Yes I recognize that "we", especially philosophy as a discipline, require [a] reason(s) in order to establish a proposition as a truth. — ENOAH

You're reframing what I said. I'm not talking about propositions and their truth values. I'm talking about real-world behaviors: how people think, speak, and act regarding "belief".

Isn't reason just a cause for belief? — ENOAH

That tells me you still haven't grasped what I'm suggesting, but at this point to say more I'd just be repeating myself.

At some point some entity must be the arbiter of when such reason(s) may safely transport the thinker to the settlement called knowledge or truth. — ENOAH

For me, the only arbiter there is, is the universe itself as I experience what little of it I can. No other person and not all the thinking of all other people together arbitrates my experience or what I make of it. They inform me, they do not judge or arbitrate. Their thinking is based on their experience of the same universe, much like mine, so no one's is privileged over anyone else's, including mine. The judgment others might use to arbitrate or judge my thinking rests on thinking equally vulnerable to my arbitration and judgment. When everyone is arbiter and judge of everyone else, no one is either.

For now, though they are presented as propositions, they are actually questions. — ENOAH

That's why I like reading you so much. Me too. Except I'd say, "they are actually hypotheses". Hypotheses can be falsified, but never proven. That's why I like to point out "lack of proof". It really bothers absolutists, but it's their "narrow gate" into the realization that nothing can be proved.

By "no one born into 'history'" I mean that fictional line when Homo Sapiens presumably crossed over from sensing the world by its animal nature, to one governed/dominated/saturated by representational structures. — ENOAH

OK, then I'm back to straight up "false" for the reasons I mentioned.

Thanks man, this has been a sweet discussion.

we ought to recognize that even the truths we arrive at through authority or Reason etc, are finally or first triggered by belief. — ENOAH

I have not seen any reason, let alone convincing argument, that establishes that claim. It continues as a baseless claim until someone can provide some reason to see it as something more. Crassly, say-so doesn't make so. I'm not saying that people can't or don't use "belief" referring to that unchosen recognition/apprehension/realization of truth. Of course they do. And I'm not "dismissing" belief: I'm calling it out. Exposing a fraud is not the same as dismissing it. I'm at the "I for the life of me cannot but see belief as a fraud" point. The next level is "I've looked at it more deeply and thoroughly than anyone I've ever known, and I can tell you -- it's a fraud, and what's more, you will fail when you try to demonstrate (not merely ipse dixit) that it's non-fraudulent." Notice the difference between that and "Belief is irrational/incoherent/a fraud" claimed as case-closed truth. No case is every "closed" as far as I'm concerned.

But none one born into history lives outside of that world. — ENOAH

Sorry, but false -- unless you mean "no one born since history started being recorded, in which case I'd say partially true.

We're born into a codependence-inducing world now, but we have no clear, definitive evidence that all humans were born into such a world. Recent archaeology is rapidly disintegrating old, 17th/18th-century thinking like that. Hobbes is doubly dead, lol. The belief that codependence is the natural norm, inherent to human nature, and always has been, is at best wildly evidence-free. For many reasons -- psychologically, sociologically, and having studied cultism for the last 30+ years -- I consider it utterly false. Human children can, indeed, grow into mature, self-enabling adulthood. And those who grow up into codependence can -- I did -- extract themselves, escape it, and mature even though they're way late.

Even during the time of recorded history, though -- even today -- there are big differences between the codependence levels of various societies. Here's Copilot's comparison of two:

United States: High Codependence
External validation loop: Identity, worth, and competence are mediated by institutions—school, work, therapy, media. The adult self is often a performance for systems.

Dependency masked as autonomy: The myth of rugged individualism conceals deep reliance on corporate, romantic, and bureaucratic structures.

Emotional outsourcing: Crisis is often met with consumption (products, services, diagnoses) rather than communal or embodied response.

Zapatistas: Radically Lower Codependence
Deliberate rupture from dependency systems: The Zapatistas explicitly reject state, capitalist, and patriarchal structures that foster dependency. Their autonomy is not abstract—it’s infrastructural (health, education, justice).

Collective maturity: Children and adults participate in assemblies, decision-making, and defense. Responsibility is distributed, not deferred.

No savior myth: Their political grammar rejects external rescue. Liberation is not outsourced—it is enacted, collectively, daily.

Emotional-political integration: Suffering is not privatized or pathologized. It is named, shared, and politicized—without collapsing into victimhood.

⚖️ Relative Guess
Codependence is structurally and ideologically disincentivized in Zapatista communities. Where the U.S. breeds dependency through institutional saturation and ideological contradiction, the Zapatistas cultivate autonomy through material self-governance and collective responsibility. The contrast is not just cultural—it is infrastructural, epistemic, and existential.

No matter how simple clear and manifest the dialectic, like the one that nears its end with 1+1=2, to accept 2, is a belief. One believes in the legitimacy of the process, if you prefer. — ENOAH

You repeatedly reframe the matter in terms of belief, as if belief were foundational -- which is why I mentioned vindicating it. Actually, the first word that came to me was redeem. You seem quite attached in coaching epistemics In terms of basic belief. I wonder if we're using the same term to talk about two different things? I had a similar experience in working through the nature of authority. Most people are quite enamored with what they call good authority -- that of an expert or a parent or a stellar teacher. But when you look the start differences between the nature of coercive authority and so called good authority -- their intentions, their methods, their structure, and their outcomes -- it only makes you wonder why people would be so stuck on calling donkeys and horses by the same name. Or, closer to the destructive realities of course of authority, why you'd put arsenic in one jar and sugar in another and call them both "sweet stuff". It makes no sense Karma which is prima fascia evidence nonsense is motivating the confusion.

So if we were to dig into it, would we find out that what you and I each mean different realities that we refer to by "belief"? I'm starting to think so.

I'm also starting to think that the parallel between authority and belief isn't coincidental. I suspect that the reasons for the protective shell revolve around ego concerns that demand a level of authority to back them up. At least that's what it seems like when I bump into the shell of a person's belief: authority and ego.

As far as belief being inevitable, no, it isn't. I'm not saying that as a deduction, I'm saying that as a report of ongoing experience. Most human beings are codependent because we were raised, trained, and mindfucked to be exactly that. All human beings have codependent tendencies. In the world of codependence, you're 100% correct -- belief is inevitable.

Here's how I'd restate your statement: "Or, belief may be irrational, but it is inevitable among codependent people, mind-fucked into mental processes of manifesting to the body (real consciousness) and world (nature and the species) as diminished, dehumanized objects at the mercy of their situations and other more powerful beings."

The problem is that most people are just like small fry who ask each other "What the heck is water?" when the big fish asks them "How's the water, boys?" Most people have no clue what codependency is because they've never known anything else.

Perhaps it would be better if we said "Type of belief". — Philosophim

Well, that's what we'd end up with, wouldn't we, if we found beliefs that didn't fit the nut structure?

It's obvious that almost everyone wants to vindicate "belief", but you've got to let that go to participate -- otherwise that intention (vindication) is itself a bias.

The 'shell' seems to imply a biased belief. — Philosophim

At first I disagreed that that the shell involved or represented bias, but now I think you're onto something. The bias results from forming an attachment to the kernel (which is not the belief -- the whole nut is the belief) beyond what our confidence in it being true can support, so we feel the need for extra "protection".

But to say that the shell implies a biased belief is to posit "belief" as something capable of being unbiased, and it doesn't fit the nut structure I presented, which is fine, but merely positing it is non-responsive to the question of the OP.

Give me a couple of examples of non-biased beliefs -- which if the shell signifies bias, would need to be unshelled, then, which then would mean it's not a whole nut, wouldn't it?

I enjoy your thinking. We're not on the same page, though.

And was this kind of characterization, "characterization" itself, not a construction? — ENOAH

No, in the same way that I'm one thing, my role as a father is another, and "6-0 tall" is another. I should have said "characterizations of constructions, not constructions themselves of the same kind as the constructions they characterize."

