But after gaining membership, you can have populists coming into power who don't give a damn to human rights or see them just a way for the West to control their country's sovereignty. Hence you have the problems like the EU is having with Hungary and Orban. And of course Turkey under Erdogan has become a somewhat problematic member of NATO. — ssu

I agree. Focusing on the EU, while there is lots of literature out there about the problematic interplay of domestic factors and foreign factors showing the limits of EU pre-accession conditionality in shaping post-Soviet EU members’ “Europeanisation” (as the Visegrad group has shown), yet there are also the effects of EU integration after post-accession which help explain the relative stability of democratic trends in other cases (https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gpop/files/why_no_backsliding.pdf). To which one can now add the Russian threat which is breaking the Visegrad group (https://en.uj.edu.pl/en_GB/news/-/journal_content/56_INSTANCE_SxA5QO0R5BDs/81541894/150377650) and may turn in favour of a greater EU integration (e.g. in the domain of security and foreign affairs) but also European re-democratization (https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/10/13/democratic-backsliding-in-the-ukraine-conflict-and-renewed-prospects-of-re-democratization-in-europe/).

I see. So Ukraine may or may not “improve”, it's plausible the EU might help but the evidence isn't in the charts, but it's “obvious” so there's no need for you to actually show any… and we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum... and Ukraine is "different" from any of the places where western influence hasn't worked (but oddly the same as the ones where it might have), but again, no need to actually specify how because.... hey, who needs all this 'evidence'... and 'deregulation' is the means by which regulations are sometimes enforced....

But somehow this is all enough evidence to justify full-throated support for a devastating war which many experts think risks full nuclear exchange...

Yeah, I think we're done here. — Isaac

As usual, you need to caricature my views to score a point:
1 - The word “improve” is misleading, but since your objection revolved around it, you need to keep framing my views accordingly
2 - I said nowhere that is “obvious” from those charts. I was the first one to acknowledge that does charts did not discriminate between driving factors. So, given that we were uncertain about some relevant facts, I simply said it’s reasonable to make some assumptions. And to support the plausibility of those assumptions I also provided evidences.
3 - What needs to be shown depends on what it is actually claimed (not what you think the interlocutor has claimed) which concerns both what can be verified and inferred from the available evidence.
4 - I didn’t say anywhere “we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum”. Just that one can not set evidence-based reasoning standards arbitrarily high for a forum post. Even more so if you yourself are not up to standards you demand from others. For example: prove from unbiased sources that regulations are always correlated to improvements of human rights. That’s exactly how dumb your counter-arguments look to me.
5 - My claim wasn’t generic about “Western influence” nor made without considering “how” this needs to be specified wrt to other countries: e.g. Ukraine is different from Saudi-Arabia wrt joining EU/NATO as neighbouring countries with shared history did. And EU/NATO accession requirements imply policies and strategic concerns which hold for Ukraine too as they hold for its neighbouring post-Soviet countries (which joined EU/NATO).
6 - Deregulation and privatisation happened also in Poland (as suggested by Jeffrey Sachs according to his infamous “shock therapy”), and are still considered by many as the major drivers of Poland economic boost:
Advising in post-communist economies
Sachs has worked as an economic adviser to governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A practice trained macroeconomist, he advised a number of national governments in the transition from Marxism–Leninism or developmentalism to market economies.[citation needed]
In 1989, Sachs advised Poland's anticommunist Solidarity movement and the government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He wrote a comprehensive plan for the transition from central planning to a market economy which became incorporated into Poland's reform program led by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Sachs was the main architect of Poland's debt reduction operation. Sachs and IMF economist David Lipton advised the rapid conversion of all property and assets from public to private ownership. Closure of many uncompetitive factories ensued.[24] In Poland, Sachs was firmly on the side of rapid transition to capitalism. At first, he proposed American-style corporate structures, with professional managers answering to many shareholders and a large economic role for stock markets. That did not bode well with the Polish authorities, but he then proposed that large blocks of the shares of privatized companies be placed in the hands of private banks.[25] As a result, there were some economic shortages and inflation, but prices in Poland eventually stabilized.[26][third-party source needed] The government of Poland awarded Sachs with one of its highest honors in 1999, the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit.[27] He also received an honorary doctorate from the Kraków University of Economics.[17]
Sachs's ideas and methods of transition from central planning were adopted throughout the transition economies. He advised Slovenia in 1991 and Estonia in 1992 on the introduction of new stable and convertible currencies. Based on Poland's success, he was invited first by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and then by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the transition to a market economy. He served as adviser to Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and Finance Minister Boris Federov during 1991–1993 on macroeconomic policies.[citation needed] Sachs' methods for stabilising economies became known as shock therapy and were similar to successful approaches used in Germany after the two world wars.[23] When Russia fell into poverty after adopting his market-based shock therapy in the early 1990's,[28] some Western media called him a cold-hearted neo-liberal.[29][30]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_Sachs

BTW the author Tyler Cowen you cited a while ago to question the myth of the Marshall plan is talking about pro-market policies like privatisation and deregulation as major factors of European economic recovery
U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic poilicies

Policy makers and aid proponents should no longer view the Marshall Plan as an unqualified success. At best, its effects on postwar Europe were -mixed, while its impact on the American economy was negative. The basic problem with foreign aid is that economic growth is not a creature of central planning and direction. Growth is the result of individual initiative and enterprise within a sound legal and economic framework. Government can only supply the framework. Anything more will result in the well-known problems of central or socialist planning: the impossibility of rational economic calculation, the creation of perverse incentives, and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative, among others. Foreign aid programs always will be plagued by such problems.

In most cases, and certainly in the case of the Marshall Plan, the government-to-government character of foreign aid encourages statism and central planning, not free enterprise. The best way to promote free markets in other countries is to allow their businesses to trade with the U.S. without government interference. This freedom of trade includes not only exporting and importing, but also lending, borrowing, and labor emigration and immigration.
https://www.ccoyne.com/files/Marshall_Plan.pdf]/
So the problem is not “deregulation” per se but how it is implemented and fits other major driving factors.

And correlation is not causation.

Nothing in that establishes that those countries made those changes because of western influence, or were accepted into the western sphere because of an internal desire to make those changes. — Isaac

Suddenly lost all their agency have they? — Isaac

You are conceptually confused. I didn’t talk about causation which is a notion that can be particularly misleading in human affairs since human affairs involve agency (and that’s not the first time we have been discussing about it). I’m fine with correlations and arguable reasons for agents to process those correlations for decision making or explaining those correlations.
BTW human agency is also matter of responding to incentives and the fact that incentives do not lead to the desirable effect right away is not a sufficient counter-argument to those incentives. For example: even economic sanctions to Russia and military aid to Ukraine are not proving effective in convincing Putin to stop the war, yet we didn’t stop sanctioning Russia nor military aid to Ukraine, why is that? Because for example people can be stubborn in the pursuit of some goals as long as they can afford it, until they can’t of course. Since nobody can be certain that competing rational/irrational agents stop misbehaving out sweet-talking, one can just raise the costs of misbehaving until the misbehavior wears out its resources. And Putin will make the reciprocal reasoning. (One could also cursorily mention that even scientific theories have some resiliency against adverse evidences, and this phenomenon is the object of much debate about epistemologists like Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend)

No, you're ignoring the evidence and continuing with your fairytale in spite of evidence to the contrary.

Your theory is that Western influence on Ukraine would improve human right compared to Russian influence. — Isaac

Not “improve” for the reasons I already explained.

my hypothesis is not that joining EU improves human rights because: 1. when you roughly reached the top (the range is between 0-1) of course there is no much improving , at best you can preserve it 2. Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign). Indeed EU/NATO membership could also contribute to inhibit/weaken adverse trends prior and after the membership was accepted e.g. through sanctions, monitoring and induced constitutional reforms etc. — neomac

You've given data showing that some ex-soviet countries improved their human rights record (according to one metric) after leaving the USSR, but others didn't. Those that did later joined the EU, some later joined NATO.

You've not shown that Western influence was responsible for this improvement, not even given any data at all regarding the cause. — Isaac

Not exactly. First, I didn’t talk about “improvement”, you did. Secondly, also those post-Soviet republics which didn’t join EU/NATO experienced a boost in the earliest years according to those charts but then they didn’t keep the trend (until the top position) or degraded sharply. One might need to investigate domestic and foreign factors accounting for those trends (as I pointed out many times). Yet we have plausible reasons to suppose EU/NATO offered enough benefits to keep that trend relatively stable, even if we can not see that from those charts.

You've not shown that Russian influence was responsible for the lack of improvement in Ukraine (and Belarus), not even provided any data at all on the matter. — Isaac

I didn’t know such evidences were even needed (and I’m not certainly going to unload all the credible sources that anybody can easily consult on the internet in support of my claims, and that you are not going to read anyways or still consider biased because they do not into your echo chamber). Also because it’s very much obvious and implied in all discussions here. Yours included

at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes). — Isaac

Besides it’s preposterous to set standards for evidence-based reasoning for a philosophy forum exchange arbitrarily high. So unless you provide more unbiased and conclusive evidence for your claims than what you demand from me to offer for my claims, you are proving yourself to be intellectually dishonest. For a while now.

2. Many other countries within 'western influence' like Saudi-Arabia, have seen their human rights record decline (from an already poor start). If there was a significant driver of human rights improvements in the ex-Soviet nations post 1999, western influence clearly wasn't it since it did not have a similar effect outside of those states and that time period. — Isaac

3. The US (the chief 'western' influence in Ukraine) has a steeply declining human rights record and is currently below Belarus, a Russian puppet state.[/quote]

This is a total equivocation of the notion “Western influence”. The case of Ukraine is completely different from the case of Saudi-Arabia. To say the least, for Ukraine there is a meaningful discussion over its EU/NATO membership as there was for other post-Soviet countries in its neighbourhood (until their actual integration). And nowhere I claimed that Western influence has the same effects in every case. Western interests (vs competitor interests) in the region and domestic conditions must be taken into account.
Concerning Ukraine, the situation is particular because of the bitter conflict between anti-Russians and pro-Russians, and the ensuing effects of forced Russification: from the national government control to the pro-Russian Ukrainian regions (including the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars). Besides, according to your eagle eye for positive variations, the US influence may have improved the situation in Ukraine:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2014..latest&country=UKR~RUS

What we do see, however, is data which opposes your theory. — Isaac

You cherry-pick a particular group of states at one very narrow period of history (ex-Soviet states post 1999 to early 2000s) and then extrapolate a general theory from those despite the fact that you've been shown other states and other time periods which contradict that theory.
You infer reasons for those cherry-picked improvements which are not given in the data ('western' vs Russian influence), again despite being given data which shows the opposite - the Russian-influenced Belarus is now above the archetype of western influence, the US. — Isaac

You simply misunderstood my claims (your cherry-picking charge is grounded on your strawman fallacy). And keep playing dumb as if nobody can notice it.

You then ignore all other data, such as the fact that Ukraine's post-war policy is documented as being one of “deregulation" — Isaac

Economic deregulation may be needed, for example if the local economic regulations are meant to let local corrupt oligarchs win easily. There is nothing in the notion of “economic deregulation” that makes it incompatible with regulations promoting human-rights. Again it all depends on how deregulation is going to be implemented. BTW I don’t need AT ALL to ignore all side-effects and failures of Western induced policies in post-Soviet countries (like Russia). Yet they didn’t fail everywhere (see Poland). Besides, as I understand the stakes of the current war, lots of already compromised Western reputation (instrumental to its power struggle as for any other competing power) hinges on the fate of Ukraine, so the West can’t reasonably let it be just another failure story in Western and international perception.

The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries. — neomac


Not derivable from the charts. As I said, V-dem bias their scoring heavily in favour of democratic representation which is only a small part of human rights. We can say with certainty that the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a strong increase in democratic representation (and associated freedoms). The rest of human rights are not addressed by your charts. — Isaac

Oh, you just went back to complaining about the metric.
The charts caption says “Based on the expert assessments and index by V-Dem. It captures the extent to which people are free from government torture, political killings, and forced labor, they have property rights, and enjoy the freedoms of movement, religion, expression, and association.” This is what they measured. If you have anything pertinent to the issue at hand and arguable better than those charts, show them to me. If you do not have them, I’ll keep reasoning over the evidence I have. You feel free to keep speculating over the evidence you do not have.

