A painting is a picture whose predominant medium is paint. A drawing is a picture whose predominant medium is pencil, charcoal, pastel, chalk etc.. There is no hard and fast distinction...it's basically a somewhat loose distinction between wet and dry mediums. — Janus

I think your notion of "picture" needs clarifying here -- you've stated that a picture need not be representational, and others have mostly taken you to task on "picture" because it seems to indicate a kind of representation? I think?

Either way if this is how you'll differentiate paintings from drawings -- dry and wet pictures -- it's fair to ask "So how do we identify a picture?"

Yeah, that's true. And even before that https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Stieglitz is widely credited with demonstrating that photography is just as much an art as anything else rather than a perfect representation.

I'm really enjoying reading everyone's answers. I want to put forward one other possibility as I'm thinking it over because I haven't seen it said yet and I want to see what others think.

So this will be close to the idea that a painting is what we say it is, but with more details. I want to say that there are criteria of judgment which differentiate a painting from the wall it sits on, and that these criteria are something decided by our artworld. In some sense the expectation set by going into a museum that showcases great works defines what gets to be considered art and what does not get to be considered art.

But then that's not quite right, of course. It's just a familiar experience for anyone whose bothered to go to an art museum to draw from: there's a certain expectation of the pieces that is different from the temple it sits in. Usually the museum is considered a peice of architectural art, but how we judge a building and how we judge a painting are very different.

I'm inclined to follow along with -- "family resemblance" gets used a lot because it resolves a lot of the various counter-examples you'll inevitably capture with a strict set of criteria. I like the idea of there being a sort of paradigmatic set which we call "paintings", and from that set we can start to make some distinctions that will hold in a good enough way -- we can see why someone would say that -- while acknowledging there's likely a counter-example within the set to any proposed strict criteria.

Something like a formalism of judgment which acknowledges the difficulties in stating universal criteria for something that's probably better suited for a family resemblance.

The distinctions I'm thinking through and liking: everyone's theory on the difference between a drawing and a painting has been more illuminating that I suspected it would be: I thought the far comparisons would do better, but actually I'm enjoying these various distinctions between drawings, paintings, pictures, and art: wet/dry, High/low, warm-up/real-deal...

https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/voting-age-by-country

https://www.boerneraadet.dk/english/

Also found out that there's a bi-annual "children's congress" for children with type 1 diabetes in the states. Something interesting to note there is that the children don't have a right to vote but they can still participate in the process if there's some sort of organization to facilitate lobbying.. Funnily enough that's probably more effective than granting the right to vote carte blanche to children.

Overall, though, I tend to think children have more to offer the world in terms of their own needs than given credit for. The best way to teach responsibility is to make someone responsible for something and follow through. If you forgo all "irresponsible" decisions until 25, like the United Arab Emirates according to the link above, then you'll have no practice in being an adult until 25. Then you'll be the equivalent of an 18 year old who has likewise not experienced adulthood yet.

Also I think adults make much ado about their own strengths. If a person is impulsive all the way into their middle age then something tells me that they're not going to "reform" into proper property-owning responsible citizens that can make clear decisions in national affairs. They're just as confused as the rest of the world.

But the real reason to give people the right to vote is because they have a right to voice their own interests as they see fit. It's about giving them power as a universal right, not ensuring that they are meritocratic enough to wield power.

How locally? Just for you, in your own head so to speak, or how wide can the local go, and why do you think that? — Fire Ologist

I'd say "just for us", rather than just for me. It's not like I invented logic, philosophy, language, etc. I'm connected to others and through that connection -- which included a great deal of care on the part of others before I was able to care in turn -- I am enabled to participate in the game of giving and taking reasons along with everyone else so enabled. Part of that game is in modifying the rules of giving and taking reasons -- a reason for a reason. I think that's the part where we can collectively build the rules of inference in a sort of sui generis manner for every endeavor.

Now, maybe the cosmic universe cares in some sense about that, but from my perspective it only matters locally. I don't even care if there is a universal perspective that says it all. My finitude ensures that I'll never attain that.

I don't see a strict incompatibility between Davidson's account of interpretation and Searle's account of the construction of social institutions. Paying that out would make an interesting thread. — Banno

I don't, either.

And it'd be interesting to try and combine the notions.

What is odd to me is not that you don’t agree with me, but that you see your own position as coherent.

