Some of the differences I see is how we treat difference. Is difference real, or is it peculiar? Is what is the same the same as what is real? What reason do we have to believe in unity when there is a plethora of logics, even?

But all you see is that if we don't accept Aristotle's solution to the problem of induction all ideas are toast and I'm a bumbling idiot. I will weld as I see fit, though -- unless I'm on someone's payroll, then I'll do whatever the boss wants.

What is Hume's induction argument?

He brings up the problem of induction, but he does it through events. Are events the same as objects, to your mind?

But just because he brings it up that doesn't mean the problem of induction is wedded to most of what I'd associate with Hume.

What I'm denying are essences, and noting how -- if that be the case -- then Aristotle's move from particulars to generals is invalid in the sense that just because the premises are true that does not guarantee that the conclusion is true since there are some cases where the conclusion will be false.

I think you're attributing more to me than I've said.

So, to get to the titular question -- How do we know what is real?

I've answered before but like I said: we talk to one another.

A tiger is what we call a tiger in circumstances where we both understand how to use the word "tiger".

How do you know that? How do you know what a tiger even is? — Leontiskos

How I know it is certainly different from whether I think it. Why I think it is because I've seen them before and talked about them with others to make sure I know what I'm talking about.

I'd assert it because I have no reason not to -- unless they went extinct or some other circumstance that I'm unaware of they were alive last time I went to the zoo.

I'd say I know what a tiger is because I grew up in a community which differentiates a particular species.

But what that knowledge consists of isn't something which holds true for all tigers in the sense that there will be a time when a species is a not-tiger and a time when a species is a tiger for all species of the genera "tiger". Speciation is kind of like a slow sorites paradox -- at the level of our daily perception of the world, day-in-day-out, there seem to be stable species. This isn't something I perceived about tigers or all species, but rather a theory which guides our understanding of natural life. We notice similarities but rather than there being distinctions between a tiger and a not-tiger, which I understand essence to require given there is nothing in-between "A is a tiger or a not-tiger", we can usually point to some particular which breaks the mold, if not today then tomorrow.

Basically I'd say that tigers are the sorts of things biology studies, I've seen them before, and I know how to refer to them and generally these are things I believe exist. But there is very likely something in-between my concepts of tigers and not-tigers "out in the wild". Sometimes we just make choices about taxonomies out of conveinience "Yeah, maybe not a different thing in that way, but in this way sure" -- but that there are frequently small variations within the same group of species, and even -- if Darwinian evolution is true -- speciation events where a whole new organism comes into being then the very species we are talking about are always changing so we should expect there to be differences.

But these are not differences of accident -- the differences are part of the nature of animals given that evolution never stops.

What isn't logically valid? — Leontiskos

Induction. At least my interpretation of Aristotle's induction, which relies upon a premise that there are predicates which hold for all members of a species: so it looks like we can infer up from swans to birds when noting how we compare swans with eagles and so forth.

But when it comes to applications of logic to reality then I'm afraid reality dissapoints all such attempts. There are no such things as properties which are shared by every member of a species. The concept of species is one of change and adaptation, and differentiating species is often a difficult thing to do. There are frequently examples that fall between the cracks which show how our taxonomies are just conveniences for us -- the things we can notice and track reality by -- and the very nature of nature is change, differentiation, and adaptation.

Note that I haven't said anything about how many times I've seen the swan, but rather that there is no essence of the swan for Aristotle to move from the species to the genera. This isn't framed in Humean terms.

So do you think tigers exist or not? — Leontiskos

Yeah, there are some tigers out there today.

The argument that it is impossible to move from particulars to universals is a Humean argument. — Leontiskos

I'm gonna do the same thing here that I did with Lavoisier: putting things in terms of particulars and individuals, or species and genera, isn't exactly Hume's project. They're not even talking about the same things.

If I were to relate Hume's A Treatise on Human Understanding to one of Aristotle's texts, I'd say it's a version of De Anima, or at least this would be the interesting thing to compare. That's because I don't interpret Hume as a phenomenologist but a naturalist interested in understanding how human beings work.

I'm afraid this is just one of the parts of Aristotle that I found myself in disagreement with. Now I'm more than happy to say "it's just my opinion man", but surely you find the above clear? If no essence then moving from a particular to a general is not justified because there simply isn't something which always holds for all real things.

I don't believe concepts shape the world the way Aristotle did, and I don't think his categories eternal -- and if anything I'd say that these instincts come from reading Kant rather than Hume, because Kant claims heritage to Aristotle in the notion of eternal categories which organize nature.

I disagree with Kant like I disagree with Aristotle: Concepts don't confine reality. They are made up by us and adopted for too many reasons to list. They grow and move like a garden does, or a forest, and that is always changing: now mayhaps I have it all wrong, but can you see how that conflicts with Aristotle's philosophy in a way that isn't Humean?

Because I've only invoked Hume on these forums with respect to causation and moral anti-realism -- not metaphysics like general/particular.