The effort to find out if a thing is true or not already alienates the thing from its truth, — ENOAH

Your statement is jumbled. There are 3 things involved, but you don't keep them straight: 1. the thing; 2. the truth P about the thing iif P is true; 3. the settlement that determines P is true about the thing, making P the truth about the thing. The thing is not something that could be true or false, because it is the thing that is just itself, against which the its truth is determined. The thing is one entity, its truth is another. There is no way that the effort to determine the truth P about the thing could alienate P. I think you're trying to say something else.

A belief is not the kernel
— Millard J Melnyk

Yes! A belief is only reflecting what "it/its user" dreams up about the kernel. The kernel (the Real) cannot be accessed by belief; it can only be accessed by being [the kernel etc. re any object, including the Real that "I" refers to] — ENOAH

The "kernel" is not the real, but an apprehension about the real. The kernel is the truth P that refers to the real. The entire nut (belief) is a conceptual construct, abstract not concrete (real), so it cannot contain the real.

Belief is a truth wrapped by a shell. The truth doesn't need a shell to protect it, but when our grasp on a truth is weak, flimsy, not implicitly reliable, we feel the need to protect it. Cognitively, nothing is apprehended through belief, since apprehension is what results in the kernel, which precedes the wrapping of the kernel, without which there is no belief. Belief occurs later, after apprehension has resulted in apparent truth, i.e., the kernel. The kernel can do just fine without the shell, if indeed it's true, because nothing exists to untrue it, although deluded people can pretend it's untrue.

We need to keep the different elements distinct and in both logical and chronological order.

I'm very much enjoying your thoughts.

Knowledge and so called truth are constructions.
rational and irrational are too. — ENOAH

Kinda sorta. Knowledge is a construction: a collection of truths deemed reliable and operable. "Rational" and "irrational" are characterizations of constructions, not constructions themselves.

Truth can very often be a construction -- in which case it's better known as bullshit. For me, to qualify as truth, no matter if it's an idea or an experience or a feeling/sense/impression/intuition/premonition/gut feel/inspiration -- which kind of stuff I call "gutma" -- or a deliberated conclusion, it must be grounded by means of real work in space and time. Epistemic work. Otherwise I won't treat it as truth but as merely a somewhat convincing idea, even a greatly convincing idea, that might or might not be true. It could be true, it could be false, but if I've done nothing to find out which, I can't regard it as truth.

So, you can see why I rarely deal in "truth" other than as a point-in-time, provisional understanding that I must handle as true if I'm to be honest. No one, but no one, has figured out a way to get a guarantee that they're not wrong.

"But according to that, your 'truth' could in fact turn out to be false."

Exactly -- just like every other truth known to man. We rely on reflective analysis, subsequent experience, and the grace of the universe and our fellow humans and other conscious animals to clue us in about our mistakes. There is no coherent way I've ever seen to escape from that dependency, although many crap-thinking bullshitters pretend there is.

A so called "truth" is a settlement which mind arrives at following a dialectical process which takes place partially "unconsciously" i.e. before manifestation to aware-ing, and partially consciously, I.e. manifesting to aware-ing. — ENOAH

Exactly. And the "settlement" is a settling of relationship between a reference (the idea in question) to its referent (the reality it stands as the truth about).

A truth for human minds is never an absolute truth, always a settlement started by (or ended by, depending upon where in time we are observing it) belief. — ENOAH

That settlement or acceptance is never absolutely conclusive but rather, it is that mechanism, triggering the end of the struggle by way of a [settled] feeling, which we think of as belief. — ENOAH

I understand what you're saying, but it embodies precisely the same confusion I've been trying to parse, differentiate, and articulate (poorly so far). I agree that "belief" is commonly used similarly to how you use it here, but I'm convinced that it's sloppy use of the term driven by habit instead of the result of clear understanding of what the idea of "belief" entails. Check out what I said about lack of belief in children in my latest response to @Ludwig V at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1023823.

The more I think about and discuss this, the more I'm seeing the metaphor of a nut holds. The important part of a nut is its kernel. A belief is not the kernel. The kernel is what you're talking about here:

At the latter "stage" a "truth" is settled upon when that dialectical process reaches the point where the aware-ing body is triggered to [having] a certain real and natural feeling. — ENOAH

There's two parts to the kernel: the idea itself (content) and our "settled feeling" (our conviction/its credibility). No content, no kernel. No settlement, no kernel, although the content could be the beginnings of one. Settlement might be the result of a dialectical process, or it might precede it, ("settlement started by (or ended by, depending upon where in time we are observing it)") or both. The kernel might consist of gutma; or of inspiration, revelation, dream, epiphany or psychedelic experience, etc., which are too real and convincing to be dismissed or not taken as conveying truth; or of something resulting from a conscious process, such as a finding, a discovery, a conclusion, etc. All of these can leave us with a "this has gotta be/there's gotta be something to this" feeling of some convincing magnitude.

Those are not beliefs, although we're often very sloppy and say they are.

To arrive at a belief about those primal senses/experiences -- "about" signals relationship between TWO things, not one, a reference and a referent -- we must do something with them. What do we do? We put them in a shell. Putting a shell around a kernel makes a nut. The nut is the belief -- the actual content plus a protective barrier.

I'm not interested at this point in arguing whether "all beliefs" fit this structure. I'm far more interested in approaching it scientifically, quantitatively: of all the usages of "belief" and "believing", how many fit that structure and how many don't fit? Answer those questions and we'll know what the proportions are and, therefore, how much attention to give each and how much weight each carries.

People don't couch their cogni-affective "kernels" inside a "shell" until they've developed an attachment to them that warrants protection. A belief involves both parts, and I've yet to find someone who sees this with much clarity, much less anyone who has clearly explained it. I'm doing my best, haha, but I've still got a ways to go!

All of that is what we start with - the inheritance we are lumbered with. — Ludwig V

Well, we're not born tabula rasa, but neither were we born with indoctrination, presuppositions, etc.

Since computer/Internet/AI analogies are all the rage, we could say we were born with an operating system. Within the constraints of brain morphology and the physics of neurology, it's self-assembling and self-coding, which we haven't achieved with digital tech yet. We could take a step nearer it by having two apps which rewrite each other based on what the other app just rewrote in them -- or make two AIs talk to each other and see what they come up with. But human beings actually rewire their own brains based on what they experience and what they make of the experiences. To some degree, experience (in the broadest sense, to include environmental exposure) impacts gene expression, if not gene mutation. So far as we currently know, this is an almost exclusively deterministic process, but nothing structural in the human make up (not that we know) prevents conscious interventions that could impact gene expression.

Short story, human psychology is the process of using a biological apparatus designed not only to change and adapt to external experience, but also to internal experience, even consciously-driven/directed internal experience (e.g., meditation, psychedelics etc.) We are self-changing biological engines by design. We don't seem to have an "Undo" key, though. It's more of an "Do-over-better" key. We literally process past experience and change our own makeup (within broad constraints) to handle future experience differently.

So, we're able to do examine the substrate elements that people who subscribe to "belief" build their beliefs atop -- which begs the question: Then why are believers so resistant to that examination? People like to talk about the human characteristic of resistance to change, as if it's innate to human nature. Pshaw. Up to a certain age, children show no signs of that but precisely the opposite. Until what I call the "My dad's stronger!" age when they develop identity attachments, they literally have no beliefs. They'll argue with each other about things -- but not because they "believe" them, because believing necessarily implies the possibility of disbelieving. They do neither, just like small fry who don't know what water is can't "believe" they're swimming in it. What kids know is, for them, all there is, so "It IS bigger!" isn't even the kind of thing that could be "believed" in the first place.

So, no -- change resistance isn't a structural, immutable characteristic of nature. Something induced it as we grew up. And it's just a symptom. Believers display resistance to the examination of their biases, presuppositions, indoctrination, attachments, etc. before the prospect of changing their beliefs even comes up -- not because they think examination would force them to change their beliefs, but merely because it has the potential to put them in a position where they might have to change them. They're not just resistant to changing, they're resistant to looking. So, in this way, children are smarter than they are. (Which is one reason why Jesus recommended we become like children, I'm sure.) [<-- So what's the difference between that and saying, "I believe" ? :grin: For me, they are not synonymous.)