After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence — neomac


Again, that's not what the charts show. The trend is similar in EU nations as it in Russio-sphere nations (in fact the trend is, on average, slightly more positive in Russio-sphere nations than it is in EU nations). — Isaac

What do you mean by “similar”? I don’t see very much relevant similarity wrt what I’m arguing.
Here some latest stats:

Post-Soviet republics (outside NATO/EU):
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=1988..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=MDA~TJK~TKM~UZB~BLR~RUS~ARM~KAZ~KGZ~GEO~UKR~AZE
Only 3/12 are upper bound >= 0.9
Only 4/12 are upper bound >= 0.8
Only 5/9 are upper bound >= 0.7
Only 5/9 are upper bound >= 0.6

Post-Soviet republics and Eastern bloc (within EU/NATO)
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2000..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=LVA~LTU~EST~SVK~ROU~BGR~POL~CZE~HUN~HRV~SVN
Only 7/9 are upper bound >= 0.9
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.8
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.7
Only 9/9 are upper bound >= 0.6

Once again you fail to consider comparative likelihood, and comparison is not over variation but over desirable levels of human rights index. Also a turd can look similar to a chocolate muffin. Yet I guess it would still taste different enough in your mouth, innit? Would this change significantly enough if you removed the sugar-coat on top of the muffin and put it on the turd?

We have no such reason from the data you've provided. You've given no evidence that EU pressure, monitoring and requirements improve human rights as a whole. You've given no evidence that Russia is responsible for the low V-dem scores of the nations which chose not to join the EU. Basically you've come at this with a preconceived notion and squeezed the data into your theory. — Isaac

The data I provided shows some trends and allow us for some reasoning under uncertainty.
The good reasons are things like these:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/648145/IPOL_BRI(2020)648145_EN.pdf
https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en
https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/peace-and-governance/human-rights_en
Which must be again assessed comparatively. And the alternative here is to be Russian puppetry.

at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes). — Isaac

What we actually have is...
Post Soviet break up, some nations chose to move toward joining the EU, for which they increased their systems of democratic representation which dramatically improved their V-dem scores. We don't have any data on why or how.
2. Other nations chose not to, so their V-dem scores remained low. We don't have any data on what influenced them to make this choice, certainly nothing showing that 'Russian influence' was the determining factor. That is entirely a fabrication of yours.
3. We have no data at all on comparisons between non-democracy related human rights such as freedom from slavery and the right to respect for family and private life.
4. We have no data at all on the impact of the post-soviet states on the human rights of other nations such as developing world trading partners.

Relating this to Ukraine. We have no reason (from the data you've given) to think that Ukraine defeating Russia would lead to a Lithuania-style improvement, or maintain the previous Ukraine-style levels. We don't know why Ukraine had such a low score and we've no evidence at all to suggest that might be related to Russia in a way which their defeat in a land war would prevent. — Isaac

Of course we have reasons. Just we are reasoning under uncertainty as avg dudes by considering the available evidences (which will always be very limited, we are neither experts nor decision makers), make comparisons, guided by some reasonable assumptions like the EU/NATO policies, the degree of involvement of the West in Ukraine, the Ukrainian aspirations, geopolitical theories, history, etc. If you refuse playing this game, that’s fine with me. Believing that’s not worth playing it, that’s entirely your problem not mine. You didn’t offer any better alternative anyways to anything we have discussed so far. You just wish all and only Western rich people and politicians sell all they have and pay for Yemeni/African/Chinese/Indian/Russian kids starving and the UK healthcare system. And apparently the best strategy for you to make that happen is by holding them accountable through posts on a philosophy forum. How is it going so far? Don’t need evidences, use your imagination.

since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime — neomac


Bollocks. There has been a civil war raging between those who want to remain in the Russian sphere of influence and those who don't. Your elaborations of data are bad enough. If you're going to just start making shit up we can't progress at all. — Isaac

Which doesn’t contradict what I’m saying at all. Indeed the separatists fighting the civil war concerns Russified regions of course. If you are ignorant about Ukrainian history, it’s not my problem. I gave you the link to Timothy Snyder classes. Alternatively a wikipedia summary can come in handy too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russification_of_Ukraine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Tatarization_of_Crimea
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_nationalism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donbas
Ukrainians in the Donbas were greatly affected by the 1932–33 Holodomor famine and the Russification policy of Joseph Stalin. As most ethnic Ukrainians were rural peasant farmers, they bore the brunt of the famine.

NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat — neomac


...and a single shred of evidence for this would be…?. — Isaac

I gave it a while ago [1]

it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends — neomac


It is unequivocal from the data you yourself provided that the EU is no such promoting factor. Look at the data. The main net gains during the period after most states joined the EU were from Russia and Belarus. If anything, the data show the exact opposite, that being outside of the EU is a better influencer on human rights.. — Isaac

Irrelevant. Even if one can’t discriminate the impact of the EU/NATO from domestic factors from those charts (“absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence”), one can still clearly see that COMPARATIVELY those post-Soviet or eastern block countries which joined EU/NATO are in much better human rights conditions than those which didn’t. Besides we know that EU membership requires reviewing before and after the accession, pro-human rights policies, sanctioning mechanism and various other economic/security/social benefits which may motivate countries to stay in line. So if we do not fully know how effective or broad they are in promoting human rights (in comparative terms), still anybody who cares about human rights and is risk averse may still reasonably prefer to have them than nothing at all or the opposite of it.

how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance — neomac.

That depends on the progress of the war. If the war goes very well and Russia lose quickly and completely, then that will secure Ukraine a free and intact future. If the war goes really badly and Russia make gains, that will actually increase the chances of Ukraine becoming a puppet state over say, simply ceding Crimea and Donbas right now. If the war drags on, then it will be the worse outcome of all since whether Russia win or lose will be irrelevant. Ukraine will be financially crippled and will be utterly under the control of either Russia or the IMF. In neither case will it be free to make its own choices. — Isaac

That’s not related to what I was arguing: EU/NATO influence vs Russia influence. If Ukraine didn’t join EU/NATO, it would have likely become a Russian puppet as Belarus due to its strategic importance and the evident intolerability for Russia to have a pro-West democratic government over there. So human rights conditions would have been likely as shitty as they are in Russia and Belarus.
There is no free meal you know? And IMF may still be the lesser evil than Russia.
In any case, my understanding is that Western international reputation is bound with the fate of Ukraine during and after this war. So if Ukraine can not be sold as a success story in some credible way for years to come Western reputation is screwed much more severely than what happened in Iraq or Afghanistan or Vietnam (put together).

there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free — neomac


Firstly, No one is talking about Russia taking Ukraine. That has never been a negotiating position of either power. The dispute is over the territory of Donbas and Crimea and the security thereof.

Secondly, there's ample reason. The longer the war drags on the more people die (or are put at risk of death) both Ukrainians and other affected groups such as those reliant on Ukrainian exports and those who care not be destroyed by nuclear holocaust.

No one has yet provided a shred of evidence showing that a Russian controlled Donbas/Crimea would be so much worse for the people of those territories as to justify the deaths of thousands (and risk to millions) of a continued war. All the evidence points to the fact that life for the people of those regions would be much the same either way (pretty bloody awful). — Isaac

Russia tried to attack Kyiv with the purpose of denazifying the Ukrainian regime. Since it failed, it had to redefine its military objectives and now it seems to focus on South-Eastern Ukrainian territories. But threats from Russia and for Russia are all still there. Even if you want to limit the scope of your argument, the choice for Ukraine between joining EU/NATO or remaining prey of Russia is still there. Therefore for the West and Ukraine the Russian threat needs to be reduced as much as possible (e.g. concerning Russian military capability to pursue conventional wars for further expansion or in support of China, also to give the West enough time to grow its military capacity bigger and more advanced than Russia’s ). That’s necessary for any negotiation to be perceived enough reliable (coz Putin’s word have absolutely zero value right?).
I don’t think the West/Ukraine are fighting this war to save the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas/Crimea, but to keep strategic territories and to save those who aren’t pro-Russian.

If Ukrainian casualties... — neomac


We're not talking (primarily) about Ukrainian casualties. We're talking about the risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation. Ukrainian casualties are a drop in the ocean. More people died from Ukraine's appalling environmental pollution that died in the war so far (civilians). I don't see that over the front pages day after day. — Isaac

If you are claiming that pollution is a more serious problem than border disputes because it causes more deaths, that has nothing to do with the war. One can’t fix all problems at once and those that have priority concern the means of survival for competing geopolitical actors.
So, for example, the strategic relevance of “risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation” can’t discount implied moral hazards which competitors can exploit (indeed less risk averse or bluffing competitors may easily turn perceived risks into emotional blackmailing strategies).

https://jacobin.com/2023/01/ukraine-postwar-reconstruction-western-capital-blackrock-neoliberalism/

Ukraine is being sized up by neocolonial vultures from BlackRock to the EU for a carve-up after the war is over. On the menu is deregulation, privatization, and “tax efficiency” — measures that may have already begun.


Among the policy recommendations are a “decrease in government spending,” “tax system efficiency,” and “deregulation.”


Perhaps you could explain to me how "deregulation", the removal of what you call "conditional requirements", can have the effect you're claiming is likely?

All this bullshit fairy tale you're spinning about how EU rules are going to keep human rights up to scratch is counter to the documented reality that westernised post war Ukraine is planned to be a deregulated neo liberal nightmare. — Isaac

"jacobin.com"? "deregulated neo liberal nightmare"? "documented reality"? show that to me, I wanna see the metrics of your unbiased source.




[1]
From:

THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:

Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.


Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :

If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.


So you morally ought to do nothing to have people abide by your moral principle, except engage in dialogue perhaps. So I guess nobody else morally ought to do anything to have people abide by your moral principle, except engage in dialogue perhaps. Clear enough.
So imagine someone is bombing the neighborhood where your family and friends live (some die a horrible death, others are severely injured or maimed), they lost where to live and all basic services in the neighborhood, some even jobs if working in the neighborhood, does anybody (you included) morally ought to do anything about it?

I would consider even a single person dying against their will to be an enormous cost that was unjustly imposed, on the moral ground that no person has the right to tell another to give their life against their will, under any circumstance. — Tzeentch

Clear enough. Question: do you yourself ought to do anything to have people to abide by your principle?

you have neomac literally arguing that Western influence is so instrumental in improving a country's human right record that it's worth fighting a bloody war for, — Isaac

Side comments to this otherwise misleading summary:

• "literally arguing that Western influence" yet the starting point of my views is not "Western influence" and "human right" was just a good starting point.
• "so instrumental" suggests a degree of conviction that I do not have, nor need to have. We are assessing likelihood under uncertainties.
• "it's worth" always in relative terms (like letting Russia subdue Ukraine and get away with it)

So you admit that you cannot possibly derive anything from them about Ukraine's likely trajectory by knowing only one such factor (sphere of influence). — “Isaac

I disagree. Notice that the reasoning was focusing on “human rights” only (e.g. we didn’t talk other benefits: economic, security etc. which may also be very much relevant for well-being [1]). Accordingly, based on some related charts and despite the uncertainty (about the driving domestic/foreign factors) anybody can notice that:

• The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries.
• After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence

And since we know that Soviet Union (and Russia’s Putin) have shitty policies in terms of human rights and hegemonic ambitions, while the EU has conditional requirements (which may have been influential in the years prior to the entrance to the EU), policies to monitor and promote human rights [2] and pressuring means, we have good reasons to think that EU may have been a stabilising (if not a boosting) factor, while Russia may be a destabiliser and threat to human rights. So in relative terms, “human rights” may more likely benefit from joining EU/NATO than falling under Russian influence despite the uncertainties.

