But the first distinction is made by the first cell, and then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers, and then...

The Observer is the observed.
— Krishnamurti

Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world.
— The Grateful Dead

I would not say that the world is composed of eyes, but it has eyes, and we are those eyes. — unenlightened

There's a flag I want to put on "first cell", but it feels too off topic.

Granting the first cell making a distinction, which I can agree with, it's interesting how the story can be used for a single developing organism -- a story from birth until here we are talking -- as well as the development of organisms. "then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers" helped click some of GSB to his wider, philosophical sense that I haven't been grasping (and, truthfully, I'm still feeling around about).

"The world has eyes" is a nice phrase. It feels mystical in that way that tries to make a reflective statement -- where we talk of the world, which is usually not ourselves, but then it fits us within the world as we see our own eyes in our minds-eye -- that is, through language (or at least with a great deal of assistance from language)

When you finish with your next post: What do you make of 's linked summary?

especially Americans are hung-up on the mob influence on the unions in the past. — Benkei

I think there's been a concerted effort to undermine unions.

There's a lot of images of unions, like the mob (but so, so many others), which are popular because they make a splash and feed into people's preconceptions. There are even law firms dedicated to busting union drives. There's also been a long-term concerted effort to defund unions through what are called "right to work" laws such that people who benefit from a given contract can opt in or out of whether they'll pay union dues, which -- due to human nature -- most people prefer free things to not-free things and it takes about one generation before a union is unable to hire enough staffers to appropriately service the contract and it becomes something of a limping organization that, with appropriate activism, can be strong -- but everyone at this point is used to the more bureaucratic form of labor unions and they really do just want a fee-for-service model (without paying for the fee-for-service model).

And with fewer numbers comes less influence within the political realm, which in turn means that politicians are more likely to ignore the demands of labor even while unions contribute to the democratic political party. It's a feedback loop.

Which is why I say the capitalists have become better at divide and conquer -- that's basically what's happened over the course of the last half of the 20th century as a concerted political effort to undermine the democratic base in favor of capital.

OK So rather than a Cartesian subject: "One is always in one's world" has a phenomenological sound to it. The world is composed of distinctions, in this case, some of which include me (inside) and the rest of which doesn't (outside), but which are still together as one world: the world composed of distinctions. The book is gesturing towards a flow of distinctions upon distinctions with the first distinction holding for all distinctions thereafter.

Not quite clear to me, esp. the last statement, but it's OK. — Alkis Piskas

You make it sound like a simple phsychological game. I'm afraid there's much more to it than just that. One does not risk his job, his income and the support of his family because he gets angry.
(Except if he's a total idiot, of course.) — Alkis Piskas

There are always more details, and often times they're important to a particular circumstance. I presented a simplification which was meant to highlight how emotion, rather than duty, would be the reason a person decides one way or another. The simplification fits with the scenario of a strike.

The "more" would be the lead-up to the strike, what other tactics had been tried, the sorts of demands the workers are making, how long the contract has been in place, what relationships there are between union members, union leadership, and management, what the wider circumstances are in which the conflict is taking place....

In short, the sorts of things that a historical account would take care of better than a hypothetical.

Consistency, authenticity, candor, good intentions, competence, dedication to achieving clear goals that align with your own. The ability to listen. I think it is easy to recognize when someone is showing you the way to what you want, or what you think your nation needs. — ToothyMaw

These all sound good to me. I'd even be able to point to some examples of people that fit.

I'm not sure anyone would disagree with this list. They'd disagree on who fits, though. And I bet we'd be more inclined to put dead figures on the list, too. It's easier to honor the dead than the living.

I suppose I'd just point out that we have quite a few leaders. But I don't recognize your list in many of them. And so this is the cause of doubt: it seems that we already have leaders who believe themselves to be all of these good qualities, but we're lamenting that they don't possess them.

But is it just because certain people haven't seen that it's their duty to lead and influence people towards good ends? We have lots of people attempting to lead and influence, it's just not the right people? Is all that's stopping them is that they don't realize what their duty is?

I should begin by saying that it has been some years since I have worked extensively with Aristotle's primary texts, so a strict Aristotelian may quibble with me on this point or that. Still, I think I will give an accurate account. — Leontiskos

You're in a better position than me. Years ago I read a substantial amount of Aristotle in English, but that's about it.

An essence is what something is in virtue of itself, and the definition describes the essence. It will also be useful to note that for Aristotle the standard beings are substances: things which exist of themselves and which possess their own mode of being and acting. So hammering would be an act of a substance, in particular an act of a human substance. — Leontiskos

A hammer is an artifact, not a substance, but be that as it may, we still need to understand what a hammer is before we use it. For Aristotle definition is not restricted to a means by which one shares knowledge. To understand what something is is to have its definition, and to have partial knowledge about what something is is to have a nominal or partial definition.

So when you approach a hammer for the purpose of manipulation you have already formed a partial definition of it. It is a physical object (which can be manipulated physically). It is graspable by the hand. It possesses a kind of leverage. It has a hard head which can be used to hit things without incurring damage. All of this is part of the definition, and is already implicit in one who manipulates a hammer. For Aristotle it wouldn't make much sense to say that you manipulate a hammer without some understanding of what it is. — Leontiskos

Is it possible to act without knowing?

