For instance, if our inductive propensities are not grounded in our rationality, but instead in our emotions, then in order to say that the inductive propensities are reliable we would have to say that our emotions are "reliable" in some sense. I don't see that going anywhere within Humean thought. — Leontiskos

Right, I agree!

So enter Kant -- he puts the rationalist spin on his philosophy but then I think he has a more romantic undertone which relies upon emotion than stated. Much in the same way we can look at Hume as a rationalist we can look at Kant as an emotivist and not because this is some defect in their thought or some such. What Kant adds to his moral theory is that there are proper kinds of emotions in order to claim one is acting morally or elsewise. That emotion is respect for the law itself. And then his aesthetics open up a door to a rationality of the aesthetic. Ya'know, a new one other than Aristotle's ;)

What I see is that the way we generate knowledge requires a priori assumptions, rather than knowledge -- or we might be tempted to call it knowledge after relying upon it or proving it or some such, but if we do there's be some other a priori assumption by which we are doing it. There's a certain arbitrarity to a starting point, to the question that one wants to ask, or to what sounds plausible to a person.

But then we hold to these because we desire to have a kind of shared knowledge with our fellows -- in a way these a priori assumptions are the basis of a philosophical research group or scientific group or what-have-you. And it's a unity of mind and reason that we see in our goings abouts and doings.

So in the soft neo-Aristotelian way this isn't even that far from Aristotle, but I do have certain objections and I take other answers more plausibly than his, and have already noted where I find it hard to believe and the consequences of those beliefs.

And I really do think it's important to see outside of the Aristotelian framework, sometimes. Since I don't see metaphysics as a knowledge I see it as ways people perceive the world when they ask philosophical questions, and when we listen to one another we find that it's different.

Do you hold that Hume's argument is sound, or not? — Leontiskos

Yes, but I don't think it does the work you're thinking it does.

The first time I read Hume I thought the same, which is what ultimately drove me to Kant.

But then I realized there's this other reading of his skepticism which treats it a bit more in accord with the Kantian notions than a first reading might suggest. The skepticism doesn't undermine knowledge as much as note how human beings' rationality is embedded with their emotions. The bits Kant adds notes how the mind has a rational structure, like I believe you're insisting upon, but he also puts a limit to knowledge. For Hume it's that the way we infer things about causation does not match his philosophical construct of causation, and so he must conclude that though his description of the human mind leads to conclusions we would not otherwise consider he can't help but draw the consequences when thinking philosophically.

In some ways we can read them as the emotivist and the rationalist both contending with this classical philosophical duality between emotion and reason, but each putting their own spin on it. Whereas for Hume it's to note that human beings don't produce knowledge by engaging in philosophy, for Kant our experiences are rationally conditioned. (But also, importantly, we don't produce scientific knowledge of philosophy, except for his one tome, of course, because he got it right)

Skip to Popper. His attempt to deal with the problem of induction is to note how our scientific theories aren't exactly positive cognitions or syntheses of reality exactly as it is, but instead what differentiates science from philosophy is the criterion of falsifiability. He takes up the notion that induction skepticism is true, and science proceeds, logically, by the modus tollens (which I flipped in my head earlier and misspoke)

The idea of a guess isn't that far off, to my mind, of how science works though Popper and others try to dress it up a bit more than that. But for me I'm trying to look at it as simply as possible in order to explain it to someone, rather than grasp its essence, and also to hear what others say on the matter of course.

In any case, your whole idea that induction is an inference that is supposed to be valid is a strawman. Valid inferences are deductive. Induction is not formal in that way, and has never been said to be. — Leontiskos

Now I've already agreed to say that my understanding is terrible in order to jump into the ideas and arguments. Let's just say Aristotle is right about everything.

If what I say is false, then you can set me straight.

You think the "problem of induction" is a problem for Aristotle, but not for your lackadaisical positions (like, "I've been told, therefore I know"). — Leontiskos

Why would I think such a thing?

I have noted that we could just not know. I don't particularly care to overthrow Aristotle -- I think he's anachronistic to our practices of science and philosophy today, but I don't particularly mind others who want to adopt his methods. I don't really see philosophy as this tournament of positions which must be laid out in order to demonstrate who the victor is.

