That couldn't be more wrong. Surely you know of the many controversies over the interpretation of quantum physics. The question of whether the objects of analysis really exist, or in what sense they exist, is central to that. — Wayfarer

There are a variety of interpretations of QM, and it seems unlikely that it will ever be possible to verify which one is correct. That seems a background curiosity, and gives a good reason to be agnostic as to which interpretation is correct. However, it does not provide a reason to deny that the "objects of analysis" exist. These objects are (obviously) analyzable- which seems sufficient reason to regard them as real. If some interpretation of QM entails these things as being nonexistent, that seems more of a reason to deny the interpretation, than a reason to deny the existence of these analyzable objects.

At worst, this interpretation establishes that it is possible the object doesn't exist. But that possibility still seems no more than an idiosyncratic curiosity - not a fact that further scientific investigation should feel obligated to take into account.

Perhaps such idiosyncratic interpretations of QM might lead some brilliant scientist to develop a new paradigm on this basis. If that paradigm is more successful at making predictions, then it could become relevant. But unless/until that occurs, it seems a dead-end.

What I said ‘couldn’t be more wrong’ was this:

A scientist doing science is not going to worry about whether an atom of hydrogen is "really out there" or not. — J

That’s why I mentioned the Bohr-Einstein debates which were precisely over this issue, insofar as this statement assumes the realist attitude.

There are the things, and there are the experiences of the things. I don't understand how this is controversial.
...
Of course consciousness gives an advantage. — Patterner

This is inconsistent with your assertions. The part that gives the advantage is sensory input and the ability to react to it, all 'things' according to your posts above. You've defined consciousness as only experience of those advantages, hence it does not itself give any additional advantage. If it did, it would become on of those cognitive things, experienced perhaps, but no longer experience.

You seem to describe it like somebody going to a cinema to experience some stream of 'things'. Go into a room showing a human and you get the experience of a human. Go to a different room and you get the experience of a rock, which is pretty blank, but at least it's still a stream of almost nothing. Go to the photon room and you don't even get that since you are punted out of the cinema as fast as you enter.

Point is, you going to the cinema has zero effect on the story being told in any particular room.

1) If consciousness is not present from the beginning, then there is nothing but physical. Physical things and processes, and evolution that occurs through purely physical mechanisms, and selects for arrangements that are advantageous only in physical ways.

2) Somewhere down the line, consciousness emerges.

You are very much confusing emergence and change. The latter takes place over time. The former is not a temporal effect, but rather a property of a system that is not a property of any one of its parts.
So per physicalism (which is not defined as 'lack of consciousness from the beginning'), over time, matter rearranges (mechanism unimportant) into physical configurations which have this emergent property.

Biology might do this rearrangement via growth or by evolution. Other arrangements might be by design (growth is a form of change by design). Yet others might be by some other mechanism (including possibly yourself).

Does it not seem like amazing happenstance that physical arrangements having nothing to do with nonexistent consciousness are selected for, and consciousness, which did not exist and was not selected for, just happens to emerge from those arrangements?

This is a gross misrepresentation of the physicalist position, especially given your definition of consciousness. Under physicalism, biological experience is part of cognition (the information processing), not something separate that merely experiences the cognition. No, it isn't amazing at all that the simplest creatures evolve to react to their environments, and as soon as they do this, the beginning of consciousness is already there and needs only to be improved. It would be far more amazing if these simple adaptations never occurred. Even plants do it.

The value of a coin is not a property of the coin. — noAxioms
Ok.
Aristotle again. — Banno

No. Aristotle distinguished social/legal value (of say money) from real value (of say food). I am saying that value (of any kind, money, food, whatever) is not a property of the thing of value, but a relation of the thing with that which values it.
I said this in reaction to your assertion that value was a property of the thing itself.

:roll: — Banno

Your argument from ridicule is noted, but fails to justify your apparent dismissal of my statement, or perhaps of Aristotle's stance on value.

it's possible the person you're replying to is introducing a concept or argument not specifically addressed by the argument or belief system you refer by name of one person. — Outlander

Indeed. I tried to clarify above. Thx for the support of somebody who actually couldn't spout the teachings of any of the famous names. I try to do my own philosophy and would totally fail a philosophy course which focuses more on the history of what others said and not so much on how to go about working it out for yourself.

I don't rate [a fossil record] as memory. A rational observer such as ourselves can intepret it, but it is not information that is conserved for the sake of maintaining homeostasis as memory is for an organism. — Wayfarer

So you're saying it isn't memory if there's not a purpose of homeostasis in it? Wow...