Do you mean that the suspicion of "once for all" is wisdom. I wouldn't argue with that. — Ludwig V

No, "once and for all" isn't suspicious in my view. It used to be, but I've resolved my suspicions. "Once and for all" is a fantasy, a Holy Grail, a delusion that arises from psychosis (when taken generically, not as defined currently in notorious psychiatric fashion as a quantum instead of an analog affair, i.e., a spectrum). A little hysteria that makes us misinterpret an obviously friendly gesture is still hysteria, for example. It still caused a minute break from reality. The motivation for hoping and searching for "once and for all" is contrary to every obvious aspect of existence because existence is continually changing, and we don't have a fucking clue to what extent it's capable of changing or even if there are any limits at all. I like to tell people that "absolute truth" isn't just impossible, it's incoherent, because it's not truth if it doesn't inform us about reality, and there is nothing immutable about reality other than that it's mutable. If everything absolutely stopped changing so that the truth about it were absolute, there would be no way to know if anything still existed for there to be a truth about. The truth is always changing, as far as we can tell. Ideas like "once and for all" actually have nothing to do with truth. They are vain attempts to resolve psychological dissonance by people who cannot bear the vagaries of mutability. I call them "codependents".

I'm not sure it's a presumption. If one understands when a belief is invalid, then it follows that one understands when a belief is valid, don't you think? That's true even if one has never encountered a valid belief. I would say that that approach hopes, even expects, that there will be some true beliefs to be found. Proving that there are none is very hard, since you would have to examine every possible belief and discard them all. That's an endless task. As for your "what if", it is not a great worry - you'll never know for sure. — Ludwig V

I think you missed my point, partly my fault because of how I worded it. Saying, "If one understands when a belief is invalid, then it follows..." demonstrates presumption that there is a belief, whether valid or invalid. You can't determine anything at all about something unless it's there. So, "If one understands when a belief is invalid, then it follows..." presumes the existence of a belief which is coherent enough that evaluating its validity would, in turn, be coherent. If believing itself is incoherent, then all beliefs are the result of that incoherency. (I wonder, maybe the it would have been better to use "incoherent" instead of "irrational" in the OP?) That is the presumption I meant.

Presumptions may be found to be true or false. Good arguments are a different matter. — Ludwig V

Yes, but you need to consider the chronicity and timing here -- something that philosophers, in general, have been deplorably negligent in, given their obsession with freeze-framing the truth. At the point that it's a presumption, it cannot have been found true or false, because once it's found one way or the other, it's no longer a presumption. Problems arising from pretending that presumptions are self-evident or treating them like conclusions when no work was done to arrive at the conclusion can't be redeemed by "but maybe later we'll find out it's true or false".

That sounds very reasonable. However, the proof of any method is, in the end, the results it produces. — Ludwig V

Of course, which is the only reason I'd have adopted it and stuck with it so far. Works great! :blush:

I don't think that's bizarre at all. It's horses for courses. Philosophy, Science and everyday life are different environments and our different ways of making sense in each environment are, on the whole, pragmatically successful - mostly. — Ludwig V

That's simply not the case. Everyday life is primary. All of our fields of study are at best (when not compromised or fabricated) secondary processing efforts totally dependent on primary experience for their validity, meaning, and significance. The everyday life of a scientist in the lab or in the real-life "field" or at the telescope is the basis for all the science they generate. So, science is not something that's non-anecdotal like people pretend it is. We have merely exempted the primary experience of a person trained in processes and equipment, then recorded in lab notes, as something "more than" mere (pfft) subjective experience. It might be of a higher quality/caliber than the "everyday life" lived by untrained people, with respect to training/lack of training, but it is in no way different in kind with respect to subjectivity.

All that to say, no: everyday life is primary experience in specific real environments, but academic fields (whether done inside or outside academic institutions) are not just the same kind of things. Being secondary processing, they do not belong to the real-world environments that the data they process was obtained from. They aren't the same kind of thing, so it makes no sense to say they are "different environments" as if they were ontologically and epistemically similar.

What's more, the real world is not compartmentalized. We compartmentalized our processing of it. That doesn't mean our compartmentalization necessarily or best reflects reality, and it certainly doesn't impose itself on reality in any material way. Academic categories (or any other abstract compartmentalization) have no bearing on reality. They are just reflections (at best) which do not divide, shape, or alter phenomena—only perception. Their only impact is through human mediaries that impose them on a naturally integrated world.

Besides, I wasn't making a philosophical statement there, I was making a historical one. The divisions between our fields have study have, in fact, caused plenty of problems that only recently we've taken steps towards rectifying. One example is "interdisciplinary studies". Well, we wouldn't have needed to reintegrate them if we hadn't compartmentalized them in the first place.

I was actually talking about the cognitive compartmentalization effected by all this. Except as a self-defense against horrific trauma, cognitive compartmentalization is always detrimental. A great example is how we presume violence on the part of government is ipso auctore virtuous, but violence on the part of non-governmental parties -- even if it's exactly the same actions in far less severe and detrimental degrees -- is considered "criminal". A Madoff is regarded as far less vile than the neighborhood racketeer.

I want to say thank you for this discussion, I'm enjoying it -- but especially, I appreciate your openness and honesty and effort to understand what I'm saying as opposed to what I usually get: reactions against whatever spooks were triggered in people's heads by what I said. It's really cool. Refreshing.

Now why, if all belief is irrational, would I have a belief that knowledge/truth settlements start as belief? I don't believe that -- not because I believe the opposite, but because I don't rely on believing, period. In fact, I don't want anything to do with beliefs. For me, they're incoherent, unnecessary, and soiled. I go commando! :lol:

Beliefs are constructs. So is knowledge. They are categories of something far more basic we've manipulated into certain forms to fit those categories. Wittgenstein was right-on that philosophy reduces to word games, or we could call them map games. Map is not territory, the words are not what they signify. They are references which hopefully have referents, but manipulating references to the furthest extent possible does nothing to change the referents they refer to.

So, if you couch what I say in a framework where "belief" is both sensible and meaningful, you're talking about a whole different ball of wax than I am.

So are you saying that we shouldn't be looking for rock-like foundations, but only for foundations that are good enough for whatever purposes we have at hand? — Ludwig V

Not at all. I said we dig down -- under our biases, presuppositions, indoctrination, attachments, etc. -- until we find rock-hard foundations: hard enough we can't dig past them, same as Descartes. Where I differ is that I don't assume that seems hard is hard enough. I take the risk that Descartes wanted to avoid: build confident, but realistic that seems hard might not be hard enough, which translates into more caution, humility, less cut corners, less risk-taking. And then, when betrayal, overwhelming, "world-ending" events, etc., prove that the foundation was insufficient, the world doesn't end, and you dig it all up and dig deeper, this time.

This fable of once-for-all understanding, the Holy Grail of philosophy, is actually a hatred of wisdom, and it's a big reason why I've rejected the entire philosophical proposition as it's been pursued throughout history.

It seems a bit over the top to dismiss all beliefs just because some of them are wrong. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't say over the top. I'd say f*cking stupid -- which is something I don't do if I can help it -- and I have not done and do not do that in the discussions here.

I would have thought that the challenge is to distinguish between those beliefs that refer to something in reality and the garbage. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's a common approach, but it presumes (without warrant) that valid beliefs must exist. What if they don't? And what if the desire for beliefs/believing itself turns out to be pathological, and the formulation of beliefs (i.e., believing itself, regardless of content and referential validity and accuracy) turns out to be a symptom of underlying irrationality? That's the question I raised here, so I'm sure you can see that responses based on the presumption that beliefs/believing itself must be rational in some form completely miss the point (unresponsive).

So is that your rock? Fair enough. Can you tell me more about the process of analysis? — Ludwig V

No, that's the ground -- the data. It's the only stuff we've got to work with. We have to dig through it to find rock, no different than how science analyzes and theorizes from empirical data. Philosophically, the hardest rock I've been able to identify is, "It's happening." There's simply no way around or past that. But then you need to find out what "it" is and what "it" is doing/having done to it. That's not a philosophical process, because without experiential contact and the data it provides, there's nothing to philosophize about. By "embodied" I mean the entire spectrum of experience from sensory through to the extremes of the fantastic it might inspire. Limiting philosophy to cogitation is another big reason I've rejected its proposition. I do philosophy, but I don't confine myself to existing philosophical methods, obviously.

