A lack of making observations, formulating and testing hypotheses, and then revising beliefs and hypotheses in response to evidence. — Terrapin Station

I'm guessing the reverse would be that having these qualities makes something science, in the broad sense you espouse.

But I'd say the emphasis on observe-hypothesize-test-revise misses out what's going on in theoretical discussions. The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies doesn't have observations and tests and so forth. It is largely an argument from the basis of what difficulties are resolved -- towards a more coherent theory.

Surely you'd include this in your notion of science. But then there must be more to science than just these qualities. And if there be more to science than just these qualities I'd wonder -- how would you differentiate theoretical discussions on the existence of the ether from, say, discussions on the existence of God?

For my reasoning --

The examples you provide aren't the sorts of things that scientists research. So if science is what scientists do then clearly personal intuitions, delusions, or theological claims aren't the stuff of science. Though in some far-fetched sense I suppose they could be, if scientists began research programs around such stuff.

I take a pretty hard historicist stance on science. I believe that such an approach allows us to, through familiarity with the history, begin to gain an understanding of what science is without boiling it down to a programatic methodology or set of allowed inferences based on rules. It allows us to discover what this thing called science consists of while leaving breathing room for the creative aspect which goes into scientific work.

The counter-part to that, however, is that machine operators, lighting technicians, and cooks are not scientists, and therefore they are not doing science. Same goes for plumbers.

But then I don't think that science can be characterized along methodological lines. Even broad ones will come across exceptions simply because science isn't static, it grows and changes with the people that do it. I suspect that those who wish to demarcate science wish to do so along either methodological lines, or possibly other ways too -- like natural vs. supernatural or something like that; something which is metaphysical.

But to pronounce methodologies as science leads one to absurdities, on the whole -- unless construed along historicist lines which observe tendencies while keeping room open for new methodologies. And to put up metaphysical barriers on science seems to poison the well from the get-go. Either science answers questions about metaphysical things or it does not -- we can't go about prescribing to scientists what it is they should discover. And if it doesn't answer metaphysical questions at all then there is no reason for a metaphysical demarcation ala natural/supernatural.

What is it that makes these activities not-scientific, in your view?

I agree with the examples, but I suspect our disagreement is the reasoning behind them.

Cool. I pretty much agree with him.

But perhaps it is the example that's in the way. Let me try this question out -- is there any practiced field, like plumbing but something else, where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science?

Some examples that come to mind for me: A machine operator. A lighting technician. A cook.

If those don't seem to "ring true" for you, are there any that do?

This by way of getting to the heart of the question of how you and I understand science and what you and I understand science to be.

Generally mathematics is grouped in with the sciences. But your point can be made at a less abstract level. Check out Massimo Pigliucci's Why Plumbing Ain't Science.

Are you interested in anyone besides Chomsky? The immediate counter-part to Nozick that comes to mind is John Rawls -- though he is not a left-libertarian by any means.

In the video @Baden posted Chomsky drops some names of left-libertarian/anarchist/etc. thinkers that might appeal more to your sensibilities, too.

Yes, the feeling of cold/heat cannot be the temperature the thermometer measures because the feeling varies between individuals and even the same individual when the thermometer does not.

I'd just say that it's a way of talking with one another, rather than something which exists.
— Moliere

I don't see how that's possible. Language doesn't make us feel cold or hot. Animals and babies feel heat. It's biological. And language doesn't make a thermometer work the way it does. That's physics.

Physics gives us an explanation which doesn't depend on feeling at all. It says temperature is the result of kinetic energy of particles.

Thus we have an appearance of heat/cold that's biologically based, and we have the temperature reading, which is physics based. The feeling didn't tell our ancestors what temperature was, only that we should avoid things that were too cold or hot for us, and that certain things happened when it was hot (fire starting) or cold enough (water freezing). But they didn't know why.

The skeptics thought we couldn't know, but the stoic retort, "I'm horsed", shows why it is possible to know. — Marchesk

My contention is directed at:

This is why the subjective-objective divide exists, whatever conclusions we draw from such a division. — Marchesk

So my feeling and your feeling and the thermometer reading all exist. But calling these entities subjective or objective is a manner of organizing rather than a divide which also exists.