Nice example. The word and the meaning are separate parts of the idea. — noAxioms
So you agree that the idea exists as an irreducible mental event? — MoK

Your inability to parse a statement leaves me floored. I give a clear example of an idea being reduced to parts, and you suggest that I would agree that ideas are irreducible.

Aristotle — noAxioms

- that odd idea that properties are "more real" than relations.

So you're saying it isn't memory if there's not a purpose of homeostasis in it? Wow... — noAxioms

Show me I’m mistaken and I’ll change my view. As always.

‘ ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’ ~ Ernst Mayr.

I'm not sure. The problem seems to hinge on whether we can speak objectively about experiences that can only be had subjectively. A lot of traditional science would rule this out. — J

I think maybe the problem is trying to speak objectively about experiences that can only be had subjectively, and trying to fit the study of consciousness into the mold of traditional science. Maybe a new way is needed.

I agree. A key problem is how we know that a subjective experience is being had in the first place. We posit such experiences for everything from other people, to animals, to (for some optimists) AI . . . What version of science can help us with this?

You've defined consciousness as only experience of those advantages, hence it does not itself give any additional advantage. — noAxioms

No, I haven't. Look all you want, and you will not find me saying that anywhere. Consciousness is causal. There's no denying that. All we have to do is open our eyes and look anywhere at all the things humans have made that would not exist if only the laws of physics were at work. The more consciousness has to work with, that is, the greater the mental capabilities of the conscious entity, the more consciousness can use the laws of physics to do things that the laws of physics would never do without consciousness. Which are things that are favorable to the survival of the conscious entity.

At least they were historically. Humans do a lot of things that aren't for our survival.

I agree. A key problem is how we know that a subjective experience is being had in the first place. We posit such experiences for everything from other people, to animals, to (for some optimists) AI . . . What version of science can help us with this? — J

I'm suggesting we need a new version of science. All our sciences use the physical to explore the physical.

Fair enough. I wonder if the so-called human sciences might offer some options. Some versions of psychology, for instance, offer themselves as hard explanatory science, yet don't limit their explanations to physical causes.

I'm suggesting we need a new version of science. All our sciences use the physical to explore the physical. — Patterner

We are dealing with an anomaly, so-called experience, within physicalism. I agree that we need to discard physicalism/materialism. We at least need two different substances, the so-called experiencer and the object of experience, if you want to describe the phenomenon of experience coherently.

We know dark matter exists, because of its gravitational effect. But that's it. With all our sciences, we can't detect it at all. It doesn't absorb, reflect, or emit light. It doesn't impact matter. Nothing. But we know it's there.

I think we know consciousness is there for a similar reason. Consciousness isn't explained by the physical properties of the universe. Something we can't detect with all our sciences is there. Unfortunately, we can't measure its effect the way we measure dark matter's. At least not in any way I can think of.

We know dark matter exists, because of its gravitational effect. But that's it. With all our sciences, we can't detect it at all. It doesn't absorb, reflect, or emit light. It doesn't impact matter. Nothing. But we know it's there.

I think we know consciousness is there for a similar reason. — Patterner

It may be the case that both dark matter and consciousness are inaccessible to current scientific investigation. But I don't think we know about them for "a similar reason." As I understand it, dark matter is a postulate that seems to be required by the math, and has so far stood up under theoretical pressure. Surely consciousness is more than a postulate, something we have to infer or deduce? Or maybe you mean that it would look that way from a strictly 3rd person viewpoint, with no access to any person's mind? But of course this immediately raises the conundrum of how there could be any viewpoint at all that did not partake of consciousness. In short, my access to consciousness is a given, even when I'm wondering whether other beings have it too.

I think we know consciousness is there for a similar reason. — Patterner

Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind to experience, so we cannot measure it. We cannot measure consciousness if it is used as a synonym of experience as well.

Consciousness isn't explained by the physical properties of the universe. — Patterner

Sure. It is the basic assumption of physicalism that an electron, for example, doesn't experience.

Something we can't detect with all our sciences is there. — Patterner

The mind, although it is present, is a light substance, so we cannot detect it, at least at the current stage of scientific development.

I'm saying dark matter and consciousness are both thought to exist because matter is doing things that can't be explained by what we know about matter. Or at least no other explanation has been found, and people who are many times more knowledgeable about what we know than I am say we don't have the vaguest idea.