Regardless knowledge does indeed begin with listening to others. Without the ability to hear a teacher, say in an academy or some other setting that's not controversial, one doesn't obtain knowledge. But, really, we learn about what exists in this world more or less daily by this method. We don't go to the degree of questioning whether the induction is a logically valid construct for our inference -- in our everyday life the way we determine what is real is through that interactive process with one another. Think of hallucinations here -- we classify someone who sees things no one else sees as undergoing a hallucination: it's real in some sense but not real in another. The way a person would realize they have a hallucination is by communicating with others about their perceptions. Since we have no way of verifying someone else's perceptions -- to perceive their perceptions as my own perception -- we pretty much just have to trust one another on what it is we see.

Over time we learn to discriminate that trust further, but the last thing in the world I think it comes from are logical constructions of knowledge. I don't think the process of knowledge generation is constrained by logical validity, except where research in logic and other disciplines might be concerned as a meta-requirement. We really can make guesses and then go and see if they are correct. Usually someone who is a better guesser knows a lot or has some familiarity with the world and what is considered knowledge, but that doesn't make their guess anything more than that.

If we know we know something then there's no reason for us to invent some frame in which to say how we know that we know that we know something -- like what philosophy is trying to do. We can just say "Rule 1 of this discussion: We know things"

Upon thinking that we can see that though there's a problem in Aristotle, and though there's the philosophical puzzle of the problem of induction we still know stuff. This is an inversion of the question. Instead of asking after the method in order to know our conclusions are good we are seeking out possible patterns in what we already know in order to answer the question "How do we know?"

It's a philosophical question with more than Aristotle's and Hume's answer, though: And I've even supplied a name so I feel like we've hit the merry-go-round of disagreement and will just go back and forth asserting what we're asserting thinking it somehow addresses whatever it is we're trying to address.

Oh, Ion!

I don't know that -- it's something I wonder about. And in the context of art I think it's interesting to explore the objectivist stance. In what sense can we make aesthetics "objective", or whatever? Is it even appealing to do so? Does it matter at all if the qualities are objective, or is this just a way for us to say "It's really important for others to see this"?

Ultimately I'd say the same of aesthetics as I do of ethics though -- that the statements aren't interested in matters of fact, exactly. But they are still valuable for all that.

Which is kind of a theme of my thinking generally. With respect to objective/subjective, though, I really don't think it's an important distinction at all. We get the drift, but there's plenty of interesting questions which can't be addressed by such a simplification of the authority of a speaker -- either it's TRUE or it's just your opinion doesn't exactly allow for nuance.

I was wondering what the consequences of the question were. When they said they wanted opinions I thought to give them one that hadn't been stated yet.

But also I don't feel a deep attachment to the dichotomy between the objective and the subjective, which is why I noted Kant's theory of aesthetics which could be read as both/and or neither/nor -- it's a troublesome theory to categorize as strictly objective or subjective.

Hume's argument is a kind of exclusion of induction by exhaustive dichotomy. What is your response here supposed to be? Do you think that Hume would say, "Oh someone told you that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger! Oh, well in that case my argument doesn't apply!" Or would he say, "Oh, you are 'simply asserting that you know things,' well in that case my argument really seems to break down." — Leontiskos

I imagine it'd be easy to get him to see that knowledge is generated by human being, and that the conclusions of his argument are at least consistent with that. Rather than making appeals to the logical structure between events, which he demonstrates is invalid, we make appeals to people's emotions and habits of thought. In this case those habits are at least academic of some kind, though there is surely more knowledge in the world than the academy -- the electrician knows a good deal about the world, for instance.

Rather than undermining knowledge and philosophy it demonstrates why it's necessary to pursue -- we will never have a grasp whereby we can derive necessary conclusions about things. The question then becomes how does that work, in spite of induction being invalid?

But what essences do is give us something we know of the thing that must be the case. In which case we'd say that with a new essence we have a new species.

It's not so much "falling prey" as saying -- there's more than one philosophy that answers this question. We don't have to accept Aristotle's solution. And, indeed, we could just say we don't know, like good and curious skeptics, though I indulge in philosophy and try to answer the questions anyways because they're enjoyable to think about and connect with others over.

You don't get to exempt yourself from the criticisms you level at others. That's not how it works. — Leontiskos

I don't think that when I make a guess about something that I'm making a valid inference, so I'm being self-consistent.

It's not concerning that we cannot tell whether you are jesting? — Leontiskos

I mean once I get called a bumbler, an idiot, and a manbaby for a philosophical position I hold I'm afraid I can't resist the urge to crack a dry joke for myself. It is a bit funny you have to see.