Language does not make us feel cold or hot. Language does not give us an explanation of what the thermometer means.

But calling our feelings subjective and the thermometer reading objective is just a manner of speaking about things which exist, rather than something which exists.

This is why the subjective-objective divide exists, whatever conclusions we draw from such a division. I feel cold, you feel warm, but the thermometer says it's the same temperature. This eventually leads to a scientific understanding of temperature as the amount of energy the particles in a volume of space have. Cold and hot are only relative to absolute zero and minimum entropy, which is far beyond the range at which we can experience temperature. — Marchesk

This is the paragraph where I begin to lose the plot.

I gather that the first line of the quoted paragraph is the conclusion you are arguing for. Am I reading you right here?

If so, then I'd have to say that everything that precedes your conclusion does not imply your conclusion. Maybe I'm being a bit pernickety in my reading but I don't think I'd go so far as to say the subjective-objective divide exists.

We can have a means (a method?) for dividing perceiver-dependent qualities from object-dependent ones. So we have a thermometer, as in your example, which reads the object-dependent quality whereas you or I may say the water is cold or warm depending on whether we came from a hot or cold room prior, which we would say is the perceiver-dependent quality. In one case we call those qualities which we use an instrument that reads the same for ourselves the object-dependent qualities, and in the other case we just state how we feel to designate the perceiver-dependent qualities.

I can go along with this kind of category. But I don't know how that leads to a belief in some kind of divide which exists. That strikes me as a hypostatization.

I'd just say that it's a way of talking with one another, rather than something which exists.

It may seem off, but I have a question for you and I believe it relates to your topic "on the next step" so to speak.

To what extent do you group rationality, scientific activity, and reason? Is the venn diagram of these three akin to an "O"?

I ask because I'd like to posit that reason -- our ability to think -- differs from rationality -- social norms for collective thinking -- differs from science -- the present way we do things in universities, labs, and industry.

In which case we should be able to provide a reasonable account -- at least in principle -- of rationality or science, though it would by these definitions count as unscientific.

Of course I would agree with you that there is more to the story than reason when it comes to how we do things. But I guess I'm asking is the more even state-able, on your view?

I probably haven't said much, no. :D Only attempted to answer your question. We can have new rituals by doing something new, and that doing is both re-occurring, and brings us (or perhaps just oneself) closer to what we/I/you find meaningful -- because it is easy to forget what is meaningful in the day-to-day. Rituals bring us out of our daily rhythm and back to what we find meaningful. At least in an ideal sense, since clearly rituals can also become just another thing on the checklist of life's duties -- but then it isn't exactly meaningful anymore.


I believe I agree with you in saying that reasons and causes are inadequate to our lives -- and I'd at least agree that the unreasonable is commonplace.

I read the article. It's a cool story -- I sort of wonder about that moment things clicked for him. Everything had a reason at one point, before, and then as he tried to "Fake it" he became it. Or, at least, he let go of his reasons and waited to see what would happen after he passed the test.

Isn't it a bit like acting in a play? We are given a script in a play that's different from our lives, and so an opportunity to try a different role on. In that transition we might come to recognize that what we were living was more of a script than we had realized.

I'd say that new rituals arise just by doing them -- at least that's what I was trying to get at. It's as simple as finding meaning in the world and doing something to bring oneself closer to it.

How, for fucks sake, can a ritual be new? — unenlightened

It seems to me that a ritual, while often reliant upon tradition, need not be motivated by tradition -- how else did our rituals come about in the first place, after all?

But rituals are re-occurring. So when Christmas comes about perhaps we do not give gifts this time around. Instead we get together and sing songs -- because the whole gift-giving thing become a monster on its own, and took away from the meaning of Christmas, where being merry together seemed to bring is back to what we were after in celebrating in the first place.

Obviously there's nothing new in that, but it gets at how rituals are re-occuring -- Holiday on such and such a day has such and such a meaning, we get together and do something every year to enact, remember, or get closer to that meaning; to feel the meaning.

Holidays in general are sort of like this, I think. There is some significant thing in our life that we are easily drawn away from in the day-to-day, and so we commemorate it with a holiday where we go out of our way to remember or enact that important thing, and we make a ritual of it.