That seems to be the only condition you'd accept human activity as non-essential, given that any amount of knowledge results in having at least a partial definition or some approximation of an essence.

I believe these two are incompatible with each other as to the direction and recipient of the effect (fear and anger).
Fear works against the employees. Anger --as I can assume from how you put it-- works against the company. So I can't see how you can select between the two ... — Alkis Piskas

"working against the company" is a bit of a stretch, I'd say. "the company" is primarily comprised of employees, after all. But the union is for the employees, so it doesn't make sense to say "against the company" from that standpoint. (against management, now...)

Anger works against fear that management uses in its negotiations. Once you're at the point of a strike that's pretty much the emotional spark which will drive a person to select one side or the other -- or the professionals will stand back and wish people could just get along without acknowledging that there are simply differences in desire due to social position.

For a lot of professionals or independent contractors they have a hard time understanding this stuff because they're simply treated differently than workers who are viewed as replaceable or as not really worth being paid enough to live or just enough to live. They've had roughly fair dealings with employers and opportunities they can move onto if something goes south at their current place of employment. The social position of the workers just isn't something that clicks for a lot of people until they have felt it.

The other thing that's missing from the scenario is the build-up to the strike. By the time you get to a strike you've already exhausted pretty much every other option. What a union really does is negotiate -- striking is just a tactic in that process of negotiation, and it's basically the last resort.

But most negotiations are not conducted on such strong lines that warrant a strike. But by the time you get to a strike... I mean, avoid it at all costs, but my answer remains the same because I prefer to have power in a negotiation rather than not.

My conclusion is that we have to cooperate, because others would see us as "selfish", "traitor", "a black sheep", etc. — javi2541997

Heh. That's an interesting conclusion, at least for myself, because I would push against it while maintaining that we have to cooperate. pointed out how the owners of firms are already incorporated, and the workers are only kinda-sorta incorporated.

If I were the King of Rules, or some such nonsense, I'd say that every firm must be a closed shop.

Or: we have to cooperate because we're human beings.

It is not the same crossing the picket line just because you are afraid of being sacked than having other kind of duties. — javi2541997

I think your first example is a bit of a fiction. It's not the same, but anyone in that situation isn't crossing the picket line because they're afraid of being sacked. I'll bring it back to my opening response: it's because their anger dried out and they've come back to their fear. The scabs believe the boss will win, which sometimes the boss does win, and so they go back over to the boss's side.

But sometimes the workers win too.

(EDIT: And either way, I'm still maintaining that duty can't justify choosing the path of the scab. It's not a duty. It's a selfish action, which we all do all the time. It's merely not dutiful)

I have empathy, but they're still scabs. I understand why they're doing it, but the choice they're making is still "My family is more important than your family".

I don't think we, as philosophers, should give the scabs anything more than the truth. The truth is they are choosing themselves over the other families to the point that they are willing to sacrifice the other families who are benefiting workers for their own family.

That, even if you don't call them such, is a scab. And once the strike is over the scab will get picked off by the boss, eventually, because they already did what the boss wanted, and the new recruits won't remember all the conflict from before.

It's your claim to duty that I'm challenging. I empathize with people lesser because I'm lesser. But I don't claim that I'm good for that reason.

I accept the argument about Socrates and the Singleton Socrates. And I understand the paper to basically be directed towards essentialists (so it's not for me), but rather arguing that this is a better concept of essence than the modal concept, while accepting and explicating their connection.

But I'm not seeing the conclusion very well.

So what is an appropriate specification of the meaning? The only satisfactory answer
appears to be that the specification should make clear what the meaning (essentially) is; it should
provide us, that is to say, with some account of the meaning's essence.

I think I'd just say: I got some unsatisfactory answers to your question.

Carrying over my response here, though I'm fine with moving it back to "Belief" as well.

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. — Leontiskos

My understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence is that it is a given something's definition.

The first thing that comes to mind is know-how. I know-how to hammer, regardless of what the hammer is pointed at (or even what the hammer is -- animal, vegetable, mineral, or familiar tool). I don't need to know the essence of a thing in order to manipulate it. And a lot of knowledge is at this level of manipulation rather than at a definitional level. The definitions come later when you're trying to put knowledge into some sort of form which can be shared to assist in spreading the knowledge.

At that point definitions are important. They're a wonderful tool for teaching someone differences that were picked up through practice, but would be much more slowly learned without the definitions.

But because definitions are developed from practice I'd say that definitions are not necessary. (What is the essence of "thingy" in "Hand me that thingy over there"?) And if it's not necessary we can conclude definitions are not essential to knowing-how.

I still don't see how that is a lie. They aren't brainwashed; they are convinced that there is a good cause and that they should take it up. I would say manipulation is not always via unsavory means, although it has that connotation. — ToothyMaw

That's at least pretty close to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_lie ? Or not?

It's not brainwashing. It's myth making.