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/648145/IPOL_BRI(2020)648145_EN.pdf
https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/achievements_en

[2] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/peace-and-governance/human-rights_en

So what improvements could you possibly anticipate, since electoral reform is petty much the only improvement that's consistent and even Russia achieved that with the break up of the USSR. I don't see any evidence of Ukraine's 'likely' path there.
What's more, at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes). — “Isaac

First, it’s good that you see electoral reform and democracy in post-Soviet Eastern European countries have improved human rights. Yet Putin doesn’t seem to like pro-West democratic governments in Ukraine despite the fact that since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime (Empire, Soviet Union, Putin). So, democracy may very much need securing and NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat (besides allowing states to keep low military budgets in the interest of civil economy/society). Even more so if Russia under Putin doesn’t seem to be very sensitive toward just sanctions and diplomacy (as proven during this war and before). Second, from those stats, one can notice that the trend of human rights protection in post-Soviet states has improved immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union in all countries yet in later years it declined too in some countries, even sharply (see Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan [1]). So it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends (e.g. before and after the accession for Eastern block countries to the EU). Third, “if Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes)” (so also for the sake of human rights) how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance (as the war is proving), wrt Ukraine joining EU/NATO? Even Kissinger changed his views about it: https://unherd.com/thepost/henry-kissinger-nato-membership-for-ukraine-is-appropriate/



[1]
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=1988..latest&uniformYAxis=0&country=MDA~TJK~TKM~UZB~BLR~RUS~ARM~KAZ~KGZ~GEO~UKR~AZE

It's whether a protracted land war is the best, or even acceptable means of achieving that, considering the enormous cost. — “Isaac

Wars often have enormous costs. Yet no country will likely capitulate if it has the means to fight. First reason, readiness to surrender to a foreign force can be a very disturbing moral hazard because it encourages further abuses (especially by an authoritarian ruler that pursues hegemony) that may lead to subjugation and degradation of standards of life (also in terms of human rights). Ukrainians know very well that from history. Secondly both subjection and freedom may affect not only current but also future generations.
For the West is the same. Even if Russia doesn’t constitute yet an actual existential threat to the West as it is to Ukraine, there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free (and enjoy related strategic benefits plus full military assets for further expansions) just to find out later what existential threat Russia might become, because then it may well be too late. So Western support for Ukraine is not just for the present generations but also for the future ones. This includes a greater integration that might benefit both the West and Ukraine.
Besides, you keep talking about “enormous cost” without giving any moral criteria to understand the moral relevance of such “enormous cost”. For example: exactly how many Ukrainian casualties count as morally relevant “enormous cost”? If Ukrainian casualties were 0.000001% of the population would it be an “enormous cost” in moral terms? How about 0.00001%, or 0.0001%, or 0.001%, or 0.01%, or 0.1%? On what moral grounds you choose that number?

None of the countries you cite as examples have come out of long protracted land wars, nor have such significant far right nationalist sentiment, nor have such influential natural resource reserves, nor have Ukraine's position strategically for Russia... Nor a dozen other factors. The charts I selected show that there's nothing causal about entering a Western sphere of influence. Some countries improve (Lithuania, Estonia), others don't (Croatia, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq). so there's no reason at all to believe that it's the Western influence, and not internal factors that drive the changes. — “Isaac

As already argued, I question the claim that there are no reasons to think that the West had an influence in terms of human rights as a driving factor. On the contrary, since the West is appealing for many good reasons we can understand why Eastern block people (including those who could care about human rights among other benefits) wanted to join EU/NATO after the collapse of Soviet Union instead of wanting to ally with Russia (now Georgia and Moldavia are also very much interested).
If the far right nationalist sentiment looks more significant in Ukraine, that’s because mainly nurtured by anti-Russians and philo-Russians tension. Otherwise it would likely be as intense as in other Eastern European countries given their more xenophobic culture wrt the Western European countries (https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/) which also suggests that foreign conditions may more likely trigger social reforms and government response supporting human rights than just domestic ones.

. Joining the EU is unlikely to improve human rights in Ukraine based on the unequivocal evidence that it has not done so for any other country. — Isaac

But my hypothesis is not that joining EU improves human rights because: 1. when you roughly reached the top (the range is between 0-1) of course there is no much improving , at best you can preserve it 2. Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign). Indeed EU/NATO membership could also contribute to inhibit/weaken adverse trends prior and after the membership was accepted e.g. through sanctions, monitoring and induced constitutional reforms etc.
As I explained several times but you keep playing dumb, I care comparing the likely trends concerning human rights institutions of ex-Soviet Republic between those which joined EU/NATO and those which didn't and remained under anti-West Russian influence. Why would I care about such comparison? For the obvious reason that Ukraine wants to join EU/NATO to escape from Russian sphere of influence. So it's relevant to understand what might happen to "human rights" institutions in the 2 cases. And since no trend in Russia/Belarus is close to reach any trend in ex-Soviet Republics that joined EU/NATO so far (EVEN WHEN IS DECLINING), my hypothesis is still very much plausible.

But I see you have a new favourite metric. — Isaac

What?! You were wining about the metric "physical integrity rights " (as you wined about the "democratic index" in the past). Then you wined about the examples I've selected. And now that I gave you the metrics you asked for, you are wining over trend variations [1] which aren't significant enough to challenge my hypothesis. Are you crazy?!

[1]
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=BLR~RUS~ROU~LVA~SVK~BGR~LTU~EST~POL

So because western countries have better human rights records than Russia, it's morally legitimate to support Ukraine's fight over territory?

If Ukraine would then join the west's approach, and if the west's human rights are not simply bought at the expense of others (1), and if the utter destruction of Ukraine's economy and the flooding of its black markets with weapons aren't enough to tip it back over into nationalist extremism (2)… then you might, just might, get an improvement in human rights.

And this slim chance is worth the deaths of tens of thousands? (3) — Isaac

Concerning claim (1), my reasoning is about the likely fate of human rights institutions in Ukraine once they join EU/NATO as other ex-Soviet republics did IN COMPARISON WITH the likely fate of human rights institutions in Ukraine under the influence of an anti-West Russia (e.g. as Belarus is). So unless you can bring actual arguments (what does it even literally mean “human rights are simply bought at the expense of others”? e.g. In what way the West is “buying” its human rights status out of say Iran’s, China’s, North Korea’s, Russia’s human rights?), evidences to support your bare conjecture, and argue for its pertinence wrt what I’m arguing, I don’t feel rationally compelled by it.
Concerning claim (2), again bare conjecture which still ignores the membership conditions of EU/NATO and Ukrainian motivations to join the West, as premised by my line of reasoning.
Concerning your moral question (3), first, I prefer to assess chances over actual pertinent evidences and arguments about their relevance, instead of rummaging biased conjectures as you do, but only when it goes against your opponents’ arguments (because you yourself don’t abso-fucking-lutely give a shit about chances when it’s matter to support your moral claims). Second, yes it’s arguably worth it as the lesser evil for Ukrainians and Westerners. But given the Western hesitancy to support Ukraine and the internal conflicts of national interests wrt this war my expectations about the evolution of this war change over time as much as my conviction about future consequences at the end of the war. So I too have my doubts. Obviously.

Tell me. Those other ex-soviet countries which came under western influence, did we fight a proxy war with Russia over each of them? Or did economic development, local political action and covert support bring that about? — Isaac

No to the first question. Yes to the second. Now you tell me: do you agree with that? If not, for what reason?

So in what way is fighting a long protracted proxy war with Russia necessary for this vague and speculative end goal of yours? — Isaac

The random charge of being “vague and speculative” is simply preposterous because I’m an avg dude (not en expert), we are reasoning under uncertainties of many relevant facts, and exchange in a philosophy forum from our armchair during leisure time. Didn’t we explicitly factor in all that in our claims many times already? Yet I care about the clarity/logic of my arguments and the evidences available to me to assess them (including the input from all sorts of news/stats/reports/experts of course). Since I take such arguments and evidence assessment to be affordable also by other avg dudes in a philosophy forum post format, I expect such avg dudes to reciprocate in intellectually honest and challenging ways. So in relative terms that charge is more apt to qualify roughly all your arguments and objections as I abundantly proved.
Besides the charge must be abso-fucking-lutely irrelevant especially to you: bare conjectures (nothing in any empirical theory excludes that things can’t go differently, right?) and “not enough imagination”-kind of objections are enough to you.
Finally, why on earth would I even care to answer such “vague and speculative” question of yours? In what sense, would this proxy war be “necessary” ? It you merely conjecture historical possibilities for Ukraine by comparison to the ex-Soviet republics, of course there is a counterfactual possibility that for Ukrainians things could have gone differently, the proxy war is “necessary” at all. Besides we should consider related choices by political strategic agents, so if those were free choices and free choice is understood as a non-necessary choice, then of course the proxy war is “necessary” at all. Still there are dramatic events, reasoning over them and choices by involved strategic players that led them step-by-step where we are. So I try to understand them as input for my arguments, whenever pertinent.

BTW, I forgot to mention the context where I extrapolated that line of reasoning from:

As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there. — Isaac

What is the well-being of the people? — neomac
That's up to us to decide. Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point. — Isaac

That’s what inspired the first step of my line of reasoning, namely "human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes”, as a good starting point (not because I find it self-evident).

And you're using physical integrity rights as a proxy for human rights because…? — Isaac

Because physical integrity rights are covered by human rights, aren’t they? And I care to assess my claims against actual and pertinent evidences accessible to me. So if they support my claims, that’s good. Anyways you’ve got plenty of charts in that site. Here:

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~RUS
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~USA
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~UKR
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~POL
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~LTU
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~ROU
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~BGR
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~SVK
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&country=~BLR

Anything else you want to randomly quibble about?

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

1. Note Croatia, the most recent accession to the EU, whose record has gone down since joining.
2. Note Belarus, undoubtedly a Russian puppet state whose score is higher than the US.
3. Note Saudi Arabia, an ally of the US performing identically to Russia.
4. Note Iraq, a famous beneficiary of the US's military help, at the bottom of the list below everyone.

Even with your own cherry-picked proxy for human rights (which are so much more than just democracy and government freedoms), your argument falls flat on its face. — Isaac

The charge of “cherry-picking” is random (as it was when you raised the same charge months ago, so re-looping again over the same stuff). You evidently don’t even understand what the charge of “cherry-picking” actually means.
My speculation concerns specifically the fate of Ukraine which wants to enter EU and NATO, so it makes perfect sense to make comparisons with other countries to the extent they share relevant similarities with Ukraine for that hypothesis (cherry-picking happens when part of the dataset falling within the scope of the hypothesis is ignored to support the hypothesis, defining the theoretical scope of the hypothesis is not cherry-picking at all!). Ukraine, ex-Soviet Republics, Belarus and Russia share part of recent history and many aspects of their social background again due to historical and geographic reasons. Due to these similarities it makes perfect sense to compare them more than including Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the US in the comparison, and delimit the scope of the hypothesis accordingly. Besides certain ex-Soviet republics joined EU/NATO, which is also what Ukraine wants. While Russia and Belarus didn’t. So we have a test for COMPARING their trends wrt question “what could happen to ex-Soviet countries joining EU/NATO instead of remaining under Russian sphere of influence in terms of human rights?”.
Getting back to your random objection: you can take the examples of US, Saudi Arabia and Iraq into the garbage. And leave them there forever and ever.
How about Croatia? Well it wasn’t an ex-Soviet Republic, it wasn’t even an ex-Warsaw pact member. So it’s the least similar in the group and we could throw Croatia into the garbage for ever and ever too. But I get that it’s an interesting case for comparison if the scope of the hypothesis was extended to ex-communist European countries. However the decline is not so sharp to significantly question the extended hypothesis either, so I don't mind if you play with it. Just don't forget to throw it in the garbage once you finished.