So perhaps a ritual can be new insofar that it has some established re-occurring activity we do together -- and it's just a matter of starting it and making it a re-occurring thing rather than going back to a tradition. Maybe it doesn't need to be a holiday, or a day on the calendar set aside for the year. Perhaps it could just be a morning ritual. And I don't think that pouring a bowl of raisin bran every morning would quite count all by itself -- it would have to have some kind of meaning attached to it as well. Like a morning cup of coffee to take in the simple pleasures of life, or a prayer at night to feel grateful.

Yes, in a sense. But not just coping like it's a cure.

I think I've mentioned this analogy before, but think of diabetes. There is no cure for diabetes. There are strategies for living with diabetes. Now if a cure comes along of course we'd be interested in taking it. But there is an undue amount of stress you can put yourself through by thinking that you'll be cured in your lifetime and once that cure finally comes through then I can get on with the process of living.

There are just some conditions that do not have a cure. And depression might be such a condition for yourself, as it is for myself. In which case all you can do is identify the symptoms, recognize them for what they are, and wait for them to lessen (or not, if they do not) while you go on living. It's just another thing to recognize as outside of your (direct) control.

Well I think I've mentioned that I've been diagnosed with depression before. And those sorts of thoughts are just a part of my life. They come in waves -- with crescendo's and valleys. It's just a part of the ride.

For myself at least nothing really helped me out of a bad spot. But medication and therapy helped me get through a bad spot. I never felt better really when things were wrong, but such effects made the affect feel less bad -- as if I could get to the next day.

I think that usually, for most folk, there's a light at the end of the tunnel. It's unfair that you have to go through that tunnel, but hey life was never fair. It's an odd waiting game where everything you can do is more indirect rather than direct -- it's not about feeling good now, it's about coping with a disconnection from your emotions now however you can do so.

And it's not the sort of thing that is cured in the sense of *erased* -- it's much more like a torn tendon. It goes away, and you learn to even run again, but you always feel it a little after the fact when the weather is awry.

EDIT: I guess in a way I mean you don't really combat them, you live with them. And through living with them they become less influential -- "combat" indicates something far too direct for something that actually works. It's a bit counter-intuitive, but seems to work for me.

Philosophically it sounds like you're asking after the nature of identity.

But I think your underlying question is: should I continue to see this man in a romantic way?

And for that question I wish to emphasize that only you can answer that question in the end. I know that you know that, but it's worth stating because these things are so very confusing.

Maybe it works out. Try it. Why not? You're only a few dates in. At the worst he shows himself a fraud and all his promises to drink less will show themselves easily enough after a month or two.

And if he changes then you'll know that by the fact that he follows your advice. If he doesn't -- and this is important to you of course -- you're in a different situation. Regardless of the question about personal identity you may decide, though it is painful right now, to move on.

Yeh. That's cool with me at this point. I've been a bit MIA mostly because of a move and a new job.

Sure, I'd agree with that.

But I suspect the devil is in the details.

Tying this all back to intuitinism -- it seems to me that there is an "aha!" moment when we read philosophy. It's like when we are able to see both the duck and the rabbit, just to lead this back to hinge propositions. I couldn't give a straightforward answer to your question, @Banno because I just felt too ignorant to be able to affirm or deny your question, but I can see a certain amount of sense to it from my perspective which is broader, far away, and not as intimately connected to the details.

But I believe that good philosophy is like that @Terrapin Station. We can see how the hinge can be flipped, and we might have reasons why we believe it should be this way or that way -- but in the end there is no method for determining which one of us is correct. The best we can do is provide our reasons for why we are satisfied this way or that way, and at least check for things like consistency or undesirable consequences. But in the end every theory can "bite the bullet", so to speak.

Also, with philosophy the theories we're exploring are usually so totalizing that it can be hard to un-see what we're used to seeing. You see this a lot in ethics especially, where one normative theory re-interprets another normative theory into its own frame -- "Well, that's just basically a form of deontology/virtue ethics/consequentialism because...." -- but if we are sensitive to this totalizing habit then we can begin to sense how there are hinges beneath our big-picture views, and that there are differences that are subtle, but important.