We are talking specifically about Hume's argument from induction in a broad sense, namely the idea that we cannot reason from particulars to universals. That's the thing that you keep vacillating about, using it as a weapon to attack others while ignoring the fact that it would destroy your own beliefs if it were deployed consistently. — Leontiskos

I don't think that knowledge depends upon that inference being valid. The proof is in the evidence -- we generate knowledge from checking wild guesses all the time. Theories aren't generated in a methodological fashion. We don't need to know how we know in order to know that we know -- we can, from knowing that we know, look for patterns for how we know. Much in line with the Aristotelian way.

But upon doing so in our world today it doesn't really look the same as it did back then. And post-Kant we have good reason to separate metaphysics from science -- my thought is that Aristotle's notion of science is perfectly fine in his day even with the invalidity. Basically that the logical structure doesn't allow for the inference demonstrates that knowledge doesn't require necessary and sufficient conditions, or essences, in order for us to generate knowledge.

My view is a bit more pedestrian about knowledge -- it's wonderful, but very much a finite and human affair. This is much in the spirit of Kant (as was Popper, for what it's worth)

Though, also, my metaphilosophical position is one which does two readings: With the grain, and against the grain. So for every philosopher you start with the grain else you won't be addressing the arguments they are making. But then it is necessary to return and look for why people might object, or where there might be an error in the argumentation, or where some uncertainty is and what we might say in response. I call this against the grain. This is a metaphor I'm pulling from carpentry for how one is "supposed" to cut the wood, but noting in philosophy we are supposed to cut the wood the wrong way in order to see the full meaning of a philosophy.

In doing so we can lay out a particular philosophers position, but then note how we might diverge, or even just wholesale steal ideas out of the text. In order to understand the concept we reference back to the text, but philosophy is a generative activity. It is creative. We can do what they did and write our own little thoughts, inferences, suppositions, and what-have-you.

You have to either embrace Hume or reject him. — Leontiskos

That's a false dilemma. We can accept the parts we agree with and not accept the parts we disagree with.

Is it concerning that it is hard to tell? — Leontiskos

Heh, I was only playing into your preconceptions according to what you said -- it's not concerning at all, but expected.

But, no, I am speaking in jest.

I'm not sure. I need a Philosopher Daddy.

So your mom told you that tigers are an existing species and that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger? The problem is that at some point we need to grow up and say, "Mom, how do you know that?" If Hume is right then your mom passed on to you "knowledge" that she can't have. This is a good example of the way that you selectively deploy Hume, against Aristotle but not against your mom. "Humean objections for thee, but not for me!" — Leontiskos

Yes, indeed. Most of what I believe is from my mother. She was herself a Humean so I tell myself that I'm not, but you've seen my true essence. I haven't grown up, I know so little, and the toys of philosophy are never thought through or even worried about after having said my bit.

That's fine, but you need to work through the cognitive dissonance inherent in objecting to other's positions on the basis of Hume's arguments, but then exempting yourself from those same objections. You'll need to work out that double standard that is so ubiquitously present in your philosophical approach. You can't just magically jump back and forth between pro-Humean and anti-Humean positions whenever it is desirable to do so. — Leontiskos

I can and I will!

If don't possess an objection that does not destroy all of philosophy and all of science, then you don't possess an objection at all. :meh: — Leontiskos

But it doesn't do that.

We learn about what exists by listening to others. It's marvelously simple, but it brings down the grandeur of philosophy and science a few notches. Names are learned prior to any philosophizing about the nature of tigers -- we can use names without theories as to how it is a name refers.

The fact that you wrote six posts in response makes me think that you know your approach is deeply problematic. — Leontiskos

My goodness, Leon. Are you applying to the philosophical school of inquisition?

I wrote that much to give you more to latch onto, to show where I'm coming from, and to counter your notions of me in the hopes of communicating. But all you can see is Hume.

If I'm a Humean in your mind then even if my view is deeply problematic you aren't addressing it.

I think we need to figure out what to do with the nuclear bombs before we have even the smallest chance for a fruitful conversation. — Leontiskos

The problem of induction is just one of those classic philosophical problems that comes up -- we can ignore it and claim a tradition, like Aristotelianism, which furnishes a solution of some kind.