But that's as far as I'm going with that. Certainly, the specifics are extremely different. There probably aren't two people in the discussions here who agree on the definition of consciousness. I don't know how many can give a firm, consistent definition of their own, regardless of agreement with anybody else. And nobody has evidence for how it comes about. For the most part people will not even attempt to understand another person's theory, wanting only to say it's wrong. So no attempt to work on any theory can be done by more than the holder of that theory. Not easy to find answers this way.

On top of which, as I recently said, all theories play out the same.

Surely consciousness is more than a postulate, something we have to infer or deduce? — J

Sorry. I was meaning that in regards to my position, that consciousness is fundamental.

People with different guesses about the nature of consciousness could easily, and many obviously do, think otherwise.

I'm saying dark matter and consciousness are both thought to exist because matter is doing things that can't be explained by what we know about matter. — Patterner

OK, I see that parallel.

There probably aren't two people in the discussions here who agree on the definition of consciousness. — Patterner

True, but I bet we all would affirm that our own consciousness is real and (perhaps) indubitable. As you say:

I was meaning that in regards to my position, that consciousness is fundamental. — Patterner

My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are. — Patterner

You assume that consciousness does not have physical properties. Is consciousness something different than being conscious?

If yes, then what is the difference?

If no, does not being conscious have physical properties, and is it not those physical properties that allow us to tell that consciousness is present?

Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness. — Patterner

That might indicate that the idea of consciousness as something undetectable is a kind of reification, as distinct from simply being conscious, which is a detectable condition.

Ideas to me are irreducible mental events. — MoK

A pretty sketchy notion.

Indeed. We can detect consciousness. That's why we differentiate between some's being asleep and awake...

And we differentiate between doing something consciously and unconsciously - driving to the local shops being the usual example.

You assume that consciousness does not have physical properties. — Janus

I do. Consciousness does not have physical properties.

We can detect and measure brain activity. Electrical activity; magnetic activity; blood flow; blood oxygenation; metabolic activity; maybe others. We know about other things that are going on that we can't observe in action with or various devices, such as neurotransmitters crossing the gap.

Do any of these things, or combinations of them, explain how the physical subjectively experiences, and, in at least our case, can be aware and self-aware?

Basically, if there was no consciousness, the electrical activity, magnetic activity, blood flow, blood oxygenation, metabolic activity, gap-jumping neurotransmitters, and whatever else, would still be taking place. How would the readings of any scans look different in that case? The differences in the scans of brains with identical activity, one with consciousness and one without, would reveal the physical properties of consciousness. Obviously, we can't scan a normally-functioning human brain that is not conscious. I guess this is a TE about if we could.

Basically, if there was no consciousness, the electrical activity, magnetic activity, blood flow, blood oxygenation, metabolic activity, gap-jumping neurotransmitters, and whatever else, would still be taking place. — Patterner

I disagree. Such a brain would still report its own consciousness and talk its own consciousness in the exact same way we all do. It would be able to engage with you just as well as anyone about phenomenal experiences.

It stands to reason that your knowledge and reports and whatever compels you to make the statements, have the beliefs you do about consciousness would be for the same kind of reason as this brain that supposedly does not have consciousness - the electrical, biochemical activity is what makes you open your mouth, type the words on screen, does it not?

If everything you say and claim about consciousness is for the same reason as this brain that supposedly does not have consciousness, then the idea of distinct "physical" stuff with completely separate, independent causal powers to some distinct "phenomenal" stuff becomes increasingly absurd and also causally redundant. It also leads to questions of reliability about your "knowledge" about conscious stuff, after all, this brain without consciousness may come up with the exact same viewpoint as you without having any consciousness itself, supposedly. Why would it do such a thing?

Seems to me if you want to bite the bullet and commit to such a picture you would have to commit to some bizarre mental gymnastics about the nature of the universe, entertain supposed hypotheses about the brain in relation to conscious - possibly with serious implications for physics and other sciences - that we simply have no empirical, scientific evidence for.

I find there is a certain bizarre lack of humility in people who think that, in principle, their own direct aquaintance with experience is beyond and superior to facts about the causal powers of their own brains and the possibility of illusions or fallibility about the way they are as beings in the world.

Such a brain would still report its own consciousness and talk its own consciousness in the exact same way we all do. — Apustimelogist

I don't understand. Why would anybody/thing that was not conscious say it was? ChatGPT doesn't say it is conscious.

Would anything in a universe that was completely devoid of consciousness ever have any vocabulary about consciousness? Would the concept ever come up in that universe?

Hmm, I misread this bit as something to do with philosophical zombies.