I think I see our disagreement in that light @Terrapin Station -- though by all means we can of course continue to try to provide reasons which will allow us to refine our views and state them more carefully (which I think is a good benefit, even if we don't agree in the end)

I'm just skimming this paper you linked, but I'd encourage you to look at it again with a different idea in mind tham relativism.

I ran a quick search on your Canadian paper and the combination "social construct" does not appear in that paper.

The Canadian paper seems concerned with integrating indigenous knowledge into the wider scientific curriculum, focusing on Saskatchewan in particular as an example of what this looks like in practice. The problem is that the social stuff is getting in the way of teaching the science stuff.

Objectively speaking this isn't about social construction at all, but how to help students to learn. They note that there is a general problem with scientific pedagogy in that it alienates the student from the subject matter, and that this alienation is more pronounced in the cases where the social world has experienced European colonization.

They state:

A cross-cultural science curriculum promotes the decolonization of school science.
Indigenous students learn to master and utilize Eurocentric science and technology without, in
the process, sacrificing their own cultural ways of knowing nature

So, really, this is mostly about getting students to learn given the real obstacles teachers face, and very little about the social construction of science or something like that.

I agree with the part about Wittgenstein -- he is kind of an ubermensch of philosophical value. Reading him, for myself, was like changing my thinking against my own will. That's a pretty good example of tablet-breaking.

The part that had me thinking from you was your last sentence. I'm not at all certain about ethical progress -- though the good, the beautiful, and the true do seem to have a certain familiarity with one another when it comes to meta- issues.

I don't know.

I tend to see philosophy as not having correct answers -- but there are good answers and bad answers.

Heh. I made no such assertion about popularity.

And I do not expect you to agree with me. This is, after all, philosophy. However I think we can both see that we're at the point where we basically believe or do not believe a proposition, and we're kind of at the part where we're just asserting our belief -- we have tried to show the other what we mean, but failed.

I suppose that seems false to me because of the two reasons I've tried to convey.

There are extreme cases. So Chuck Berry and Beethoven -- that's a hard case to judge. They are good in their own ways, and which we prefer listening to is likely a matter of preference. But Beethoven compared to the garage band next door? They are just beginning. They haven't learned much about music. They are mostly playing covers, and they aren't able to play together in unison - they are often playing different beats and aren't listening to one another.

Just to keep the analogy cleaner -- comparing them to the New York Philharmonic to the garage band next door, the New York Philharmonic is better.

And then there are middling cases for which it makes sense to differentiate between what I like and what is good. In one case I know I just like it. In another I can provide reasons why you should like it too. Kant makes a similar distinction when talking about aesthetic judgment -- that though there is no fact to the matter we hold aesthetic judgments as if others should conform to our judgment.

It's the reasoning part that differentiates matters of aesthetics from mere liking -- for you can reason to the ends of the earth and I will like or dislike something just because I like or dislike something. There is no reason to it. But something is good because of such and such reasons which have to do with comparison between artworks, context, history, the elements of art, and the principles of art.

Then you have the capability of choosing which is better. To me that is enough. Of course you have a preference for this or that. Preferences play a role in evaluating what is better or worse. But it's also not quite right to say that they are the same as mere opinion either -- we have elements of an art and principles by which said art is made, a history to draw from, and -- importantly -- reasons we can provide to others as to why this is better or worse than something.

With matters of preference there isn't anything more to judging something other than whether or not it pleases you. But with matters of aesthetics there is -- we provide reasons for others to consider in making their own judgment about whether such and such is good or bad.

Which is why I was trying to drive the point home with Star Wars. There is a difference between my saying "I like Star Wars" and my saying "Star Wars is a good movie" -- and I'd say that the primary difference is in whether we can reason about something. It wouldn't make sense to debate whether I like something. But it does make sense to debate whether this movie is better than that one -- we have this, that, and the other reason.

That our preferences influence our judgments doesn't matter and is obvious. What matters is that these two things are not the same sort of judgment.

The general method is one of engagement with the medium as creator and audience, knowledge of its history, as well as the elements and principles which make up a medium. It is not one of reduction to something else. This is something that stands on its own. As such there is no deeper "because", though it is always possible to ask why.

Let's take an extreme example.

Have you ever watched The Room?

Now compare that to Guardians of the Galaxy.

Which would you say is a better movie?