So the bane of the law is identity-thinking's tyrannical character, and the non-identical is actually affected by this ("also influences the non-identical"). I often say that the non-identical is that which "escapes" our concepts, but in fact, it suffers under their systems. Or, it is distorted by them and appears as contradiction. — Jamal

Something I found interesting in the translator's introduction was that "Bann" can also be translated as "Spell", but the translator chose "bane" because it doesn't have magical connotations like "spell" does. But to say someone is under a spell could also be to say that identity-thinking has a way of becoming so coherent that the difference right before our eyes isn't being seen because we've started keeping track of the concept "reality" rather than what is real.

Very impressive summary. I had the same question about what Adorno meant by "a standpoint" -- best guess is that there aren't perspectival boundaries built into the method of negative dialectics, though upon going through the process obviously one will end up with some kind of standpoint, a "sidedness".

A bit behind but catching up.

Another difference is that the species/genus schema is not predicated on the bare particulars of modern logic — Leontiskos

Judging by your quote I'd say that this is really just where I disagree with Aristotle -- there's no such thing as essences.

So while I understand that within his system of philosophy he believes that induction is valid, and this is due to things having an essence -- i.e. there is some needed common traits or relationships which are shared by each member of the genera.

But, OK -- yes, that's a difference in terms of the philosophy. I don't think Aristotle is a Quinean or anything of the sort when considering his whole system -- but conceptually the various species and their genera look a lot like sets.

For Aristotle I would just add that there are ontological conditions to the sets, whereas today we'd prefer to abstract to the logic alone and leave the ontology undefined so that we could then speak clearly about what exists.

Make sense?

Simplified, Aristotle is basically saying that familiarity breeds understanding. If we become familiar with swans then we will begin to understand swans. There is no guarantee for Aristotle that there are no black swans. There is no Humean induction. — Leontiskos

I'm only using that as a familiar example.

You would agree that there is an essence which a swan possess which makes the swan a swan according to Aristotle?

Whatever the essence is for Aristotle there is an essence that can be discovered, and I think that's what secures his knowledge via the empirical method. He can know about every member of the set because of these necessary and sufficient conditions which make a tiger what a tiger is.

Whereas I would say that it's in the very logic itself that makes the move from species to genera invalid. There is no essence that holds all tigers together, a what-it-isness which makes the tiger a tiger.

So I'm not talking about being wrong in the sense of error as much as I'm saying there is no valid construction of induction because there is nothing to universalize. This is a big difference between my understanding of Aristotle, vs. Darwinian, biology. The species aren't as distinct as what Aristotle's method indicates -- they slowly morph over time and we update our taxonomies the more we learn, but this isn't a logically valid move.

Familiarity with swans will help us to understand swans, and if we happen to notice that all birds have wings then we might say that the essence of birds is "has wings", and since all swans are birds all swans have wings since that is what holds for all birds.

In such a world, if you could correctly identify an essence -- what holds for all the tigers, or whatever species/genera is under discussion -- then moving up to a more encompassing category would appear entirely valid.

So, in my understanding of Aristotle at least, I can understand why he believes it's valid. It's not like he didn't know what validity was. However, I think he is wrong about essence, and what you end up with for any process of induction is never a logically valid move. It's a guess. Hopefully an educated guess, but a guess all the same -- and the taxonomies we write about animals are our way of understanding life rather than the essence of life.

I don't think I've said anything Humean here -- if I were I'd be talking about relationships between events or the wash of perception or the emotional grounding of inference or something. But I'm just saying that Aristotle is wrong about essences, and that's what masks the invalidity of going from a particular to a general. The allusion to mathematical induction is to say that it appears to me that Aristotle treats inductive knowledge of particulars in the same manner that we treat inductive knowledge of math -- i.e. there is some conditions which hold for all tigers, and once we know that from some tigers we will have knowledge of all tigers in their essence, if not in their particulars/accidents.

Or I could be wrong about the role of essence in Aristotle. But at least this is how I'm understanding it. Does it make sense to you?

Something that hasn't been mentioned yet is Kant's aesthetic theories which puts art into a category in-between the objective and the subjective. We judge works of art as if they have a truth value, and speak about works of art such that we believe others should feel the same, and yet there is no fact to the matter. Rather than a fact aesthetics consists in how the various powers of judgment in the mind relate to one another -- so the mathematically sublime is when the mind tries to reach up to comprehend infinity, and that aesthetic is one's finitude before the infinite that one feels as they attempt to grasp the infinite. Or the dynamically sublime is when we see horrible things, but from afar such that we can feel the fear without at the same time truly believing we are going to die: thus the attraction of tragedy.


It's neither objective in the sense that there are objects with properties like "beautiful" of which we can say they are true and false, and it's not subjective because it's not just my opinion but the shared structure of the mind which allows us to judge and understand one another's judgments.


Broadly speaking these are attitudinal theories of aesthetics to where it's the attitude of the person witnessing the work of art which explains our judgments about beauty.

Yes.


Now what?

Nope.

It would be interesting to hear about the book and Moliere's response.
What was it? — Amity

Eh, not much of one. I was fine with it being deleted at the time for the reasons @Jamal mentioned.

I'll respond to an OP of any quality as long as a thought comes along that I think might help. But I'm comfortable with what Jamal has done -- I didn't expect it to lead to a member self-deleting, but I hope they come back.

I get the notification, but it doesn't bother me.