My process is thoroughly experimental and, in that sense, empirical. Subjective experience is our only way of contacting reality -- when people cry, "Anecdotal!" I just roll my eyes -- and thinking about it (hypothesis) and experimenting (test) which generates data (findings) and then making sense of it all (theory) is how we build a grounded understanding of things -- and then do it all over again and again, partly as a quality assurance method and (hopefully) to incorporate revisions based on new information. That's "my" method and it's best method I know. And guess what? Prior to the 20th century, not a philosopher I know of followed that method.

People think that the scientific method is a skeptical method, which just shows their understanding of it is superficial. One of the most imaginative and credulous things a person can do, short of becoming superstitious, is formulate a hypothesis. "It's raining." Stated as a fact. "God exists." Stated as a fact. And then, do the work to find out if and how much truth lies in the hypothesis, if any at all.

Notice that "belief" actually muddies all that. A belief is a hypotheses to which we have formed attachments prior to doing the work and, in most cases, specifically so that we can avoid doing the work. That's why "arguments" are so ubiquitous and notoriously interminable in philosophy.

In my experience and reading, beliefs are like nuts. When a person tells you they believe P, they're not just saying that they did the work and found P true. P is the kernel. In fact, they're often saying "believe" precisely because they're well aware that they didn't do sufficient work to call P true. But they're saying something in addition to that. They're saying, "Regardless what I did to become attached to P, even if I did nothing at all and have no idea why I'm attached to P, P is important to me -- so respect the fact that I'm attached to it."

That's the shell. If the kernel was the only thing that's important to them, they'd focus on the kernel and skip the shell.

Obviously, the fact that we're attached to an idea has shitall to do with ascertaining its truth. The shell isn't there to assure us that the kernel is ripe or rotten, nutritious or poisonous, or anything else of the sort. The shell has one and only one job: protect the kernel.

I just explained why it's so difficult to get believers to change their minds.

Since I'm dumping anyway, one more reason why I've rejected philosophy as we've known it, and this is probably the elephant. Philosophy has been compartmentalized from real life, both in the minds of philosophers and "laypeople". Even the best, most stellar philosophy ever done wasn't done with the intention of creating a reliable method for individuals to live their lives -- which is what I was after when I started my philo major in 1972. Boy, was I in for a shock. Philosophy's goal is to create an explanation/understanding which can be used to rationalize actions. That's at its best. More realistically, its goal has been to serve its patrons -- the parasitic "ruling" classes -- providing a basis for their rule, a pre-rationalization for what they want to do, and a post-rationalization for what they did and were dead-set on doing, regardless.

That's why philosophy has always taken a God's-eye-view for its cogitations. Phenomenologists tempered this somewhat, but only partly. Not only has most philosophy omitted but downright denigrated the individual's perspective as "subjective" -- another eye-roller, because the only knowledge there is resides in finite form within individuals who cannot in any way transcend the finiteness that limits them subjectively. No matter how far we extend those limits -- the subjective knowledge of 100 billion, trillion, quadrillion subjects never stops being limited and subjective.

The compartmentalization has led to a bizarre situation where sensemaking in philosophy is a completely different proposition than sensemaking in science, which is a completely different proposition than sensemaking in real life. Different goals, different standards, different expectations. One of the most frustrating things for me is how easily people write off irrationality in real life, as if "well, people are basically irrational" and then worship "science" like it's a religion and pooh-pooh philosophy as some strange mental affliction of a strange sort of nerds. It's bizarre.

Not "perfect" by a long shot, lol. Plenty of valid criticisms have been raised, but the syllogism isn't the point. I posted it to provoke criticism to see if there are considerations I mistook or missed.

Beliefs (like thought, idea, ideology, knowledge, on and on) are concepts of human construction that, at best, refer to something in reality. At worst, they contribute to bullshit and gaslighting.

Feelings are a completely different kind of thing, far more immanent and psychologically deep than any concept or, for that matter, cognition itself. Cognition is connected to affective capacity, but psycho-therapeutic processes (and cults, for that matter) prove how difficult it is to revise affect on the basis of cognition. The flip side -- cognition warped by affect -- is incredibly easy, ubiquitous, and durable.

So your feelings toward your wife, your family, your community, and God are quite secure, I assure you. :blush:

Again, you remind me of Descartes. Like him, you have some sort of idea what a belief needs to have if it is to be legitimate and worth something. Like him, you are disappointed when you ask around. I would suggest, tentatively, that you think about the standards you have by which you assess beliefs. Where did they come from? What could make one belief more legitimate and valuable than another? — Ludwig V

The likeness is legit to a point, except I fundamentally disagree with Descartes on his entire skeptical project. He sought to find a rock he could build on. That's cool, gotta start somewhere. His mistake was in thinking that once he found what seemed like rock, that was the end of the project. Wrong.

Jesus likened it to housebuilding, which is what I did for a while as a general contractor. What did he point out that Descartes missed? Rain and floods and wind. Empirical reality. Experiential reality. In short, embodied reality. How do you know you found rock you can build on? If the rain and floods and wind blow it down, it wasn't rock. So, you did deeper until you find firmer rock. Does that guarantee your house won't get knocked down again? No. If it doesn't, you found the firmest rock you need for that location. If it does, you dig deeper.

I've lived through 4 complete demolitions of my worldview houses: agnostic => believer => Bible cultist => no fucking clue what's really going on just gonna do the best I can => building on embodied truth and wisdom. That last includes a continual feedback/self-assessment loop that was exactly what Descartes wanted to escape.

But you're wrong about the "you have some sort of idea what a belief needs to have if it is to be legitimate and worth something". Nope. I don't approach things that way. I feel no obligation to accommodate prior thinking when it represents a break from real-world functionality and sense. I start with embodied experience -- actions from communication to experiment -- take the findings, then analyze them. That method has revealed plenty of monkey business. I have no interest in redeeming beliefs or anything else -- that's what I mean by preexisting attachments. I trust that the way things happen is obviously functional (except when psychosis interferes) and follows established patterns, so I trust that when I find goings-on that rupture or resist those patterns, we have a problem.

You suggest what I've already done and am well into developing further. Happy to talk about it if you're interested. It does beg the question why you thought I might have neglected it.

Thanks for the contribution. I don't subscribe to many of the categories you mentioned, let alone to their prioritization. For me, it's simple: Something's happening. I don't compartmentalize it before trying to understand it. Any categorization ought to map to the goings-on and add value to them. Otherwise, they're of no value to them or, more often, disruptive. In effect, I'm exploring the possibility that "belief" is a bogus category. Most of the pushback I get originates from, "But that's not what we were taught, and that's not how we're used to seeing things!", not from legit critique.

How to approach reading this paper: This may seem odd, but it is important to come to this paper with the correct mindset to keep discussion where it needs to be.

The discussion on this paper is intended to be an analysis of the terms and logic within it. Your primary approach should not be introducing your own idea of knowledge. Please make your own topic if that is what you desire. — Philosophim

That doesn't seem "odd" at all. It, actually, should be SOP for anyone engaging in this sort of thing. You assess an idea on the same terms it was developed by means of, not other terms. This is exactly what I was talking about on my last comment on the "irrational belief" post. Everybody came to it with predefined terms and, instead of openly considering the possibility, immediately launched into why it's not a possibility. Why? Because the only terms they could think in are those that presuppose that belief can be rational. See the circle?

I read through the paper. Much of made sense, but I was left with a question:

Let's say that everything you said is absolutely true. This is what knowledge and induction are within "your self-context". What does this understanding enable you to do that you could not do without it?

Especially when it comes to knowledge, I routinely find myself asking that question when I read what people write about it, philosophers especially. It's like everyone assumes a theory of knowledge is important, and everyone acts like they're referring to the same fundamental thing when they use the term, even though they say very different stuff about its nature. But no one says what "it" is. I find that they don't distinguish between their theory of what knowledge is from the archetypical form of whatever makes it knowledge rather than brain farts. If it has no real-world referent, you can define it to be whatever you want, but then it's knowledge only in a solipsistic sense. If it has a real-world referent and one says it's JTB and another says it's pragmatic and another says it's procedural, they're all talking about "it", saying what "it" is like, how it's formed, how it works, etc. -- and this "it" is a reality that "knowledge" refers to, whatever "it" consists of. But to recognize what "knowledge" refers to, "it" must be recognizable by something besides the mere fact that we labeled it with some squiggly marks on a page or screen.