You can’t say “better” in any meaningful way. I agree we could all agree something is better, but who really gives a shit what we think? Certainly nobody in 100 years.

I’m trying to say something, anything, one thing, that someone might give a shit about in 1,000 years, or if they were an alien race of persons 10,000 years advanced, or a god. — Fire Ologist

Why?

Personally I know that what I say is in the face of an absurd world -- so it will only matter locally.

However, that's what matters. Our responding to you demonstrates that "who gives a shit?" is us, here, talking.

I think they would all agree the LNC will always help clarify reasoning.

I am going for it, anyway, despite stepping out too far over the precipice.

And I see you doing the same but you won’t admit it.

You think that, but the only reason you think it is because you can't imagine things otherwise, yes? :

The LNC is an absolute. Maybe someday we’ll find we can use reason while contradicting reason, but probably not, so I see no need to say the LNC is merely stipulated and temporary and provisional awaiting its revision. It’s absolute - I can’t think otherwise and be thinking. — Fire Ologist

"I can't think otherwise" is usually a hint at a kind of transcendental argument going on, if it be articulated.

If it's absolute, then it's not absolutely absolute -- it's only absolute relative to your ability to imagine or think.

Aren't the bourgeoisie just the middle class today? — unimportant

No.

The bourgeoisie are the owners of the means of production -- the workplace.

The boss you deal with is "middle class" in the sense that they're in the middle and make enough money to not suffer and are mostly aligned with bourgeois interests due to that.

But the owners of the workplace are the bourgeoisie. Not the owners of a home who peddle its ideology in the workplace, but the bona-fide owners (and perhaps movers and shakers at a certain level) who make decisions about the economy and how workers will conduct their business because they have purchased their labor.

'Reference frame' is from relativity theory. It is true that relativity theory and quantum theory undermine the idea of absolute objectivity. That's one of the sources of the very anxiety that this thread is about. — Wayfarer

"Reference frame" came from math prior to Einstein. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_transformation

Lorentz (1892–1904) and Larmor (1897–1900), who believed the luminiferous aether hypothesis, also looked for the transformation under which Maxwell's equations are invariant when transformed from the aether to a moving frame. They extended the FitzGerald–Lorentz contraction hypothesis and found out that the time coordinate has to be modified as well ("local time"). Henri Poincaré gave a physical interpretation to local time (to first order in v/c, the relative velocity of the two reference frames normalized to the speed of light) as the consequence of clock synchronization, under the assumption that the speed of light is constant in moving frames.[8] Larmor is credited to have been the first to understand the crucial time dilation property inherent in his equations.[9]

In 1905, Poincaré was the first to recognize that the transformation has the properties of a mathematical group, and he named it after Lorentz.[10] Later in the same year Albert Einstein published what is now called special relativity, by deriving the Lorentz transformation under the assumptions of the principle of relativity and the constancy of the speed of light in any inertial reference frame, and by abandoning the mechanistic aether as unnecessary.[11]

I can see the link between the two. But I don't see how that fits with what Banno says. — Ludwig V

On the left hand side I have three examples of representing belief, and on the right hand side I have each corresponding constituting actions of belief. At least, that's what I was thinking in offering the examples: Also to get a better idea of this wider sense than the bet, to see what other species of representing/constituting belief there may be.

Hrm.

So we are not all really bad people deep down?

Interesting perspective but I dont think making a thread on this thought makes a person good. maybe it makes the person "Self Aware bad person" — QuirkyZen

By the argument that I provided that that person is self aware as being a bad person means they're not bad deep down -- they may never become good, but that recognition is enough.

And if even that knave with a heart of gold isn't bad deep down, then surely there's more than the knave?

I'm wondering -- were I to have the ring of gyges I very much doubt I'd post on a philosophy website about that possibility, unless we aren't all really bad people deep down.

So, if you make a thread on the thought then you are not a really bad person deep down.

If at least one person is not a really bad person deep down then not all people are all really bad people deep down.

QED.

The bet is just a portrayal of any act. The philosophical move is from the action representing the belief to the action constituting the belief. — Banno

OK, fair.

So, bets, promises, posts on one hand and paying up, following through, and reading on the other.

Who will take my bet, and at what odds? Should I be prepared to trust anyone who did take it? — Ludwig V

I'll bet the same against you, on the odds that it doesn't -- given I have nothing and I could win on the bluff I might as well.