Okay, fair enough. I am not familiar with Lavoisier so that reference isn't informative to me. So you are saying that Lavoisier worked with precise instruments and Aristotle did not? That is the difference I see you pointing to. — Leontiskos

Aristotle worked with what he had -- but I'm not sure he had instruments at all, to be honest. His instrument was logic, description, empiricism, and interpretation of prior works on the subjects he was interested in.

I'm saying Lavoisier's contribution to our intellectual heritage is scientific because he was building instruments to test theories and discover what the empirical formula for water was in a way that convinced the rest of the scientific community.

Building instruments in accord with a theory does not look like philosophy, to me -- at all. So he serves as a contrast case to Aristotle who was a philosopher-scientist -- Aristotle is an empiricist, but he was born before a time when measurement was theorized at all. So it makes sense that he'd think there's a continuity between science and philosophy.

I appreciate your thoughtful approach.

I have some objections though.

I think you've supported thesis 2 better than thesis 1.

"Materialism", as I understand it, is not intuitive at all. I'm hesitant to guess anymore, but if I had to guess I'd say that "Dualism" is the "default" position of most people, if pressed; but mostly philosophy isn't interesting enough for people to define their categories that cleanly.

The reason it is not intuitive is because of all the problems you listed with it. It needs to be defended in some sense.

And I take umbrage with the notion of "default" in philosophy -- I think the default depends on one's environment they grew up in. So if you grew up in a spiritualist household then spirituality would be the "default", and so on for any other ontology.

By: @Count Timothy von Icarus (Only placed here because it wouldn't fit the character limit in the OP)
Footnotes:

1. C.S. Lewis. The Discarded Image. Cambridge University Press. (1964) pg. 161
2. Boethius. De Consolatione Philosophiae. Trans H.R. James (1897) Book I, Prose I
3. C.S. Lewis. The Discarded Image. Cambridge University Press. (1964) pg. 161
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Book X, Ch. VII.
5. Plato, Laws (645a).
6. Samuel Johnson. A Dictionary of the English Language. (1755)
7. David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. (2.3.3.1) (1740)
8. David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. (2.3.3.3) (1740)
9. Plato. Timaeus. 90a

10. Although under “deflationary theories of truth,” where all that can be said about truth is exhausted by an account of the role of the term ‘true’ in our language, it is now less clear what “truth” itself refers to.

11. That is, the desires Plato ascribes to the “rational part of the soul,” namely the desire for truth and goodness as such.

12. E.g., St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Part I, Q.16, A.1
13. St. Thomas Aquinas Questiones Disputatae de Veritate. Q1, A2. Trans. Robert W. Mulligan (1952)

14. Here, it is worth noting that the reduction of man’s “rational soul” to merely the power of discursive ratio might be seen as a major cause (and presupposition) of views that confine truth to language or formal systems

15. Aristotle. De Anima. Book III, Ch. V
16. See: St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologia. Part I. Q. 85. A.1 R
17. The most erotic passage of the Commedia occurs at the end of Canto X of the Paradiso, in the Heaven of the Sun, where Dante meets the souls of the wise theologians who progressed furthest in knowledge of the divine (see endnote iii).

18. Byung-Chul Han. The Agony of Eros. Trans Erik Butler. MIT Press (2017) pg. 1

19. That is, something like the actions of the man in John Searle’s “Chinese Room” thought experiment, who follows the rules of the Chinese language in producing text, but understands none of it. Some of the most deflationary conceptions of the human intellect claim that there truly is nothing more to language and rationality than this sort of rule following.

20. St. Thomas Aquinas.Summa Theologia. Part I. Q. 79. A.8
21. Boethius. De Consolatione Philosophiae. Trans H.R. James (1987) Book IV, Prose VI
22. See: St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologia. Part II/I, Q.3, A.4
23.For an example of this distinction see St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologia. Part II/I, Q.8, A.1
24. Dante Alighieri. Epistle to Cangrande. Trans James Marchand. Georgetown University. §7
25.Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume I: Inferno. Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto I, 3

26.It is not incidental that an erotic other, rather than a teacher, must lead Dante on this last leg of his pilgrimage.

27.Virgil will require angelic assistance to get past the demons who block the pairs’ descent (Cantos VIII-IX).

28.See Paradiso Canto XXXIII, lines 103-104, where Dantes specifies the Good (God) as the goal of all willing.

29. Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume I: Inferno. Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto, III, 17-18
30. Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume I: Inferno Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto III, 6 & 12
31. See: Inferno, Canto V
32. Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume I: Inferno Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto XX, 20-21

33.That all goodness relates to the Divine Good is explained in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Part I, Q6. Lucifer and Adam’s falls are recounted in Canto XIX and XVI of the Paradiso respectively. Lucifer’s fall and his current condition is also covered in Canto XXXIV of the Inferno.

34. See: Paradiso, Canto IV, line 33
35. Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume III: Paradise. Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto I, 1-3
36. See: St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, Part I, Q6 on this point.
37. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume I: Inferno (1984) Canto III, line 6
38. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume III: Paradise. (1984) Canto XXXIII , line 145
39. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume II: Purgatory. (1981) Canto XVII, lines 103-105
40. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume II: Purgatory. (1981) Canto XVII, 91-96
41. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume III: Paradise (1984) Canto II, line 19
42. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume II: Purgatory. (1981) Canto XVIII, 25-27
43. See Purgatorio Cantos XIV and XV.
44. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume III: Paradise (1984) Canto IV, lines 124-126
45. Plato. Republic. (518c-518d)

46. It is worth noting here that on St. Bernard of Clairvaux (Dante’s final guide in the Commedia)’s “Ladder of Love,” the final step is the “love of creatures for God’s sake.”