Another solution, similar to what I've been saying, is Popper's that scientific theories aren't exactly true, or we don't really know that they are true. Rather we know when we falsify them and we know that the next guess is just a guess which contains conditions of falsifiability.

For me I'm fine with simply asserting that we know things. I don't think that the problem of induction jeopardizes knowledge. I think that the philosophical theories, whether they be true or false, will not do anything so drastic as make all knowledge impossible.

Have there been any anarchist societies (seems like a contradiction to me), or societies that reflect Marx's vision in human history? — Harry Hindu

I'm willing to include some in those categories, yeah.

Let's say for Marx The Soviet Union, and for anarchists the Anarchism in Spain -- so not just theories but some historical examples.

Yeah I see a sort of "dialectic" between them -- in some way it feels like the two "fill out" one another, and by keeping that tension in a single political philosophy we build in some kind of way for people to make appeals which curb each philosophies excesses.

That's why I think on how to make anarcho-Marxism coherent: there's something there, but people will immediately balk at it if they don't know much about either. And it's not like we live in a world that rewards people for knowing about radical political theory, so it's understandable why people believe what they do: this adds to the challenge of making it coherent due to the multitude of perspectives that one has to appeal to.

Sure, if I squint I see that. But analogies are more pedagogical or helps us to orient ourselves -- the thing itself isn't either of the animal metaphors, but human social organization. So it will differ from our closer cousins, even, it's just a metaphor for thinking through things.

It seems to me that you are saying that a social structure is only hierarchical if it is male-dominated. — Harry Hindu

That's interesting.

It's not what I think.

I think there is a history of patriarchal hierarchy within human culture that continues on into today, but I'd be hesitant to apply that to all hierarchies ever. The sci-fi scenario of a matriarchy but like a patriarchy where the women rule in a hierarchy would be an obvious counter-example that we can think of as a possibility so I wouldn't say "only".

Rather, I'm using closer cousins to get at a metaphor for two sides of human nature -- not that nature is fixed in some sense, but these are two strategies which species like us employ in resolving differences within the social organism.

Kinda-sorta, if we squint. As metaphor, but not reality.

The danger there is that anarchists are more organized than cats, and Marxists are less organized than ants. Further, ants only look like they have a hierarchy -- a queen ant and the workers -- but that's our hierarchical prejudices being projected upon the social form of ants. Ants are far more invested in the collective than any human ever has been.

If I were to use animal metaphors I'd say that anarchy expresses our bonobo side and marxism expresses our chimpanzee side, with the intent of dismantling the chimpanzee side. In order to topple hierarchies hierarchies are necessary evils simply because that's always what's worked before. But for the anarchist in order to topple hierarchies we have to start living like they aren't there, and learn how to chill out and have sex all the time without exploiting one another.

Lastly: I am quite serious about my answer -- we come to know what is real by listening to others. Talking.

However we answer this question I would say that in answering it we are not doing science as we practice it today. We are engaging in philosophy, and perhaps a philosophy of science or a philosophy of a particular science, but we are reflecting on the meanings of things rather than the things. We are, in some sense, asking after concepts.

But in science that's a very small part of what scientists do -- a lot of the conceptual work is in the application of ideas that have already been refined, agreed upon, and so forth. Philosophy tends to work in areas that are obscure, rather than clear, because it's good at spelling out concepts more precisely or generating new ideas for old problems or maintaining dialectical reflections between ideas.

But you don't exactly generate data in philosophy, though I wouldn't be opposed to attempts it would still seem different to me since I don't think concepts are real or universally binding, but still meaningful for all that. And you argue about who is right, but not about the theory being used. The activities feed well on one another, in particular if we pay attention to science from a historical perspective, but they are quite different.

This all to say Hume's notion of causation is obviously a limiting case that doesn't cover enough, but that doesn't mean Aristotle is suddenly correct about causation. I'd say causation is a fraught topic -- but talk of it is philosophy, not science.

One of the things that might sound Aristotelian, but I want to note differences, is that I'd question Hume's notion of causation.

Insofar that we're talking about billiard ball causation then it seems to hold -- in which case the sun may not rise tomorrow even though it has risen so many days before. One day it will collapse -- unless, of course, we're in some way wrong about the sun and stars and such.

But if we think of history we have a good example of a looser notion of causation that seems to produce positive knowledge through synthesis and isn't predicting anything. So what to make of the historian's use of "cause" if we deny it alltogether as something predicts events?

