking out loud here about the stuff I like to think about here, I doubt I'm introducing you to anything:


One thing w/ Ari's deductive logic is that it can be reconstructed with the latter inventions of logic. Ari pretty much sets his definitions such that quantification, predication, and sets are all rolled into kinds of propositions and explores the validity between these kinds of propositions.

I find that interesting on many levels -- one, Ari's deductive logic is supportive of his inductive logic due to there being properties which things have that can be discovered. So it's not "innocent" in the sense that it fits into what we tend to interpret as his Philosophical Project: but it is "naive" in the sense that today we'd distinguish these things.

Well, in predicate logic you have individuals that have/satisfy a property/predicate. I propose that the property is the set of these individuals. — litewave

Cool. Let's look at this.

If the property is "is the set of these individuals", effectively F in F(x), what is the individual which satisfies this predicate?

It's interesting to try and think of sets in terms of predicate logic -- and I can see the analogy between a predicate and a set since we can quantify over both and make valid deductions between those quantifications. So the temptation is strong to equate a set with a predicate.

The way I was taught*, at least, sets are different from propositions are different from predicates, but they can have relations to one another. If I were to render set theory in terms of predicates I would say "Set theory is the study of validity of the "is a member of" relation", whereas predicate logic is the study** of validity between predicates. So they're kind of just asking after different things -- one is "how do we draw valid inferences between two propositions?" and the other is "how do we draw valid inferences between collections of individuals?"

Now, interestingly, I think we can mix these logics sometimes -- but usually we want to keep them distinct because they're hard enough to understand as it is that it's better to not overgeneralize :D

I'd argue what this shows is that logic is something we choose to utilize. I'm not sure there really is some universally true thing we can say about sets and predicates sans the rest of the logical system. We could choose, for whatever reason (perhaps because this question is interesting and we're interested in how logic works), to start with the equation "Properties are equivalent to sets" and then work out the validity of that identification.

But, at least if we're learning, these are generally treated somewhat separately (even though, yes, there's a lot of overlap between these ways of talking at the intuitive level)

**EDIT: OK, is the result of the study.... a theory is not an -ology

*EDIT: Also, "taught" was by a math instructor and the rest is self-study, so I could be missing something. I don't want to lead people astray but I do like thinking about this stuff.

This might make the point better --

Consider "The set whose elements consist of sets without properties which is a member of itself" --

Well, I'm trying to describe the concept of set in some intuitive terms. You may say that the concept of set is extra-logical but I wouldn't be able to make sense of logic without it. Like, why are the conclusions in syllogisms necessarily true if the premises are true?

The set is an object that somehow unifies different objects without negating their different identities. One over many. — litewave

The concept of a set could be extra-logical, yes. If I'm talking about a chess set, for instance, I'm not using "set" to talk about logical sets. So in a way what I'm asking here is to say "How does this notion of unification fit within a strict logical definition?"

Intuitively I understand what you mean -- I just think that we can drop this business about sets having properties at all if we can always substitute the members of a set for whatever the property picks out. The abstract property which picks out the nearest pebble and the first sentence I say five miles from now just is that these are in a set, and there is no more to it than that.

It's a set because we decided to treat these elements within a logical structure, not because there's some property which the set has that we pick the elements out with.

It's very unintuitive, I'll grant. But the intuitive statements can easily run into paradoxes which is kind of where I've been coming at the question from: with Russell's Paradox in mind which I tried, in my lasts reply, to reframe in terms of your use of "unificiation" -- it doesn't quite work because to be more precise the set would have to both contain itself and not contain itself, hence the paradox -- I was going for something like "Here's a set which has a property which is unification, and that property for this set is that they are all not unified, in which case the set is both unified and not unified".

Does that make any kind of sense, or is it just boring and not worth investigating?

"unification" -- I'd say this is an extra-logical notion. We may posit the set consisting of ununified elements, for instance -- is this then not a set because the elements are ununified? Is it possible to posit such a set?

Even the extravagant set that Moliere has mentioned above is something in addition to the pebble and the sentence, and this something is a property that the pebble and the sentence share. It is an unimportant property for which we have no word, and being in that set means having that property. — litewave

If there are abstract properties which define sets without a known common property -- such as the set I proposed grouping an abstract and a concrete individual -- just how does this unknown property come to define the set? What is it that this property does that makes sense of saying sets are defined by properties if there are an infinite amount of abstract properties (considering there's at least an infinite amount of abstract objects this shouldn't be a stretch)?