In any case, what you fail to understand is much deeper. There is no need for me to ignore deviant cases because I’m talking in terms of relative likelihood (and supporting evidences) wrt alternative hypotheses (like having Ukraine fall under Russian influence as Belarus). So not mathematical certainties. Besides I’m not assuming anywhere that the original hypothesis (nor even the extended one which I didn’t make) identifies the only relevant driving factor in the evolution of a country wrt human rights, because there may be other domestic or foreign factors that can get in the way.
Nor I’m assuming anywhere that a boost in human rights is the main motivating factor for countries to join EU/NATO: there are also economic/security benefits too, of course. For that reason I’m not even assuming that joining EU/NATO is necessarily a booster in human rights (indeed, the main booster looks national independence after the collapse of Soviet Union and ensuing reforms). Still the membership may be a relevant counterbalancing factor against potential declining trends due to domestic politics (like the EU for Orban’s Hungary).

BTW, I forgot to mention the context of our exchange in introducing that line of reasoning:

As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there. — Isaac

What is the well-being of the people? — neomac
That's up to us to decide. Personally I think the notion of human rights is a good starting point. — Isaac

That’s what inspired the first step of my line of reasoning, namely "human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes”, as a good starting point (not because I find it as a self-evident, or the only possible, or the best starting point).

Here's it's chart that it achieved all on its own first ...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=earliest..2004&country=~LTU

Notice the difference? In 2004 Lithuania joined the EU and NATO. That move ended all progress in your chosen metric of human rights. — Isaac

Mind blowing, innit?

Apparently neomac is capable of comparing two entities only by looking at data on one of them — Isaac

Where did I do that?

If we were to do a side by side comparison of human rights violations in the 21st century of the United States and Russia, I'm not sure who would come out on top, but my bet would be on the Americans taking the cake. — Tzeentch

Here all the stats you want:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK~GBR~USA~AUS~CAN~JPN~KOR
Ukraine is better than Russia, and the US is better than Ukraine and Russia. The rest of Western countries (including ex-Soviet republics) are much better than the US, Ukraine and Russia.

We're all up in arms about supposed Russian torture of Ukrainian POWs (which if true is horrible and inexcusable, don't get me wrong), but have we already forgotten Guantanamo? — Tzeentch

No we didn't. It simply doesn't abso-fucking-lutely have anything to do with the line of reasoning I was making (is Ukraine going to be like the US by joining EU/NATO?) and you two keep abso-fucking-lutely ignoring.

Here is a summary for you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Russia — neomac

John is taller than jack because John is 6 foot.
See any problem with that argument. — Isaac

I gave you the chart:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

The wikipedia article was to make you appreciate the remarkable breath of evidences one can find about the poor status of human rights in Russia (especially under Putin).

Christ! You didn't even put Ukraine on the fucking chart (which if you had, would have put them next to Russia).
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=UKR~RUS
It's like arguing with children. — Isaac

Why would I need to put Ukraine? I was comparing Russia with the West (including ex-Soviet republic joining the West) not Russia with Ukraine, for the obvious reason that I expect that the Western integration process of Ukraine will improve its human rights conditions as it did with other ex-Soviet republics (indeed it's one of the condition of EU membership https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership_en). That's exactly the line of reasoning that you can't even follow on a step-by-step basis.
But good you posted your chart, because it still neatly fits into my line of reasoning: Ukraine outside the Western influence, under Russian sphere of influence or in conflict with Russia, shows as poor human rights conditions as Russia wrt West (according to those charts). Not to mention that Ukrainian very poor human rights conditions may very well include the human rights violations of the pro-Russian Ukrainian regions [1] during the years of the conflict (including the tragedy of the Crimean Tatars). So the resulting border changes may also positively impact Ukrainian stats in terms of human rights.


[1]
UN monitoring of abuses

At a press conference in Kyiv on 15 December 2014, UN Assistant Secretary-General for human rights Ivan Šimonović stated that the majority of human rights violations committed during the conflict were carried out by the separatists.[115] He also said, however, that this could not be used as an excuse by Ukrainian forces to commit human rights violations.

UN observers also registered multiple episodes of sexual abuse against locals, mainly women, at the border checkpoints run by both Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian armed groups. The presence of combatants in civil communities also brings up a danger of sexual violence against their population and increase the risk of rape and human trafficking.[116][117]

During 2014 and 2015 the UN Monitoring Mission documented multiple reports about people abducted by pro-Russian armed groups and Ukrainian military forces.[118][119]

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_situation_during_the_war_in_Donbas

Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes — neomac

This step does not support your argument. To do so it would have to be possible for all countries to be like western countries, but if the human rights in western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in chattel countries, then it is not. You’d have to demonstrate not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state. — Isaac

I don’t mind to review my past arguments once again (for the thousand time?), however it wasn’t the reason why I quoted them in the first place. The point was that I can argue for my moral claims only if there is sufficient understanding on how I conceptualise them because otherwise you will likely make outlandish objections. As the one you just made. The question “are human rights better implemented within Western countries?” is a question, not an argument, so you should address it as a question. And that question can be answered affirmatively or negatively independently from the possibility for all non-Western countries to be like western countries. Besides I do not need AT ALL to exclude that human rights in Western countries are bought at the expense of human rights in non-Western countries, maybe human rights institutions can emerge only as a result of zero-sum game (and if you had read my “entire wall of text”, you would have imagined why). So no, I do not have to demonstrate that “not only that human rights are better in western countries, but that western countries do not worsen human rights elsewhere in achieving that state” AT ALL.

is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is. — neomac

Seriously? A bit of pro-western rhetoric is the gold-standard evidence of a desire to adopt western human rights values?
The human rights record of Ukraine is on record for all to see. You can't bluff your way out of it. Read the reports. — Isaac

Again the question is “is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia?”, the answer can be affirmative or negative independently from your further clumsy objections. That’s why I was reasoning step-by-step to make you follow my line of reasoning to the end instead of jumping in all random directions as you did when you objected to it in the past, and as you are re-doing it now. So it's pretty symptomatic that you can't follow such a simple exercise.
Anyways, being pro-Western for Ukraine means at least what I exactly wrote: wanting to enter the Western sphere of influence through 2 organisations EU and NATO, and the readiness to suffer the consequences for this choice intolerable to the Russians corroborates it.
Said that, even though being pro-West doesn’t equate to the desire to adopt western human rights values, I don’t find that troubling at all, for 3 reasons:
1. The West imposes certain conditions that need to be satisfied before becoming an actual EU/NATO member, so nobody will accept Ukraine if it doesn’t comply enough to Western requirements. Its integration will require time before happening and even after to deeply reform the Ukrainian society (as for all post-Soviet republics).
2. This war proved that Ukrainians have great tolerance for sacrifices, so making the necessary institutional steps to satisfy Western conditions to membership should be a much more tolerable sacrifice.
3. Two potential problems in Ukraine, corruption and ultranationalism, persisted so far due to historical conflicts and ties with Russia: many Ukrainian ultranationalist (including Nazis) are essentially anti-Russian, Ukrainian corruption was abundantly nurtured by past pro-Russian regimes (Russia itself being a renowned example of “mafia state”). So if entering the Western sphere of influence means severing these ties and downgrading such historical tensions, the 2 problems may be more easy to deal with.
And if all that’s not enough to you (to me it is), a 4th reason will most certainly be: nothing in those reports says that Ukrainians can't act differently.

anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights — neomac

It does not have a poorer human rights record. Again, this is all on record. Read the reports. — Isaac

The claim that anti-West Russia does have poorer human rights record than most Western countries comes from reading the records (as already reported in our past exchanges).

the democracy index is telling — neomac

Democracy is not exhaustive of human rights, not even close. It's one of 30 articles. Usually the one chosen by neoliberals like you to excuse nations for trampling over the other 29. — Isaac

Indeed, that’s not the only evidence I reported. We are just looping all over it again:
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

Is this enough evidence? If not why not? — neomac

See above. What could possibly make you think that the satisfaction on one out of thirty articles of human rights would be all the evidence needed? — Isaac

Here is a summary for you: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Russia

these categories as “ingroup” and “exploitation” (cooperation to exploit an outgroup) moral norms but now prefer Eisler’s names. What do you think? — Mark S

I find Eisler’s names more appropriate:
- “ingroup” is expected to be the antonym of "outgroup" while in your name convention is unexpectedly contrasted to “exploitation” (which according to your definition presupposes the notion of "outgroup" anyways),
- besides "ingroup" and "outgroup" seem to refer to "groups", so they seem to suggest relations between groups, while cooperation can simply hold also between "individuals".
- if we do not stipulate a terminological contrast between "outgroup" and "exploitation" , then when can avoid to inconveniently equate "ingroup" with "partnership", and will leave room for the idea of forms of ingroup's exploitation.

Which do you think communicates better, “marker norms” or “signaling norms”? — Mark S

"signalling" sounds more appropriate and it may fit well with analogous notions used in animal ethology (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory)


I'm very much interested in this topic and I'm sympathetic to your views so I hope we can discuss it further but I would like to finish to read Oliver Curry’s Morality as Cooperation

think military supporting Ukraine is morally right — neomac


Yet...

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac


Make up your mind. — Isaac

There is no contradiction between those extrapolated claims, because I made both moral claims (like "I actually support the military aid to Ukrainian resistance" and repeatedly argued for in our earliest exchanges even months ago [1]) and claims about how I conceptualise moral claims (i.e. "national security can be a moral imperative" and the like which again are nothing new in our exchanges [2]). And since you have hard time to process them separately, or you are playing dumb, I'll add clarifications which you ignore to re-loop over your clumsy random objections.
Clarifying our conceptual framework to deal with ambiguities and misunderstandings is a form of intellectual cooperation useful to better understand each other (which again is nothing new in our exchanges [3]), if you care to have a fruitful exchange. In addition we are in a philosophy forum so that's the right place to discuss them, as far as I'm concerned.


[1]
I’m reasoning on a step-by-step basis :

• First step:human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes
• Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes
• Third step: is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.
• Fourth step: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not?

[2]

No evidence, no 'proof'. — Isaac


No evidence, no 'proof' of what exactly? I was just exposing a conceptual framework.

The requests for 'proof only started when I objected to that position. — Isaac


That's false. Your objection started with: "How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746158)
To which I answered: "I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory." (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746177)
So no, I didn't ask you for proofs in this case. On the contrary I exposed once again my conceptual framework. You might have objected that it's incoherent or with little explanatory power and consequently I would have asked you for proofs. But such a random objection like "representation is not the same thing as sovereignty" simply means you didn't understand what I was talking about. That’s all. — neomac

[3]

wanting a war to continue — Isaac


Then by your definition I'm not warmongering. I didn't want a war between Russia and Ukraine nor I want it to be continued. I was talking about my expectations about what the Ukrainians want not about what I want. BTW were the Russians warmongering when fighting back the Nazis out of their country in WW2? — neomac

No it isn't. I'm a member of the electorate in one of them, I hold them to account. It matters tremendously what I think they out to be concerned with. — Isaac


I wasn’t questioning the relevance of your moral standards to you nor the relevance of your political choices in a democracy. Again, I am questioning its relevance to establish what individuals, collectives or States are capable of. A part from that, people can surely have all the unrealistic expectations and set their moral standards arbitrarily high as they like, of course. — neomac

I’m describing and not making moral claims — neomac

Then your entire wall of text was a waste of time. If I want 'description' I'll consult an expert, not some bloke off the internet. — Isaac

I'm asking for your moral view. the thing all of us are experts on, the thing for which there is no body of fact to draw on and so no expertise to be gained. What you think is right and why. — Isaac

It wasn't a waste of time because my wall of text is very much part of the "why" i think military supporting Ukraine is morally right. What I described wasn't for the purpose of informing you about facts that require fact-checking and experts' advice. But for the purpose of illustrating to you the conceptual framework that makes intelligible any exchange on morality issues with you or others over Ukraine and any other political issues you may consider. It's essential part of my basic background knowledge (they are my "hinge propositions") and what was still missing in support of my moral claims about the Ukrainian war I argued for many times in our previous exchanges (so there was no point for me to rehash them). They are essential, because if we can't converge enough on conceptual frameworks, you simply do not make sense to me. So these very objections of yours are totally self-defeating. Not surprisingly though.