I'd say that I'm uncertain to what degree causation is real because of considerations such as this -- rather it seems the physicist, the biologist, and the historian all organize their ideas in a manner that differs. Including fundamental ones like causation, which we'd think probably seems important.

The surprising result is that we have knowledge even though we can note these things. This might be referred to as a "knowledge-first" approach -- seems like we know things. Sort of undeniable to my daily life, though it's fun to speculate sometimes just to see where our ideas go. But then how do we know things and what does that indicate for our world and reality?

There's a pair of arguments that I like to employ together as a kind of antinomy.

One is the problem of induction.

The other is the post-modern meta-induction: That we have been wrong before so many times justifies us in believing we're generally wrong.

One way out of the antinomy is to weaken our certainty with respect to knowledge, and flesh that out somehow. More or less that it justifies us in believing that we probably have false beliefs, but not that all of our beliefs are false -- i.e. the problem of induction still holds true.

We can justify that however -- pragmatically, because of human nature, whatever.

But if we believe that then surely we must accept that induction isn't valid -- we do it for whatever reason, but since our premises can be true and our conclusion wrong it's simply not valid.

Some of the differences I see is how we treat difference. Is difference real, or is it peculiar? Is what is the same the same as what is real? What reason do we have to believe in unity when there is a plethora of logics, even?

But all you see is that if we don't accept Aristotle's solution to the problem of induction all ideas are toast and I'm a bumbling idiot. I will weld as I see fit, though -- unless I'm on someone's payroll, then I'll do whatever the boss wants.

What is Hume's induction argument?

He brings up the problem of induction, but he does it through events. Are events the same as objects, to your mind?

But just because he brings it up that doesn't mean the problem of induction is wedded to most of what I'd associate with Hume.

What I'm denying are essences, and noting how -- if that be the case -- then Aristotle's move from particulars to generals is invalid in the sense that just because the premises are true that does not guarantee that the conclusion is true since there are some cases where the conclusion will be false.

I think you're attributing more to me than I've said.

So, to get to the titular question -- How do we know what is real?

I've answered before but like I said: we talk to one another.

A tiger is what we call a tiger in circumstances where we both understand how to use the word "tiger".

How do you know that? How do you know what a tiger even is? — Leontiskos

How I know it is certainly different from whether I think it. Why I think it is because I've seen them before and talked about them with others to make sure I know what I'm talking about.

I'd assert it because I have no reason not to -- unless they went extinct or some other circumstance that I'm unaware of they were alive last time I went to the zoo.

I'd say I know what a tiger is because I grew up in a community which differentiates a particular species.

But what that knowledge consists of isn't something which holds true for all tigers in the sense that there will be a time when a species is a not-tiger and a time when a species is a tiger for all species of the genera "tiger". Speciation is kind of like a slow sorites paradox -- at the level of our daily perception of the world, day-in-day-out, there seem to be stable species. This isn't something I perceived about tigers or all species, but rather a theory which guides our understanding of natural life. We notice similarities but rather than there being distinctions between a tiger and a not-tiger, which I understand essence to require given there is nothing in-between "A is a tiger or a not-tiger", we can usually point to some particular which breaks the mold, if not today then tomorrow.

Basically I'd say that tigers are the sorts of things biology studies, I've seen them before, and I know how to refer to them and generally these are things I believe exist. But there is very likely something in-between my concepts of tigers and not-tigers "out in the wild". Sometimes we just make choices about taxonomies out of conveinience "Yeah, maybe not a different thing in that way, but in this way sure" -- but that there are frequently small variations within the same group of species, and even -- if Darwinian evolution is true -- speciation events where a whole new organism comes into being then the very species we are talking about are always changing so we should expect there to be differences.

But these are not differences of accident -- the differences are part of the nature of animals given that evolution never stops.

What isn't logically valid? — Leontiskos

Induction. At least my interpretation of Aristotle's induction, which relies upon a premise that there are predicates which hold for all members of a species: so it looks like we can infer up from swans to birds when noting how we compare swans with eagles and so forth.

But when it comes to applications of logic to reality then I'm afraid reality dissapoints all such attempts. There are no such things as properties which are shared by every member of a species. The concept of species is one of change and adaptation, and differentiating species is often a difficult thing to do. There are frequently examples that fall between the cracks which show how our taxonomies are just conveniences for us -- the things we can notice and track reality by -- and the very nature of nature is change, differentiation, and adaptation.