47.David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. (2.3.3.415) (1740)
48. Mark Musa. The Divine Comedy Volume II: Purgatory (1984) XXVII lines 140-142
49.Mark Musa. Divine Comedy Volume III:Paradise. Penguin Classics. (1984) Canto I, line 70; see also pg.13 for Musa’s commentary on the use of this unique term.

Endnotes:

I. Indeed, the triumph of volanturist theories of liberty can be seen as stemming, at least in part, from the fact that the new conception of reason is incapable of ruling over a person because it is bereft of its own motivations (i.e., its desire for Goodness and Truth as such).

II. One need only consider likely modern challenges to St. John of Damascus’s matter of fact claim that: “neither are all things unutterable nor all utterable; neither all unknowable nor all knowable. But the knowable belongs to one order, and the utterable to another; just as it is one thing to speak and another thing to know,” to see that labeling both modern and pre-modern views “correspondence theories” papers over a great deal of difference (St. John of Damascus. An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith. Book I, Ch. II)

III.
Then, as the tower-clock calls us to come
at the hour when God's Bride is roused from bed
to woo with matin song her Bridegroom's love,

with one part pulling thrusting in the other,
chiming, ting-ting, music so sweet the soul,
ready for love, swells with anticipation

Paradiso, Canto X, lines 139-142 (Musa translation)

IV. Much more could be said about how Han’s recent influential critique in The Agony of Eros relates to Dante’s conception of love and knowing. It’s worth noting that Han covers ground that is very similar to Pope John Paul II’s Theology of the Body in Simple Language, with the latter drawing heavily from the tradition Dante represents.

Han quotes Emmanuel Levinas’s Time and the Other (pg. 11-12) approvingly, questioning if the erotic love must always be a “failure” if it is defined in terms of “grasping,” “possessing,” or “knowing,” since these presuppose the conquest (and so elimination) of the other, and are “synonyms of power.”
However, Levinas’s inclusion of “knowing” in the paradigm of power presupposes the modern notion of knowledge. This is not the knowing of ecstasis one finds in Plato and much of the pre-modern tradition, nor is it the "knowing by becoming" of the Neoplatonic ascent. Rather it is a knowing where a static self lays hold of the other and makes it a part of itself, consuming it. There is no "going out" or "being penetrated" in such a view, but merely "acquisition."

This shift in “knowing” makes certain a sort of sense when one considers the modern reduction of man's rationality to discursive ratio alone. Aquinas himself says that ratio is to acquisition (and movement) as intellectus is to possession (and rest). The latter is, of course, likened to "possession," but this is not Levinas’s “possession as power.” It is possession as respects rest in a goal, a rest in the other as an end, rather than a frenetic, never-ending movement, a need to extract from the other as means for the gratification of the self.

V. Such a view of knowing also goes along with Ferdinand Ulrich’s conception of “being as gift,” which is heavily influenced by Aquinas and the medieval tradition.

VI. Christian Moevs’s excellent work The Metaphysics of Dante’s Comedy explores these notions of “knowing by becoming,” and “knowing as self-knowledge” in depth.

VII. Understanding the role of love vis-à-vis reason is complicated by the fact that “love” has itself been subject to a sort of deflation. We can see this in the collapse of several unique concepts (i.e., philia, agape, pragma, stroge, eros, and ludus) into a single English word: “love.” Today, one finds the language of the buffered, atomized, discursively rational economic actor (the goal-driven consumer) even in the language of romantic relationships. Be it in guides on attracting "high value males," and not being a "pick-me," aimed women, or the "attraction through competition," and "peacocking" schemes of male-oriented advice writers (the self-described “pick-up artists” of the online “Manosphere”), Homo oeconomicus appears to have replaced Homo sapiens.

VIII. Another of Dante’s sources, Dionysius the Areopagite uses similar circle imagery in De Divinis Nominibus (Book IV, Chapter IX):

Further, there is a movement of soul, circular indeed,----the entrance into itself from things without, and the unified convolution of its intellectual powers, bequeathing to it inerrancy, as it were, in a sort of circle, and turning and collecting itself, from the many things without, first to itself, then, as having become single, uniting with the uniquely unified powers, and thus conducting to the Beautiful and Good.

IX. For instance, in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant stakes our ability to distinguish dreams from reality on “connection according to [discursive] rules that determine the combination of representations” in experience, rather than on any definite relation between the actuality of things and their appearances (4.290).

X. For instance, Wittgenstein’s influential On Certainty takes up many of the same questions about justification and knowledge addressed by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Yet the two thinkers come to radically different conclusions on the nature of knowledge, in large part because intellectus is not considered as an option in the later work.

