I was probably fortunate in h — Jack Cummins
Atheism is the absence of belief in God.
— Agent Smith
Every monotheism is "the absence of belief" in every god except "the one God" ... that's not saying much. I prefer to be clear: either (A) belief that there aren't any gods or (B) disbelief in every god. – they are roughly synonymous as far as I'm concerned (and is my preferred definition of atheism until about fifteen years ago when I traded-up from mere clarity to precison ...) Anyway, the latter formulation (B) may seem more defensible than (A), but it's not, as they are two sides of the same shekel; complementaries such that (A) warrants (B) and (B) assumes (A).
Smith, my point is: disbelief is a mode of active belief and not a passive "lack of belief" as Andrew4Handel's thread's title (OP) suggests. — 180 Proof
I would answer that question put to Bertrand Russell more or less the same way he does but with slight variations: (1) intellectually trust nothing but publicly accessible evidence and sound reasoning; (2) morally practice Hillel the Elder's principle: "What you find hateful (or harmful), do not do to anyone." — 180 Proof
That is due to the failure of philosophy. The philosopher's task is to lead the people out of the cave. After 2.5k years, the philosophers have failed, and we remain, in the cave. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, will is wrongfully linked to choice. When we drive a wedge between the two it is to change the way we look at the world. Then the world looks more real because we see causation in a realistic way. Consider Plato's cave allegory, the real existence of "the good" is not even acknowledged by those still in the cave. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what "good" (value) means but minimally bad (reducing disvalue) makes pragmatic sense to me. Ambiguities, complementarities & degrees of difference grounded in human facticity (i.e. needs, defects ... of our species) seem more concrete and consistent (à la fuzzy logic) with lived experience than formalist / structuralist 'binary oppositions'. — 180 Proof