However, go ahead and say what you want about it. I kind of want to know what you were going to say. — ToothyMaw

My first thought is that if duty is real for some and not real for others then there are some people who are not attuned to duty. So who are the dutiful, such that we know they are attuned to duty, and who are those who are not attuned to duty? Or is it not a kind of knowledge at all?

One should lead by example, demonstrating that a cause is worthy even without such an appeal. — ToothyMaw

Seems like it would apply to Donald Trump and to Joe Biden, for instance. At least we can see that there are people who follow either leader, and so believe those leaders to be demonstrating their cause to be worthy. But you're blaming the leaders -- so it's not them.

In fact I think it's no one, if I'm reading you correctly.

So how am I to know this duty when I see it?

. If one is genuinely trying to instill a sense of duty for a good, substantial reason, then no. — ToothyMaw

I think that's pretty much what a noble lie amounts to: it's technically a lie, but it's for a good, substantial reason of drawing the people towards what's good. Since your account asks leaders to instill goodness in others through manipulation it seemed to fit.

A cynical exploitation would not be a noble lie, but just a lie.

These concepts can be real to one person and not another and it doesn't diminish the importance of duty to those who are attuned to it. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to try and do a little philosophy with this sentence, if you don't mind.

Something that's confusing to me here is "concepts can be real" -- not the relativism, but just that sentence alone. My guess is you're saying duty is not a noble lie because duty is real, in some sense. So duty is real for some people, and not real for others. Is that correct?

I'm calling out the leaders, not the people. And yes, I do maintain that duty is the most powerful motivator, as it can override just about any other consideration if the human is manipulated correctly. Remember the Third Wave experiment? In that instance it was used to harm, but such manipulations can be used for good. Many, if not most, of us have grown complacent, and good leaders with the peoples' best interests at heart need to intervene - before a nasty, fascistic one does. — ToothyMaw

Nowhere do I say that duty is what one "ought" to do, but rather is a subjective motivator that can be manipulated by good leaders to good ends - which is what I'm actually advocating for here. — ToothyMaw

So duty is a kind of noble lie, then?

There are so many inspiring stories in the history of labor. Thanks for sharing, I didn't know that one.

Yeees... only... Well, let's say both the political and economic landscape of the future are as yet unmapped. But I think that speculation belongs elsewhere. — Vera Mont

Heh, yes.

Well, it is interesting to see that mafia trade unions share the same industry/commerce: trucks and transportation. To understand how poisonous can a trade union be, we have to look at Jimmy Hoffa's story. Hoffa became involved with organized crime from the early years of his Teamsters work, a connection that continued until his disappearance in 1975. He was convicted of jury tampering, attempted bribery, conspiracy, and mail and wire fraud in 1964 in two separate trials. He was imprisoned in 1967 and sentenced to 13 years. In mid-1971. — javi2541997

The one I was thinking of was learned of in passing, and I rather like my legs.

It takes a lot of bravery to organize on a shop floor, or youthful anger (as others have already pointed out). It takes even more bravery to try to organize the honest way if the mafia is involved. Some organizers have done that, but not me. But because some organizers have done that this is how I know they still exist (and that the answer is always organizing).

But it's a rare case. I mentioned it as an obvious example of when unions can go bad. I don't think anyone should just blindly believe that because there's a union it's a good thing. It could be a bad union. There are examples of that.

The thing is: you can either leave your job, or organize. Sometimes the fight is too much for some people, and I understand that. Human beings are frail and weak. Duty is something that's a bit out of reach for most of us, though it can be inspiring.

I just don't think you can frame scabbing, in particular, as a dutiful action. It really is as selfish as I described: you're picking your own family over the families of your coworkers. A lot of people have sympathy for that position, but think on the categorical imperative: if everyone scabs then there's no strike to scab and everyone is back at work. I understand that duty need not follow the CI, but it's a pretty well worked out example of a philosophical theory of duty at least. So I have my doubts.

I think it's time to ditch all the old forms. — Vera Mont

:D

A saying after my heart. But I've mellowed out. Union structures work to give some semblance of power to working people. The old forms stick around because they still work better than nothing, and also because the old form of capital is still around. It hasn't changed that much, except to grow larger and become better at divide and conquer.

But I'm afraid I have to say one should think in terms of bosses and workers, when looking at political economy. Or at least the bourgeoisie, if not the lieutenants of capital. As a socialist surely you agree here? Automation can give us good things if used well, but to be used well the workers need to have a say in political economy?

Right, I understand. I just mean -- look at the 1800's. The hours were longer, automation caused there to be a labor reserve army, and there were fewer laws in place.

I don't think the working class has disappeared, though it's not a topic for USian political parties. Like you say, it's all middle-class based talking points.

But it's not like the house of commons during Marx's time was the most progressive force, either. It took organizing then, and it took organizing during the 1900's to maintain those victories which brought about a kind of golden age of labor, and that's what it would take today. And really it'll depend upon the workers. Not my little opinions on the matter.

It might have to get worse before people want to make it better, though. Most workers are not fighters. They just want the best for them and their family, and fear is an effective motivator.

I know something about the history of trade union movements and labour parties. The present is pretty dim, especially in the US, but other countries, too, where a succession of governments have been systematically kneecapping unions.