XI. In Christian terminology, this would be the rule of the “Flesh.” Yet it is important to note that the “Flesh” is not simply the body, nor is it the sensuous appetites or passions. These are to be purified and redirected towards what is truly good, not uprooted. The appetites and emotions are an important part of the person, and the human being’s perfection in “the age to come” involves the restoration of their body. Rather the “Flesh” represents an orientation towards finite goods and away from God, the ultimate end of human existence. Because it is the intellect that knows the good as good, it is only when the intellect rules that man can be directed towards goodness itself, and so escape the allures of the “World” and “Flesh.”

XII. It is instructive that Virgil makes this pronouncement before Dante is led to Limbo, with its bucolic scenery and its brightly glowing seven walled castle (likely symbolizing the seven “liberal arts” by which men are made free and the “light of intellect,” as suggested by Musa pg.103). The imagery here recalls the Earthly Paradise atop Mount Purgatory, a “heaven on Earth,” that Virgil, human reason, was ultimately capable of directing the Pilgrim to. Indeed, as Gerald Walsh suggests, had Dante wished to write a Human Comedy, an ode to humanism, the story might have ended with Virgil bringing Dante to that summit, to a Limbo-like Heaven atop Mount Purgatory. In so doing, Walsh claims Dante would have advanced a view of man’s telos in line with Condorcet, Kant, and Hegel (Gerald Groveland Walsh. Dante’s Philosophy of History. The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jul., 1934), pp. 117-134).
Yet Canto IV begins with Virgil telling the Pilgrim that he is now descending “into the sightless world” (Canto IV line 13), and the air of Limbo is filled “the sounds of sighs of untormented grief” (line 28). Hence, we must not forget that for Dante, those in Limbo are still “damned.” These souls have “lost the good of intellect” in that intellect can no longer bring them to man’s natural end. They are consigned to endless motion, never reaching satisfaction. They have seen the Beloved, but cannot reach Him.
Dante’s narrative here, far from showcasing a “secular semi-heaven,” should rather be taken as a potent critique of ethical systems that take the Good to be the proper target of rational thought and will, but in the end merely an “intentional object” (ens rationis but not ens reale). Such a system supposes that, though we might become true self-movers, exercising a rational freedom, our movement is ultimately every bit as vain as Satan’s fruitless kicking (and so in some sense still irrational).

XIII. Such an association of multiplicity with sin is a foundational part of the Christian tradition. For instance, Origen of Alexandria, often regarded as the first systemic Christian theologian, writes in his On Prayer (Chapter XII. The Lord’s Prayer:: The Preface in Matthew):

There is no unity in matter and in bodily substances, but every such supposed unity is split up and divided and disintegrated into many units to the loss of its union. Good is one; many are the base. Truth is one; many are the false. True righteousness is one; many are the states that act it as a part. God’s wisdom is one; many are the wisdoms of this age and of the rulers of this age which come to nought. The word of God is one, but many are the words alien to God.

XIV. A look at how St. Thomas defines “spirit,” in contrast to “soul” might be helpful here. The spirit is the soul vis-a-vis its transcendence of the body (e.g. ST 1.97.3). When we consider the “spirit,” the agent of the operations of intellect and will is the soul considered in its distinction from the body (as opposed to its unity with the body). The sensible appetites, which attract us to finite goods that cannot be freely shared, are excluded from spiritual activities (ST 1.75.2).

Hence, we could think of envy, and all of our competition for status, wealth, etc., as in some sense a misordering, since it involves the lower part of the soul (i.e. sensible) ruling over the higher part (i.e. the rational). It is also a misuse of our body, if we consider the body to be primarily a vehicle for the spiritual life, that is, a conception of the body as sacramental (e.g. in Pope John Paul II’s Theology of the Body in Simple Language).

XV. St. Bonaventure, one of Dante’s many sources (and a soul he encounters in the Heaven of the Sun), is instructive here:

The creatures of this sensible world signify the invisible things of God [Rom. 1:20], partly because God is of all creation the origin, exemplar, and end, and because every effect is the sign of its cause, the exemplification of the exemplar, and the way to the end to which it leads; partly from its proper representation; partly from prophetic prefiguration; partly from angelic operation; partly from further ordination. For every creature is by nature a sort of picture and likeness of that eternal wisdom… (Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. Chapter 2.12)

XVI. Dante’s conception here is in line with the classical Christian tradition. For example, we could consider the famous adage from St. Maximos the Confessor that:
Nothing created by God is evil. It is not food that is evil but gluttony, not the begetting of children but unchastity, not material things but avarice, not esteem but self-esteem. It is only the misuse of things that is evil, not the things themselves.

This is very much in line with how I see science.

Well, it's not that a number holds for the iterative set, but rather that a relation holds for the iterative set. But yeah, that's close. — Leontiskos

Fair.

Right, though a species is not a set if we wish to speak more carefully. — Leontiskos

How would we differentiate it? It looks a lot like set theory to me.

Why do you see what you describe of Aristotle's method as "mathematical induction"? — Leontiskos

Because, for him, the genera are real. When he moves up the chain there's no such thing as a black swan, for instance. It's different from mathematical induction in that it's about concretes, but it's like mathematical induction because the sets are real and the induction is thought to apply to all cases, which is what secures the claim to validity. Also, since I'm thinking about these as sets, where a genera is only a more general set than some given species, so I think he quite literally thinks the world is structured like his categories. There's still a basic material, but it requires some form -- like a cause -- in order for something to be real. This makes sense for him because ultimately where we end up is in a finite universe which is produced by the mind of God thinking himself into being. So the categories are a part of our world, and not just our experience, and certainly not just a way of ordering our thoughts. That's why there wouldn't be any invalidity in moving up, inductively -- the categories have an essence which makes it to where there's no problem making an inference from the particular to the general.