Is it to say anything more than this set is a collection of these two members? What is this extra "unspoken property" doing for us in understanding what a set is?

Good. I like Sartre as an "in" to this approach to consciousness and I'm not particularly bothered by the critique in this context (also, my relative lack of knowledge of Husserl means I can't effectively argue the point anyway). — Baden

Same for me.

I now wish I had more patience for Husserl -- but I do need to recognize him as a giant that could provide interesting input if @Joshs is willing to give his take.

I'm trying to fill out above a context (more to come) that I'll try to loop back into a fuller application to body image disorders (including body dysmorphic disorder and eating disorders). — Baden

Cool :)

One thing that comes to mind for myself is something less intense: even the idea of "I need to lose weight" is a (mild)* form of wanting your body to be elsewise, and in a literal sense it's something that goes on in the mirror -- not just the mind's eye of the self, but the reflection one sees and judges of oneself.

I don't know Husserl well enough to say, but what I want to say is that this relates to the pluperfect tense of consciousness -- this is something I only recently picked up from Sartre so I could just be throwing it out there as the thing I've been thinking about -- but his notion of time seems to require a pluperfect tense in language which seems to indicate a structure of consciousness.

To use the mild example above: One cannot say "I need to lose weight" without being able to refer to a before-during-after that is not the current before-during-after -- more specifically the "pluperfect" tense is the tense one takes after having referenced either a past or future point of time and then, with that reference assumed, refers to another point of time relative to that reference.

In terms of "wanting to lose weight" it seems to me that right now I have to think about what my body once looked like and imagine what it could look like which requires a double pluperfect scenario to make sense of the desire.

Which kind of goes into the slogan, at least, of "consciousness is what it is not" -- not strictly in terms of being-in-itself/being-for-itself, but at the level of meaningful sentences.



*Started to think and realized that this isn't quite true -- it could be mild or intense, depending on the person, but it's mild in the sense that is relatable to lots of people and possible to conceive as a mild disappointment.

:up: Thanks.

Yes. So what, if anything, would we want to say about identifying such a set with some property? I take it you don't want "being in set X" to count as a property -- nor could it, on the OP's proposal. — J

I'm open to 'being in set X' because I think Russell's paradox is legitimate, and generally I like the paradoxes of self-reference as a point of thought -- stuff like the liar's paradox seem to sit here.

But, yes, it could not count on the OP's proposal which is why the paradoxes of self-reference came to mind.

I don't want to say anything about identifying a set with a property for this very reason :D

What was the question? — Banno

" My understanding is that "classes" can include rules, but I don't understand how to do that formally while I do understand naive set theory at least. "

I suppose I was looking for reassurance of this distinction between sets and classes -- either in the right or wrong way. I've thought of sets as any collection of individuals whatsoever and classes as collections of individuals with inclusion rules. Is that bollox in my head that I'd need to defend or let go of, or something sensible from your perspective?

Does that avoid Russel's paradox?

If so, does it do so by delaying the question? :D

I'm good with forming sets in stages either way. Defining sets in a technical manner is something I still think on and think I don't understand, really.

A set is a single object. — litewave

That single object is the collection, but the thought here is that there's nothing more to that than being the collection of the individuals in the set.

We can name a set, so it can be an element -- and is an element of the set that is itself -- but a set need not be a single object (or name) at all. The empty set comes to mind here.

Relations are different from sets in that they are somehow connecting one set to another, but sets have no "rules" for inclusion.

My understanding is that "classes" can include rules, but I don't understand how to do that formally while I do understand naive set theory at least.

I think covered this well in that "object" is ontologically loaded. I'd include "property" there.

A set is a collection of individuals. They need not have anything related to one another, or share anything at all -- the individuals are the set and there's nothing else to it. The pebble on the ground and the sentence I say 5 miles away can form a set.

I've expressed it as "a set is a collection of objects -- where objects are logical objects (any name whatsoever) -- that need not share anything in common other than being in that collection of objects"

Not sure how right I am as I still think on these things.

That's my understanding, at least given Russell's paradox. (which the OP reminds me of)

It feels plausible that a set can be identified by a property or even a set of properties.

But, no, they're different -- a set is its' elements, rather than a property which all the elements share.

