Dogmatists do not even start a conversation ;)

I reject the Hobbesian view of human nature here - one that dovetails with Darwin's "survival of the fittest" logic that drives capitalism. To a degree, yes, people are unequal. But the more important point is: people are treated unequally. The idea that our society should be based on nature is an aristocracy: a totalitarian regime. — Zoneofnonbeing

If people are unequal it is only fair to treat them unequally. If someone is wrong, you don't want to treat them in the same way that you treat someone who is right. That's not fair. If someone is wrong, you want to discourage, and not encourage, their mistaken actions.

White men are in positions of power, and have been for hundreds of years. Following your logic, you are saying that white men have a "better sense of what is good and what is bad" than women and minorities. Two cheers for racism and sexism! — Zoneofnonbeing

That's not what I said. But then, it's not something I wouldn't say. White men do appear to have better judgment than women and minorities. That's reality. You can shame it all you want with your "racism" and "sexism" accusations but it won't change the fact that it is reality.

People are unequal, no doubt about that: pick a trait, any trait, and you will find that it is dispersed across a mostly normal distribution, with most people in the middle, smaller numbers above average, and smaller numbers below average. — Bitter Crank

That's why you should use your intelligence to pick the best candidate for the job instead of throwing a dice to pick any. Also, once you pick the best person for the job, you don't want to remove him from the position, unless it turns out he's not really that good.

The reason for randomly selecting people to serve is to eliminate the "preselection" by the political system, which is pretty good at selecting people who are quite devoted to the interests of the ruling class. (This isn't peculiar to either parties -- its endemic to both of them.) — Bitter Crank

It is important for the government not to serve any kind of interest in the same way that it is important for parents not to give into the whims of their children. I hope we can agree on this one.

it isn't "expertise" so much as intelligence, thoughtfulness, insight, and interest. — Bitter Crank

In other words, it is expertise.

The reasons that women and minorities are not surgeons is the same reason women and minorities are not in positions of governance. What we are calling "expertise" is the alibi of oppressors. It is easier for us to believe that white men are "experts" than women and minorities. So we need to completely detox our minds of this aristocratic/meritocratic/capitalistic way of thinking and organizing society. — Zoneofnonbeing

The point is that people are unequal. Some people are better at certain things than others. This applies to legislature too. Some people have a better sense of what is good and what is bad than others.

You think that legislature requires no expertise? Anyone can create laws? It's that easy?

I think that the idea of random selection is childish. I can't believe that someone can say that governance does not require expertise. We don't choose our surgeons randomly. We choose our surgeons intelligently. We want the best possible surgeon. That's how things work in real life. That's how they worked in the past and that's how they will work in the future. I can't see any other way that can persist through time.

Why would anyone want a system in which every cook can govern? Why would anyone want a random selection?

When one believes what they say they are not lying. — creativesoul

That's not true. Beliefs that have been formed with the aim to deceive others are lies regardless of whether the deceiver believes in them or not. That's what a lie is: it is a belief that has been formed with the aim to deceive others.

The idea that lies are only lies if you don't believe in them is a tactic used by liars in order to fool others into thinking they are not liars. It's a very powerful tactic. What you're doing in this thread is you are trying to make it even more powerful by means of sophisticated pseudo-intellectual activity.

Every belief has an origin. Some beliefs are formed with the aim to map reality. Some beliefs are formed with the aim to deceive other people or to prevent one's own brain from being rudely motivated. Forgetting the origin of your beliefs does not change their origin. Believing your own lies does not change the fact that they are lies. Your mistake is that you ignore the history of a belief. You ignore its genealogy. You ignore HOW and WHY a belief is created. You focus TOO MUCH on what is in the present.

I've already told you that an intent is said to be conscious if the organism to which it belongs is conscious/aware of it. That's all it means. Not every intent is conscious because not every organism is conscious/aware of all of its intents. There are organisms with intents whether or not anyone is aware of them. Consciousness isn't all there is.

