So it's not a fact that I'm standing here right now? What's happening right now hasn't already happened. That would be absurd. So it can't be a fact under your ill-considered definition. But that's also absurd, because it is a fact. — S
Could it not be the case that we truly feel wrongly about a moral issue, though? Or no? — Moliere
Bewitched by language use much?
There's a period of time between your report and what your reporting upon(what happened). I wouldn't expect one who has not acknowledged the inherent untenability of Heraclitus' river to understand...
Horses and rivers... — creativesoul
So it's not a fact that I'm standing here right now? — S
Could it not be the case that we truly feel wrongly about a moral issue, though? Or no? — Moliere
What is truly feeling, as opposed to feeling? Or do you mean that we can be deceptive to what we feel, and thus there is what we truly feel and what is only ephemeral or false? — Moliere
In what way does that differ from approval? As you say just above I am misunderstanding you when I say that Bob's action is moral because he approves of it, so truly feeling cannot be the same thing as approval.
What is truly feeling? — Moliere
It's a misunderstanding of moral relativism because it leaves out the relativism part! Approval relative to who or what? I don't approve. He does. I don't approve of his approval. Approval in this context comes under the broader category of moral feeling. Examples of other moral feelings are guilt, shame, outrage, righteousness, vindication, and forgiveness. — S
If all the world believes it proper to kill all the blond haired babies, is it wrong? In this hypothetical, you too believe it's proper. — Hanover
Of course, in a relative sense. The puppy kicker's feelings are wrong relative to my standard of judgement, and probably your standard of judgement, and probably Banno's standard of judgement.
Who here amongst us judges it to be morally acceptable to kick a puppy? Hanover, put your hand down.
In hindsight, some of my past feelings on matters relevant to ethics are wrong relative to how I now feel about it. — S
I just meant that we can make true statements about how we feel. — S
It's a misunderstanding of moral relativism because it leaves out the relativism part! Approval relative to who or what? I don't approve. He does. I don't approve of his approval. Approval in this context comes under the broader category of moral feeling. Here are some more examples of words which can indicate moral feeling: disapproval, guilt, shame, outrage, condemnation, righteousness, vindication, and forgiveness. — S
Here's a question for you: if it was proper to kill all the blond haired babies, would you go along with that? — S
But obviously that's merely a hypothetical, and one which doesn't reflect my actual moral judgement about killing blond haired babies. — S
You have the idealism disease, too? Or are you just pretending to for "fun"? — Terrapin Station
(My bolding)it's a phenomenon that occurs outside of our minds. — Terrapin Station
Hrmm, well for me at least, then, this still leaves out the sorts of sentences we say that are ethical, yet mean there is a fact to the matter in the sense that an action has the property of wrongness or something along those lines. — Moliere
I wouldn't dispute that we can say true statements about our feelings. But I wouldn't say that a speaker who says:
"Kicking a puppy is wrong" is true
means
In accord with my feelings, "kicking a puppy is wrong" is true
If they wanted to say that they'd just say "I feel that kicking a puppy is wrong" -- but, instead, they use the gerund and form what appears to be a proposition.
And what they mean is that this statement about goodness is true. — Moliere
Sure, if hypothetically 1+1=3, then it does. You've stipulated the impossible, so the impossible occurred. — Hanover
I get it, but why give your moral judgements higher regard than mine? — Hanover
Yes, so we have two different models for using moral terms. On my model, whether or not Bob's action is moral is independent of whether anyone approves of it or thinks it is moral - which is what makes it a realist model. — Andrew M
That's fucked up. I certainly wouldn't go along with killing all the blond haired babies. Proper be damned. — S
Because I trust my moral judgement more than yours. You would have to give me greater reason to trust your moral judgement over mine. Good luck with that. — S
Because I trust my moral judgement more than yours. You would have to give me greater reason to trust your moral judgement over mine. Good luck with that.
— S
Is it based on reason? — Hanover
You hypothesized that killing blonde haired babies was moral, so therefore it is. — Hanover
It's like if I asked you if you would say it was moral to kill blonde haired babies if you subjectively thought it was moral. — Hanover
Is it based on reason? — Hanover
A sincere speaking saying "It is raining" implies that said speaker believes it is raining -- but they are talking about the rain, and not their belief. — Moliere
When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there ought not. — creativesoul
I'm not presenting a model per se. I'm describing what's really going on ontologically. Are you simply avoiding claims about what's really going on ontologically? — Terrapin Station
Part of the reason I'm focusing on what's really going on ontologically is that it's necessary for epistemological purposes here, especially when there's a disagreement and anyone is claiming that someone else is simply wrong a la getting something incorrect/inaccurate. — Terrapin Station
Is not Bob's action moral or immoral on account of what would be the normal, or the most common, human attitude to it? — Janus
No quiet. When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there is not.
Using ought to mean is is obtuse. — Banno
When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat.
I didn't write that, because I wasn't talking solely about what it takes for a speaker to be mistaken(for their belief statements to be false). I was also talking about what it takes for their statement to be meaningful and sincere as well. — creativesoul
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