I don't think slave holders in the 1700s or even Nazis had no love for themselves. I just think they had no empathy, which was rooted in their belief that their victims were not fully human. I don't know they could have been convinced otherwise, and I'm not convinced something was broken within them. They were persuaded by the societies that created them. — Hanover
The problem is that "heart" is not really defined by you. It sounds like just gut instinct. I would think my moral decisions are based upon instinct, reason, experience, bias and probably some other things. But we've all faced moral quandaries in our lives and we've had to sort through them, asking ourselves (and maybe others) what the best course is. Telling someone to just listen to their heart isn't enough. Sometimes you have an inkling your heart is telling you you're going the wrong direction and you want to be sure. — Hanover
So help me out here. Bob wants to rape and feels it very much a part of his intrinsic nature and he doesn't want to be judged for it. He asks me why it is immoral to rape. What do I tell him?
Am I immoral when I condemn him? Why? — Hanover
Well, no. It's pieces from p.207 and §258 of Philosophical Investigations. It's not Kripke. It's pretty much straight Wittgenstein. All I did was change "sensation" to "intrinsic nature". — Banno
Notice the difference between "Think for yourself" and "Follow your intrinsic nature". "Thinking for yourself" allows for consideration of others. "Follow your intrinsic nature" drops consideration from the agenda. — Banno
The notion that we have a "deepest essence" is deeply problematic, especially after "existence precedes essence". — Banno
This is the crux of St. Augustine's famous saying: Ama, et fac quod vis (Love, and do what you will). — Joshs
This makes sense to me, with this addition - considerations of good and evil may be post hoc, but they are likely to effect my judgment when another situation comes up in the future. — T Clark
It's not that judgment has to prove itself somehow in terms of value. Sometimes it's just there.
— frank
In order to effectively stop the hit man, I have to judge the situation and decide how to act. I don't have to judge whether or not what he is doing is evil. It's not relevant. — T Clark
As for judgment, if I call my enemy "evil," "monster," "inhuman," what value does that provide? As far as I can see, and I see it everywhere in the world, all it does is distract from the most effective response. — T Clark
But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. — Banno
I'm not even sure that behaving in accordance with the golden rule will arise automatically when I live in accordance with my inner nature. — T Clark
But I somehow want to prioritize "listening" as an action. Or togetherness. I'd say that our being-with is prior to our Dasein, tho Dasein is more accessible -- tho terribly close and thereby needing exposition -- something something Levinas lol. (or Sartre) — Moliere
I'm glad you brought up the golden rule. I've spent some time thinking about how it fits into my formulation. I'm not sure of the answer. — T Clark
There is no thinking here, no conversation, no reflection, no philosophy. Ethical thinking, I suppose I mean, is more open than all that. — Moliere
The corpuscular view has many difficulties here. For one, in an a deterministic universe of little balls of stuff bouncing around, where the little balls define everything, information theory becomes difficult to conceptualize. There is no real "range of possible variables" for any interaction. The outcome of any "measurement" (interaction) is always just the one you get, there is no "potential." The distribution relevant for any system is just that very distribution measured for all the relevant interactions. You need some conception of relationality, potency, and perspective to make sense of it (Jaynes arguments for why entropy is, in some way, always subjective I think are relevant here). Arguably, you need perspective to explain even mindless physical interactions, but the legacy of the "view from nowhere/anywhere" is strong. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It's kind of curious then, when you consider what our most accurate physics says what an atom is, has nothing to do with the intuition that leads us to believe that atoms are these visible concrete things, that make the world up.
And atom is far from that, and perhaps should be considered more of a kind of "cloud" of activity, which is so far removed from anything we can visualize it starts to look like an idea of sort, which is NOT to say that the atom itself is an idea. — Manuel
It's in there. Otherwise, when kids point at things and ask "what is this?" we should have little idea what they are referring to, since it could be any arbitrary ensemble of sense data. But when a toddler points towards a pumpkin and asks what it is, you know they mean the pumpkin, not "half the pumpkin plus some random parts of the particular background it is set against." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yet if there were no objects (pumpkins, etc.) given in sensation, kids should pretty much be asking about ensembles in their visual field at random, and language acquisition would be hopelessly complex. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Aren't they two sides of the same coin? We have evidence to tell us that a plant is different from an animal (universal ) — Count Timothy von Icarus
We also have plenty of empirical evidence to support the idea that this pumpkin right here is different from the one "over there on the shelf," namely their different, observable histories, variance in accidental properties, and obviously their appearing to be in two different spaces (concrete). — Count Timothy von Icarus
f there was absolutely no physical evidence to demarcate particulars then decisions about them would be completely arbitrarily, and it should random whether I consider my car today to be the same car I drove last month. But our consideration of particulars isn't arbitrary, nor do they vary wildly across cultures, even if they can't be neatly defined. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think the problem here is the same problem I referenced before, wanting to try to define objects, delineation, continuity, etc. completely without reference to things' relationships with Mind ("Mind" in the global sense since this is where concept evolve). — Count Timothy von Icarus
If physical basis means something else, then I would like to know. Until someone can present a convincing argument as to what "physical" must contrast with (and why is this so) we may do away with "physical" and speak about "objective basis" of objects. — Manuel
There's no physical evidence behind the way we divide the world up.
I pretty much said that in my OP, yes. — noAxioms
None at all? It seems there is plenty of physical evidence behind the distinction between plant and animal, living and non-living, physical squares and physical triangles, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Then you've communicated the convention to it. The question is if 'object' is defined in the absence of that communication. — noAxioms
It could do that with AI directed actuation. Just tell the AI what you want to shoot
— frank
Again, that evades the question by using language to convey the demarcation to the device. — noAxioms
This presumes that the physical device (which artificially made to serve a pragmatic purpose) will be able to glean the pragmatic intent when being used — noAxioms
. I'm personally pretty confident, for instance, that the measurement of the gravitational constant doesn't reflect our biases — mcdoodle
More controversially, it might be possible to extend this inherit relationality into an argument for an inherit "perspectiveness" to all physical interactions— relevant perspective (or something like it) without experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Rocks also might be the wrong sort of thing to look at for a paradigmatic example of discrete objects. Rocks don't have much of a definite form. A rock broken in half becomes two rocks, generally speaking, and many rocks fused together become one rock, whereas "half a dog" is clearly a half. Rocks are largely bundles of causes external to them. They don't do much to determine themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus
