Don't worry! They'll cook it and feed it to the masses. — Wayfarer

The Chinese masses are turning middle-class. There's a threat in that that Chinese communism never had to deal with. They have a learning curve ahead of them. But for now their economy is tanking. The immediate significance of that to me is that the Aussie dollar is dropping relative to all other currencies.

I like that, although it's not a slam dunk for physicalism. It's an excellent expression of the physicalist vibe.

I guess I particularly appreciate it because I've gone back to reading Nietzsche. He has to be taken the same way. None of it amounts to a rigorous argument, but it's more like the truth you find in poetry or maybe even music.

Fooled By Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb. This is philosophy of the market, which touches on philosophy of math. The same author wrote The Black Swan. There's a black swan event brewing in China as we speak.

Agreed. I never meant to the contrary. My original post was supporting methodological naturalism, not physicalism. — Bob Ross

Oh, I see. I thought you were saying they're the same.

Yes, it does. But out of respect for your present thread on physicalism I am trying to not veer too far off topic with a discussion of Phaedo and the problem of interpreting Plato in this thread. — Fooloso4

Thank you.

Phaedo is one of my favorite philosophical works. I also disagree with your interpretation, and indeed your whole take on Plato. But there's always room for diverse views. It creates dynamism in discussions.

If your point is that people with views which do not impede some areas of their naturalistic investigations can still contribute to our knowledge even if those views cannot, then I totally agree. — Bob Ross

My point was that physicalism isn't entailed by empiricism and naturalism.

I would say the most compelling reason to be a physicalist is methodological and not ontological. We simply have only one valid methodological approach: naturalism.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. Likewise, it seems, historically speaking, that we assume something we don't understand is supernatural and then learn later it is perfectly natural--which I think counts in favor of methodological naturalism. — Bob Ross

But Berkeley paired empiricism and idealism. Augustine advised methodological naturalism in that he advised people to look first for natural causes before claiming miracles. Augustine was a hardcore idealist like most intellectuals of his day.

Best explanation I've ever heard. Thank you, my friend. :up:

You wanna bring up Aristotelian vs Galilean physics, do it in the OP! — fdrake

I honestly thought it was obvious from the question itself. Oh well.

potential vs actual infinity and whether the limit construction in analysis actually represents the concept of infinity. — fdrake

Instantaneous velocity does touch directly on those issues, so Aristotle. :roll:

Plus you copied my use of "adjacent" you prick.

The answer varies with starting assumptions. Only one set of assumptions leads to the answer 4.

Specifically, you have to pay attention to what's been declared stationary, or what your POV is.

I think Israel would react the same no matter who was in Gaza. I don't think their actions are governed by racism, such that if the Gazans were Dutch, everything would be fine.

Pretty cool!

Anyway, the OP under discussion here was moved because it was lazy and far too brief. OPs need to have more than “x says y, true or false”. — Jamal

I think the appeal of the simple question is that it inspires one to think outside the box for a second. Instead of trying to figure Kant out, do some philosophy yourself. There isn't one right answer to the question. That's what was cool about it.

But I get it. It looked lazy to you.

Perhaps climate change should go to the Lounge as well. Keeping it the main page makes it more philosophy than science? — jgill

And Israel? And Ukraine? And whatever the hell other than philosophy?

I disagree. I think it would be obvious to anyone with a little familiarity with philosophy of math that this question opens up in multiple directions, from contemplation of infinitesimals to set theory.

But wait, NOS said something about Trump. Let me go slam some brain cells together to answer him!

ha. It was supposed to be about instantaneous velocity, finitism, all that stuff

Eh. Who cares.

Yes. But let's talk about Donald Trump instead of philosophy. :up:

Are causes in the world or in the way we describe the world? — Banno

whereof one cannot speak...

If it is a way of thinking, is causation then not a thing in the world but a way of understanding things in the world? — Banno

What does the way we are bound to think have to do with the way the world is?

Schopenhauer wanted to answer that by way of Kant. Wittgenstein says we can't have an answer to that question.

we can't not think in terms of causation by our very nature. — Moliere

Schopenhauer agreed. He called it the law of explanation.

What does this actually tell about the West itself? — ssu

Nothing. Gaza was a giant refugee camp, one of the most densely populated areas on the planet, spewing demoralizing attacks on its neighbor.

The west cautioned Israel not to go overboard attacking Gaza because of all the helpless, innocent people who would suffer or be killed. Israel didn't listen. What was the west supposed to do about it?