Partnership moral norms – Parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems between people with equal moral standing. These include heuristics “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, “Do not steal, lie, or kill”, and “Be loyal to your group” which advocate initiating indirect reciprocity. (Cross-culturally moral norms are partnership moral norms.)

Domination moral norms – Parts of strategies to cooperatively exploit an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. These include “Slaves must obey their masters” and “Women must be submissive to men”.

Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos. — Mark S

Where did you get this classification? Is it yours?

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?! — neomac

There’s no moral requirement for any specific government to govern any specific peoples or land. — Isaac

If that’s an objection to the quotation, it doesn’t make much sense, because the quotation is not even talking about moral requirements. If that’s a moral claim you believe, is it supposed to be self-evident or do you have an argument for it? As far as I’m concerned governments of people and lands can be morally justified, of course. And that’s all I care arguing for (more on this below).

Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern. — neomac

No it doesn't. Clearly some other government could bring about the same committent. If I'm committed to building the biggest sandcastle ever, I can easily step aside and let someone else finish the job. Building the biggest sandcastle doesn't require that I have the ability to build sandcastles, only that someone does. Likewise a government committed to a moral objective does not require that they have the means, only that someone does. — Isaac

That’s a random objection. The claim of mine you quoted is NEITHER stating a bi-univocal relation between governments and moral commitments, NOR logically implying such a bi-univocal relation, NOR suggesting it. In a Western democracy, several governmental administrations with different political leanings can succeed one another, and yet they all may be morally committed to same moral principles like respect/support for human rights and respect/support for democratic institutions, and then govern accordingly. To the extent they do that and the people they rule over morally care about it, they gain moral legitimacy. In Russia, the same territory was governed by an emperor, by a soviet regime, by a post-soviet regime. To the extent they supported shared moral views and ruled people were morally approved it, they gained moral legitimacy.
BTW nobody can easily step aside from commitments taken with people, if those people do not agree or there is a price to pay for that. So it depends on what there is at stake and the trust between involved parties (see my example of the care giver). What's more is that governments have their own social and historical reasons that pre-exist and support specific administrations with or without any specific commitments. Therefore as long as governments are the products of a society, no society changes local governments for foreign governments just because it's possible to do that or test if foreign governments can be better. If it happens this is typically through imposition by the foreign government.

The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty. — neomac

So? This clearly has no impact whatsoever on a government's ability to commit to programmes of any sort since borders are always changing. I listed above over 40 major internation changes in border in the last 30 years. In no case did the governments of those countries cease to be able to carry out their objectives in their remaining territory. — Isaac

Right, so Putin could still govern Russia without grabbing Ukrainian land. So why is he doing it? Why isn’t Putin giving all Siberia to China, Putin will still be able to govern Russia without Siberia right? Why Putin needs to govern at all? He could let Biden govern Russia, what’s the problem with Putin? Since you can already guess all answers from the international relation theory you champion, namely Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”, I’m just getting to the conclusion: political governments are security maximisers over territorial resources wrt perceived threats, so much so that they may even need to project their power outside their land borders, and can do it offensively not just defensively. This is what history and geopolitical theories are teaching us. So the point is not the outlandish observation that government can still be able to govern if they suffer territorial resources losses (after all people can also live in prison or with a revenue below the poverty line, can’t they?), but what precisely history and geopolitics can tell us about states’ expected “securing” dispositions when facing security threats from rival states, their expected readiness to use coercive force to repel invasions and land grabbing, and the price to pay for failing that. BTW we may expect that even suffering land grabbing with little or no economic/logistic/demographic importance can likely trigger coercive responses from states if they perceive their authority threatened, and/or encouraging further land grabbing or invasions (as it likely happens for the smaller territories of the Sino-Indian border dispute).

even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory. — neomac

Why?

All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history. — neomac

This is just bare assertion. — Isaac

Yours is just bare assertion too. If your point is that you need examples backing up my claim, then check wikipedia. That’s basic history trivia which I can leave you waste your time on.

Nonsense. A government is not morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request. Again, this just obvious nonsense if given even a moment's thought. If the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so and it would still be a war crime. Things are not made right by voting for them and governments are not automatons devoid of moral responsibility. — Isaac

Your objection is evidently grounded on a huge misunderstanding of my claims:
First of all, I didn’t make anywhere the moral claim that “a government is morally required to carry out all actions it's citizens request”. I’m being descriptive in talking about moral behavior, and relativizing the notion of “moral standard” to communities. So with the expression “moral legitimacy” I’m descriptively referring to the possible situation in which the government is committed to support (by means of its governmental functions) the moral standard X shared by the community X within the territory under its control: e.g. say Putin is committed to protect the Russians from annihilation by Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists. This would let Putin gain moral legitimacy among ordinary Russians who believe that Ukrainian nazis and Western satanists are set out to annihilate Russians. And if all the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a Ukrainian hospital for those reasons, then it would be “morally legitimate” (it would be even if they didn’t vote at all: approving it might just be enough!).
Since the expression “morally legitimate” is ambiguous wrt its descriptive/normative usage, and despite all of my clarifications you can’t process my claims correctly, let’s put it this way: if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would be PERCEIVED as “morally legitimate” if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital for their own PERCEIVED legitimate moral reasons. “Perceived” means that related moral claims may be right or not, and this epistemic possibility is all I care to maintain at this point of my analysis. But notice that anybody sufficiently mentally sound and convinced that his moral claims are right may in parallel only conjecture that his moral claims are merely “perceived” (i.e. ultimately or likely wrong/unjustified). And precisely because those who are really convinced their moral claims to be right won’t change their belief or falter by simply conjecturing in parallel the possibility of being wrong/unjustified, the word “perceived” may be misleadingly suggesting lack of conviction, or readiness to re-examine moral claims, that’s why we may as well avoid using the word “perceived” in describing moral behavior. In any case, I’m here describing a moral behavior irrespectively of what anybody’s moral claims and convictions actually are (so I don’t even need to exclude the possibility that some may believe the moral duty of a government is to do all people voted for, including destroying hospitals).
Secondly, you offered a decontextualised hypothetical example (“if the Russian population unanimously voted to bomb a hospital, it would still be immoral for the government to do so”) to support your a-priori moral claim, without considering the possible contextual and a-posteriori reasons Russians may have had, to morally justify their decisions. Maybe they have been convinced by the Russian propaganda that the hospital was a cover for stocking biochemical weapons to annihilate Russians, or building a nuclear bomb in an underneath bunker that would certainly have escalated the situation to nuclear world war so bombing the hospital was the lesser evil. One could argue that the decision may still be moral, if moral evaluation is limited to intentions, or immoral if it comprises consequences but maybe excusable by ignorance. Or, else, maybe it wasn’t propaganda at all: some Ukrainian neonazi with the help of Zelensky as a cynical henchman of American evil financial/military/oil lobbies did really stock biochemical weapons in or build a nuclear bomb under that hospital. Would this still be a good moral reason to bomb the hospital at the risk of committing a war crime? Would this be nearly as bad as Americans nuclear bombing Japan (and yet they got away with it)? Or maybe: bombing a hospital was a retortion for terroristic bloody attacks Russians suffered in 10 of their hospitals, so their retorition is even subproportional wrt what they suffered from the Ukrainian nazis. Would this still make Russian bombing unquestionably immoral? You may say yes, others may say no. The point is that real moral cases can be trickier than your a-priori assessments of decontextualised examples suggest, and that people (honestly or dishonestly) disagree over moral standards, over how they apply moral standards in different often unexpected circumstances, over how they assess them in isolation or in comparison with past cases, etc. Refusal to acknowledge this intellectual predicament may lead to outright rejection of opposing views. While acknowledging this intellectual predicament may trigger more civilised discussions over moral reasons for the disagreements. But at the end of the day discussions do not necessarily lead to convergence, they may escalate into heated disputes and can persist even after long hostile arguing. They may split communities or create bitter rivalries, even in everyday life, nurturing resentment and intolerance, or worst, leading to civil wars. Or agreement can be reached at some point but without significant impact on society at large or where it matters, because maybe competing moral views are having greater significant impact on society at large or where it matters. And even the fact that shared convictions about what is morally right don’t have significant impact on society at large or where it matters, can trigger deeply felt personal disappointment and outrage (at worst, along with fear of discrimination, persecution, oppression). Why is that? Why can’t anybody (including Isaac) just blissfully enjoy having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, and contemplating the sheer logically possibility that everybody acts in accordance with it, even in the hypothetical case that nobody acts, has ever acted, or will ever act like this (including Isaac)? After all, as Isaac will sermonize, “oughts” are different from “facts” so who gives a shit if they never match? Or else why can’t anybody (including Isaac) having intellectually identified what is morally right to do in all circumstances, act in accordance with it INDIFFERENTLY from whatever other people’s actually do or believe? Or keep their outrage for themselves? Or live a misanthropic eremitical life if outrage is so intolerable? After all, if one single person on earth is acting according to what is morally right, why should anybody be outraged if there aren’t more people acting morally?
Maybe because moral claims concern also what other people’s do or believe, and/or because PROMOTING morality among people against “moral bankruptcy” (starting with showing moral outrage to protest against immoral people) is part of the morally right things to do. And failing to do that would be immoral. However, the problem is that if discussing, disputing, evangelising, confronting at grass-root level is not enough to promote collective morality or impact wherever it morally matters then, what to do? Maybe one smart thing to do is to get some support from those in power (e.g. asking Western governments to just sanction and diplomatically pressure Russia for aggressing Ukraine, right?), so unite with like-minded people to beg, plead with, pressure, sermonise, lobby governments to be supportive and take them morally accountable accordingly. In other words, there is a pattern that people with certain moral beliefs (you included) are drawn to follow by their own moral reasoning in interacting with governments that can lead to what I was referring to as “government moral legitimacy”.
So, despite the fact that you have such a hard time in processing the anthropological pattern I described and you yourself neatly follow, that anthropological pattern is very much real and related implications as well: 1. Even if moral ought claims and fact claims about society are distinct, still people (you included) may very much morally care if their claimed moral “oughts” actually inform social life de facto, but then considering chances of success may matter very much 2. The desirable moral impact one can have in informing society may be practically better achieved by having those in power (i.e. governments) morally accountable, therefore in condition of responding in compliance with moral standards shared by a ruled community. But then, power may very much matter to moral agents (whatever their moral claims are) when it’s instrumental to promote moral standards by increasing the chances of informing society, and it is therefore morally legitimised by those moral standards. The toughest part (for you to admit, if not even to understand) is that governmental power is essentially grounded on centralisation and capitalisation of scarce resources (arms, money, manpower, knowledge, etc.) which can be easier to be consumed than accumulated. So in order to keep relying on government power any competing moral community must pragmatically ensure that this power is not only consumed but also capitalised, that the ratio between capitalisation and consumption is positive and sustainable in the best interest of the moral community too. Governments will likely reciprocate the interest by finding more appealing those moral views and communities that can ensure them greater possibility of capitalising power (typical dynamics of security demand/supply). So moral communities already competing for incompatible moral standards or issues with rival moral communities, will additionally compete for the government support depending on their tolerance for capitalisation of power by governments, including all sorts of implied costs and risks (like possible abuses by cynical politicians and hijacking by powerful lobbies). On the other side, governments too suffer other forms of competition, on top of the competition between rulers and ruled: namely, the internal power competition for leadership (by leaders and lobbies) within a state government, and the power competition with other state governments. So governments too may compete for the moral communities' support depending on their tolerance for committing to moral communities (typical dynamics of moral legitimacy demand/supply), including all sorts of implied costs and risks for their power capitalisation and capacity of copying with security dilemmas. Conclusion: 1. one way or the other any moral community that morally cares to have a social impact is morally compelled to care for power capitalisation (not just consumption) to the extent it needs to rely on government power to morally promote shared moral views against competing moral views in a context of political power struggles and related security dilemmas. And even if we remove central governments from the equation, but moral communities still need to survive in accordance to their moral standards and in competition with rival moral communities, they will still need to directly engage in struggles for capitalisation of power and related “security dilemmas”, as forms of self-government 2. These are core logically interrelated claims that constitute my understanding of moral behavior. They are logically immune to the random objections you raised (failing to distinguish normative from factual, morally claiming to be right for governments do whatever voters demand). They are transversal to political, moral, ideological views, so by no means favour a-priori my own moral claims wrt rival moral views. They simply point to the fact that our moral claims don’t free float in a social space void of power struggles (between moral communities, governments, political leaders, social lobbies), on the contrary, their chance of informing social life very much depends on such power struggles in all their dimensions. And that’s logically compelling for all those moral views that morally care about informing social life, and therefore acknowledge the importance of increasing the chances of success. For those moral communities who don’t care, I’ll leave them to whatever fate the other moral communities will let them experience.

