The thing about objective reality is that it exists with or without us. Even with no one around to perceive it, the world just keeps on existing. The fact we don't have direct access to objective truth doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that objectivity is subjective, though it might mean that we are doomed to never be totally sure of anything about reality... except the cogito. But not having direct access to a thing and being forced to view it through an imperfect lens is not the same as it not being objective. The objective exists, the issue is in getting at it.

I am not falling into a trap. I just disagree with you. I will quite happily fly in the face of the way morality has been understood throughout most of history, as I think it has been understood very poorly. I am inclined to agree that the best way of identifying how to be moral starts with inquiring into the nature of people, if by people you mean persons, but that nature is the ability to understand and make choices. That is what makes one a person. So I would say no, self-harm is not immoral as every person owns themself to do with what they will

I am interested in the true philosophy, but everyone thinks the philosophical theories they believe in are true, that's why they believe in them. Claiming to have a true moral theory (though I think it is) wouldn't be any kind of claim at all.

As for objectivity. I think you're just wrong. To go back to basics, when we go through the reasoning of Descartes to find that we most definitely do exist, this is objectively true. It is an odd kind of objective truth in that only you can know, but it is objectively true none the less. It isn't merely a matter of opinion. I agree that happiness could be subjective, but that doesn't mean everything is. 2 + 2 = 4 is, if true (and I'm pretty confidant that it is), objectively true. It isn't a matter of opinion or intra-subjective agreement, it's true because of that those concepts mean. You could say that it is subjective in the sense that we might understand the term "2" to refer to something else, but that is rather missing the point. It isn't that those words have an objective meaning, it is that concept they are presently describing is objectively the case.


I would say that it is completely morally permissible to be a luxury escort, or a poorly paid escort for that matter. I would say so long as they are not hurting anyone else (which in this context can be understood as violating anyone else's freedom), then people can pretty much do what they want. Although I will add the caveat that people can have obligations to do good rather than just refrain from evil, but there is nothing about being a luxury escort that would prevent this person from living up to those obligations.

Bitter Crank: First let me say thank you for reading my work and providing your thoughts. The issue about freedom over one's own mind is something I would like to discuss in my thesis objections chapter. Would you mind if I referenced you as someone who had brought up this objection? If you wouldn't mind, please message me your name so I can reference you properly as I fear calling my detractors bitter cranks won't go over well in my thesis :).

That said, let me try to deal with these issues in order.

First, I think I have made it reasonably clear that I am talking about morality in an objective, universal sense, and not just referring to a system of cultural norms. So it isn't really an issue that Hitler thought he was acting rightly, because he wasn't.

Second, it seems to go over okay so far, but if I only said things my supervisors agreed with, I wouldn't be much of a philosopher.

As for the main issue here, I am not convinced that when someone blurts something unkind and uncharacteristic out unthinkingly, that they are in any sense not acting freely. I am inclined to agree that we do not choose to like or dislike things (though it seems we can choose to attempt to cultivate a like or dislike in ourselves which may or may not be successful), but I think we are free to choose our actions. When we say "felt the uncontrollable urge to punch someone in the face", I would say we are being poetic, rather than precisely describing what is happening in our minds. Firstly, we are still the ones acting, there is no one and nothing else making the choice but us. Secondly, I would say that we can choose how to act in these situations and when we choose to act in a way which is wrong, we are morally culpable for them. The fact that you are very angry doesn't make you hit someone, you still choose to, although the choice may be made quickly and influenced by the person's emotional state. To put it another way, a person does not need to be good at controlling their temper in order to be free.

But, supposing that people exist for whom turning around and slugging someone in the face really isn't a choice, but is rather an automatic action, like a reflex. I would suggest we might want to hold them at least partially morally responsible for this conduct after they know that they have this kind of reflex, if they do not take reasonable steps to avoid situations where they might violently assault another person without intending to. Much in the same way as we might want to hold Cyclops responsible for destroying a building because his glasses got knocked slightly, because he went out with two cannons attached to his face and only a pair of sunnies preventing them from going off... or some other example that doesn't involve one of the X-Men.

As for how free a person needs to be, I would say that the question is ill-formed. A being either has free will, or they don't. That is, they either have the ability to make choices that are not wholly determined by preceding or external factors, or they don't. If we had several more reflexes, we wouldn't be "less free", though there may be fewer things over which we have freedom. If we imagine an alien that has a mass of tentacles that all act independently of its intentions, to ward of predators, absorb nutrients, etc, and could only control its head, then it could still have just as much free will as any other person. So I would say that having free will or not is a dichotomy and not a sliding scale.

I could give it a go. I was worried it would lead to a lot of feedback that was already covered in the body of the thesis. But sure, here goes nothing:

Freedom consequentialism is a consequentialist theory based on the idea that what is of value is the protection of a particular, limited kind of freedom: that of persons over that which already belongs to them; their mind, their body and their property. In the first chapter posted, I begin with the starting assumption that if moral realism is correct, that an objective, universal morality exists, then there is a way in which persons ought to be or act. I make the case for this being a more fundamental starting assumption than those made by other normative theories such as utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics and that their starting assumptions presuppose mine. Then I argue that based on this assumption, our best candidate for moral value is the ability of persons to make their own choices, which I call freedom. Then I make the case for being an act consequentialist rather than a kind of virtue theorist or a deontologist of some kind.
In the second chapter I discuss what kinds of freedom matter and use a triadic relationship chart to clarify what I mean by freedom. Then I discuss how freedoms over different things can be weighed against one another.