:up:

ALL IS ENERGY. — boagie

Not first thing in the morning

Plotinus by Eyjolfur K. Emilsson — Manuel

I read this one! How did you become interested in Plotinus?

:up:

I don't mean given in the sense of something given once and for all without the need for explanation. — JuanZu

Sorry, that's what I meant. "Explanandum" was changed to "explanation" by my autotext. Fixed.

I would simply say that there are phenomena that are given — JuanZu

I think that's similar to saying gravity is an explanandum in its own right. We're just saying it's a given.

I don't think this got the attention it deserves:

The statement that "only physical statements are true" is not a statement in physical terms. It is neither falsifiable nor demonstrable.
— Banno — Banno

This is sort of what Wittgenstein is saying in the Tractatus, right? It doesn't get the attention it deserves because it spoils all the fun. :razz:

Maybe. I just don't see how physicalism differentiates itself from the wider umbrella of naturalism in that case though. I can't think of any reason why objective idealists, dualists, or physicalists couldn't overlap completely on methodology. "Methodological physicalism," seems like a misnomer to me. It seems like it would just be naturalism + a certain set of theory laden ideas. The difference isn't in the methodology, but in contents of the theory ladenness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The physicalist sees a "dead" universe, so to speak. Scientists don't consider the possibility that the universe is alive or developing according to psychological rules. If an idealist looks at the world that way, then yes, that idealist is basically a naturalist.

As a philosophy of mind, I think physicalism has some killer arguments that suggest it gets at least some crucial details right. Physicalist philosophy of mind also doesn't have the same need for reductionism to be coherent, minds don't need to reduce to brains, embodied cognition still works, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Embodied cognition just aims to explain some features of functionality. But I admit that the term kind of irritates me. It's not like we overlooked the relationship between mind and body as we went about discovering how the body works.

What many physicalists would like to say is that the physical facts underlying any mental facts are more essential, and that the physical in some way causes the mental. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But multiple realizability means it may not be possible to identify that kind of causal chain. Supervenience becomes the default.

If you abandon the idea of the physical being fundemental and the mental being caused-by/emerging from the physical (and not vice versa) then it appears like the monosubstance from which all things emerge being "physical" doesn't really explain anything. — Count Timothy von Icarus

True. So maybe physicalism has never been an explanation. Maybe it represents a certain mindset? A way of problem solving? One of the outcomes is that if a person is struggling emotionally, they're likely to be piled high with medications meant to support them. To the extent that doing that works, that's the argument for physicalism.

It seems to me constrained by the burden of the physicalist presupposition though, — Pantagruel

I think that just comes out of being conservative. At least in the anglo-american world, physicalism has been an assumption for a good while.

It about being able to talk about the same thing at two different levels of abstraction, what is viewed as the emergent level and the pre-emergent level. — wonderer1

I think so, yea.

Because we would really like you to stay our democratic ally. — Beverley

I see. :up:

I think that the only possible argument for physicalism has to start from a neutral monist metaphysical position, then argue that emergent psychological properties are real, in a strong sense. So mind is not denied but rather affirmed at the physical level. — Pantagruel

I think this is the most popular view today, right?

t seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency — creativesoul

I don't think it's about dependency. It's just that two things that track together: "There cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference."

praying you lot pull together because we could really do with you putting your differences aside and showing a united front right now! — Beverley

Could you explain why?

But more than an argument it would actually be an operation. The operation would consist of an effective reduction of all the contents of the world objectified by the sciences [biology, economics, psychology, sociology, logic, mathematics, phenomenology, philosophy, etc.] to phenomena, terms, relations, correlations, operations and demonstrations of that specific science that is physics.

For example, a physical theory of supply and demand that reduces it to relationships between, so to speak, their masses and their covalent bonds. A physical theory of the Pythagorean theorem that reduces it to relationships between atoms of some element, etc.

Is that something impossible? If it is impossible then we need another ontology. A more pluralistic ontology that can identify genres and irreducible categories. But also an ontology that identifies how these genres and categories of what exists are related to each other. — JuanZu

I think you're echoing Chalmers, but going beyond asking for a theory of consciousness to asking for a theory of abstractions (like math) as well. He said we should start with just proposing phenomenal consciousness as a thing to be explained by science, similarly to the way gravity was added, with no insistence that science as it is has to be able to answer it. It could be that we have to wait for more quantum theory answers? Or maybe a type of physics that we haven't thought of yet.