I am the one fighting to make it okay to use AI — Athena

I think that the way you are using AI is okay to use.

Our antipathy isn't directed at what you've described what you use it for, at least. You're not copy-pasting directly out of it, and you're willing to hear other sources rather than rely upon it as a source -- it's a tool for seeing something you may not have heard about, but you're not parading it about like an authority.

Saying that I hope you don't feel like we're fighting you, while still answering your question as to "Why not AI?"

I was surprised how much I liked it, but jamming along and thought to share it because it's unique and new.

something new I've never heard before, but am captivated by:

So, for the sake of clarity, the Boltzmann brain comes in because our experiences and memories are consistent with both our living in the world we think we do and with our being Boltzmann brains that might dissolve at any moment. The evidence we have doesn't determine our embracing one theory over the other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this different from the Cartesian scenario, in your mind?

Actually, given some multiverse formulations, it seems that we are vastly more likely to be Boltzmann-like (there are many similar variants) brains than citizens in a lawful universe. Or, even if we are in a seemingly lawful universe, it would be vastly more likely that we are in one that has just randomly happened to behave lawfully by sheer coincidence for a few billion years, and will turn chaotic in the coming moments. In which case, while the case is underdetermined, we might conclude that our being Boltzmann like is vastly more likely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Heh.

I'm a "Copenhagen interpretation" dude, but only by habit and because it made more sense than the others.

In my mind, at least, Boltzman brains can be treated the same as Evil Demons.

Now, if we are hardcore Bayesian brainers, what exactly is the wholly predictive mind supposed to do when available data forces it to conclude that prediction is hopeless? It's in a pickle! — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not, and would be surprised to hear you express that I am.

I've not pushed it, but have been against Bayesian epistemologies.

Not Bayesian analysis, tho. Bayes' theorem has many relevant truths and uses.

I just don't think it does much to explain knowledge or inference. It's a bit of a "just so" theory, in which case why not phenomenology?

(This flaw in multiverse theories that fail to place any real restrictions on the "multiverse production mechanism" (e.g. Max Tegmark's view that all mathematical objects exist) is, IMHO, completely fatal to attempts to offer up the multiverse as a solution to the Fine Tuning Problem, but that's a whole different can of worms.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given that I've said I'm an absurdist it probably isn't, or shouldn't be, surprising that "The Fine Tuning Problem" is something I'd "pass over" as a bad problem, though would only address it in a thread on that problem because, holy moly, you've been gracious to me (which I appreciate) but that would take us way off track.

This sounds to me a bit like post hoc rationalization, as if one is going to decide on a theory and then allow their theory to be "a selective pressure on which evidence is relevant to consider."

The difficulty here is that you seem to be redefining "theory" to be something that precedes rather than follows after evidence, and such is a very strange redefinition. For example, on this redefinition someone might say, "I have a theory...," and this statement would be indistinguishable from, "I have a prejudice..." The basic problem is that 'theory' and 'prejudice' do not mean the same thing. We distinguish between reasoning and post hoc rationalization, and yet your definition seems to have made such a distinction impossible. It seems to have made impossible a distinction between "following the evidence where it leads," and, "engaging in selection bias in favor of some a priori theory." — Leontiskos

I think this is the scary part of underdetermination.

I was taught that evidence leads to conclusions.

That's still true! They do!

It's just more complicated than that. It's not like I can just gather the evidence and then know the conclusion -- that's because we're limited, we're human, and can only form provisional thoughts which are justifying themselves and present them to others to critique.

I agree that "theory" and "prejudice" are different -- but i'd say that this is the difficulty being presented by the under-determination of a scientific theory by its evidence.

At the point of scientific revolutions empirical justification is what decides things.

But at the secondary education level the theory is what decides things, since it's very likely the student is wrong.

What's the argument here: "There is no problem with identifying pseudoscience because in these examples scientists came around to calling out the pseudoscience?"

Why exactly will science always tend towards correctly identifying pseudoscience? Will this always happen? What's the mechanism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good questions. I gave three characteristics, but they are generalizations which aren't always strictly true in the universal way.

Also, I don't think scientists will always do so -- it could have been the case that, for instance, Jewish Science "won" vs. Nazi Science, at least hypothetically, and my suspicion is that it could uncover true things but it'd be because they waited until a person of the right designation said it rather than because the first person who noticed it said it.