There is no method. I'll put that out there. And the same holds true for factual matters.

But there are stories I can give you. With Star Wars I'd say that I discovered it was not good by watching more movies, reading more scripts, taking classes on acting and script writing, engaging with the history of storytelling and further developing my knowledge of the movie artform. In comparing Star Wars to other movies I could see how Star Wars was primarily plot-driven, that the characters were two-dimensional, and the dialogue came out because of the storyteller had a plot they wanted to tell and it drove that plot.

In general -- engaging with the history of an artform, in its production and as audience, is how you discover aesthetic values.

I don't think you'll find my response very satisfactory. :D

But, from my perspective at least, determining whether a phenomena is external or internal to our thinking isn't a productive question. It's a metaphysical set up that gets in the way of looking or "going back to the things themselves", as Husserl put it.

Whether you determine that values are strictly internal to thought or external to thought, regardless of how you interpret the phenomena -- values are distinct from facts, and they are not just preferences.

Seems to me that they operate on their own. That is, after all, my position -- that they are not reducible to something else.

The question is about the status of flaws in a film--wasn't that what I was asking you about? It's not a fact that there are flaws in a film, and it's not simply a result of preferences/opinions, but it's what? — Terrapin Station

It's a value.

What would you say it is that's different from facts or opinions/preferences? — Terrapin Station

Wouldn't there be many things that are different from those?

Let's take knowledge. Under a simple theory of knowledge it involves belief and justification as well as facts. And it isn't right to say that knowledge is merely opinion.

Don't you think things like forgiveness, redemption and repentance are applicable to particular actions that would be entirely ignored by other religions, cultures or relationships? — Judaka

Yes. I think there is a relative element to values. I also think there is a relative element to facts -- as in, other religions, cultures, or relationships ignore certain facts.

Is the wrongness of those actions really innate if this were the case? — Judaka

Well, it could be. If the cat stands up and walks off the mat, the cat is no longer on the mat -- and "the cat is on the mat" is false. Facts change, and for all that we do not say that our preference dictates what is true or false.

how much can you twist and bend something until what it's based on changes? — Judaka

A bit of a different question, but still a good one.

Start with this. Do you believe that what you're referring to are flaws factually? Or are you just saying that they're flaws in your later opinion, given how your preferences have changed? — Terrapin Station

Neither. Values differ from facts, so they are not factual. But it is not just an opinion or preference either.

Factually? No. There is a difference between facts and values.

But I'll use an example. I grew up watching Star Wars. I love watching Star Wars. I have good memories of it and a soft spot for the fantasy world that inspired me as a kid.

But as I grew older and developed a taste for film I could come back to Star Wars and see its flaws.

Now, knowing its flaws, I still love Star Wars. But I would not argue that Star Wars is a good film.


To go with music -- preferences can change over time. But there are still ways of evaluating music that do not reduce down to mere preference. Beethoven, regardless of your preference, is a good composer. You may not have a taste for classical music, or prefer to listen to electronic dance music, or some such. But in spite of your or my preference he is still a good composer.

To take a page out of the Critique of Judgment -- we treat objects of art as if our matters of taste were in some respect "objective". For Kant this had to do with purposiveness and the effects that some work of art had on our faculties. But there are other aesthetic theories out there -- and with them we can say why this or that work of art is good or not good. We can articulate an argument about our judgments, rather than simply saying "Hurrah, Beethoven!" or "Boo, Beethoven!"

The problem of appearance/reality as applied to ethics --

So this is why I think that acts like changing one's mind, repentance, forgiveness, and redemption are strong indicators for moral intuitionism. Sure, we can be wrong. In fact in the face of our own evil we often acknowledge our error and try to make amends. In a similar way in the face of our own falsity we often acknowledge our error and try to amend our beliefs. If we can be wrong then there is something we can be wrong about, unlike our preference for ice cream of which it is silly to say you can be wrong about.

But this set up is the sort of set up which denies our ability to tell someone else what is right or wrong, because it depends on intuition. And then depending on how much tolerance we are allowing the argument from a difference in ethical beliefs either does or does not get off the ground.