But what of their future? Given the state of automation and collar-bleaching... I wonder. Teachers, librarians, nurses, yes. Who else is, or can be organized into, a progressive political force? — Vera Mont

I'm out of the game, and I broke my crystal ball awhile ago, but my sympathy for the future of labor has always been the service sector. But as long as there's a money-flow within a firm and a group of people who depend upon a wage from the firm then there's lies the possibility to unionize: call centers, food chains, delivery drivers, uber/lyft drivers, amazon, wal-mart, target, alphabet workers, public sector workers, migrant farmers, transit workers, baristas, catering companies, hotels, non-profits...

When people talk about the dimness of labor I note how the golden age of labor was something of a fluke, and it only came about due to fights under arguably worse circumstances (sometimes the same, in the most extreme cases -- migrant farmers come to mind here particularly). What worked then is what would work now, if people decided to stop living in their little family-bubble.

And that's why I think the scenario, as posited, is basically reactionary: it's the scabs prayer.

I've been in unions at various points in their life-cycle, including an attempt to form a brand new one. That was defeated, and two years later, the same workers opted to join one of big, powerful unions, in which they would be an insignificant cog. Not a great outcome, but a rational choice that resulted in better pay for my ex-colleagues. By then, I was working elsewhere as a member of one of the big, powerful unions - which served us very well, as it happens, and deserved our support. — Vera Mont

I started as an organizer on my own shop floor and then eventually became a staffer for a different union in another life. But not so much union activity now that I'm doing the sciences -- scientists, among other professionals, have a hard time seeing themselves as "workers". The images of the factory are still strong, even though there's no need for a factory to have a union that works -- all you need is solidarity. Also I've had my fill of fighting. Being an organizer is a stressful, thankless job where everyone blames you for everything and most of what you do is run around putting out fires for less than the members you service make ;).

There are definitely flaws in unions which are worth noting and learning from. They're human organizations. And from a Marxist perspective it's generally viewed that unions can't be strong enough to compete with capital, so there are even political reasons to criticize unions from the left.

I guess I just don't see the scenario as presenting the flaws and how to learn from them as much as giving us a very common image that the boss uses: the image of the poor, benighted worker who has two bosses, the union boss and the company boss, and he's just trying to feed his family.

The OP example was questionable, so I questioned it. Is that not why we're here? — Vera Mont

It is. But I thought @Banno had a good point. There's a very rich history, and I thought the scenario was kind of highlighting the worst aspects of a union without really getting at how people have actually overcome (or failed to) these sorts of things. So I suppose I'm just questioning the question. The annoying philosophy thing.

As presented in the example, the call to strike seems irrational. — Vera Mont

That's because it's meant to ;).

At least so I'm maintaining, while maintaining that it's not possible to make the argument from duties to scab.

But it is just an example, a hypothetical.

The example I used the strike was for equal pay for women. They didn't win in the first strike, but they got some victories, and then some odd 15 years later the original demand was met with a longer strike.

This is why I wanted to know if there is a possibility for a worker to disengage from this structure. When I read papers and news related to this issue, I figured out that a "scab" is badly seen among workers and most of them end up disowned. Yet, I was curious to understand the purposes of a scab and then some delicate situations like my OP could exist. Even, the trade unions can act aggressively towards the workers and threaten them. Acting like a gang, as you explained. — javi2541997

When I said "mafia laundering" I wasn't making a metaphor. I mean there exist legal entities in the United States which are registered as unions but are operated by the actual mafia as a money laundering operation. They don't really service their contracts very well, and they don't even bother to fight for a better one. They'll just re-up the contract for as long as they can so they can keep the structure, and for the most part the contracts are hardly enforced anyways.

The funny thing here is that the solution is still the same. It's not disengagement, but engagement: you organize. Else you just let the mafia run the show. Same goes for if you disagree with leadership: you organize.

Participation is what keeps a democratic organization alive. A worker can disengage with the structure, sure, but I think you'd have a hard time making the case that it's a duty to do so unless a worker's duty is only to themself and their family. (which others have basically said so far -- so if you take that extra step then you can even be secure in yourself and know you've done your duty)

Now insofar that democratic structures are gang-like then a union can act like a gang. But this is more of a reaction to having to deal with social structures and a desire to be independent than it is engaging with the reality of trade unionism: The next job, contra @ssu, will have similar structures in place. The cowboys of the world, as I call them, are entirely selfish as I set it out: they're there for themselves and their family, and that's that.

But the union movement benefits them even if they decide to hamper it. That's why it'd be hard to make the case that it's a duty -- if you're a worker then you're already indebted to a long history of struggle. There are the cowboys who want to be individuals, but by that they're making the choice I said: they're choosing their own family over the families of others.

And that's true even if human nature is basically bad, and so unions, too, are of course corruptable. But that's not what they are, and that's kind of the vibe that your scenario presents: it would be naive to believe that every union is a shining beacon of goodness, or something along those lines. I don't even think "goodness" enters the picture -- it's about power, simple as. But it's similarly foolish to judge unions on the basis of the single scariest thing that a worker might have to do. That's not even most of what a union does. Most unions try to avoid strikes.