But I'd argue that since reality is wider than these races' thoughts, at least on the philosophical level (which a fascist would not allow), maybe we should listen to the other people who had the thought first rather than wait for one of our "master race" people to pillage the thought and say it?

I don't think there's a mechanism in scientific practice, though -- not like a bike with a chain or a conveyor with a gear etc.

It could be the case that in the future it falls to some stupidity. At times I feel like it's still doing so, given science's marriage to Capitalism, but also -- that's what we have to do now to live, and "pure" knowledge still gets funding sometimes.

The 19th century was rife with pseudoscience, and I think developments in scientific methods and the philosophy of science played a significant role in curbing this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree here, too!

I'm beginning to wonder if "underdetermination" is wider than I think on it. "Boltzmann Brains" aren't something I'd even associate with "underdetermination" -- I largely think of "underdetermination" with respect to the philosophy of science. So a (scientific) theory is underdetermined by the evidence it references. That doesn't make it false it just means that an observations doesn't determine the theory, not even in a large set of observations.

Eventually the theory determines what you're looking for once it's a good scientific theory. It's starting to point out patterns we can talk about, predict, describe, and agree upon.

But that, in turn, means that one must -- to make scientific progress -- ignore many irrelevant facts.

And sometimes those deemed irrelevant happen to be relevant.

****

So, again, I feel we're agreeing on the basics but disagreeing on the interpretation. I'm still wondering why or where.

And, still -- I also wonder if it's just not "for me" -- I'm an absurdist who accepts causation isn't real. Many people baulk at that and wonder about what you're wondering.

Both can be good philosophies, but it's hard to find a bridge.

You can "use" AI to learn material, particularly if you verify it elsewhere. That is, if your friend teaches you something where you then know it and you can write your own understanding of it, then you're fine.

It is hard to enforce, of course. We're mostly relying upon an honor system except when it's blatant because of that -- some people will be people and break the rules because they can get away with it, but for the most part it's discouraged because the point of the site is to think on your own in some manner.

Call me a luddite ... — 180 Proof

With respect to AI I'm fine with being a luddite. For many reasons.

Yes, people will use it. But if we see it's AI slop (which I'm sure people are aware of) then out. We encourage it because we're all probably luddites in this particular way too.

And:

Because it's a forum for people to talk with other people. — Outlander

If I wanted to talk to an AI I could just go do that, but this is a forum for people to talk to one another.

I've slowly come to accept that this is the way the world is, but I don't like it. Perhaps it's because I'm prejudiced against AI.

Sorry for double posting @Count Timothy von Icarus but I wanted to make sure you saw this thought:

I ought say that underdetermination, to my mind, is at odds with a strictly empirical epistemology -- it's more of a rationalism of empiricism. "Yes, we have to go and see, but..."

It highlights that the mind is at least partly responsible for our knowledge -- we don't have a blank slate which is imprinted upon by reality, ala Locke.

:up:

I think you're misunderstanding by "extreme forms" here. I don't mean anti-realism, but rather those sorts of "Boltzmann brain" type arguments that conclude that it is more likely, or just as likely, that the world will dissolve at any moment or radically alter its behavior, as to maintain in its reliable form. This implies that science isn't even likely to be predictive or "useful" on any consistent timescale, and I don't see how that doesn't make it a waste of time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't propose radical skepticism, but also it's not a possibility I feel the need to deny. It is, after all, logically possible -- it's just entirely irrelevant to the task at hand.

Generally I treat radical skepticism as a special case rather than a case we generalize from, except for the cases where a philosopher is purposefully arguing for or utilizing it towards some other philosophical question (so, Descartes and Hume are the "good" kind of radical skeptics; The Freshman philosophy student who just heard about the possibility of solipsism isn't -- rather, that's a sort of "right of passage" that all people interested in philosophy bumble over)

Basically I think such arguments are sophomoric, in the literal rather than pejorative sense, and someone would have to present a radical thesis to make it credible, to my mind; i.e. the "default" position isn't radical skepticism, to my mind, and so isn't so worrying. Sure it's logically possible, so are a host of irrelevancies just like it. Where the bite?