Basically, if there was no consciousness, the electrical activity, magnetic activity, blood flow, blood oxygenation, metabolic activity, gap-jumping neurotransmitters, and whatever else, would still be taking place. How would the readings of any scans look different in that case? The differences in the scans of brains with identical activity, one with consciousness and one without, would reveal the physical properties of consciousness. Obviously, we can't scan a normally-functioning human brain that is not conscious. I guess this is a TE about if we could. — Patterner

The point being I don't think there's anyway something could not experience things in a way that is not directly related to how brains, or something equivalent, work.

Edited: spelling

You've defined consciousness as only experience of those advantages, hence it does not itself give any additional advantage. — noAxioms

No, I haven't. Look all you want, and you will not find me saying that anywhere. — Patterner

Granted, you've not explicitly said that, but you've excluded everything except 'experience-of'.

Consciousness is simply subjective experience. It doesn't have anything to do with thinking, or any mental activity. — Patterner

It seems to me most people think consciousness means a lot more than subjective experience. Cognition, thinking, awareness, self-awareness, and whatever other mental activity people can think of, are usually part of someone's definition, i'm saying none of that is consciousness. — Patterner

There are the things, and there are the experiences of the things. — Patterner

OK, so the question is, how can consciousness, as you've defined it, be any sort of advantage when all the advantages I can think of fall into the categories that you've excluded.

Consciousness is causal.

Is it? What does it cause the photon to do? I'm not denying that it is causal, I'm simply pointing out that your definition of it doesn't seem to allow that.

The more consciousness has to work with, that is, the greater the mental capabilities of the conscious entity, the more consciousness can use the laws of physics to do things that the laws of physics would never do without consciousness. — Patterner

Maybe the photon can't consciously cause anything, but rather condition X must exist (that which you say it is working with) first, but in that case, it seems it's X doing the causation, not the experience of X.

I'm saying dark matter and consciousness are both thought to exist because matter is doing things that can't be explained by what we know about matter. — Patterner

Can you come up with a specific example? Where does anything physical do something that is different that what physical laws predict? OK, you said 'lack of physical explanation', but that just means any process that you don't understand.

You might talk about picking up a piece of litter, but that's caused by physical muscles and such. Where does the physical break down in that causal chain? You whole argument seems to depend on denying knowledge of how it works (which isn't solved at all by your solution). It's too complex. But being unable to follow the complexity is not in any way evidence that it still isn't just matter interactions following physical law. How is it any kind of improvement to replace a black box with an even blacker one?

The dark matter example is one of a new discovery, yes. Might as well say that consciousness is like distant stars, a story made up because the lights in the sky couldn't be explained by what we knew about matter at the time. So sure, add this mental stuff as a new entity, but it requires experimental evidence (which dark matter has and consciousness currently doesn't). How do we know Mars is real? It's not like you've touched it. But it explains the reddish light in the sky that has no better explanation. You can't see Mars, you only see the light that supposedly comes from it. Mars is one explanation of that light. A projection is another.

All we have to do is open our eyes and look anywhere at all the things humans have made that would not exist if only the laws of physics were at work. — Patterner

My list of that is empty, since all those accomplishments seem to be the result of "Cognition, thinking, awareness, and whatever other mental activity". Chalmers would say that a p-zombie would have accomplished as much, being indistinguishable from something conscious. If this is the case, consciousness is not causal. If it is not the case, the p-zombie is distinguishable.

Such a brain would still report its own consciousness and talk its own consciousness in the exact same way we all do. It would be able to engage with you just as well as anyone about phenomenal experiences. — Apustimelogist

Agree with all, but I would say that I (all of me, not just brain) is conscious. A brain in isolation of the body would not be, but of course one could in principle be fed artificial input.
What of a thing that has multiple brains? Would it be conscious or would it merely have multiple consciousnesses?

So you're saying it isn't memory if there's not a purpose of homeostasis in it? Wow... — noAxioms
Show me I’m mistaken and I’ll change my view. As always. — Wayfarer

You will do no such thing. You've chosen a definition of 'memory' that I find absolutely nowhere. It's a definition, so it's wrong only in the sense that nobody else uses that definition. Only memory such as that in the hypothalamus might count as memory per your definition since it explicitly is used for that purpose (Neurobiological Homeostasis).

I recall my child's birthday. That's memory, despite the ability to do that without a calendar not in any way helping to maintain my homeostasis. I'm not sure if you consider the recall of a birthdate to be an act of a brain or an act of that other substance.