For myself I think of these as ways of ordering our thinking rather than as an ontology. The world isn't constrained by our logic, and frequently demonstrates this. But it's easier to see that when we have so much knowledge that no one person will ever be able to dwell on it. In Aristotle's day it makes sense to continue the research programme he set up in the manner that he did.

Basically because we can always be wrong when we follow a procedure of induction it's never valid -- there is at least one case where the inference could be false, where we are mistaken about the object we are talking about, so it fails to the basic definition of validity. But since it doesn't structure reality itself that's not as big of a deal for me.

In math we can form an induction which is valid by starting with a particular case and then proving that it holds for all cases so that the individual number, say n=0, holds for all n +1, and so on.

But with Aristotle I think of his categories more like trees in set theory where the trees are increasingly wider sets that encompass the lower sets as their species -- so there are individuals, but then sets become individuals, and we can make inferences about the world because these sets aren't just a means for us to organize our thoughts, but rather are depictions of the world as it is -- so that the induction which takes place from an individual, like a human, can hold for the more general category when we utilize that individuals essence that fits within a wider category.

Does this make any sense at all?

EDIT: Though if we were to build a tree of Aristotle's concepts it would look "inverse" because there'd be one node at the top -- being -- under which all the other genera are species, and at the bottom you'd have all the individuals which the sets "contain"

The hylomorphism that he espouses makes sense of why one could do this with respect to reality.

Eh, well how do we view induction about math? When you say that I think of inductive mathematical proofs, which do not remind me of anything in Aristotle. So I'm at a loss again. — Leontiskos

Good point. I think Aristotle sees his categories as mathematical inductions because he empirically witnessed them.

I see them as mathematical inductions because I read Aristotle as feeling justified in writing his metaphysics because he had covered all the theories prior, showed their weaknesses and strengths, and expressed the truth given their inputs -- in light of his prior analytics I think he thought it possible to find true categories, such as the four causes, which would resemble the necessary conclusions of his prior analytics.

The categories looked real, as they do today -- but he decided, in good taste, to philosophize them. (or write down his notes so he could teach tomorrow, flip a coin)

I mean, that's impressive if you've read all of that. I sure haven't. — Leontiskos

Only in english, and years ago. Something like 15 years. I don't doubt that my reading is rusty.

But, yes. I wouldn't bother to say something here unless I had at least some reading, experience, or knowledge that relates.

Different in what ways? And what is his method? I asked for your source for your ideas about "Aristotle's view of induction," and you literally pointed to seven different works without giving any specific references. That doesn't help me understand where your ideas about "induction" are coming from. — Leontiskos

Fair questions.

The posterior analytics deals with induction, by my memory. And I want to add that I think Aristotle's notion of induction is not the same as induction today. But I grant you that I didn't give the specificity you asked for: My reading is certainly rusty.

I feel we're getting closer here now, though, in terms of not talking past one another.

The ways that Lavoisier and Aristotle are different, by my head-cannon at least, is that Lavoisier didn't question the enlightenment premises as much as pursued them and did them well.

***

I think Aristotle's method -- Lavoisier I think didn't invent a method as much as adopted one -- is to review what has been said, demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses, then show his conclusion.

And, on top of that, Aristotle had empirical verification for his conclusions.

For his "view of induction" -- I listed the sources I did because I thought thems would explain it... but maybe not. I can tell you in my own words, though, since that's more relevant to our conversation: Aristotle views induction about objects in the same way we view induction about math. Since there are no other categories he is able to say "this is what that thing is. this is its being" -- but over time we've found that his methods are, while a good guess, not quite right either.

He thinks that the world is harmonious. As I read the metaphysics, at least, all of being is within the mind of God thinking himself. Being is God thinking himself into being by thinking, and the categories apply because we can, through empirical research that climbs up, discover the essence of things.



Now, I could be very wrong in my interpretation, but since you asked for how I understand Aristotle's notion of induction I'm giving an attempt at answering that more clearly.

Though @karl stone -- you ought respond to

Subjectivism is bunk! Science rocks! — karl stone

Science does, indeed, rock.

I like it anyways.

Useful if starting a commune, which I may want to do. — unimportant

Now that you mention it -- one of the most practical ways of practicing anarchy in our world today is through the housing collective. Finding one and joining would be a way to learn from people actually doing the practice rather than reading a lot of long books, and you said you were interested in meeting up with people so that would be a good route.

For an organization that's alive today which will put you in contact with anarchists I'd suggest Food not Bombs -- it has a diverse group of people and it's activist work so it's quite literally putting the ideas into practice. I know lots of anarchists tend to frequent that organization because of how it's run, and they'd know what possible institutional resources -- such as a housing collective -- might be in your area.

BUT

I can understand that the fruit might just look too juicy to be true, and dreaming big dreams can bring one down. I'd only do it if you enjoy it rather than out of a sense that one must accomplish the mission.