So, let's say you exactly described what "it" is, calling it "knowledge". What does the description do for us? What's the merit of the description, and for what purposes?

Yeah you hit the nail on the head. You're coming at this as an epistemologist would. That's why 3rd person is important for you. You're taking a bird's/God's/universal viewpoint to look at the totality of the question.

I'm only interested in the 1st person aspect because I'm not creating an epistemology/epistemological theory. That's why I use the term "epistemic". My sole interest is how an individual can, for themself, DO epistemic work, and I'm trying to figure out how and why we as individuals fail either to do it at all or do it poorly.

So, yeah -- different projects, because all epistemic work -- just like all science -- is done, fundamentally, in the 1st person.

In fact, I'm positively disinterested in the 3rd person angle, because it doesn't inform the 1st person issues. I'm not saying ignore the 3rd person, period. I'm saying that the 1st person issues determine how you're going to take on the 3rd person stuff, so first, let's get 1st person epistemics right.

Hope I'm making some sense to you here.

I'm not sure what you mean. They work quite differently, as I tried to show. — J

You showed the distinction, you didn't show how the distinction makes a difference to our topic.

Wouldn't you agree they're nearly synonymous? — J

In sloppy usage, sure. Are you saying that the difference is insignificant?

"I believe it's raining" is a rather trivial matter, and also easily checked empirically. "I believe the COVID vaccines are harmful" -- not so much. "Think" and "believe" mean something significantly different in that case.

Sure, I can see what you're saying. You're taking the position of a dissertation committee and faulting my weak defense attempts. Cool. My goal here was to evoke feedback that would clarify. "Not clear enough, there's more to it, you're vague here, here, and here" and the like are almost always valid, but rarely serve to clarify a topic. I'm not trying to build an airtight case here for the irrationality of beliefs/believing. I'm exploring horizons and limitations. I think I've gotten all I could hope to get from our discussion. Thanks, man.

That's why it seems to odd that you want to ignore "know". — Ludwig V

I haven't ignored it since you first brought it up, and I've said so. After working it through, tho, I realized it doesn't matter.

We're dealing with exactly the same form of statement, "I ______ that P" regardless what you put in the blank. All these statements include an assertion P prefaced by a self-reference "I _____". P is identical in all cases, no matter if you fill the blank with think/believe/know/speculate/guess/conjecture/SWAG (super-wild-assed-guess)/predict/prophesy/deduce/WHATEVER lol. So the only thing that changes is the semantics of the self-reference, which has no epistemic bearing on the assertion.

That raises two questions. One regards the self-reference: what are the differences between think/believe/know/whatever and what's the motivation for and significance of choosing one or another?

But here's the surprise (for me): Why interject the self-reference at all? Why add ego concerns to the mix? If the assertion is the message, why stick ourselves in there? Crassly, if the assertion is the important part, who cares whether I think/believe/know/speculate/guess/conjecture/SWAG (super-wild-assed-guess)/predict/prophesy/deduce/WHATEVER lol.

All the girl cares about is "You're beautiful." She's smart enough to know you think so, lol.

Not really sure how to respond to the rest of your reply. Yes, we can think about it in ways that make it hideously complicated. That's what I'm trying to rectify. Setting it up as I described above simplifies it immensely. Much of the responses I've gotten here and elsewhere boil down to failing to recognize that think/believe/know have no logical bearing on the assertion being made. They're not really about the assertion -- they're about the person's subjective assessment about their relationship/attitude towards the assertion.

Can you explain as clearly and as succinctly as possible then please? — I like sushi

Sure. Simply put, epistemics includes whatever we do to make sure that something we think is true actually is true (or find out it's not.) Especially when it comes to beliefs/believing, this often means we haven't done enough to say we know, but we want to say/feel more sure/certain than "I think".

Believing bridges the gap between what we've done to make sure we're right and the level of certainty/commitment to the idea where we want to be but haven't got the goods to show it's legit to be there, yet.

I guess epistemics is like a ladder. You can legitimately go as high as the ladder (warrant) is tall. If you want to act and feel more certain about it, it would take a leap. "I think" kind of indicates that you've got reason to assume Floor 5 is there, but your ladder only goes as far as Floor 2 at the moment, so "I know there's a Floor 5" really isn't justified.

But you could say, "I believe there's a Floor 5." The question then becomes: why say "believe" when you've got no more reason to believe than you do were you just to say "I think" ? Your ladder is exactly the same height both ways. Epistemically the same.

So, either you do the work to extend the ladder, or you say "believe".

And when you realize there's two important pieces, not just one, and that "believe/think" applies to only one of them, it changes how we usually talk about it.

"I ______" (think/believe/know) is a self-reference. It has nothing to do with "it's raining" in the statement "I _____ that it's raining." No matter what you fill the blank with, all versions are statements of the form, "I ______ that P" (P = "it's raining").

So, think/believe/know has nothing to do with P (whether it's raining). They indicate how sure/committed I am to the assertion. I'm implying but not saying how tall my ladder is.

Hope that helps.

NICE! Almost exactly, but far better job than I did. I suck at syllogisms, lol.

I'd say "instead of 'I think'" instead of "above another prefix". Also, sometimes the motivation is to embellish credibility unduly, but not necessarily. Sometimes it's an honest attempt to reflect one's internal level of credence and commitment to the assertion. Sometimes it's actually to downplay the issue, saying "I think" when the fact is that we're sure beyond reasonable doubt.

It's been pointed out that many alternatives to think/believe are available, and it turns out that they all work similarly: guess/speculate/conjecture/deduce/imagine/whatever. They're semantically different, but they perform the same function in "I _____ that P."

Yes, "All belief is irrational" was my "teaser headline".

C2 as you stated it is JUST PEACHY!

So, to the extent that thinking/stating/ascribing believe/belief to an assertion overshoots legit warrant, especially when illegitimately overshooting is the point, it doesn't make the assertion "believed" irrational, but it makes believing it irrational.

So, in that sense, under those conditions, all belief is, indeed, irrational.

What remains is to determine if you can involve belief without overshooting warrant. Yes, many people say "believe" when they mean think and everyone understands they mean think. However, I don't think our epistemics should accommodate that kind of sloppiness and confusion.

Consider:

"God exists."
"I think God exists."
"I believe God exists."
"I know God exists."
"I guess God exists."
"I infer God exists."

I could go on, of course. Each conveys something distinctly different. Where a lot of the confusion enters in (as became clear in this discussion and others elsewhere), the difference is irrelevant to the assertion "God exists". It's relevant only to the self-reference, "I _____" -- which is semantically irrelevant to the assertion, actually. That begs the question whether injecting an irrelevance is itself rational or not.

Of all those (and any others), "believe" is unusual. It's less firm/certain than merely "God exists" or "I know God exists," and yet it comes across as more firm/certain than "I think God exists."

And yet it's the same assertion, so the assertion itself can't be more or less true depending on the self-reference. So, how could the firmness/certainty change mere by changing the semantics of the self-reference? There's no semantic (let alone logically entailed) connection between them. So, the self-reference, rationally, reflects the state/relationship of the speaker in terms of certainty and commitment to the assertion, and doesn't reflect on or impact the assertion itself.

I was going to say more, but now I'm in exploratory territory and it turned into a brain dump, lol. I should probably write through it (it's how I think into new ideas) elsewhere and come back with something more intelligible than one of my meanderings.

What do you think so far?

There's an equivocation going on between two senses of "think":

Mary thinks the house is on fire.
Mary thinks, "The house is on fire."

The first usage is more or less synonymous with "believe." — J

Yes, fair point, but the question is: does it matter? If both work the same, it's all the same. Please explain how the distinction matters.

The first usage is really not synonymous with "believe" -- otherwise people would use them interchangeably, but they don't. "I think that P" and "I believe that P" are not totally different. P is the same. But "I think" and "I believe" are semantically different in specific, consistent ways that are important enough that common usage represents a clear pattern.