I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies). — neomac

No you didn't. You just said it. — Isaac

No, dude, I argued it abundantly (way more than you ever did in supporting your claims and objections). Here is where I summarised the argument:

To understand my point one needs to get one step back. Moral rules like legal rules do not grant compliance by themselves. What’s worse is that differently from any legal system moral rules do not offer a procedure to resolve moral disputes , so a community can rely on central governments that are committed to promote a certain moral code within their sovereign territorial domain. How can governments comply to their commitments ? Through power (coercion, wealth, propaganda, etc.). Securing power within a sovereign territorial domain is how governments can both exist/function and accomplish their moral commitments wrt their people. Notice that these are transversal considerations wrt regime/ideology (communist, fascist, capitalist, theocratic, democratic, authoritarian, etc.).
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power.
And that’s also how the notion of “sovereignty” can ground legal/political relations among states also in moral terms. — neomac

if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted. — neomac

Nonsense. A government has no moral right to the territory it governs. All border changes would thereby become immoral. — Isaac

Again I’m describing and not making moral claims. If it helps I could rephrase it as follows: “if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are ‘PERCEIVED’ to be morally warranted by the community that morally approves it.
Here another conceptual claim: governments’ moral rights to the territory are grounded on governments “moral legitimacy”. And a government may have as much moral right to the territory it governs as an individual has a moral right to his owned flat. The normative notion of “sovereignity” is designed to conceptualise such right. And it’s false to claim that all border changes would thereby become immoral. Indeed there might be moral/legal legitimate transfers of territorial rights (e.g. the independent states resulting from Soviet Union collapse), as much as there are moral/legal transfers of flat ownership.

If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim — neomac

Nothing about political realism says governments can't act differently. It's a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one. — Isaac

Sure miracles can happen. Nothing in the standard model of physics says miracles can’t happen.
Yet the standard model of physics is taken to be a descriptive theory of physical phenomena. Related laws of physics rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such laws.
So the geopolitical theory of “offensive realism” is taken to be a descriptive theory of international relations. Related behavioural patterns of States facing “security dilemmas” rule out as most unlikely those possibilities that contradict such patterns. So when moral views prescribe actions that contradict such patterns they are most likely not going to be followed. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory doesn’t predict that Western states will stop military support Ukraine if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people. It predicts that even if the Ukrainian casualties or the Yemeni casualties or the zillions of dying African children for famine is morally intolerable by some people, this will most certainly NOT be prioritised over security concerns that led to Western military support of Ukrainian resistance.
At best, one might argue that Western policy is the result of a miscalculation of Western security concerns because Russia is a declining power, while China is a rising power so the West increased security threat which China might profit from, and the like. Therefore the West could have processed better its security (not moral) concerns. On the other side, that argument doesn’t sound very much as a description because it’s a personal assessment of threat perception and response (suggesting related prescriptions), so they shouldn’t be part of a descriptive theory of international relations, right? Or worst, that argument is surreptitiously trying to hide a falsification of Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” theory of international relations. Indeed, NATO enlargement could very much fit into the offensive realist pattern, if it wasn’t for the fact that “the West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and organizations” [1] (in other words, certain States decide to support certain shared moral values, neglecting all relevant security concerns, contrary to the theory!)
Anyway, to recapitulate, a descriptive realist theory of international relations is not concerned with mere logical possibilities of states acting morally (as much as an empirical theory about human psychology is not concerned about the mere logical possibility of telepathy), instead it’s there to offer us empirical explanations and predictions on how states realistically behaved and most likely will behave, which in turn affects the chances for any moral standards to inform society. So that's why we may want to have reliable empirical theories in the first place, to inform our actions in a rational way and increase the chances for our actions so informed to succeed.
Conclusion: you are championing a theory of international relations that
1 - is predicting that Western governments will most certainly ignore any of your moral arguments/prescriptions in taking their decisions about security matters (Shit!)
2 - is totally irrelevant to morally justify what you claim Western states should do, and that makes perfect sense to you because of the logic distinction between “oughts” and “facts” (duh, right?), and absolutely nothing in that theory says that Western governments can’t act differently (but then why on earth are you championing it?! It’s like me saying: “I champion the Newtonian theory of gravity, but I’m gonna jump off that cliff anyway because nothing in that theory says I can’t fly!”)
3 - is totally relevant to question your opponents views of what Western states should do (ooooh, that’s why you are championing it!), because apparently you are mathematically certain that the already clumsy moves you just made to dodge the theory of international relations you yourself champion are some killer karate moves only you can master. Really impressive.

[1]
https://www.natur.cuni.cz/geografie/socialni-geografie-a-regionalni-rozvoj/studium/doktorske-studium/kolokvium/kolokvium-2013-2014-materialy/ukrajina-a-rusko-mearsheimer-souleimanov.pdf

it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational. — neomac — Isaac

It's not my claim... It's yours. Here...

I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states — Isaac[/quote]

I find your comment unintelligible, so until you rephrase it in English, I limit myself to add a few more clarifications to the two claims of mine you quoted.
Concerning the first quotation, as I previously argued, according to the theory of international relations you champion your moral prescriptions will most certainly never inform governments’ decisions about security matters. That’s what we should rationally expect by the theory. As far as I’m concerned, however, I do NOT champion Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations [1], nor his understanding of the interaction between moral and security concerns. That’s why I can argue for the possibility that moral oughts inform political action in the international arena in ways theoretically unavailable to you, and without believing in miracles as you need to do. Indeed, the second claim I made is precisely pointing at the solution of the riddle: only when national security concerns (and power capitalisation! [2]) are taken to be moral imperatives of governments, moral oughts can inform political actions while addressing “security dilemmas”. It’s very much realistically possible that governments act in support of shared moral views, if contextualised and a-posteriori moral reasoning can more “pragmatically” rely on governments’ in-built “security maximising” dispositions, instead of compulsively questioning them as your moral claims do in an a-priori, decontextualised, “idealistic” fashion. In other words, it can be moral for Ukrainians to keep fighting at the risk of sacrificing lives, and it can be moral for Westerners to support Ukrainians’ resistance if both are reasonably expected to effectively address security dilemmas favouring certain shared moral views (like the Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity, the Western countries’ sovereignty and democratic standards of life), despite all the other humanitarian emergencies the rest of the world is facing. Indeed I’m arguing for it and I morally support it (finally, these 2 are actual moral claims/commitments of mine!).

[1]

there are also non-pragmatic normative constraints (i.e. legal, moral) that one doesn’t need to ignore nor dismiss as Mearsheimer would do, like the ones related to the notion of “sovereignty”. — neomac

the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. And even if maximising national security would somehow equate “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can” under certain circumstances (like the ones prospected by Mearsheimer’s theory of International Relations that you champion) so be it. — neomac

[2]

“Capitalisation” and “power” and “capitalisation of power” must sound all “caca” expressions for exploitation of the working class to you, right?

How can governments comply to their commitments?...
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power. — neomac

Why would governments need to use power to comply with their commitments? If government A and government B both have similar commitments it's not morally necessary for either government to have power over that territory in order to bring about it's moral objectives. Clearly either government will do the job. — Isaac

How could a government govern if it does not have the means that allow it to govern?! Governing in compliance with some moral commitment still needs enabling means to govern. That's a rational constraint. Any government A,B,C,…,Z with exactly the same commitments or totally different commitments or half similar and half different needs means to govern people within a territory. The territory delimits the community and the resources within a government’s reach, the perimeter of its sovereignty.

The idea that governments need to secure territory in order to carry out their moral commitments only applies if the alternative government (the one competing for the territory) doesn't share those commitments. If it does (or if it's even better), then it doesn't make any difference, the moral commitments will be met, just by a different government. — Isaac

No, even if different governments share the same commitments they would still need to secure a territory. All Western, Ukrainian, Russian governments of all political regimes needed to secure their territory against invaders and/or separatist forces in their history. The territory is the geographic scope of governments’ governing activities so it's very much factored in the notion of governing activity. Congectures over what government is doing or can do better are still irrelevant at this point of the analysis.

It's as if I make a committent to care for an elderly relative and then set about murdering any rival carers on the grounds that I need to see them off so that I can keep the commitment I made. It's an absurd argument. — Isaac

I’m talking about political governments as we know them from history (city states, national states, empires): governments establish laws, impose taxes, have tribunals, law enforcement bodies, build infrastructures, hold their jurisdiction over a certain territory, etc. and they do it in a self-preserving way. They are political organisations that emerge as historical products from social dynamics within certain geographic coordinates and centralising certain public functions within those geographic coordinates. This is roughly what political governments are, with or without moral commitment. I’m just arguing that they can ALSO gain moral legitimacy wrt the people they rule over to the extent they are committed to support the moral standards of the people they rule over and exercise their governing functions accordingly.
Territorial disputes undermine governments’ resources (so their operative capacity and authority) if not their existence, with or without moral legitimacy. IN ADDITION to that they may threaten their moral legitimacy. For example, Ukrainians do not want to be governed by a pro-Russian regime, nor make territorial concessions. So if the Ukrainian government doesn’t commit itself to do what the Ukrainians want nor act accordingly, the Ukrainian government will lose also moral legitimacy in addition to see its sovereignty severely shrunk.
So the argument you take as a good analogy, not only looks absurd, but it’s very poor analogy. So poor that it’s even hard to improve. But I’ll give it a try anyway, here: X’s only job ever is to take care of client Y, but a rival carer Z wants to replace X in part or completely (so X may lose in part or completely his means of subsistence), and to that end Z is trying to convince Y accept him by forcefully entering in Y’s flat and repeatedly kicking in his stomach as hard as he can just in front of X. If X doesn’t intervene to defend Y, not only X may lose part or all of his revenue (were Z to succeed in his “special persuasive operation”) but X also betrays his deontological commitment as a care giver if there is one.

Russia violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine is defending its sovereignty. And the West is helping Ukraine to secure its Western countries’ sovereignty (NOT Ukrainians’ sovereignty, that’s the Ukrainian government’s task!) against Russian strategic threats. — neomac

So? What's any of that got to do with the moral case? Why would anyone else care about Ukrainian sovereignty? — Isaac

I’ve already answered both questions. I argued that “national security” can also be a government's moral imperative (this is true for all types of regime and ideologies). So if Western governments believe (and I would add "reasonably so") to secure their sovereignty against Russian threats by supporting Ukrainian resistance, and act accordingly, they are morally warranted.

You are championing a theory of international relations which is incompatible with the kind of moral imperatives you think States should comply with. — neomac

If you can't understand the difference between how things are and how things ought to be then that explains a lot about your failure to engage with any moral arguments. — Isaac

It isn't made so just by you saying it. If states can’t act or are rationally expected to not act based on moral oughts as the offensive realism theory you champion would claim, your claims about what states morally ought to do are doomed to be frustrated, not occasionally but systematically whenever they clash against state security concerns. So it’s precisely because, according to your own understanding of international relations, oughts can never inform political action in the international arena that your claims about what states morally ought do in the international arena are irrational. It’s like a farmer yelling at a cow: you morally ought to stop to eat grass over there because that’s not our field, and failing to do so it’s immoral! This would be a moral ought claim distinct from a fact, yet an absurd moral claim because addressed to a subject that can’t act or is rationally expected to not act according to moral claims. Now imagine the farmer objecting me like you did: "Dude, you do not understand the difference between facts and moral oughts that's why you can't engage with any moral arguments". Apparently you have a very poor understanding of your own conceptual framework.