Heh, fair enough. No worries.

For myself the end-goal isn't as important to be achieved -- organizing with likeminded people was enough for me to want to know how it works. But it's not like you're going to earn a living or achieve anything immediately practical by studying it -- you'll improve your mind, which is good, but in terms of whether you ought study other things or not I can understand saying "OK, sounds interesting, but I'd rather deal with something more realistic"

No, you're not being clear, you're being intellectually dishonest - admitting Descartes was self censoring, but refusing to draw the conclusion that he wrote Meditations; a subjectivist epistemology in diametric opposition to Galileo's objectivist epistemology, as a defence against potential accusations of heresy. — karl stone

Couldn't it be the case that Descartes both censored himself and expressed himself? Or must we say, because he censored himself once all of what he did in his life is an act of self-censorship, including what he said?

Heh, I've once again not been clear.

I agree Descartes was self-censoring. However, I don't think he was doing so in his philosophy, while he was doing so in his science.

With respect to his science he was self-censoring, but I don't believe he was in his philosophy.

And I'd hesitate to call Descartes' philosophy subjectivist, at least. Seems wrong to me given he wanted certain foundations for scientific knowledge in his philosophy.

I agree he was self censoring.

I'm not sure I agree he wrote the Meditations to stop the inquisition, though. I think he liked both science and philosophy, and that his published philosophy could be read as his response to his circumstances -- I can't work scientifically because of these ideas in place, and so I'll set about doing the philosophical work that needs to be done in order that science might flourish.

Cool, I don't have that deep a knowledge of the sequence of events in his life so I'll go with it.

But I know Descartes was not scared of doing science; covering himself from the ignorant, sure. And I agree he didn't think "subjectivism" is a valid epistemology -- that's not his thing. It's methodical, and not metaphysical, doubt.

He wrote the meditations afterwards -- but it's still a methodical doubt, but like you noted: People often like the question but reject the answer.

I'm pleased to see so much analytic work going on. Working through the issues is the only way to work out how to fit all these pieces together - if that is possible.

This is core analytic philosophy - looking closely at how the terms involved are being used, comparing them with formal systems we know are consistent, seeing what works and what does not. Bread and butter stuff. It's hard conceptual work. — Banno

Same.

wasn't Descartes purpose to establish certainty, to avoid assumptions? I don't think he was particularly successful. Indeed, I don't believe he believed what he claimed to believe. I think he saw what happened to Galileo, and wrote an alternate epistemology more consistent with doctrine. — karl stone

He didn't establish certainty to avoid assumptions. He did not believe what he claimed to believe with respect to radical skepticism -- he explicitly says it's a methodical doubt rather than a doubt about the world.

I think he withheld his publication of The World after seeing how Galileo was treated, but his philosophy differs from that.

Well, the anonymity won't be preserved if we add another essay, but I don't mind throwing another one that's done into the mix -- the next one won't happen until next year.

But I don't want to upset anyone either. So I'd welcome it, but can see a need for a cutoff as well.

:up: That makes sense to me.

Onto paragraph 5! ;)

Moliere I think this is what you were asking about here: — Jamal

Yes.

Trying again with some rest and your rendition --

"The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each Spirit and power, strikes the attempt to comprehend this hegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood."

"meanwhile" contrasts the way the technician and the philosopher operates in a world which glorifies the technician. So the philosopher has turned away from positive cognitions and instead critiques itself while the technicians demonstrate their worth through power -- the mismatch then is between Spirit and Power.

To add a punctuation mark to note how I'm reading this now...

"The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each,Spirit and Power, strikes the attempt...."


So the philosophers -- the introverted thought-architects who have a sense of Spirit, are struck with futility at even being able to comprehend the hegemony if the technician.

The desire to comprehend this hegemony indicates a technician's knowledge, which in turn turns one away from Spirit.

***


How's that sound to you?

When you talk about "Aristotle's view of induction," what texts are you referring to? — Leontiskos

I'm thinking about the physics, the metaphysics, on the weather, the prior analytics, the posterior analytics, parts of animals, and de anima.

The prior and post analytics serve as his epistemology -- how he goes about making inferences. One by deduction and the other by induction. His treatises on weather, the soul, and the parts of animals too serve as examples of Aristotle applying his epistemology to the world at hand. The physics serves as a precursor to the metaphysics in that it is both a particular and general science since it deals with the topic of change, itself an entry into the study of the most general categories.

I know you've read him and know him -- that's why I thought him a good example for us, and didn't think there'd be anything controversial in comparing his method to modern scientific methods and noting that they are different in what they are doing and arguing.

How many pages have you read of any of them? If they are to serve as exemplars of the putative categories you attach to them, then apparently both of us must have strong exposure to all three. That seems doubtful. I have read lots of Aristotle, a small bit of Kripke (less than 70 pages), and nothing from Lavoisier. Have you read enough of each to take them as exemplars of categories such as "philosopher-scientist"? If not, they are not going to function as exemplars of anything substantial. — Leontiskos

Yes. Aristotle I'd say I'm most familiar with, and the bit of Kripke we've been referencing in this conversation is something I've read here on the forums. Lavoisier's contribution to science is his meticulous work on making precise instrumentation, which I gather is a clear difference between what both Aristotle and Kripke are doing.