Consider:

"You're beautiful."
"I think you're beautiful."
"I believe you're beautiful."
"I know you're beautiful."
"I whatever you're beautiful."

You can see the differences, right?

Yeah, there's been some discussion here and much more on Reddit (/r/epistemology). What it's brought me to are:

• Recognition that we're dealing with exactly the same form of statement, "I ______ that P" regardless what you put in the blank.
  
• Recognition that these statements include an assertion P prefaced by a self-reference "I _____".

That raises two questions. One regards the self-reference: what are the differences between think/believ/know/whatever and what's the motivation for and significance of choosing one or another?

But here's the surprise (for me): Why interject the self-reference at all? Why add ego concerns to the mix? If the assertion is the message, why stick ourselves in there? Crassly, if the assertion is the important part, who cares whether I think/believe/know/speculate/guess/conjecture/SWAG (super-wild-assed-guess)/predict/prophesy/deduce/WHATEVER lol.

All the girl cares about is "You're beautiful." She's smart enough to know you think so, lol.

Nice catch dude! You're right. I'm not at all interested in the 2nd or 3rd person cases because I'm not trying to build a theory here. I'm only interested in 1st person because my thinking (for me) and your thinking (for you) is at the root of all problems we have with thinking about others, so that's where we need to find the damage and fix it.

This post is how I'm trying to answer the question I have of myself, "Can I say that all belief is irrational?" This is how I stress test the hypothesis "All belief is irrational." It's an empirical way of doing philosophy (empirical in the sense that I'm getting real data from original sources, i.e., the best-effort thinking of other smart people.)

Yes, the debates around the remote possibility that p might be false can indeed rather tiresome. I'm prepared to concede that philosophers and scientists might have stricter criteria for truth (and so for knowledge) than we apply in the rough and tumble of everyday life. — Ludwig V

Ahh... if only that were true. Justified True Belief is a prime example showing that their criteria tend to be pretty shitty. And philosophers don't dictate the views of the vast majority of people. They don't even influence them directly. The work of philosophers is the stuff that "leaders" cherry-pick to rationalize their agendas. It works, because you'd have to be a philosopher to debunk the crap some of these guys came up with. Philosophy has always served as a foundation for building "civilized societies" (when the power-crazed even bother trying to rationalize what they do.)

Yes, I think Frankfurt is right about that. However, I'm bewildered by your apparent belief that all beliefs are based on bullshit. That doesn't follow from anything that Frankfurt says, so far as I can see. — Ludwig V

It doesn't follow from Frankfurt. And no, lol, it's not a belief. For me, everything is provisional. I state hypotheticals that look like fully-believed assertions because that's exactly how hypotheticals are stated: as unquestionably true. This helps me understand the mentality of the person I'm talking with. If they take it as an authoritative statement of belief, they deal in the currency of authoritative belief. If they take it as a hypothesis to be falsified (and I make it so easy for them lol), then I'm dealing with someone who thinks scientifically, empirically. Guess which type I run into the most? :rofl:

Prefix: "I think/believe/know/WHATEVER"
Assertion: "it's raining" (P)

Once those two parts are clear, (along with the fact that P doesn't need prefixing in the first place,) the question becomes why the speaker chose the prefix they did. "I think" seems to be a simple admission that this is where the person is at. This is how they see it. I don't see much more implied. "I know" conveys that this isn't just how they see it -- they see it this way because they're thoroughly convinced it's this way, by whatever means they became convinced. So, if something doesn't just appear to be true (think) but we're sure/convinced/certain it's true (know), then why would a person choose "I believe"?

I'd like to hear what you think the answer to that question is. For example, why to people say, "I believe that God exists"? Why not, "I know God exists," or just, "God exists"? What's that hedging really about?

But I think that the third person is useful. It's an important moment in the development of children when they recognize that sometimes they may know something that someone else does not (and the possibility that someone else may know something that they do not). It would be impossible to deal with people if that were not possible. — Ludwig V

Absolutely. Nice to meet someone who thinks about childhood development. Ever real Lloyd deMause? He showed quite irrefutably (as far as I can see) that all the most severe and widespread problems in the world trace back to the FUBARed psyches of "leaders" who have engineered them, thanks to traumatic childhood abuse.

"I think" and "I believe" and "I know" shifts attention to the speaker's relationship with the empirical reality. The effect is to dissuade (to some degree) empirical investigation by deflecting attention onto the speaker.
— Millard J Melnyk
H'm. I think that depends on the context. — Ludwig V

Well, I can't think of any exceptions. What can you come up with?

Hey dude, nice to discuss with someone who is actually thinking! :grin:

I find that this kind of glitch often results from the clash between categorical thinking and empirical thinking.

I'm working to understand what's going on with actual behavior from psychological and sociological perspectives, so it's really cool when I find a solid pattern that explains extant behavior. I'm aware of mainstream term definitions and categorizations, of course, but I don't approach experience (mine and others') through that filter, and I dispense with accepted definitions and categories if they don't fit what's really going on.

That's why I don't offer definitions. I want readers to use their own understandings/senses for the terms, because if I'm onto a legit pattern, it will hold for most or all people given their own unfunneled grasps of the terms. And if not, if someone introduces novel elements that don't fit the pattern, that's a find not a problem. Is it legit? What are the differences? Are they significant? Do they imply an important, different angle, etc?

I call this part of an exercise like this post a "sweep".

So, looking at people actually using those Part 2/prefixed terms, when they do and don't use them, what motivates their choice of term in different circumstances and to what end -- that's my study.

I'm interested in belief for reasons I've already explained on this post. Until a conversation I had with one of my sons a couple of years ago, I assumed belief/believing had a modicum of legitimacy and value. Since then I've had the suspicion that isn't true, so I've been digging into it. This post is the kind of thing I do as a last-chance, redeem-yourself-now-or-forever-hold-your-piece step (not really, always open to revision) before accepting my own confidence that it's true.

So, I put what everyone says, including philosophers, out of my head, observe what's really going on, find the patterns resident in actual behavior, and then I go about reconciling the differences with academic and mainstream thinking. I think this is important because, to the extant that our most respected and most predominate thinking are responsible for the FUBARs in the world that look like they're increasingly threatening our very existence, I think it behooves us to assess and fix their psycho-social and ideological causes.

Try approaching the syllogism (such as it is, it's not stellar, but you get the drift) and see where we come out.

So, do you get how there are two parts to the various think/believe/know/WHATEVER statements? "Epistemically identical" means that if you do exactly the same epistemic assessment on them (what warrants me considering P as true?) you come out with exactly the same results for all cases. Once I realized these statements have two parts and that the actual assertion part (P/"it's raining") for all forms is the exact same assertion, I realized that "epistemically identical" is an unnecessary qualification. They're the exact same. All that differs is the 2nd part that indicates the speaker's relationship to/attitude towards their assertion. I put it 2nd because it's far less important than the actual assertion. In fact, when you think about it, as far as the assertion goes, it's irrelevant. How I view the assertion and what relationship to it and confidence level I have in it makes no difference to whether it's true or not.

So, that begs the question why it's important to the speaker to prefix the assertion with an irrelevancy. That's kinda the first red flag that irrationality is involved. Why not simply say, "It's raining." ?? Part 2 (think/believe/know) is irrelevant to the rain and the question whether it's raining, but not irrelevant to the speaker.

I'll let you digest that and take another look at the post, then tell me if the reorientation helped.

One, they're premises. They don't need proof. You're right, I'm relying on the reader's own experience in using the terms and observing they're use. Are you saying you have no working grasp of the difference between think, believe, know, etc., or that your grasp of them is so different than mine that we're not referring to the same things with those terms? I'm not building a universal, iron-clad case here, just testing the limitations of a real-world observation.

Ok, I'm in agreement with you that in certain contexts, "I think" can mean the same thing as "I believe". — Philosophim

Well, no, we're not in agreement, because I haven't said and don't agree that think can mean the same thing as believe.

So then, and please correct me again if I'm wrong, you're using belief and think as synonyms. — Philosophim

Nope. I'm not sure I can make it clearer. Last try: I'll restate it with a bunch more possibilities:

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know/consider/speculate/conjecture/theorize/hypothesize in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", "know P", or "WHATEVER P". Epistemically identical in all cases. Maybe the problem is how I tried to

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know" or "WHATEVER" -- which are not synonyms. The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value, which is identical in every case.