The opinions of deceivers were formed with the goal to deceive other people. Self-deception is when these opinions that were formed with the goal to deceive other people OVERWRITE those that were formed with the goal to map reality. That's EXACTLY what deception is. The only difference is that this kind of deception is unconscious in the sense that the deceiver is not aware that he's deceiving other people. That's the only difference.

You cannot erase history with the simple act of forgetting. All you can do is you can erase your memory of it. Do you understand this? When you forget that you are lying you do not stop lying. You merely convince yourself you are not lying. Which is a part of deception. By being unaware of the fact that your opinions were formed with the goal to deceive other people, you make sure your duplicity is well hidden.

Your claim that self-deceivers are not lying is MORONIC given the fact that their opinions were formed precisely with the aim to deceive others. Noone cares that they are no longer aware of this fact. That does not change a thing.

Well, if one bullshits and later comes to believe it, then they didn't believe it at first. They were aware of the fact that they did not believe what they were saying - at first. If they later come to believe the bullshit, they are not aware that they once believed otherwise. Lying is deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought/belief. So, in the case of the bullshitter who later comes to believe his/her own bullshit - after they've come to actually believe it - they are no longer lying. That holds good regardless of whether or not what they say is false/true. — creativesoul

You are nitpicking. Noone cares what THEY are aware of. What matters is that WE are aware of that the beliefs that they currently hold to be true were formed with the aim to deceive other people. That they forgot the origin of their beliefs does not change what the origin of their beliefs is. In fact, it strengthens it, since being unaware of your own lies makes it easier to effectively lie.

I believe that all intent is conscious, and will unless and/or until someone could convince me otherwise. — creativesoul

Conscious intent is simply one's own intent one is conscious or aware of. There are intents whether we are conscious of them or not.

Your question implies an unconscious intention to deceive oneself...

Unconsciously intending to trick oneself into believing something that they don't...

Nah. That doesn't make any sense either. — creativesoul

Why? Is it because of the following paradox?

When a person A deceives a person B into believing p that means that person A knows or truly believes that p is false while causing B to believe that p is true. So when A deceives A (i.e. himself) into believing that p is true, he knows or truly believes that p is false while causing himself to believe that p is true. Thus, A must simultaneously believe that p is false and believe that p is true. Which is a logical contradiction.

If so, we must return to your earlier claim that it is only a matter of language whether a tree is a single thing or many things. It isn't.

Self isn't a single thing. It is many things. We treat it as a single thing for the sake of convenience. So when we say that A decieves A this must not be interpreted literally. Rather, you must interpret it in the sense that something within A (e.g. A1) deceives something else within A (e.g. A2.) If you do so, no logical contradiction, no paradox, arises.

That's a tree. How much more precise can it get? Which part misses the mark? — creativesoul

The more you say about the tree the more likely you are to say something about it that isn't true. — creativesoul

So when you say "that's a tree" that is just as precise as saying "that's a red tree" which is just as precise as saying "that's a trunk with a number of branches each one of which has a number of red leaves"?

I agree that the more you say something (whether it is about a tree or something else) the more likely you are to say something wrong. This is why many people prefer to say less and even be silent. But that's no argument against saying more. It's merely an argument against saying something that is not true.

So would you analyse Game of Thrones in terms of pixels? Yet it is a sequence of computer images. Words are complex, letters simple. And so on and so forth. — Banno

You don't have to describe Game of Thrones in terms of pixels unless it is necessary to do so. For most purposes, it is unnecessary to do so. You describe it in terms of characters and events. That's enough. Nonetheless, it is pixels that give rise to the sequence of computer images that is Game of Thrones which is what in turn gives rise to Game of Thrones characters and events. So if you wanted to describe Game of Thrones in detail, for some strange reason, you'd have no choice but to describe it in terms of pixels. Talking about Game of Thrones with your friends and even analyzing it in detail is not the same as doing philosophy. When we do philosophy what we need, in many cases, such as for example this one, is a highly detailed description of the aspect of reality that is under our examination. It is true, what we do determines how detailed our description has to be. But when what we do is philosophy, especially of this sort, our description has to be quite detailed. In this particular case, we want to know what is the difference between that which is mental and that which is not. Notice that your description of the difference between what is mental and what is not is not merely lacking in detail. Rather, it is lazy. It is pretending that it is an answer when it is merely an evasion.

That all depends upon how the person talks about it. — creativesoul

It's not merely about talking. It's about which one of the two descriptions is more concrete or precise. When I say that a tree is a single object rather than a multiplicity of objects I am being less concrete and less precise.

What is complex, what is simple? Depends what you are doing. — Banno

Nate Robinson is short. LeBron James is tall.
Pixels are simple. Computer images are complex.
Words are simple. Sentences are complex.
Bricks are simple. Buildings are complex.
And so on and so forth.

But the point is that the tree only appears to each individual, and it does so differently. — Janus

Even the tree itself as it appears to one individual isn't a single object but a multiplicity of objects.

Yes. The question is what makes that difference. How do we differentiate between the two? What is the logic behind this process of differentiation? When I ask you what makes the difference between an image that has a face in it and an image that does not how do you answer? Do you answer by saying that the difference is that one has a face in it and the other does not or do you answer by describing the step-by-step procedure that we use in order to determine whether any given image has a face in it or not?

There may remain a difference, I don't disagree with that, the question is what would make the difference. For example, is it something within the VR experience or something outside of it? If it's something within the VR experience then perfectly realistic VR experience would be indistinguishable from normal real-life experience in all regards.

For example, you don't think that video game graphics can ever become perfectly realistic? Even if you had all of the resources in the world, there is quite simply no possibility?

That is, even in the Matrix, there is a difference between seeing a real tree and seeing a virtual tree. — Banno

So you don't think there can be a VR experience that has the same degree of fidelity that normal experience has?

I won't. Actually I could argue against either one of those points.

When perceiving a virtual reality, we'd perceive a physical image and get an external perception of it. I don't believe that to be mental. — BlueBanana

But there is no VR headset. You are not getting your VR experience from some kind of physical screen. The process is entirely biological. You took a VR pill, fell asleep and entered a VR dream. It's the ultimate VR experience.

Maybe one day I will wake up and realize that this forum discussion was only a dream. But until then, I have no reason to think that this is the case. There is simply no evidence at present time to support it.

When we go to sleep and fall asleep and when we start dreaming we forget. We forget everything we knew. This alone allows us to be certain, as we dream, that everything that happens, within our dreams, is real. There is simply no evidence that we're not in a dream. We forgot it. However, as soon as we wake up and unforget what has been forgotten, we change our minds.

The experience of seeing a tree when we're awake is not mental. The experience of seeing a tree in a virtual reality that is so realistic that it is indistinguishable from reality is mental. I think that everyone will agree on this point. Where people disagree is the manner in which we differentiate between the two. Given two identical objects, how can we say they are different? My answer is context.

Again, I agree that there is a physical world that exists in space and time regardless of whether or not human beings are around to perceive it. My question is: what does that mean? I gave you my answer in one of my previous posts. You never gave yours.

I think it primarily means there is a larger world humans are but a small part of. We are late on the evolutionary scene, we only occupy the land surfaces of this planet, for the most part, and there are tons of other stars and planets out there.

The real world is the far bigger and older world, where only a little tiny bit of it has human society. — Marchesk

I think that most people would agree with that. I am not a realist, I am a phenomenalist. And I agree with what you're saying. I agree that there is a larger world humans are but a small part of. I agree that we are late on the evolutionary scene. I agree that we only occupy the land surfaces of this planet. I agree that there are tons of other stars and planets out there. That's not where the disagreement between realists and phenomenalists, or at the very least me, resides. The disagreement lies in the MEANING of these statements. And one characteristic feature of all realists is that they REFUSE to explain in sufficient detail what they mean with their statements. Which is exactly what you're doing. You did not explain what the word "real" means. You did not explain what phenomena this category that we identify with the word "real" includes and what phenomena it excludes. What you did is you merely explained one mystery with another.