That's what I meant to imply by the 1 million dollar buy in before. Maybe it's stupid. I ought read Ramsey that @Banno linked to judge either way.

I distrust betting on the whole. It's a test of who is right and who is wrong -- so I can persuade a person to bet against that the LNC* is false in at least one circumstance, and then provide the argument from the liar's sentence (which will certainly not persuade), and we'd be right back doing philosophy again rather than betting.

*EDIT: I think going for the LEM is much easier but that'd undermine my point: that at a certain spot we'd stop betting and start talking philosophy

Got it: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4280/pg4280-images.html#chap105

A few paragraphs into that section.

To be fair I didn't know the passage I just guessed it was Kant, and had some help.

The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken—a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.

Cuz we like how they look and select which of them get to count which way.

When we look at the entire tree of life then it gets a bit uglier.

I'll maintain that our aesthetic is shown in our choices. But we do expect others to agree with our aesthetic choices, and are surprised at the choices others make... — Banno

Yes, much to do here, I agree.

Somehow we expect others to agree, and are surprised by the choices others make.

Is there a way of talking about that in* in the space of reasons?

*EDIT: I had a notion of "in", but then upon rereading I thought not to emphasize it because it looked confusing.

if what I'm recording is meant to sound like a superb bass guitar, and I achieve this using my dozen post-production devices, the fact remains that I'm representing myself as having the technique of Paul McCartney when I really don't. That's uncomfortable. It's also uncomfortable because it makes me lazy. Rather than practice the damn part till I get it right, I know I can fix it in post. — J

I'd say the historical approach makes sense of the difference here -- you can make the same "product" (I wanted to use scare quotes for "the same", but thought it excessive). But the only reason you're representing yourself in that manner is that we're in a time when post-production hasn't become part of the way people hear music, yet.

I can't think of any other reason why Kanye West is so well loved :D

Post production has a magic to it because we live in a time when you can replicate what was once thought of as "the real deal"

In a way, though I may be wrong about this, post-production is a bit like Warhol? Though I'm leaping there and wondering if you see it or think it different.

I Can't figure it out.

(Tho I did the google, and wouldn't mind a A/B reference)

Thanks. I felt we were diverging far, and so I appreciate the tie-in back. (though I ought say I'm responsible for that divergence, too)

Also, your general description here:

Now a point of indifference in a philosophical debate is a point of agreement.

An alternative method might be, rather than demanding an absolute resolution, begin with points of indifference or agreement — shared constraints, overlapping commitments, common ground. From these, construct a framework of reasoning that remains coherent, though incomplete or evolving.

Ramsey shows the formal consistency of such a method, given the axioms of his system. — Banno

I get along with. The social reality of betting is what caused doubt in me, which is why I asked how literal you meant.

Any thoughts on this @Srap Tasmaner?

I'm mostly relying on you to get an understanding of Williamson, while attempting to put in enough work to make sure I'm not just missing something obvious.

In the most literal sense I suppose we'd have to ask ourselves here in the conversation what we're willing to bet on anything we say. (I bet 1 million dollars as a buy in)

:lol: OK, fair enough.

I'll admit I didn't expect that answer.

but a framework for what it would be to act coherently, given one’s own beliefs and preferences. — Banno

I suppose I'm a still skeptical of the framework, but I have little else to say as to why.

I'm fine with going along with the framework.

Is it possible to tie it into Williamson's concerns?

On the other hand I'll acknowledge that you gave a theory of aesthetics that's general in the same way I'm attempting to.

It's very clear so I'm fine with proceeding with that idea, given you're distaste for the categorical question.

In that case I have problems thinking about it as a model of rationality for reasons so far said.

It's just a game. A good inference involves conversation and dialogue and time -- a bet thrives on forcing someone to make a choice with what they have.

Does it have to be one thing? Does it even have to be specified? — Banno

I think a little bit it does. Even ostensively.

what is it we are judging when judging a flavour on aesthetic grounds? — Banno

From the way I'm thinking about it right now I'd say it's me trying to judge whether someone else will like that flavor, given what they've said about what they like about flavor.

It bypasses induction - it doesn't make use of induction.

Induction tries to show that, given some beliefs f(a), f(b), and so on, we can induce Ux(fx) for some domain. This is invalid.

Ramsey instead says given f(a) and f(b), how much would you bet that f(c)? and develops a logic around this.

There's no claim that U(x)f(x) is true - no induction.