If "justified belief" is an oxymoron then I suppose that we are relying on different concepts that we both call "belief". — GazingGecko

Probably.

Again, what you mean by belief isn't relevant to the post. The syllogism can't be evaluated on the basis of your definition, because it doesn't use that definition.

I think you take "belief" to be an add-on to expressions of ideas to signal credence to oneself or others without any added epistemic warrant being involved. — GazingGecko

Getting there! :D

As I've mentioned now in several places:

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases. Maybe the problem is how I tried to

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value.

So, not sure what you mean by "add-on", but I think the above makes clear the structure of what I'm talking about. "I think/believe/know that P" involves a discrete choice about how to characterize the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion P, not a difference in P itself. When a person chooses "believe", it's because neither "think" nor "know" fit the bill, and they're not satisfied with simply stating "P".

Given the above, I'm pretty sure that "doxastic" and similar considerations apply only to Part 2, the asserter's "doxastic stance" toward the assertion.

This conflicts with most understandings of thoughts. — Philosophim

What you have in mind does, but it's not what I said.

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.) E.g., "I believe it's raining." P = "it's raining".

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases.

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason (justified by assessing P epistemically) to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value.

You are implying that if someone thinks on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement of possibility or certainty. I would say that's not necessarily the case. Plenty of "I think"s simply stay that way. But correct me if I have the wrong base understanding of what you're trying to say here. — Philosophim

Actually, no -- which would be clear with a simpler example. Yours with "might be" and "visualizing in my head" and "plausibility" is unnecessarily complicated. Let's stick to "I _____ that P", it's all we need.

I said/implied nothing about thinking "on a plausibility for long enough, it becomes a belief statement". Our use of think, believe, and know are terminology choices we make. I'm ignoring sloppy usage and deceptive usage and assuming the the choice reflects the speaker's own honest assessment of their relationship/attitude to the assertion.

Let me know how these clarifications alter your feedback.

Just because it is "not yet rational" doesn't mean that it is the opposite of rational. This is a classic fallacy of the excluded middle. Rationality and irrationality can be on a spectrum, not sides of a coin. — Pantagruel

Well, bad call. No "middle" excluded by me, although I won't argue it's not true of your interpretation of what I've said. I can't account for or answer to your interpretation. Speaking in binaries for simplicity's sake does not imply thinking in binaries. It's seems you want to find fault if at all possible? Have you considered your own motivations for that?

Take "belief is irrational" like saying, "Todd's gone nuts!" It doesn't mean there's absolutely no sanity left in Todd, does it? But nuts enough that it's significant and has to be dealt with. Like that.

I think your confusion lies in failing to keep the two parts of such statements distinct.

"I ____ that P" is a two-part assertion. (think/believe/know in the blank, makes no real difference.)

Part 1: P is the assertion proper, and it is identical in "think P", "believe P", and "know P". Epistemically identical in all cases.

Part 2: The "I ____" part, referring to the speaker's relationship/attitude to the assertion, which as far as the truth value of the assertion is neither here or there.

Since there is no difference in P in any case, there is no reason justified by assessing P epistemically to choose "think" or "believe" or "know". The choice has nothing to do with P or its validity or truth value. P (epistemically) and the speaker's relationship/attitude to P both lie on spectra. The choice made to adopt one or another relationship/attitude does not. It's a discrete, mutually exclusive choice.

In predominate usage, "I believe" is chosen for assertions for which the epistemic analysis of the assertion does not give it sufficient warrant. It's a frank admission that epistemic warrant is weak. "Believe" bridges the gap. When warrant is strong, "The sun is really bright and hot today," we simply don't prefix an assertion with "I believe..."

I don't argue that there isn't plenty of sloppy use of language and that lots of times "think" and "believe" get used interchangeably. "Know" is quite different, though. However, I try not to make sense out of things based on sloppy examples.

Does that help?

I don't really understand what work "epistemically" is doing here. — Ludwig V

It's doing there in an attempt to distinguish the assertion from the statement of relationship to the assertion (which failed miserably as can be seen in the comments.) "I think it's raining," and, "I believe it's raining," are semantically identical with respect to the rain, i.e., the assertion each makes is identical. All that differs, as you point out, is the speaker's level of credence in the assertion.

I'm not sure why you don't add that the same is true of "I know that p". — Ludwig V

LMAO! You can see from the discussion how problematic it is to get minds to open to the possibility that "I believe" is not all it's cracked up to be. Do you think taking on "I know" would be easier? You're right, it's exactly the same situation for both, although when someone says, "I believe" and "I think" we take them at their word. When they say "I know" a boatload of new soldiers of skepticism suddenly get activated. :lol:

Once it's clear that belief properly applies only to assertions that are part bullshit (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1022560), then knowledge becomes easy-peasy: assertions which we believe (because you never know -- how much epistemic work is "enough"?) have been completely justified. To my mind, "knowledge" is a useless category, because either it remains open to revision -- in which case, what are the merits and advantages of calling it knowledge as opposed to theory or provisional conclusion or guess? -- or dubbing it "knowledge" prematurely closes the question, which accounts for the obscene levels of resistance to new ideas and angles always mounted by the "knowers" in every age and every situation.

The significant difference between "I know.." and "I believe..." and "I think ..." is that although they are, if you like, cognitively identical, they indicate more and less confidence in the truth of p, with "think" at the low end of the scale suggesting considerable uncertainty whether p. — Ludwig V

If in fact we use "believe" for assertions that involve bullshit, then "believe" is at the low end of the scale. "I think P" is honest and invites discussion. "I believe P" has a markedly different effect, immediately raising the question what the person did or did not do, (likely the latter, because jumping that gap is what "believe" does,) to determine the extra that "believe" implies over "think".

But the most persuasive form is to drop all reference to self completely.

You can see this in practice: "P." is actually more credible, all things being equal, than "I believe P."

"Fire! Get the hell out!" compared to "I believe there's a fire! I believe you should get the hell out!"

Which is more likely to prompt action?

Naked assertion without reference to self is actually more convincing than "I know". Psychologically, the reference to self itself raises questions that naked assertion doesn't. What's more, it shifts the cognitive focus away from the whole (supposedly) point: "It's raining" motivates hearers to check out the actuality to see if the assertion is true empirically. "I think" and "I believe" and "I know" shifts attention to the speaker's relationship with the empirical reality. The effect is to dissuade (to some degree) empirical investigation by deflecting attention onto the speaker.

You're, of course, welcome to theorize to your heart's content, just like I do. :blush:

That was an enjoyable little read, but it's not responsive to the post. Sure, there are different ways of looking at the same thing. I presented mine here for the purpose of evoking feedback on it, not on yours. Thanks though.

This hinges on the fact that we both believe what and that we are thinking, and think only what we believe. — Pantagruel

No, not even a little bit. Personally, I don't deal in belief at all. "I think" and -- rarely -- "I know" are all I need, precisely because overextending epistemic warrant disgusts me. Have you read Harry Frankfurt's On Bullshit? Bullshit differs from lies by virtue of the fact that the bullshitter does absolutely nothing to establish warrant, because they couldn't care less about it. Warrant (connecting what we say to what's real) is irrelevant to them. All that matters is the effect they generate by what they assert. So, where I've mentioned overextending credibility beyond epistemic warrant, you can just substitute "bullshit" without any loss of meaning, lol.

So, then, "belief" fits only with ideas that are at least in part bullshit. No bullshit, no need for "believe" -- and in fact, people rarely use "belief" or "believe" when there's no bullshit involved. They say "think" or "know" or, far more often, just state the assertion. That's something I haven't even mentioned yet: it's a curious tick, epistemically, to interject ego into the mix. "It's raining," is about the rain. "I think it's raining," is about the speaker's relationship to the rain. "I believe," is even more egocentric.

The fact that you believe something fundamentally involves asserting an epistemic authority. However it is not unwarranted so much as it is committed to establishing warrant. Hence the basis of rationality. — Pantagruel

I agree and I think that's an astute observation. Yet one more reason that belief is irrational, because the interest in imposing epistemic authority (if it's merely asserted, it carries no authority) and the act of imposing it are thoroughly irrational. Warrant established on authority is patently irrational. "Smoke this brand, it's better for you," says the guy in the white lab coat and a stethoscope draped around his neck, LMAO!