Now, readings get rusty and I make mistakes. But I'm not just using these just because -- Kripke got added to the mix, but Aristotle/Lavoisier is one I've just often thought through as a good comparison for finding a difference.

Also, what I've noticed is that between us is they are not good examples because it's only leading to accusations of ignorance and showmanship.

This is why learning to make real arguments is important. — Leontiskos

When you say this it seems like I must not know how to make a real argument, to your mind.

I'd rather say that arguments don't reveal truth as much as serve as a check to ourselves -- ah, yes, there I messed up, that inference can't be quite right.

Okay, but do you have an argument for your conclusion? Are we no longer capable of induction in the 21st century? Was Aristotle wrong that we should have wide experience before drawing conclusions? — Leontiskos

Aristotle was not wrong in his time.

But neither he nor we can make induction a valid move that secures knowledge.

I say he wasn't wrong because I can see how his inferences are good given his circumstances, influences, and concerns not just from the rest of his writing but also from others' writings at the time, as well as writings about those writings.

But I don't think we can travel by induction up to knowledge of God, for instance. I'd say there is a limit of some kind on our ability to judge on some questions we might want to answer or try to answer, but don't seem like we can reliably answer.

Because the idea that such a process is defeated if we do not consider every single scientific claim that exists or is available in our linguistic context looks like a strawman. Even if we don't look at every single scientific claim, the process is still perfectly sound. And the person who looks at more evidence will be more suited to draw conclusions. — Leontiskos

I'm not sure that the process is sound. If we don't check every member of a set it's always possible to find a black swan. If it's always possible to find a black swan then we can't make the inference to climb our tower upwards towards being and the mind of God -- and ultimately reality, all as a unity.

But if someone had something in mind other than Aristotle -- some modification which dealt with the notion that a single mind dealing with eternal categories does not bring one closer to being, but rather collective effort and distributing tasks and building trust such that we can work together, which tends to function better in an atmosphere where doubt is encouraged does.

Also, the reason I like using historical examples is because it's meant to get around the notion that stipulation of a difference between philosophy and science is uninteresting -- we can say it and put up our terms and use the terms thereon in that way, but that misses the point.

The historical examples provide a wider context other than standalone crisp definitions with syllogisms (though there's a time and place for that, too, I'm just explaining my method)
 

Are you able to say what each is? — Leontiskos

Not exactly, but by way of example I've hoped to show a difference -- Aristotle is the philosopher-scientist, Lavoisier is the scientist, and Kripke is the philosopher.

Not that I've been explicit or clear on this, really, but this is what the examples are meant to furnish -- as good examples of how to use the terms differently. The interpretation of each I'm meaning to use as why I might want to distinguish between the terms: look at what they mean and how they make inferences in these details and you'll hopefully catch onto the difference.

There won't be necessary and sufficient conditions -- I don't think we can solve the problem of the criterion, though I think falsification is still an important subject unto itself -- but there will be stark differences between two family resemblances when we compare them.

But that is relevant to the OP -- if Aristotle secures knowledge of the real through a thorough review of all of what's known and induction towards being, such that he could be in a position to say the what-it-is-ness of a thing is, its real definition stating its essence, and this is the way by which we are saying there is no separation between science and philosophy, it seems that we'd need another way to coherently weave science and philosophy into the same practice in order to rely upon the science to claim it's relevant to the question "What is real?" -- which is largely where I'm contending against not science's relevance, but an over-reliance upon science in asking that question of reality.

Basically I think philosophy and science are separate activities. That's the claim at stake from when I originally jumped with in this particular interlude.

So, for instance, I wouldn't say induction requires, but I'd say that the manner in which Aristotle's induction does. The way I see him move is securing his claim by an exhaustive survey of the extent arguments, a review of their merits and demerits followed by the conclusion of Aristotle's.

So, yeah, you'd have to figure out some other way to be an Aristotelian, at least, if you wanted to progress to metaphysical truth in the manner of induction as Aristotle practiced it.

So your argument is that <Induction requires exhaustive knowledge; in order to have exhaustive knowledge we would have to survey every scientific claim; therefore induction is no longer possible in an age with a multitude of scientific claims>? — Leontiskos

Aristotle's use of induction to reach metaphysical truths would require him to survey the prior categories before he could move upwards towards being, as I understand it. That's why he does that prior to the metaphysics, at least as I read it -- I know it could just be a nomenclature thing and not something separate from physics. It definitely fits with his general process for generating knowledge -- start with the senses and move by induction through the categories, and he usually only moves after he thinks he's considered all the options.

Not that the future couldn't be different, but now there are just that many options that this method is not feasible to do metaphysics with.

Your article says nothing at all about modus ponens, and so fails to answer my question. — Leontiskos

Blah, that's cuz I said it wrong. Modus Tollens.

Where does Aristotle say that one needs to consider every scientific claim?

Do you have an argument that connects your premise to your conclusion, or am I right that your inference was invalid? — Leontiskos

I infer that because of his method of induction -- in order for him to be able to consider being, as such, he would have to start with the lower categories and move his way up. As I read the move from the physics to the metaphysics that's pretty much how we gets to his claims to have philosophical, metaphysical knowledge.