It replaces belief in a general law with a degree of belief, as used for an action. — Banno

Ok. Then I'm not understanding it well enough.

Your explanation of induction is clear. I'm hesitant about the literal betting expression -- is it a metaphor or a mechanism?

This parallels the other discussion in this thread, again showing that we need not work with the general law, but can instead work with the local belief, contra Tim's apparent suggestion. — Banno

Here I believe we agree -- we can work with local belief.

Transcendentally, since there is no other way to work.... :D

Anyway, here we are moving into the whole area of Bayesian epistemology, not a small step. — Banno

I'm likely in error -- but when I think of Bayesian epistemology I think that it's the attempted "cure" to induction. So rather than a truth it's part of the myth.

That sometimes folk sometimes bet poorly is as relevant as that folk sometimes will argue invalidly.

Fair.

I suppose it's the notion of competition of winning that I thought I saw, but it could be wrong to say of Ramsey -- I'll certainly take your word on what he says.

The degree of a belief is measured by the degree to which we are prepared to act on it. — Banno

Here I'd go to the facts of betting behavior. There are those who show up for fun and behave in the manner Ramsey says.

But betting behavior isn't about the truth as much as it's about the thrill of winning.

I doubt philosophers would fare better here. As soon as money is involved we're speaking about an extrinsic motivation -- something done for the sake of whatever -- rather than an intrinsic motivation -- such as, what I take you and I to agree upon, the desire for clarity for its own sake.

While this sounds like a toy, I'm thinking there's an analogy to science here -- how the desire to be The Scientist actually interferes with the process of science. So it'd go with the gambler who believes they can outsmart others on their bets.

If I could persuade people to sign a contract that somehow, through a series of deductions, proved to a judge that they all really agreed to the consequences of "The sun will not rise tomorrow", then it doesn't matter much what the truth of people's beliefs are. What matters is winning.

Alright, thanks. That helps me understand the paragraph better.

@J -- afterthought on electronic music.

One thing that comes to mind is that electronic music has its own technique. It could include trying to emulate the most "dirty and real" sounding recording out there, but it would not, for all that, be a recording of that.

Looking at the particular history here again.

But that does not then mean that the electronic musician doesn't have some sense of technique -- it's just a different set of techniques from the not-electronic (whatever happens to get to count there -- acoustic guitars on a mic not fit because there's an electronic amplifier? If so, then it may be the case that all rock and roll is not music, since that slam-in-your-face wow factor I think is largley tied to the technical ability to make it obscenely loud in concert)

Fair. No one's going about teaching wasp stings, nor is that really connected to a knowledge.

But look at the artist example instead of that one -- it's different enough.

But an art teacher cannot teach an art student "of" Derain's aesthetic, the visceral beauty of particular shapes and colours.

When stung by a wasp, I feel pain. I don't learn how to feel the pain.

When "stung" by a Derain, I feel an aesthetic, I don't learn how to feel the aesthetic. — RussellA

Why not?

It'd be cruel to do intentionally but a teacher can teach knowledge of a wasp sting by having a wasp sting the student.

More acceptably we might subject a student to difficult circumstances in order for them to grow and learn how to cope with failure and pain.

Art students will frequently study "the masters" and emulate them as part of their training. They can never be Derain, but they can learn his aesthetic through this process of emulation along with a technical enough vocabulary to describe the techniques by which the artwork was produced.

You learn in the process of the doing -- but having a teacher generally helps to accelerate that process rather than doing it all on your own, so there is something being taught from art teacher to art student, at least. Something quantifiable, even (number of weeks until able to emulate so and so or such and such)

:up: No worries. I found some time and motivation so started back in, but whenever whatever.

Even our reasoned deductions are based on aesthetic preferences. — RussellA

Yes. Or, what I'd rather say, is there's a difference between one's preference and one's aesthetic taste. The latter can be "trained" such that preference becomes something which can be judged from a distance: Rather than saying "I like this" I can say "if you like such and such or this and that then you may find something enjoyable in this other thing"

Think of a sommelier here. Though there's this "subjective" side of preference the trained sommelier can describe a wine from the perspective of anyone who might enjoy that kind of wine.

Broadly speaking I agree that passion is what starts us -- but I imagine it's possible to still end up in a place where we can partake in the giving and hearing of reasons about art, given enough training. And, obviously, I'd like to ply that -- if given enough agreement on the general idea -- with respect to understanding taste in philosophy.