IDK, my reading would be that denials of any knowable human good ("moral/practical anti-realism," which is often aided by other forms of anti-realism) have tended to be destructive to politics, applied science, and ethics. That a key concern of contemporary politics, and a constantly recurring motif in our media is that our technology will drive our species extinct or result in some sort of apocalypse or dystopia because it is "out of anyone's control," suggests to me a fundamental problem with the "Baconian mastery of nature" when combined with anti-realism about human ends and the ends of science. If the aim of science is to improve our casual powers, but then we are also driven towards a place where we are largely silent on ends, that seems like a recipe for disaster, the sort of situation where you get things like predictable ecological disasters that will affect generations of future people but which are nonetheless driven on largely by unrestrained and ultimately unfulfilling appetites. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Heh, this is something we're wig-wamming our way about here because it seems we both believe things like "it's a good idea to talk about ethics, especially with respect to what science does" and "Jewish science is a pseudo-science", but we keep on reading these bits of evidence towards our respective views :D

All to be expected, but I want to say that I think it possible to be a skeptic towards scientific realism and realize it's important to direct ethically -- in fact, because there's no Architectonic of Science that one must follow, we are free to modify our practices to fit with our ethical demands.

I think there's a fundamental problem with reducing reality to science, and with prioritizing the mastery of nature in our understanding of what science does. But then this might be something of an aside with respect to underdetermination. (heh, the rhetorical side of me thought: In fact, because underdetermination is true we should see that science's activity is a direct result of our ethical commitments rather than an arche-method of metaphysical knowledge that's value-free.

It's descriptive, but not value-free, if that makes sense. Science is always interested for some reason, even if that reason is "I just think snails are cool and like to study their behavior because they make me feel happy when I'm around them"

Phrenology was discredited because it was thought to be false. But if "true" and "false" are themselves just social endorsements, then truth cannot arbitrate between racist, sexist, etc. scientific theories. So, sure, both forms are open to abuse, but only one can claim that abuse isn't actually abuse, and that all science is about power struggles anyhow. If science is really just about power or usefulness, then there is strictly speaking nothing wrong about declaring sui generis fields like "Jewish physics" just so long as it suits your aims and gets you what you want. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Phrenology was always a pseudo-science. It has all the characteristics -- the theories follow the form of confirmation and don't try to disconfim them. They held some social significance which allowed people to justify their position or actions to others. They were vague and easy to defend in light of evidence.

Now I'll go this far: If underdetermination, as a theory, leads us to be unable to differentiate between science and pseudo-science, and we believe there is such a thing as pseudo-science (I do), then we're in a pickle.

But like you have a theory which takes care of underdetermination, within realist parameters I'd be able to defend our ability to spot pseudo-science on the social model of the sciences -- i.e. it's not just me, but all the scientists that say what science is. "Jewish Science" wasn't even as clear as phrenology; it was definitely a racist category for expelling Jewish scientists from the academy. That it resulted in expelling people who we still consider scientists -- like Bohr -- is an indication that it's not a science even if "Jewish Science" happened to get the aims desired after.

I.e. though underdetermination complicates the question, it's still addressable by my lights without a realist science.

Arguments from underdetermination is extremely influential in contemporary philosophy.

They have led to many radical, and seemingly skeptical theses.

These theses are perhaps more radical than we today recognize, when seen from the perspective of Enlightenment and pre-modern prevailing opinion.

These types of arguments were not unknown in the past, and were indeed often used to produce skeptical arguments.

The tradition most associated with these arguments, ancient Empiricism, sought skepticism on purpose, as a way to attain ataraxia.

Thus, we should not be surprised that borrowing their epistemology leads to skeptical conclusions.

Hence, if we do not like the skeptical conclusions, we should take a look at the epistemic starting points that lead to them.

Indeed, if an epistemology leads to skepticism, that might be a good indication it is inadequate.

The Thomistic response is given as one example of how these arguments used to be put to bed. I use it because I am familiar with it and because the Neoplatonist solution is quite similar. (But the Stoics also had their response, etc.).

I do think that solution is better, but the point isn't to highlight that specific solution, but rather the genealogy of the "problem" and how it arises as a means of elucidating ways it might be resolved or else simply understanding it better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, fair. It may just not be for me, then -- here I'm saying "but I like the skeptical conclusions", and so the rest kind of just doesn't follow. The motivation isn't there for me.

But you were talking about a lot of the things I think about which is why I replied. I see I missed a good chunk of the essay just because of what grabbed my attention, though.