Why does a nation gathering more resources become moral when a person doing so would not? — Isaac

Your question is misleading. To understand my point one needs to get one step back. Moral rules like legal rules do not grant compliance by themselves. What’s worse is that differently from any legal system moral rules do not offer a procedure to resolve moral disputes , so a community can rely on central governments that are committed to promote a certain moral code within their sovereign territorial domain. How can governments comply to their commitments ? Through power (coercion, wealth, propaganda, etc.). Securing power within a sovereign territorial domain is how governments can both exist/function and accomplish their moral commitments wrt their people. Notice that these are transversal considerations wrt regime/ideology (communist, fascist, capitalist, theocratic, democratic, authoritarian, etc.).
In other words, governments to gain moral legitimacy (whatever the ideology and regime are) are also morally compelled to pursue/secure power.
And that’s also how the notion of “sovereignty” can ground legal/political relations among states also in moral terms.

the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. — neomac

That's the same thing. 'Security' in this context means nothing more than 'I control it, not someone else'. The fight is over the control of the resource-crucial Donbas region. Russia wants it. The West want it. Ukraine wants it. — Isaac

No it’s not, because there are also non-pragmatic normative constraints (i.e. legal, moral) that one doesn’t need to ignore nor dismiss as Mearsheimer would do, like the ones related to the notion of “sovereignty”. Russia violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Ukraine is defending its sovereignty. And the West is helping Ukraine to secure its Western countries’ sovereignty (NOT Ukrainians’ sovereignty, that’s the Ukrainian government’s task!) against Russian strategic threats.

if that’s your worry, you must listen to your favourite expert: — neomac

Where in any of that does it even mention morality? — Isaac

Exactly. But that's not a problem for me, I'm not the one championing Mearsheimer's views. You are. You are championing a theory of international relations which is incompatible with the kind of moral imperatives you think States should comply with. That’s why your moral arguments are just wishful thinking by your own standards.

I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states — neomac

That doesn't seem at all intuitive. Why would you think maintaining control over resources a moral imperative? Is it, for example, a moral imperative for me to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can? — Isaac

Your example is misleading.
First, I’m talking about moral imperatives for governments, not moral imperatives for ordinary citizens. Maintaining control over resources can be a moral imperative as much as a forced collectivisation of means of productions by a communist government to ensure the end of human exploitation on earth (which you likely must sympathise with) can be a moral imperative.
Secondly, the goal is “national security” and not “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can”. And even if maximising national security would somehow equate “to get hold of and keep as much stuff as I can” under certain circumstances (like the ones prospected by Mearsheimer’s theory of International Relations that you champion [1]) so be it.


[1]
BTW if that’s your worry, you must listen to your favourite expert:

You champion Mearsheimer's theory of International Relations as the best explanation of the events unfolding in Ukraine. You discount previous behavior by Russia as indicative of anything happening in this conflict. — Paine

Yes. What's that got to do with the argument here? — "Isaac

That’s the theory of International Relations you champion:
My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

I think that Western governments would be morally objectionable for not supporting (or not supporting enough?) the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, as long as Ukrainians are willing to fight. — neomac


Why? — Isaac

Briefly, I take national security to be the moral imperative of legitimate governments of sovereign states. If the Ukrainian government is legitimate and pursuing national security by resisting Russian aggression, I take it to be morally unobjectionable.
If a Western government is legitimate and pursuing national security in supporting Ukrainian resistance, I take it to be morally unobjectionable. “National security” is a strategic notion and it’s essential about all available assets a community has to pursue its biological and cultural needs considering time span, uncertainty, and competitors. So there are 2 important reasons why we need to take into account what the Ukrainian government wants for a moral assessment: needs and decision making.

it’s not on me nor on Western governments to decide to what extent Ukrainians are willing to fight with whatever military aid they get from the West. — neomac


Obviously not. I don't see what that's got do with the issue. The question is whether we should be providing military aid in the way we are, and/or should be doing anything else. That fact that Ukrainians will decide what Ukrainians will do is (despite the bizarre frequency with which it's raised as if it were some Solomonesque insight) trivially uninteresting. — Isaac

My clarification is related to the comment of mine you misunderstood and objected to:

but it is either the morally acceptable sacrifice to achieve your goals in your framework and "anything goes" or then there must be a line somewhere between tolerable and intolerable losses for these military objectives. — boethius


There must be, that doesn't mean you can determine it beforehand, or that it's on me to determine it. — neomac

Yeah, you can't wash your hands of it so easily. It's your governments making the decisions, it's your job to hold them to account. It's just morally bankrupt to throw up your hands and say "it's not up to me" that's just basically inviting authoritarian rule. — Isaac

Roughly speaking, you think that Western governments are morally objectionable for their support to the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression.
I think that Western governments would be morally objectionable for not supporting (or not supporting enough?) the Ukrainian resistance against Russian aggression, as long as Ukrainians are willing to fight.
In any case it’s not on me nor on Western governments to decide to what extent Ukrainians are willing to fight with whatever military aid they get from the West.

It should the authors of statements like "Russia must be stopped" in various forms or "a Russian victory in Ukraine must be prevented because it would encourage more 'rule breaking' or nuclear proliferation etc." to very precisely define what they mean "stopped" or "victory", otherwise they are of course setting themselves up to just move the goal posts later. — boethius

My point is that, if we talk strategy, nobody can specify a unique and accurate account of "victory" and "loss" during wartime the way you seem to expect (neither in this war nor in any other war). Possible but uncertain outcomes can be more than anybody can count and accurately account for. So any possible outcome (plausibly resulting from certain political choices) leading to significantly increased power asymmetries for one player wrt his opponents, especially if it engenders a relatively stable and beneficial trend over a long period (decades, generations) can count as a strategic victory.

If you're willing to say "if Ukraine has lost 100 000, then that's worth it for the harm to Russia so far, and another 1, 2, 3, hundred thousand dead would be worth it" then say so, rather than complain it's emotional blackmail. You are only considering the harm to Russia and not the harm to Ukraine, for you position to be coherent you must either state unlimited harm to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieve limited harm to Russia or then there must be somewhere you draw the line: 500 000 KIA, a million? — boethius

To my understanding, the West is interested in having Ukraine and living Ukrainians withing Western sphere of influence. And it's also interested to treat Ukraine as a sovereign state and therefore let Ukrainians decide how much they want to fight for their self-determination against Russia with Western. Besides it's Ukraine that is interested to convince Westerners with their fight and self-sacrifice that they should support Ukraine not for the sake of Ukrainians but for the sake of harming an expansionist Russia.

but it is either the morally acceptable sacrifice to achieve your goals in your framework and "anything goes" or then there must be a line somewhere between tolerable and intolerable losses for these military objectives. — boethius

There must be, that doesn't mean you can determine it beforehand, or that it's on me to determine it. I don't think that Ukrainians are suicidal, just capable of greater sacrifice than certain Westerners or Russians could expect.

If Russia ends up in the long run with more territory but does not actually defeat Ukraine then it's up for debate if the price paid for the land was worth it overall, certainly not an outright victory over Ukraine, but of course Ukraine would have paid orders of magnitude, possibly 2 or 3, higher price and didn't win anything. If the "strategic defeat" concept proves true (which now seems extremely unlikely as Russia seems to have transitioned their economy successfully) then perhaps it's a "win" for NATO, loss of some sort for Russia (not great, not terrible), and a clear immense and unmitigated loss for Ukraine — boethius

The US and Russia are reluctant to offer a clear definition of "victory" and "loss". There are plausible military (e.g. keep Russia military engaged on all fronts) and propaganda reasons for that (i.e. offering plausible deniability in case of military defeat). However, as I said elsewhere, propaganda consumed by the general public is not all that matters, because general public is more focused on the present while strategic goals concern longer terms goals. Besides the leaders’ understanding of the realistic and relevant implications of this war, may differ from official propaganda (for once they are much more nuanced because they reason in terms of relative power), so I wouldn’t focus so hard on military outcomes independently from strategic concerns.
To me, if at the end of this war, Ukraine remains a sovereign non-pro-Russian non-Russified non-demilitarised country (even without Crimea), NATO members will increase in number and military capacity at the expense of Russian security, the overall Russian military projection capacity and reputation will be significantly decreased, the Russian propaganda machine in the West wrecked, and Russian economy impoverished & decoupled from the West long enough (whatever else being equal like the Rest relative neutrality), then Russia has much more likely lost its strategic power competition against the US and the power status it wanted so badly to be acknowledged by the West. So it doesn’t matter if Russia keeps Crimea&Donbas and sells this as a victory against the US/NATO/West to the Russians. Anyways, I’m not sure that the West is ready to leave Crimea to Russia, neither that the Russia nuclear threat is enough deterrent for all annexed regions (including Crimea). Besides this year is going to be decisive also for the future presidential elections, in Russia before the US. So there are domestic politics incentives pressing for a resolution of this war. We will see.

Again, how do you actually prevent a Russian victory? — boethius

Define "Russian victory" and provide evidence from Russian officials in support of it.

The Greatest Nuclear Threat we face is a Russian Victory, The Atlantic. — Wayfarer

:up:

Possibly. But do you think this is what is happening in practice? Do you think people are becoming deeper, more thoughtful and more in touch with themselves? Do you think modern societies are progressing away from frivolousness, stupidity, and superficiality towards character, intelligence and creativity? Do you think there is less and less evidence of mental conflict evidenced through reduced levels of mental illness, unhappiness, anxiety and drug use? Or are you positing this is as a positive potential in current society that has yet to be realised? — Baden

Your questions suggest some shared understanding/assessment about what constitutes "becoming deeper, more thoughtful and more in touch with themselves" or "character, intelligence and creativity" or "unhappiness". As well as a share understanding of the verifiability of trends correlating certain social factors (e.g. "commodification" of identities) with "mental illness, unhappiness, anxiety and drug use". Both suggestions would require further elaboration to become more rationally challenging.

Anyways, there are some other questions your questions suggest in turn: should we let people explore their identities even if this turns out to be bad for them or should we teach people about their identities even this turns out to be bad for them? If letting anybody explore identities implies costs and risks, should we let people explore their identities at their own expense/risk or share the expense/risk collectively as much as possible? I think that what you consider commodification of identities answers both questions in a certain way. And that the notion of "commodification of identities" is also supposed to frame them in a negative light, because it suggests exploitation (some self-interested social agents sell a variety of goods/services designed for identity seekers despite their potential side effects and make money out of it), while the issue that we must deal with prior to discussing exploitation is the desirable balance between freedom and safety in satisfying individual needs within a community. Indeed, even self-interest, money, or power can themselves constitute identities to be consumed by those who possess them.

The aggregated views of {all the people who live within that border} has no meaning. It's just a random means of stratification unrelated to the opinion being aggregated. As such, all this talk of Ukrainian agency and Ukrainian objectives is nothing but propaganda. There's no moral weight at all to the happenstance aggregate opinion of all the people who happen to be encompassed by an arbitrary spatial line. — Isaac

A series of non sequiturs. What one earth does “The aggregated views of {all the people who live within that border} has no meaning” even mean? The aggregated views of “all human beings” has meaning? The aggregated views of “all religious people”? The aggregated views of all supporters of Barcelona football club? The aggregated views of any random family on earth? The aggregated views of the working class? When does an aggregation of views according to whatever grouping function, has meaning at all? What does determine the moral weight of the aggregate opinion of all people grouped in a certain way?
Each period is allusive in its meaning, its logic link to what precedes or follows, and its polemic target. Pure mystification.