Note that I haven't said anything about how many times I've seen the swan, but rather that there is no essence of the swan for Aristotle to move from the species to the genera. This isn't framed in Humean terms.

So do you think tigers exist or not? — Leontiskos

Yeah, there are some tigers out there today.

The argument that it is impossible to move from particulars to universals is a Humean argument. — Leontiskos

I'm gonna do the same thing here that I did with Lavoisier: putting things in terms of particulars and individuals, or species and genera, isn't exactly Hume's project. They're not even talking about the same things.

If I were to relate Hume's A Treatise on Human Understanding to one of Aristotle's texts, I'd say it's a version of De Anima, or at least this would be the interesting thing to compare. That's because I don't interpret Hume as a phenomenologist but a naturalist interested in understanding how human beings work.

I'm afraid this is just one of the parts of Aristotle that I found myself in disagreement with. Now I'm more than happy to say "it's just my opinion man", but surely you find the above clear? If no essence then moving from a particular to a general is not justified because there simply isn't something which always holds for all real things.

I don't believe concepts shape the world the way Aristotle did, and I don't think his categories eternal -- and if anything I'd say that these instincts come from reading Kant rather than Hume, because Kant claims heritage to Aristotle in the notion of eternal categories which organize nature.

I disagree with Kant like I disagree with Aristotle: Concepts don't confine reality. They are made up by us and adopted for too many reasons to list. They grow and move like a garden does, or a forest, and that is always changing: now mayhaps I have it all wrong, but can you see how that conflicts with Aristotle's philosophy in a way that isn't Humean?

Because I've only invoked Hume on these forums with respect to causation and moral anti-realism -- not metaphysics like general/particular.

So the bane of the law is identity-thinking's tyrannical character, and the non-identical is actually affected by this ("also influences the non-identical"). I often say that the non-identical is that which "escapes" our concepts, but in fact, it suffers under their systems. Or, it is distorted by them and appears as contradiction. — Jamal

Something I found interesting in the translator's introduction was that "Bann" can also be translated as "Spell", but the translator chose "bane" because it doesn't have magical connotations like "spell" does. But to say someone is under a spell could also be to say that identity-thinking has a way of becoming so coherent that the difference right before our eyes isn't being seen because we've started keeping track of the concept "reality" rather than what is real.

Very impressive summary. I had the same question about what Adorno meant by "a standpoint" -- best guess is that there aren't perspectival boundaries built into the method of negative dialectics, though upon going through the process obviously one will end up with some kind of standpoint, a "sidedness".

A bit behind but catching up.

Another difference is that the species/genus schema is not predicated on the bare particulars of modern logic — Leontiskos

Judging by your quote I'd say that this is really just where I disagree with Aristotle -- there's no such thing as essences.

So while I understand that within his system of philosophy he believes that induction is valid, and this is due to things having an essence -- i.e. there is some needed common traits or relationships which are shared by each member of the genera.

But, OK -- yes, that's a difference in terms of the philosophy. I don't think Aristotle is a Quinean or anything of the sort when considering his whole system -- but conceptually the various species and their genera look a lot like sets.

For Aristotle I would just add that there are ontological conditions to the sets, whereas today we'd prefer to abstract to the logic alone and leave the ontology undefined so that we could then speak clearly about what exists.

Make sense?

Simplified, Aristotle is basically saying that familiarity breeds understanding. If we become familiar with swans then we will begin to understand swans. There is no guarantee for Aristotle that there are no black swans. There is no Humean induction. — Leontiskos

I'm only using that as a familiar example.

You would agree that there is an essence which a swan possess which makes the swan a swan according to Aristotle?

Whatever the essence is for Aristotle there is an essence that can be discovered, and I think that's what secures his knowledge via the empirical method. He can know about every member of the set because of these necessary and sufficient conditions which make a tiger what a tiger is.

Whereas I would say that it's in the very logic itself that makes the move from species to genera invalid. There is no essence that holds all tigers together, a what-it-isness which makes the tiger a tiger.

So I'm not talking about being wrong in the sense of error as much as I'm saying there is no valid construction of induction because there is nothing to universalize. This is a big difference between my understanding of Aristotle, vs. Darwinian, biology. The species aren't as distinct as what Aristotle's method indicates -- they slowly morph over time and we update our taxonomies the more we learn, but this isn't a logically valid move.