That's an assumption not always borne out by results. The strikers are not necessarily represented by the union leadership; they may be incorrect in their assessment of the situation; this particular worker may be aware that the strike is futile.
If he makes his decision on nothing more than loyalty to the union, it's just another case of blind obedience, not a moral or ethical one. — Vera Mont

When does scabbing not hurt strikers?

"The strike is futile" is fear, as I said. So that worker is picking on the basis of their fear, because they believe the boss will win so they're hedging their bets and helping the boss break the strike. It's not "nothing but loyalty", but an awareness of how the world works -- if you help the boss break the strike then you're putting your family ahead of the other families that are also risking themselves. That's the choice being made.

The real choice... eh, we're not in a union drive here so it's a bit idle to talk about "the real choice", unless we're going to use historical examples.

Either way I don't think you can make the case that scabbing is following a duty, which is what the original scenario is speaking in terms of, unless the only duty you have is to yourself and your family. (which, in truth, is where a lot of people reside in terms of willfully chosen duties -- duty to union, outside of union families, is often seen as a naive position. But it's not. It's the only reason workers have what they have today, and it's the reason why they're losing more of it too)

I mean, there is always one specific person who, for whatever reason, is in a worse position than the rest. — javi2541997

Yup.

But here's where history can serve as a better guide to understanding the problems and decisions a worker faces. Union drives have succeeded and failed, unions have been successful in one generation and fade away with future generations, or experience resurgences. That's the ebb and flow of historical reality. (One might be tempted to call it dialectical ;) )

For instance, unions cross the anglosphere -- they are organized all across the world, across different ethnicities and language-groups. Some of the most inspiring stories of strikes come from overcoming differences in language, culture, and expectations. Unions thrived prior to women becoming more prominent within the workforce as well, to speak to another point you brought up.

And sometimes trade unions aren't even as effective as a political lobby. Sometimes they're a money laundering operation for the mafia, and the contracts they service won't protect anything, nor are they actually run on democratic principles.

All these possibilities are explored in the history of labor.

I'd echo @Banno's sentiments here. A particular worker is in a particular time and place. The scenario is already abstract from the outset: it's a deontological problem of choice. For particulars we should look to history.

But there's no choice in the abstract. If you're a worker then, like it or not, scabbing will hurt strikers. Even if the worker really wants to scab that will occur, and that's not really defensible on ethical, deontic grounds. It falls pretty easily to the first formulation of the categorical imperative because not everyone can scab -- if they did then there'd be no strike and they'd all be back at work.

One of the things missing from the abstract problem is that unions are democratic organizations. So there's already social responsibility in the mix which isn't represented by the problem.

It would be much better to look at historical cases, the miners and Thatcher, perhaps. — Banno

I agree here. Historical cases demonstrate how people have overcome various problems, or failed at overcoming various problems. What they lack in conceptual clarity they gain in fidelity to the vagaries of political action.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_sewing_machinists_strike_of_1968 is a good example because it also has a movie you can watch which I found satisfying. I like that it depicts strikes as scary things, because they are scary. You don't know the outcome of your actions, and you have the real possibility of losing.

But progress has only come from normal people being willing to do scary things.

But keep in mind that the worker of the example has problems in his family: the wife is already unemployed, one kid is sick and the other goes to college. Maybe the rest of the workers are covered up thanks to the incomes of their respective families... — javi2541997

Families are rarely in a state of perpetual comfort. There's always something to take care of. This is the common mantra of the scab: "I understand what you're doing, but I have to take care of my family" -- which is fear. The scab believes the boss is going to win, so the scab chooses the boss's side. This is to the detriment of the strikers, whose families are similarly unstable, have needs, and so forth. It's not a neutral act of duty, it's a person actively sabotaging the efforts of strikers in the name of their family: Family over Union.

A common act of social grace is to say something along the lines of "The spouse wouldn't allow it" or "My kid is at home sick", and I understand them to be bowing out of whatever it is we're doing. But they're usually speaking for themself, and sometimes the kid is at school and the parent just needs some time to themself and the only excuse people accept is some duty or other.

But when you're talking union the "my family" excuse is out the door -- buddy, we all have families. That's what we're doing this for.

Workers do face difficult decisions in supporting a union drive, becoming active in the union, and in striking, especially when the employer is hostile. The risks are not a pretense. Strikes do not always succeed, and a failed strike can leave the union members broke and out in the cold. — BC

I agree.

That's why I thought that duty doesn't leave a choice.

You may have a family. But do you think that the other strikers don't? They're already risking exactly what the OP sets up. Some cave to fear, or selfishness, and think of their own family in the moment. It's particularly difficult because a person has these connections, and that's a struggle.

But philosophically speaking the duty is clear: the strikers are risking their families already. You should do the same. Don't blame your fellow workers who are just asking for fairness to be able to take care of their families, blame the boss for not doing what's right!

Which should point out the importance of looking at, even if I'm wrong, fear and anger.