On the non-biological front, wall street (arguably under human guidance) can adjust interest rates based on historical data to prevent runaway markets.

My laptop has 16GB of RAM. What does the M stand for in RAM? Is the whole world wrong in using that phrase then? What would you call it? 16GB of what?

An operating system tracks usage patterns over time to balance usage/performance, similar to cells retaining information of pathogens to maintain systemic balance.

Such non-biological examples are technically not homeostasis since that word actually very much does have a biological implication. A more generic term might be 'equilibrium'.

I notice you frequently use the fallacious tactic of refusing to use a word for anything nonhuman or at least nonbiological, as if a definition proves anything. A computer doesn't 'think' because that's one of your reserved words, but you don't supply a generic term for anything else doing the same thing. This tactic seems to imply a significant lack of confidence in your stance. The only reason you seem to define 'memory' in terms of homeostasis is because of the very biological implication of the latter word. So show me where you got this funny definition that appears in no site I can find.

There's your problem
- that odd idea that properties are "more real" than relations. — Banno

But I never expressed that idea. It was you that suggested the coin having the property of value, not me.

I notice you frequently use the fallacious tactic of refusing to use a word for anything nonhuman or at least nonbiological, as if a definition proves anything. — noAxioms

A definition 'proves' how the word is used. If you wish to re-define memory as 'the past', then the onus is on you to justify it.

Memory: the faculty by which the mind stores and remembers information.
"I've a great memory for faces"
2. something remembered from the past.
"one of my earliest memories is of sitting on his knee

When I say memory is characteristic of life, I mean it in the strong sense: not just a trace of the past, but the active retention of previous experience for the sake of survival and adaptation. To equate memory with anything in the past—erosion marks or planetary orbits —dilutes the meaning of the word until it just means “the past.” But organisms, in contrast to geological or crystal structures, must retain and carry their past forward in order to continue existing; without the ability to capture memory in this special sense, there is no life. Artificial systems such as RAM only “remember” as extensions of the organisms that do (those organisms being us). That’s why I argue memory as such is one of the defining marks of life and is generally absent in non-living matter. I suggest that the reason you find that unacceptable is that it represents an ontological distinction which your philosophy can't accomodate.

The point being I don't think there's anyway aomething could not expeeience things in a way that is not directly related to how brains, or something equivalent, work. — Apustimelogist

A brain can't experience anything other than being a brain, if that's what you mean?

Granted, you've not explicitly said that, but you've excluded everything except 'experience-of'. — noAxioms

It's not that I've excluded. It's that I haven't gotten into what comes of this setup, because I'm trying to get the very basic idea across before moving on.

OK, so the question is, how can consciousness, as you've defined it, be any sort of advantage when all the advantages I can think of fall into the categories that you've excluded. — noAxioms

Consciousness is the property by which the thing experiences itself. Without it, nothing experiences itself.

When we're talking about a particle, the experience is of things like mass, charge, and spin. I don't imagine there's much of an advantage, because a particle can only interact with things according to the laws of physics.

But a brain? Especially a human brain. The experience is of things that are incredibly more complex. There's a boatload of information processing being experienced. And it's all tied together, functioning as one entity. So the sensory input is experienced as vision, hearing, and the other senses. Stored information from past sensory input and events is experienced as memory. All of the feedback loops are experienced as self-awareness. It is not simple physics taking place. If it was, we wouldn't have everything humanity has created.

I'm saying dark matter and consciousness are both thought to exist because matter is doing things that can't be explained by what we know about matter.
— Patterner

Can you come up with a specific example? Where does anything physical do something that is different that what physical laws predict? OK, you said 'lack of physical explanation', but that just means any process that you don't understand.

You might talk about picking up a piece of litter, but that's caused by physical muscles and such. Where does the physical break down in that causal chain? You whole argument seems to depend on denying knowledge of how it works (which isn't solved at all by your solution). It's too complex. But being unable to follow the complexity is not in any way evidence that it still isn't just matter interactions following physical law. How is it any kind of improvement to replace a black box with an even blacker one? — noAxioms

Do you think physical laws and interactions intend states of the future? No step in the manufacture of a computer violates the laws of physics. No step can. Nothing that has ever been, or ever will be, done can violate the laws of physics. However, without consciousness, the laws of physics will never produce a computer. Or an apartment building. Or a violin concerto (not audibly or the score). Or a particle collider. Or an automobile. Or a deck of cards. Or a billion other things.