Familiarity with swans will help us to understand swans, and if we happen to notice that all birds have wings then we might say that the essence of birds is "has wings", and since all swans are birds all swans have wings since that is what holds for all birds.

In such a world, if you could correctly identify an essence -- what holds for all the tigers, or whatever species/genera is under discussion -- then moving up to a more encompassing category would appear entirely valid.

So, in my understanding of Aristotle at least, I can understand why he believes it's valid. It's not like he didn't know what validity was. However, I think he is wrong about essence, and what you end up with for any process of induction is never a logically valid move. It's a guess. Hopefully an educated guess, but a guess all the same -- and the taxonomies we write about animals are our way of understanding life rather than the essence of life.

I don't think I've said anything Humean here -- if I were I'd be talking about relationships between events or the wash of perception or the emotional grounding of inference or something. But I'm just saying that Aristotle is wrong about essences, and that's what masks the invalidity of going from a particular to a general. The allusion to mathematical induction is to say that it appears to me that Aristotle treats inductive knowledge of particulars in the same manner that we treat inductive knowledge of math -- i.e. there is some conditions which hold for all tigers, and once we know that from some tigers we will have knowledge of all tigers in their essence, if not in their particulars/accidents.

Or I could be wrong about the role of essence in Aristotle. But at least this is how I'm understanding it. Does it make sense to you?

Something that hasn't been mentioned yet is Kant's aesthetic theories which puts art into a category in-between the objective and the subjective. We judge works of art as if they have a truth value, and speak about works of art such that we believe others should feel the same, and yet there is no fact to the matter. Rather than a fact aesthetics consists in how the various powers of judgment in the mind relate to one another -- so the mathematically sublime is when the mind tries to reach up to comprehend infinity, and that aesthetic is one's finitude before the infinite that one feels as they attempt to grasp the infinite. Or the dynamically sublime is when we see horrible things, but from afar such that we can feel the fear without at the same time truly believing we are going to die: thus the attraction of tragedy.


It's neither objective in the sense that there are objects with properties like "beautiful" of which we can say they are true and false, and it's not subjective because it's not just my opinion but the shared structure of the mind which allows us to judge and understand one another's judgments.


Broadly speaking these are attitudinal theories of aesthetics to where it's the attitude of the person witnessing the work of art which explains our judgments about beauty.

Yes.


Now what?

Nope.

It would be interesting to hear about the book and Moliere's response.
What was it? — Amity

Eh, not much of one. I was fine with it being deleted at the time for the reasons @Jamal mentioned.

I'll respond to an OP of any quality as long as a thought comes along that I think might help. But I'm comfortable with what Jamal has done -- I didn't expect it to lead to a member self-deleting, but I hope they come back.

I get the notification, but it doesn't bother me.

Okay, fair enough. I am not familiar with Lavoisier so that reference isn't informative to me. So you are saying that Lavoisier worked with precise instruments and Aristotle did not? That is the difference I see you pointing to. — Leontiskos

Aristotle worked with what he had -- but I'm not sure he had instruments at all, to be honest. His instrument was logic, description, empiricism, and interpretation of prior works on the subjects he was interested in.

I'm saying Lavoisier's contribution to our intellectual heritage is scientific because he was building instruments to test theories and discover what the empirical formula for water was in a way that convinced the rest of the scientific community.

Building instruments in accord with a theory does not look like philosophy, to me -- at all. So he serves as a contrast case to Aristotle who was a philosopher-scientist -- Aristotle is an empiricist, but he was born before a time when measurement was theorized at all. So it makes sense that he'd think there's a continuity between science and philosophy.

I appreciate your thoughtful approach.

I have some objections though.

I think you've supported thesis 2 better than thesis 1.

"Materialism", as I understand it, is not intuitive at all. I'm hesitant to guess anymore, but if I had to guess I'd say that "Dualism" is the "default" position of most people, if pressed; but mostly philosophy isn't interesting enough for people to define their categories that cleanly.

The reason it is not intuitive is because of all the problems you listed with it. It needs to be defended in some sense.

And I take umbrage with the notion of "default" in philosophy -- I think the default depends on one's environment they grew up in. So if you grew up in a spiritualist household then spirituality would be the "default", and so on for any other ontology.