To illustrate. If we did want to use the opinion of the people affected to influence our decision... Why aren't we asking those on the Russian side of the border? They'll definitely be affected.... Why are we asking people on the Western border of Ukraine (hundreds of miles away) but not just over that border... Why are we asking the rich Ukrainian businessmann (who arguably has the resources to weather most storms), but not the Yemeni child who might not live in Ukraine but will undoubtedly be more affected? — Isaac

More than illustrating, its muddling even further. Who is “we”? The Western citizens? The Western governments? The participants to this thread? You mean Biden, any ordinary dude in the West, or me should go ask a Yemeni child (what age? 5 years old is fine?) what he thinks of the “special military operation” of Putin in Ukraine and if he agrees on the West to military aid Ukraine and sanction Russia? You mean that if he says yes, then Biden should support Ukraine and solicit the Western leaders to do the same, and if he says no, then Biden shouldn’t? You mean a 5 year old Yemeni kid can decide for the president of the United States what the United States should do? Or you simply mean that state presidents should go around ask random people of other countries what they think about the war to let them influence his decision about what he should do as a president of the USA wrt the war in Ukraine? Are you crazy?! Did you do that yourself?! Did Putin ask a 5 year old Yemeni kid if he agrees on continuing to bomb and kill Ukrainians whatever it takes?!
Why the hypothetical form “If we did want to…”? What happens if we didn't want? Are you giving us other options? Do we have to choose randomly among them? Can we use dices?

I know that this discussion was prompted by the recent banning of Olivier5. In that case I didn't take it to the rest of the staff for discussion. The refusal of moderation, the attitude it was received with, and his suggestion that he be banned for all he cared, are what led directly to the ban. Refusal of moderation has been a reason for such bannings before, e.g., The Great Whatever, who was a high-quality poster who refused to make a small change to his spelling habits. — Jamal

Are you admins considering the possibility of revising the banning policy by any chance?

It's a choice. Precisely because admins care to preserve or boost forum quality they do not need to sacrifice good contributors for failing to abide by the rules occasionally which doesn't mean to get rid of bans, just to make the ban policy a little bit more flexible (at least for dubious cases). I'm not questioning the admins, but I would welcome a revision of the banning policy. That's all.

Here's what is written in TPF Guidelines:

Bans:

Admins have the right to ban members. We don't do that lightly, and you will probably be warned about your behaviour if you are under consideration for a ban. However, if you are a spammer, troll, racist or in some other way obviously unsuited to the forum, a summary ban will be applied. Bans are permanent and non-negotiable. Returning banned members will be rebanned. — Amity

OK I missed that. Yet a more flexible approach concerning the banning policy might still be more beneficial than a rigid one to this forum.

Agreed. But that doesn't seem to matter. Rules is rules.

As you might imagine, defiance is the worst response, not because it might be insulting, but because it's a refusal to play by the rules. — Hanover — Amity

I don't know what happened. In any case, even if rules is rules, sanctions for transgression are discretionary. So admins can still reason on case by case basis, and proportion sanctions to the severity of the transgression, without denying a second chance for positive long-term contributors.

But why a definitive banning instead of a temporary or a progressive banning (e.g. do it once and I'll ban you for one week, do it twice and I'll ban you for 3 weeks, do it thrice and I'll ban you forever)? Olivier5 wasn't like Bartricks at all.

I don't see the reason for a permanent banning for long-term positive contributors that violated the netiquette on occasions (compare Bartricks vs Olivier5). One could introduce a temporary banning or a progressive banning.

In TPF, is banning always permanent?!

he focused upon how the conflict of methods developed to establish facts beyond personal experience came to be used to explain that phenomena itself — Paine

The scientific method of natural sciences may be said to go "beyond personal experience" but not "beyond experience". Indeed, "experience" is key in empirical research (including any empirical research about "experience"!) as much as the notions of "spacetime", "mass", "charge" are key in physics.

The topic was the motives and objectives of 'Ukraine'. Since 'Ukraine' is an arbitrary line drawn on a map, it doesn't have any unified motive, nor objective and if one were to take an aggregate (vote, poll, whatever) the outcome would be different depending on where you put the line without any hint of a natural break.

As such appeal to such a notion morally is absurd. — Isaac

The comments you cite say that there is no such thing as a Ukrainian identity, history, language and culture. I've also argued that there's no such thing as the will of the Ukrainians, or the motive of the Ukrainians. I've argued that no such thing exists because Ukraine (like all other countries) is an arbitrary line drawn by powerful people based on the amount of resources they had the power to control at the time. It does not in any way 'capture' some natural grouping of people all of whom think alike. It would be no more real then me taking a quick glance at the posts on religion here and announcing that "the belief of TPF is that there is a God".

None of this prevents groups of people from ephemerally having common goals. what it does is remove any moral weight behind that commonality. — Isaac

Not only the idea that “national identities” are not natural groupings is pointless because nobody is arguing otherwise, but it is also fallacious to suggest, as your argument does, that natural groupings would justify moral claims because they are not arbitrary. Indeed, it’s a naturalistic fallacy to argue that from natural groupings (like “we are all human beings”) we can imply moral claims (therefore “it’s immoral committing to arbitrary groupings like national identities”). On the other side, non-natural groupings can justify moral claims to the extent that moral commitments (along with feelings and pragmatic reasoning) constitute non-natural groupings, like national identities, religious identities, political identities, etc.
And even if you still consider such “national identity” or patriotic commitments arbitrary because allegedly based on arbitrary lines drawn on a map, that wouldn’t be enough for you to consider them wrong, indeed you also believe that moral claims are ultimately arbitrary as arbitrary preferences [1]

Of course, appeal to such a notion pragmatically is very useful (democracy is a pragmatic appeal to the aggregated will of an arbitrary group of people), but that's not what's going on here. Not only does Ukraine not currently have a functioning democracy (a pragmatic problem), but the results of any such democratic process don't carry great moral weight. My country democratically voted for Brexit. They were wrong to. It's wrongness is not somehow superseded by its being the 'will of the people'.

It is wrong to risk the lives of innocents over a border dispute. It being 'the will of the Ukrainians' doesn't make it less wrong. — Isaac

Large groups of people can agree on a course of action and still be morally wrong about it. — Isaac

A part from the Brexit example (where is the argument supporting the claim that the democratically chosen Brexit was morally wrong?), who on earth is denying the possibility that “the will of people” can be morally wrong? Nobody, right? From that possibility doesn’t follow at all that Ukraine doesn’t actually have a moral right to self-defence against Russian aggression. So either you provide compelling arguments supporting the claim that Ukraine does not have a moral right to self-defence against Russian aggression. Or you provide compelling arguments supporting the claim that the Ukrainian government doesn’t have legitimacy to exercise such right.
The moral claim that “It is wrong to risk the lives of innocents over a border dispute” is not enough compelling because it could be also wrong to risk lives and freedoms of innocents by surrendering to the demands of a genocidal regime.

[1]

My moral claims are arbitrary. My preferences arbitrary. — “Isaac

The rewriting of history has begun. Now, apparently the country we all happily relied on for energy, and foreign investment. The one whose allies we happily rattled. That country we apparently always knew was a serious military threat because of it's obvious imperialist intent. It's not at all a hastily constructed narrative to promote war profiteering. — Isaac

Who is "we"? We are not a natural group you know. The idea that an arbitrary string of characters like "we" on a forum post encompasses a unique identity is patent nonsense. The idea that "we all" happily relied on Russia for energy and business for the same reason is, again, patent nonsense: people's reasons might have ranged all the way from pro-Russian business profiteering (true for the major leading economies in Western Europe especially Germany) to borderline pro-Putin political profiteering (e.g. Trump, LePen, Salvini, Farrage) to all-sorts of anxiogenic media coverage profiteering (great recession, Islamic terrorism, immigration, pandemic) exploited by pro-Russian info-war and troll armies. Not to mention that "we all" gave for granted that NATO was enough deterrent to discourage aggression of such magnitude and proximity by a greedy authoritarian and nuclear-weapon power. And that's why "we" apparently didn't know Russia was a serious military threat until Russia invaded Ukraine and to some extent "we" still don't know apparently.

The reason why so many in this discussion cannot seem to get their heads around viewing this in any other grouping than by nationality. As if Zelensky (net worth $20 million), Putin (net worth $70 Billion), and Biden (net worth $9 Million) were not all in the same group, and far more separate from the working classes of Russia, Ukraine and America who each have far more in common with each other than with any of their ruling classes.

As if a flag carried more significance than being able to afford a roof, food, or medical care. — Isaac

Do you mean that once they get their heads around viewing Zelensky (net worth $20 million), Putin (net worth $70 Billion), and Biden (net worth $9 Million) in the same group (because of course so many here don’t see that, and desperately need guru Isaac tell them, indeed guru Isaac has a zealously edited record of all millions, billions, trillions and zillions of dollars that each and single Master of the Universe directly sucked out of millions, billions, trillions and zillions of working class children’s blood, right?), obviously it’s going to be evident that Ukraine must surrender to Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledge its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, and affording a roof, food, or medical care carries more significance than a flag?
Or you mean that if Ukraine actually surrenders to Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledges its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, there is a greater chance that so many in this discussion will finally get their heads around the fact that Ukrainian, Russian and American working classes have far more in common with each other than with any of their ruling classes? And that being able to afford a roof, food, or medical care carries more significance than a flag?
Oh no… you must certainly mean that if Ukraine surrenders to all Russian deal-breaker demands and acknowledges its legitimate grievances in a peace deal, we all are so much closer to have the working classes of the world united in rebellion against their ruling classes, and finally able to afford roof, food, or medical care for all humanity ever after, right? "Power to the Imagination!", right?

And caricaturing people’s views is so abso-fucking-lutely fun, right?

I'm simply saying that, in a conscripted army, motivations to fight are even more diverse than in a free one. Even in a regular army people's reasons might range all the way from borderline psychopathy to heroic selflessness. Most common seems to be nationalism. In a conscripted army, you can add to that range the fear of reprisals for refusal. — Isaac

Sure, I guess it’s the same for people who have to pay taxes: some agree with the taxes and are fine with that, some would have preferred softer taxes, some really hate paying taxes. So what?

As such, we cannot possibly 'take into account' their agency. They are not an agent, they are hundreds of thousands of separate agents with separate goals, taking them into account is nigh on impossible. It's certainly not something to be done by clinging slavishly to the account of their agency given by parties with a strong vested interest in presenting it a certain way. — Isaac

One thing is the agency of individual citizens, another the agency of government. The choice of Ukraine to fight with armed forces of conscripted individual citizens is taken by the Ukrainian government. So, first of all, do you have any compelling arguments showing that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate or is taking decisions violating national/international laws? Do you have compelling evidences showing how wide is the lack of support of the Ukrainian government?
Coz, you know, literally anybody can have strong vested interest in presenting Ukrainian agency in a certain way. Even anonymous members of this forum like you: e.g. if you are paid to spread pro-Russian propaganda, or if you are personally so frustrated by your material and social life that you can’t help but enjoy sharing your populist fantasies and memes with likeminded people, or if you are abso-fucking-lutely determined to sparkle a new glorious revolution with your old friend Engels in order to at last end capitalist exploitation on earth or at least break free from your asylum.

Of course Ukraine does not have its own history, language and culture. It's an arbitrary line on a map, it's absurd to think it somehow contains a natural grouping of language, history and culture. — Isaac

Of course?! It’s really baffling how many intellectual failures you can so skilfully concentrate in just a few lines.
First of all, of course, Ukraine has its own history, so much so that there are historians expert at it and giving lectures about it like “Timothy Snyder: The Making of Modern Ukraine” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJczLlwp-d8)
Second, who on earth is arguing that arbitrary lines on a map contain natural grouping of language, history and culture?! Nobody. So what else may be the purpose of objecting to imaginary claims as if they were actually made by your targeted interlocutors other than scoring imaginary points?!
Third, it’s precisely the fact that grouping of language, history and culture are not natural but cultural that they may very much need inheritable historical record in order to preserve or extend such non-natural groupings over time.
Four, even our notions of natural groupings (e.g. racial division of human beings) have their history which in turn may very well depend on non-natural groupings’ history (like the emergence of states supporting universal human rights against racial discriminations and a public education denouncing pseudoscientific racial beliefs).