With that being said: I really like the last chapter because it's close to what I was writing out, once upon a time, when attempting to invent a purely spacial logic (that didn't work out, and so I threw it away as nonsense). Also I enjoyed working through a calculus that isn't the same as all the others, though there are parts I'm still uncertain about. And I enjoyed GSB's fusion of poetry with math, which is something I have a soft spot for. (EDIT: Might be a bit of a surprise given my approach so far -- but I wanted to treat the book as a logic in addition to its poetic value, and thought maybe that was the part I could contribute to for understanding the text)

Good recommendation @unenlightened, and thanks for the prodding and motivation. I would not have finished the book without your help.

Empathy. You see what happened to someone, you understand that you could have been the one, and so you leave something nice because that's what you'd like to be done if it were you.

Typing out the ending, because it's probably the most interesting philosophical part:

An observer, since he distinguishes the space he occupies, is also a mark.

In the experiments above, imagine the circles to be forms and their circumferences to be the distinctions shaping the spaces of these forms.

In this conception a distinction drawn in any space is a mark distinguishing the space. Equally and conversely, any mark in a space draws a distinction.

We see now that the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only interchangeable, but, in the form, identical

While I've admitted ignorance to certain parts of GSB's demonstration, I'm not sure about the conclusion here. Not that it's wrong, only that I'm uncertain that it's earned.

Observers and such haven't really shown up until this point. He's asking us to interpret ourselves as an "m" outside of a circle where the circle is the forms around us. But this would be the simple subject, if it can be reduced to an "m"? Or no? It's not clear, because "observer" shows up at the very end.

All the same I think I like "a distinction drawn in any space is a mark distinguishing the space" -- to mark a space one must mark. Even "the unmarked state" has been used so far as equal to variables, and so works, in a sense, as a marked space would (in a different way from the way space pervades expressions)

But I'd say that GSB sees something I don't, at the end. And I suspect it's because he's an idealist. He can see that the first distinction makes the observer interchangeable with the mark because he believes that, at base, this is all mind-stuff and the forms we see are mentally constructed? Or something along those lines.

But all I see is a mark, and a man who wants to be that mark.

I said I'd wait but I'm not :P :D -- I finished the book today. But that chapter on time isn't clicking.

I'm tempted at this point to just grant chapter 7. I checked T10 through the proof by example of J2 and it works out, but since I didn't get to C9 the same as GSB, and it looks close enough for me, I'm fine with just allowing it and moving on. After working through those examples the text is reading a lot easier and I can kind of see how it's good enough for me. :D -- it was fun to work through the nitty gritty puzzles, but I'm starting to think "OK, I'm ready for a point now"

Seventh Cannon is what made me think the above -- it pretty much lays out what we've been doing in the demonstrations, but allows you to use the algebra now.

The bits on time: we get the conclusion I was thinking of, which is interesting to me!, that there are undecidable expressions (now that we have functions that go to infinity).

One thing I'm thinking is you could just posit another space-dimension to accommodate GSB's "cross in a plane", but I'm ok with saying this is space-time instead.

The oscillator function makes me want to take back what I said earlier about negation. It seems like we're close to negation with it because of the relationship between the two spaces inverts, but it's never named.

But I can say I've officially lost the plot at page 62's "Time in finite expression" -- I don't understand Figure 3, or most of the figures after that. The only one I get right now is page 65's rendition of E1.

But also I kind of continued past when I normally would just because I was hooked. I've officially finished the book now, but without as much math ;). Still chewing on the ending.

The boss's weapon is fear, the union's weapon is anger.

I prefer anger to fear. But many prefer fear. I don't think it comes down to duties as much as these two emotions -- which one a person lets rule them is how they'll decide to strike or scab. Or, if I were to put it in terms of duties, I'd say there isn't even a choice. But I doubt that's surprising ;).

And let's see if I can finish it out now...


(C9.12) from above shows how C2 can be used to obtain C9.3 more easily.

Let C2's a= unmarked state, and b= r for the right-hand expression in C9.12

$\left. {\overline {\, ab \,}}\! \right|b$ = $\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|b$ (C2)

Plugging the right hand expression of C9.12 into the right-hand side of C2, while keeping $\left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|$ as is...

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|r$-->$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.13)

We remove the double cross with C1 and put back into the original expression to get C9.3:

$\left. {\overline {\, ba\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, rxy \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.3)

Looking at the differences between C9.3 and C9.4 I thought that only the left-hand cross was involved in the transformation, but then saw that we're using C2 and the only way to get r-x-y-cross underneath that cross is by setting C2's b = r-x-y-cross, and a is everything else underneath the left-hand cross. It's a transformation from the right-hand-side of C2 to the left-hand-side.

$\left. {\overline {\, ba\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, rxy \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, rxy \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.4)


This last step took some guesses for me. What worked was using C7. I could see that we really just want to get rid of some of the terms underneath the left-hand cross of C9.4. I pretty much just guess-and-checked my way to a solution.

C7, but inverted to show the direction of transformation:

$\left. {\overline {\, ac \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|c \,}}\! \right|$ = $\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|b \,}}\! \right|c \,}}\! \right|$

Let C7's a =xy, b =xy, and c = r. Ignoring, from C9.4, and maintaining b and a from C9.4 (but erasing the cross that all of this is contained in to make it less bulky)

$\left. {\overline {\, ab\left. {\overline {\, xyr \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\,}}\! \right|$ --> $\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|ab \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.5)

Which is close to where we want to get to, we just want to remove the redundant part at depth 3 and 4.

For that I went to C2:

$\left. {\overline {\, ab \,}}\! \right|b$ = $\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|b$

Taking just the expression:

$\left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|xy$

Let C2's a = unmarked state
Let C2's b = xy

It becomes

$\left. {\overline {\, * \,}}\! \right|xy$ (C9.6)

Then take this expression into C3:

$\left. {\overline {\, * \,}}\! \right|a$ = $\left. {\overline {\, * \,}}\! \right|$

Let C3's a = xy and C9.6 reduces to a single cross.

Plug C9.6 reduced back into C9.5:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, * \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|ab \,}}\! \right|$

Using C1 we reduce the double crosses over the unmarked state and plug this back into C9.4 and rearrange we obtain C9's conclusion:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right|ab \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, rxy \,}}\! \right|$

And so we have C9:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$ = $\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right|ab \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, rxy \,}}\! \right|$ (C9)

Which, yup, I can get the conclusion, but it certainly didn't involve using C6 -- and I tried to do it that way a few times but concluded it couldn't be used because there's just not that form present in the expression of interest. So a bit of a guess-and-check based on what we're trying to obtain got me through the demonstrations.

There's something odd about letting b = xy and a = xy, but I don't really see a reason within the logic presented so far to not allow two different variables to be assigned to similar names at different parts of an expression so I just went with it. But it does seem kind of funny. (Also noting how Theorem 12 states that I should use T10 in place of J2, and I didn't really use J2... I was just looking for a way to make the equation work. So that derivation may be wrong, or at least wasn't what GSB had in mind -- but it seems to follow still)

I have now figured out what he meant by "integration". I missed that C3 was named integration, and so this is him pulling out one of the sub-steps in the demonstration of C3 and calling it "integration".

That leaves the bit where he says "Thus if we consider the equivalence of steps..." which I'm still scratching me head on. I understand that the steps have an order to them, and so reduce depending upon the order of transformations. But his conclusion that "therefore the unmarked state is equivalent to a step" doesn't make sense to me. He demonstrated that taking steps is inconsistent and so he concludes that the unmarked state is a step rather than not putting steps into the calculus -- which is what I'd do since steps had never been introduced as a member of the calculus. We've been working through the marked state, the unmarked state, equivalence, and transformation through substitution. The steps are semi-arbitrary in that we can set any part of an expression equal some other conclusion as long as the forms match up. Why on earth would I take a step as a part of the calculus and set it equal to the unmarked state?

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.1)

Noticing that the form closely matches C8... (Note, I thought I had it in typing it out but then noticed I'm making a mistake, so the first part is a failed attempt at demonstrating this step, but after the break I figured out my mistake and demonstrate the step from C9.1 to C9.2)

Let C8's...

a = $\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|$

Because that's the only expression which appears under both crosses in C8's transformation to the right-hand-side.

b = $\left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|$

c = $\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|$

r = $\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right|$

Then plugging these values into the right hand side of C8 we get:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

And then we remove the double brackets using C1 and re-arrange the expressions to obtain (though it looks more like 5 times rather than thrice?) (Actually I'm making a mistake here... I'm noticing that there's an added cross in the final conclusion that I'm not accounting for... hrm, hrm, hrm...)

$\left. {\overline {\, ba \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\,}}\! \right|$$\left. {\overline {\, r \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.2) (but not obtained by the above procedure)

**************

Something I like to demonstrate in my postings here is that I'm constantly changing my mind, or noticing mistakes -- my thought is that the finished product never looks like how you get there, and I think that this forum is at its best when sharing our process of thinking in all of its messiness, in all of its faults. So I'm keeping the mistake up above, while working out the correct demonstration here (and simply adding to the post so as not to clog the front page too much) (Also why I'm fine with repeating myself, or going over old ground again)

And I figured out my mistake. The reason I had extra crosses, and needed to perform C1 more than thrice, is that the solution should be--

Let C8's...

a= $\left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r$

b = $\left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|$

c = $\left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|$

r = $\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right|$

Then plugging into the right hand side of C8 we obtain:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

And then we can remove the double crosses, three times (C1 thrice), to obtain:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|ba \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.12)

Which easily re-arranges to:

$\left. {\overline {\, ba\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\,}}\! \right|$ (C9.2)

I said that, but I took a hiatus with the USian labor day weekend, and this morning I got stuck on the first transformation of the demonstration of C9. This afternoon I think I worked out the first step, which I'm going to present here because it took me a second to see it.