A bit of an afterthought -- I first wrote on this, but then thought it better just to mention instead -- If anyone can tell others what is right or wrong, it would be the ubermensch: breaker of tablets, master of the self, inspirer of slaves to write future tablets. But the ubermensch is not an ideal, nor is it something we even could aspire to -- she cannot even help but to be an ubermensch.

This is a neat rendering. The point of behaving ethically is not to say but to show.

But if that's so, how important are moral rules?

Can we Do without them? — Banno

I had to think about that one for a bit. And I'd say yes and no. Kind of in-between.

I mean, in a lot of ways we already Do without rules. As you noted a lot of ethical talk is post hoc -- which isn't necessarily a bad thing, but if true that demonstrates that we aren't always acting from rules.

I think I'd want to develop the line of Wittgenstein that seems very reminiscent of Nietzsche -- that ethics and aesthetics are one.

Looking at aesthetics in a more literal fashion I think back to one of my art classes and we were taught the elements and principles of art. These are definitions for breaking down works of art into their components, in the case of elements, and then ways of building a work of art of judging a work of art when those components come together, in the case of principles. What's interesting about these rules, in comparison to the ethical rule-following we've been discussing, is that they are not of the form of if/then statements. Rather they are a collection of statements intended to get the student of art to think about art in a different way than "I like this picture" and "I do not like this picture" -- so that it isn't just whether or not you like vanilla ice cream or not, but rather so you can intelligibly say something about why you like or dislike something, or at least be able to begin to interpret a work of art.

Further, when you begin to study some of the masters you see that they actually break rules -- and its in the very breaking of the rules that their work shines. Of course they are masters, and not students, so their artistic intuition and ability is such that they can get away with that and still achieve something interesting. But this goes to show how though there are rules for students, the rules are more pedagogical than they are hard-line rules.


So, flipping back over to ethics and rules following -- it seems to me that we can learn to be good in a similar way that the student of art learns how to do art. Rules are in place as pedagogical tools for those who are unable to make judgments just yet, and need hand-holds pointed out to them. But rules are often meant to be broken, too, when we are masters of an art.

So in a way, if we have developed our ethical capacity we should grow beyond rules. But, at the same time, we could not achieve that ability without them. Further, though we can grow beyond rules aesthetically it's not like we don't think of them or have them in mind when we break them -- so its not a total absence.

Compare Nietzsche's view of the eternal recurrence -- a kind of rule that is not of if/then form, but is one of Nietzsche's responses to the death of God/traditional morality, a way of "saving" values from the death of their metaphysical underpinning.


Bringing this back around to Kant we can see how his articulation began this line of thinking because he did not provide rules. Freedom is the foundation of his ethics, as well as human value -- what he articulated were rules for making judgments about rules from a personal point of view.


EDIT: I think this goes some way to responding to your second post here: -- but let me know if you disagree.

Sure! It actually is a comparison I wish I had made sooner. It's really interesting to think about.

Because great projects usually end in disappointment and frustration, whereas small projects are more often successful -- and thereby pleasurable.

Extinction is the final stage of evolution. It will happen one day, but it will be out of our control.

We could, but who wants a great project when there's so much pleasure to be had in small projects?

Sure. I think we can all acknowledge that the thinkers are different.

But there is some resonance between these ideas too.

For one, freedom -- under a certain conception of freedom we do not follow rules. So by describing actions as being not-articulatable we could be saying that the ethical is that place in life where language can no longer operate -- that its in the showing, and not the saying, where our actions are free insofar that they do not follow a rule.

For two, one way of reading Wittgenstein is to focus on his interest in ethics -- compare his notion that ethics and aesthetics are one to Nietzsche, or that goodness is not found in the world to Nietzsche. You could almost say that Wittgenstein is struggling with the same problems of value that Nietzsche is, though they do go different ways with it of course.

And then there's rule-following as a traditional way of looking at ethics, of which Wittgenstein certainly has something to say and Nietzsche has something to say about rules.

They aren't talking about the exact same thing. But there's some interesting parallels to be drawn.

EDIT: It just occurred to me to mention this so it's in an edit -- but wasn't Wittgenstein also influenced by his readings of Schopenhauer?

Ahhh, Athens -- home of the 30 tyrants, the death penalty for teaching the youth to think, and leader of free thought in the ancient world.

That makes sense.