What realism is after is the God's eye view. Naive realism supposes we just have that already - we look and we can see those colours and shapes which just are the objective facts of the world. — apokrisis

The God's eye view would be the all-encompassing view i.e. the view that allows us to see everything there is in the universe. That's quite different from saying that colors and shapes are the objective facts of the world. I do not have much of a problem with the claim that objects of our experience, such as colors and shapes, are reality itself. In other words, I have no problem with this kind of direct realism. I merely think it's unnecessary to think in such a way. What's problematic is the kind of direct realism that is applied to knowledge that is derived indirectly i.e. via reasoning. It's one thing to think that our objects of experience, such as colors and shapes, are reality itself and another to think that our assumptions or inferences, such as that the way we see colors and shapes is the way other people see them, are reality itself.

A fundamental particle would also be an object of experience. Even if fundamental particles were unobserved they would still be potential, or at the very least, imaginary objects of experience. Consider that Donald Trump is an object of experience even though I never met him in person.

Presumably seeing a tree is when a tree is causally responsible for the tree-experience, dreaming of a tree is when brain activity during REM sleep is causally responsible for the tree-experience, and hallucinating a tree is when psychedelic drugs are causally responsible for the tree-experience? — Michael

What is this tree that is causally responsible for tree-experience if not some sort of tree-experience? I think this might be the place where our reasoning parts ways. I can agree with you if what you are saying is that one type of tree-experience (e.g. close-up view) is causally responsible for another type of tree-experience (e.g. looking at a tree from a distance.)

I find it difficult to accept that we're having the same experience when hallucinating or dreaming that we have when we're not. If that's the case, why would we even speak of hallucinations or dreams? There would be no reason to distinguish them from other experience, and we do. I don't think we distinguish them solely by their causes. — Ciceronianus the White

I agree with Michael. Even if the two experiences, the experience of seeing a tree with your own eyes and the experience of hallucinating a tree, were equally vivid they would still be different because of the context. Letters 'A' and 'A' are equal in the sense that they are both the letter 'A' but they are different in that their position in the sequence of letters that is this sentence is different. Context is extremely important.

Because I find it extremely lacking, and it makes science into a fiction. — Marchesk

That's simply what prediction (and also retrodiction) is. It concerns itself with what we did not experience, or at the very least, what is not within our memory. If we experienced everything all at once, and thus knew everything as it is, there would be no need for prediction. There would be no need for thinking, reasoning, intelligence, etc.

It means under certain lighting conditions (it's sunny out), the air molecules scatter light at a wavelength that we see as blue. — Marchesk

That is perfectly compatible with my description.

On the direct realist account, perceived objects would have the same properties when nobody is perceiving them. — Marchesk

What does it mean for a thing to have certain properties when noone is looking at it? I can and I will give you my answer. But I am interested in yours.

What does it mean for the sky to be blue when you're not looking at it?
What does it mean for a wheel to be circular when you're not looking at it?

For example, right now, I'm in my apartment. From this position, I cannot see the color of the sky. Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that the color of the sky, at this very point in time when I am not looking at it, is blue. What does that mean? What am I trying to say? Clearly, I do not know what's the color of the sky at this point in time because I am not looking at it. How can I know it? The answer is that, although I cannot experience it from this position, I can predict it. And I can do so by applying logic of induction to my past observations. What I really mean when I say that the sky is blue at some point in time when I am not looking at it is that I predict, based on my past observations, that if I went outside of my apartment and looked at the sky precisely at that point in time that I would see a sky that is blue. That's all it means. Phenomenalists such as Ernst Mach call this "potential experience". That's what is meant when people say that things exist or have certain properties when we're not looking at them. It does not mean anything more than that. Unfortunately, many people, I am pretty sure you among them, are not willing to accept this description. Why is this so?

What it means is that there is a circular object that gives rise to the experience of seeing a circular shape, and that's why two people can have similar experiences. Also that's why there are two people. — Marchesk

I disagree. The universe isn't a mechanism. Its particulars, or facts if you will, are not produced according to some set of rules. Rather, the universe is a mass of particulars that are related to each other in a specific way. Mechanisms are created by humans for the purpose of prediction. That's all they are. If we knew everything about the world, you can be sure, our knowledge wouldn't have the form of a theory, but that of a mass of particulars. Theories exist only because we are ignorant.