Agreed, in principle, but from that, how does it not follow that all thought is irrational? — Mww

It does not follow just from that either that they're rational or irrational.

Sorry, having a hard time following you and relating it to what I've said. It's just not that complicated. The semantic content and the epistemic warrant for both versions, believe and think, are the same with respect to the the actual assertion. One is no more or less true than the other. Agreed?

So, there is a reason and a function for choosing "believe", and that reason is precisely to extend the "this is true" subtext always implied in an assertion beyond existing epistemic warrant (having done the work to establish that "this is true" isn't false.) Conjuring this illicit credibility is the function of "believe".

That's all I'm saying here.

The objection I presented is that we can think something without believing it. It follows that belief and thought are not identical.
— Banno

I think it is fair to say that there are given contexts where they are used synonymously, yet even then we could perhaps extend this and say they are identical in the sense that light blue and dark blue are identical as being shades of blue. Meaning, both are ponderings. — I like sushi

Neither you or Banno can tell the difference between "identical" and "epistemically identical", apparently.

Conclusion ∴ All belief is irrational.
— Millard J Melnyk
Believing all belief is irrational, is irrational.
— Banno
:snicker: Ninja'd. — 180 Proof

:rofl:

Believing that believing all belief is irrational, is irrational, is irrational.

And that's to ignore the irrationality of confusing what I've said as a "belief". Where did I state or imply that I have a "belief" that belief is irrational?

Some people are so addicted to belief, they see them everywhere lol.

Hallucinatory.

Glad to see someone understands "epistemically identical". :grin:

Even granting that some beliefs and thoughts are epistemically identical, there still seems to be a crucial kind that hinders your argument from going through: "justified beliefs." I don't think these are identical to mere thinking. It seems like going from "I think" to "I believe" when that belief is justified would warrant some confidence. Given justification, the generalization is too quick. — GazingGecko

"Justified belief" is an oxymoron. Take any idea. If the idea is justified to the point that a person would be in idiot to reject it, what part of the idea needs to be believed?

When you look out the window and it's raining, do you say, "I believe it's raining." ?? Where does belief enter into it? If you're lying in bed in a dark room and hear rain on the roof, do you say, "I believe it's raining." ?? Or would you more likely say, "I think it's raining." ?? Where does belief enter into that?

To the point that an idea has been rationally justified, there's nothing for belief to do. When we're attached to an idea whose justification leaves something to be desired, we use belief to cover the unjustified aspects so that we can have illicit confidence that they merit credence as much as the justified aspects do. That's not always a bad thing. We show each other this grace all the time when we say, "I believe you," or, "I believe in you" -- and that's a good thing. But it's no more rational than believing the tooth fairy left a quarter under my pillow.

I like topics like this because they tease out people's unexamined biases. Most people here reacted to "irrational" as a negative. It's different when it comes to ideas, though. Psychologically, "I believe in you," is worlds apart from, "I belief in democracy."

How do you distinguish between generally received opinions from what has been justified by reason? — Paine

Simple. You ask the person with the opinion what they did to justify it to themself. Most people did nothing.

You want your cake and to eat it, by supposing that belief and thought are both the same and yet different. — Banno

Quote the statement where I said belief and thought are the same thing. You're hallucinating.

By "epistemic warrant", I simply mean that what is asserted as true doesn't cantilever past a solid, rational (adequately thought through and connected to reality) basis for thinking it's true. When, "I think it's raining," isn't enough to do what you want to get done, given no additional reason or fact or evidence to justify making the statement seem stronger (more credible) than "I think" affords -- i.e., given that nothing warrants the additional credibility you want to convey -- the additional credibility is unwarranted, and so, irrational.

Does that help?

As to:

"The proposition that saying as much is itself a belief only leads to comparing beliefs."

I have no idea what you're saying there nor how it relates to what I said in the post. Please clarify.

Maybe, but not just cuz you say so. Specify. Point out and explain the gaps and/or leaps.

“Epistemically identical” and “identical” mean different things.

I didn’t say that belief and thought are identical, period.

I distinguish epistemics from epistemology. Epistemics is the practical analysis of how knowledge is produced, justified, and deployed. So, when considering thought vs. belief, there is no epistemic difference inherent between the two. Neither grants an idea more or less epistemic warrant. Epistemically, "I think it's raining" and "I believe its raining" are identical with respect to the accuracy, soundness, value, etc., of the idea that it's raining. The differences are rhetorical and epistemically unwarranted..

If it's raining, you can justify both “believe” and “think” versions. The justification for one is exactly the same as for the other. Both versions have equal and identical warrant. Epistemically identical.

Which just begs the question: then why "believe" rather than "think"?

In other words, what justifies/gives warrant to characterize "It's raining" as a belief as distinct from a thought?

The rest of your comment from “if your point is that we ought perhaps treat our beliefs with scepticism” and down is actually off-topic. Relevant, yes -- but I made no pretensions of getting into implications of what I said in the post. Happy to talk about them, though, once we get on the same page about what I in fact did say. My sole aim here is to stress test the argument as it stands before getting into its ramifications.

I admit that the title of the post was a bit of provocateuring as I worded it. What’s irrational is the shift from “think” to “believe”. No rational warrant to make the shift, which means no warrant, period. No value add – unless you think that creating an illusion adds value. “Believe” smuggles in illicit credibility. Granular gaslighting.

So, the rational content, meaning, and the epistemic warrant for, “I believe it’s raining,” and, “I think it’s raining,” are exactly the same. “Believe”, however, sneaks in credibility that isn’t rationally defensible, and so, it’s irrational. To the degree that a belief is semantically and epistemically as rational as a thought, there is no rational justification for holding it as a belief. If we’re thoroughly convinced of the idea, rather than say, “I think…” we say, “I know…” When we say, “I believe…” we’re admitting we don’t know it, but we want to impress more than, “I think…” will buy us. That “more” is the irrational bit. Add it to a thought, resulting in a belief, and that belief is definitionally characterized by the irrational bit.

So, I guess, strictly speaking, the title is right on as it is.

I pretty much never go for argumentum ad populum. I generally assume that whatever is generally recognized in a world such as ours is must be incorrect.

I'm assuming you're thinking along lines of justified true belief. That pertains to knowledge. I'm not talking about knowledge, but the difference between thought and belief.

Per Copilot at https://copilot.microsoft.com/shares/1YnFudJCauyNC69pJSbJi#:~:text=At%20this%20point,the%20JTB%20framework.

-----------
Me:
At this point, is JTB still considered a robust definition of knowledge?

Copilot:
No—JTB (Justified True Belief) is no longer considered a robust or sufficient definition of knowledge. Philosophers widely agree that Gettier-style counterexamples expose fatal flaws in the JTB framework.
-------------

You're welcome to specify the epistemic differences between, "I believe it's raining," and, "I think it's raining."

If it's raining, you can justify both statements. The justification for one is exactly the same as for the other. Both statements have equal warrant. Epistemically identical.

Which just begs the question: then why "believe" rather than "think"?

In other words, what justifies/gives warrant to characterize "It's raining" as a belief as distinct from a thought?

You're welcome to explain that. I'll be all ears. I can't.

The difference is as simple as that "exists" denotes "is" and that somewhere, sometime and somehow are consequent to the "is" and not inherent to the "is". — Shamshir

Actually, no, they're not consequent because they're not subsequent. There is no "exists" without "exists somewhere" -- which would necessarily be a requirement if "somewhere" were consequent to "is". You're free to give an example that contradicts that assertion.

In your drop of water example, you're confusing the fact that H2O molecules in the drop are there, in the ocean, with the inability to isolate those exact molecules and identify their precise locations. The latter fact does not negate the the former fact.

If you set up is vs. is experienced, explain how one can become aware of is apart from experience. I doubt that you can. Experience puts us in touch with actuality. All our information about actuality is consequent to experience of it -- or else it's imaginary. Everything that we conjure up as a consequence of our experience is narrative. "About" is the tell.