Right, more a turn of phrase (mine, not Danto's). It's meant to suggest the usual circumstances under which someone will point and say, "That can't be art because it isn't made of the right stuff, or made correctly." Danto argues that Duchamp and his ready-mades began the demonstration against this view, and Warhol put it permanently to bed. Conceptual art, too. — J

Cool.

Conceptual art is something I don't really understand, but Warhol makes sense enough that I'm understanding. Perhaps the following might be conducive to this way of thinking?

This conclusion deeply annoys people who equate art with a craft or skill. And it leaves a serious question -- what is techne, in the arts, if it can't be equated with art itself? I've written about this in various posts, relating to my practice as a musician. I think Danto is right and I'm upset that I can now make music without mastering skills that used to be de rigueur. My "art object" is not "made of the right stuff," according to the old view. It may be indiscernible nonetheless, compared to something that is made of the right stuff, and isn't that enough? But the difference in process, in the act of creating, is damn well discernible to the artist, and I don't like it.

I might turn to the "What makes a great work of art a great work of art?" for this one -- at some point it's because it was painted by Van Gogh, or whomever, that ended up defining beauty in their own particular way.

Likewise if we say there's more to the art-object than the product, but includes the process as well, you could tie that to the similar sentiment people have with respect to great works of art: At some point it's the particular history of the art-object that's part of the art-object. And just as we think replicas of great works of art aren't the "real deal", and there's no property of the object that differentiates them (let's say it's a very good forgist who uses chemical techniques to replicate the exact places of the atoms in a painting) we still differentiate them on the basis of the art-objects process of production.

Looking back at the ending of Speculative Moment and I found its conclusion beautiful:

What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound
in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the
subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.
For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it
experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

Goes to your noting that Adorno wants to give expression to the suffering @Jamal


EDIT: Just throwing another one in this same comment because I wanted to highlight it:

Great
philosophy was always accompanied by the paranoid zeal to tolerate
nothing but itself, and to pursue this with all the ruses of its reason,
while this constantly withdraws further and further from the pursuit.

EDIT2: Also I'm finding myself scratching my head in the first paragraph of Portrayal (Darstellung) -- Darstellung contrasts with Vorstellung, which is what I'm gathering to be the difference between the importance of Portrayal in philosophy, at the beginning, and how it is not just science at the end.

Vorstellung is usually translated as "Representation", and in Kant is important to scientific knowledge. So I understand that much. Darstellung is the "portrayal" -- expression, language -- of the representation. But I'm struggling to see how Darstellung, in Adorno, differentiates philosophy from science at the end somehow and that's what I'm puzzling over:

If the moment of expression tries to be anything more, it
degenerates into a point of view; were it to relinquish the moment of
expression and the obligation of portrayal, it would converge with
science.

Aesthetics and ethics involve a direction of fit such that we change the world to match how we want things to be. This should be read as the reverse of what we do when talking about how things are, when we change the words we use to match how things are.

So an aesthetic opinion. will amount to a choice we make in our actions. Vanilla over chocolate. The preference is individual - we do not expect others to agree, and are happy for her to have chocolate rather than vanilla.

Ethics differs from this in that we do expect others to comply. Not kicking puppies is not just a preference - not just my choice, but a choice I expect others to make, too.

Given this framing, we can address the place of aesthetics in philosophy,

Some bits of philosophy are about how things are. On these, we should expect some general agreement. Other bits of philosophy may be how we chose things to be. And we might variously expect that others will agree, an ethics of philosophy; or we might simply be expressing our own preference: an aesthetics of philosophy.

There's a start. — Banno

I think there's still one thing that needs answered here, still. Even if ice cream is an aesthetic judgment in the manner you propose we would not say that our judgment of ice cream is a philosophical judgment.

The descriptive category still needs something of an answer just to be able to say which of all the possible referents are the relevant ones when speaking an aesthetic opinion in philosophy?

I don't need strict conditions -- I imagine, if there is some statable principle that approximates our past judgments, it will likely involve some vague predicates. So "The sorts of writers one finds being talked about in a history of philosophy" is more than adequate for the categorical question.

But I'm wondering how you'd answer that part of the aesthetic question: Good, bad, indifferent, what is it we are judging when judging a philosophy on aesthetic grounds (as you put it, a preference where I don't hold others to have to share it with me)?

Mohism — Banno

It looks interesting, from the wikipedia page.