Science claims otherwise. There is big universe that exists beyond and before, and after us. But our everyday experiences tell us the same thing. The big oak tree has 120 rings. It was alive before I was born, etc. — Marchesk

The problem is that people confuse actual experience (i.e. sense-data that we possess) with potential experience (i.e. sense-data that we expect.) Even though I was born long after Alexander the Great died, I do not deny the potential experience of seeing him in person.

What we mean is that we have similar color experiences when looking at the same sky. — Marchesk

It applies to any kind of experience. When two men look at a wheel and agree that its shape is circular what that means is that their "shape" experience is similar.

The word "external" means "outside of (some set)". Similarly, the word "internal" means "within (some set)". The set (or more accurately, category) always refers to some range of experience. There is thus no dichotomy between experience and reality that is separate from our experience. There is only dichotomy, or rather polychotomy, between different kinds (or classes, or categories, or sets) of experience. This view is very close to that of Ernst Mach and William James that is known as Neutral Monism.

When you dream, hallucinate, visualize or remember a tree, it's only available to you. When you perceive a tree, other people can also perceive it. Realists say this is so because the tree is mind-independent. — Marchesk

Each one of us has his own experiences. When we say that we both perceive something (e.g. that the sky is blue) what we mean is that we have similar experiences. Nothing else.

Reasoning is by its nature indirect. The purpose of reasoning is to make guesses regarding something that is unknown (i.e. something that hasn't been experienced or at the very least something that hasn't been memorized.) Thus, to say that knowledge acquired through reasoning is direct is false. Only what has been experienced in the past can be said to be direct. And how do we call these things that have been experienced in the past if not phenomena, sense-data, qualia, events, neutral stuff, etc?

I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. — Cavacava

Okay, but then what happens when you decide to run through the unconceptualized blob of green & brown? — Marchesk

Without concepts, you cannot make predictions. You can only live in the moment. Roughly speaking, to conceptualize the visible (i.e. what you have experienced) is to imagine the invisible (i.e. what you did not experience.)

When you look at that duck-rabbit picture, your brain cannot decide, solely on the content of that picture, whether the animal is a rabbit or a duck. It can decide that it is an animal but it cannot decide what kind of animal. This is because that particular view is ambiguous.

Note that an animal is more than just a single view of it. An animal is, properly speaking, an animation, i.e. a sequence of views, that is interactive. The duck-rabbit picture only shows one side of the animal.

Anyway, we definitely interact with trees as if they are really 'out there', as if our eyes are windows upon a public world that we happen to be located in a particular part of. — antinatalautist

That's true. But we do the same when we're dreaming. When we fall asleep and start dreaming we forget that we fell asleep and started dreaming. Instead, we think that the contents of our dreams are real. We do so until we wake up and unforget what has been forgotten. What this shows is that what we think is real is not necessarily real. Our judgments are fallible. We are clearly wrong about dreams being real and we could be wrong about our wakeful consciousness being real. The only thing that stops us from doubting that wakeful consciousness is real is lack of evidence. There is no evidence that our wakeful consciousness is merely a dream.

I mean it's extremely hard to get in conversation with someone, touch someone, kick a ball back and forwards, etc, and seriously consider that their body, and your entire experience of the interaction, the world around you, and your body are entirely relativized to just your own conscious experience. Other people sort of impose their otherness on you. Consider being in a room alone, and somebody bursts in. Suddenly there's a distinct sense that you (your body) is being seen and you can't rationalize this self-consciousness away in the moment, it just imposes itself upon you. Or when you are on a train, and you accidentally meet someone's gaze, then both of you quickly look away and pretend you didn't just basically stare into each others soul lol. — antinatalautist

Well, dreams can be very convincing, and yet, when we wake up, we always look upon them as being unreal. It is therefore not that hard to see wakeful consciousness as being unreal. It's just that we don't think that it is unreal, naturally, since there is no evidence for it.