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$ = $\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

Just looking for patterns I noticed how the only transformation occurs on the final two depth=2 crosses, so I simplified to looking at those final two crosses alone:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|$

Which to fit the form of C1, as the text suggests, I set this whole expression = a, and from C1 I add two crosses onto the expression:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$

Which gets us to something close to J2. From J2 let p = $\left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right|$ and let q = $\left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right|$, then the expression resembles the left hand side of J2. Converting to the right hand side of J2, but substituting back into the original expression we obtain:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, x \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, y \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right|$

Which from C1, but this time going from the left hand side to the right hand side to remove two crosses above both X and Y, and plugging this expression back into its place from the original expression we get the first step:

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, b \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, a \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, xy \,}}\! \right|r \,}}\! \right| \,}}\! \right|$ (C9.1)

EDIT:

About an hour later, some random thoughts I'm having while working through these:


One of the things I'm thinking of is how we're showing, from the rules set out so far, how one expression equals another expression. But even though we're using variables I remain uncertain that we have really marked out the domain of expressions such that these are proofs. And further it seems that we could show some other expression could equal one of the other conclusions, like C1. Or, at least, it's not clear to me that these hold as proofs in the same way that numerical expressions with variables have proofs in them, or that other logical systems have proofs in them, like De Morgan's Laws.

To make a list of what we are able to do so far: substitution, the marked state, the unmarked state, variables, equality, and step-wise transformation from J1/J2 (and all demonstrations from J1/J2). The demonstrations are claiming to be a calculus of the marked or unmarked state, but how to delimit that space such that these demonstrations are proofs, in that they hold for the whole space of all expressions? Are there no other expressions other than the marked/unmarked state, or is there a value in-between marked/unmarked? Or is the law of the excluded middle an assumption of the calculus such that we also can conclude that?

One of the differences I'm seeing between this logic and the other two I listed (algebra, Boolean logic) is the lack of negation. There is no negation in this system. There is marked/unmarked, but no negation of the marked/unmarked, which I wonder if that somehow ties into making a consistent system of symbol manipulation. It makes me think that we can think of the unmarked state as more in analogue with 1/1, like it can perpetuate anywhere within an expression in the same way that (1/1) can always be added to either side of an algebraic expression.

Still meandery. One thing these exercises is providing me is a vantage from which to see how logical systems work in the abstract, or at least a vantage to reach for that perspective. ALSO, back of the mind thought, if negation never shows up then perhaps Godel's Incompleteness Theorem will not apply here. (Back of the mind for so many reasons... but I've noticed that the system may not be powerful enough to represent arithmetic, and that's why I have the thought)

Also interesting to note how the proofs of J1/J2 work by showing all cases: under the assumption that p,q, or r is such and such we show the whole expression is equal in all possible cases. This is important, I think, because it may be the case that at some additional variable point we would be unable to check by the method of all cases (which reminds me of truth-tables' check for validity, actually), and so one wonders if a multitude of variables could lead to undecidable, or multiply decidable expressions such that they could lead to both the marked/unmarked state. I think this is the thing that would have to be secured to count these demonstrations as proofs -- we have the demonstration, but is it possible for the demonstration to turn out the opposite value? Like with C1, is it possible to come up with an expression that reduced a-cross-cross to the unmarked state without a from the transformation rules? It's a niggling thought at the back of my mind, and it would be hard to find such an expression, and I may just be completely off base. But hey, sharing the thoughts in the spirit of the thread.

Good stuff.

I especially like the connection between vulnerability and transparency: forthrightness can be a boast, but if you're really at your limit of certainty then it's a good idea to let go of the desire for certainty -- especialy the certainty that you'll win the argument ;).

Transparency, though, is a way to subject yourself to the criticism of philosophy.

Also true.

:)

I'm pleased to see you thinking through the problem. It's something I tend to think about, once and again.

The reason I say the guide is the senses has to do with my time as an activist. I am no longer an activist, so don't trust this as a forever-truth -- one of the things I learned as an activist is that it's too easy to think you have a forever-truth, at least for the philosophically inclined.

But then the world you live within has a way of interrupting thoughts and forever-truths and even certain truths.

****

A dark note -- "violates human rights" in the universal sense is something the United States does. Not in an "on occasion" basis, but of course this will involve a discussion on what human rights are, and when they are worth violating (like war).

But if "human rights" has any meaning outside of the nation, at least, then the U.S. is really good at killing people -- sometimes in the name of war, but sometimes in the name of selling weapons.

My response was a joke, of course, but a joke with a point -- the question needs refinement, else the little modus ponens I offered is an answer: touch is possible because I'm touching something, and in order for me to be able to touch something it must be possible for me to touch it. (Or, if we want to be sticklers about form, I should have started with the implication)

Note that the original question didn't mention anything of physics, but rather was speaking in terms of spaces. After @T Clark pointed out that touching is not when two objects occupy the same space, and @elucid saying it makes sense I read the problem as being resolved.

Still -- the argument I offered wasn't entirely vacuous. For one, you know I'm touching a keyboard because I'm typing out to you (or, at least, you could infer that it likely, given that I have no reason to lie about it even though it's possible I could be using a talk-to-text program), and so the argument points out a relationship between possibility and true statements -- to demonstrate that something is possible all you need is one true statement of the case.

For your argument you'd need to somehow introduce physics and electrons as worthwhile entities in the domain of discourse about touching.