Something that didn't exist was wanted. Planned. Intended. It was decided that something that could not be found anywhere, no matter where you look, and that would never come into being due to the interactions of matter and energy following the laws of physics, must come into being. Interactions that were not going to occur had to be arranged. Consciousness used the laws of physics to do very specific things in very specific orders and combinations, that would never have occurred spontaneously.

Rather, experience cannot be disentangled from the functional structure of the brain; attempts to do so result in bizarre paradoxes like the p-zombie who believes they are conscious, reports their own experiences and can converse about it as well as yourself.

Rather, experience cannot be disentangled from the functional structure of the brain; attempta to do so result in bizarre paradoxes like the p-zombie who believes they are conscious, reports their own experiences and can converse about it as well as yourself. — Apustimelogist

Yeah, because that's wrong. If a universe had beings that were not conscious, they would not be talking about consciousness. They concept never would have come up.

:up:

Consciousness does not have physical properties. — Patterner

And yet being conscious does have physical properties. So, I'll ask again―what is the difference between consciousness and being conscious?

Do any of these things, or combinations of them, explain how the physical subjectively experiences, and, in at least our case, can be aware and self-aware? — Patterner

Being conscious means being aware. But being aware as in being able to respond to signs does not necessarily entail being conscious. Awareness happens at all levels of life. In simple forms of life, the presence of different molecules at the the cell membrane elicit different responses inside the cell. Those processes cannot be entirely understood in mechanistic terms, they are understood to carry information to the cell, but they are nonetheless physical processes.

Stated in biosemiotic terms there are interpretants as all levels (of life at least), but it does not follow that there is consciousness at all levels. It is probably symbolic language that enables reflective self-awareness.

Granting these assumptions means that there is a function that describes the property of the system. The only avalaible properties are the properties of parts though. Therefore, the property of such a system is a function of the properties of the parts. Therefore, we are not dealing with strong emergence in the case of consciousness. — MoK

This argument works from the perspective of Physics. But, in Aristotle's Meta-Physics, he introduces the non-physical notions of Potentiality & Actuality*1, Form & Matter, Essence & Substance. Hence, the Function of a System is non-physical, even though the parts are material items. It's a mathematical input/output relationship that you can't see, but can infer as purpose or meaning.

Function*2 is what a system does : the output or usefulness or purpose of the process. And the collective Function of a zillion neurons (Mind) is an Emergent property of the aggregated (integrated) parts, in the sense that the separate parts do not possess the Property of Consciousness. An example of physical-to-metaphysical Emergence is Abiogenesis : the otherwise inexplicable process we call "Life" displayed by interactive amalgamations of inert material bits : a complex System.

So, one explanation for the eventual Emergence of Life & Mind from a mass of protoplasm --- water, ions, amino acids, and monosaccarides --- is that those simpler material components possessed un-actualized Potential*3 that became Actual Life & Mind processes when combined into a complex organization. And one kind of Potential Actualizer is the physical-but-immaterial activity we call "Energy"*4. Therefore, the material components of a system are activated by inputs of a Causal Force, which by itself is neither Mental nor Vital.

The emergence of Life & Mind only after billions of years of evolution implies that it takes many rolls of the dice to hit upon the right combination to open the vault of Biology and Psychology*5. And no combination of parts would do the trick, if the Potential was not there all along. :smile:



*1. For Aristotle, a substance is a thing's essential nature, understood through the interplay of potentiality (its capacity to become something else) and actuality (what it currently is). Each substance consists of both potentiality (its matter) and actuality (its form).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/

*2. Function is what a system does, especially its purpose within an environment, while emergence is the process by which novel properties or behaviors arise in a system from the interactions of its parts, properties that cannot be predicted or understood from the parts in isolation. Essentially, emergence describes how a system achieves a function through its integrated components, creating a whole with new characteristics that are more than the sum of its parts, such as the coordinated movement of a car (function) emerging from the interactions of its engine, wheels, and other components.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=function+and+emergence

*3. Potential : latent (hidden) properties or qualities that are capable of emerging when combined into an organized (enformed) system.
Note --- One way to understand Potential is : the combination that unlocks Actual.

*4.Yes, in a fundamental physics sense, energy can be considered immaterial or non-material because it does not have mass and does not take up space, unlike matter. Energy is better understood as an abstract property or quantity associated with matter and systems, representing the ability to do work or bring about change, rather than a tangible substance itself.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=energy+is+immaterial

*5. The probability of life arising from non-life, a process called abiogenesis, is incredibly low when considered as a random event, with estimates of probabilities for complex molecules like proteins ranging from 1 in 10^40,000 to 1 in 10^251, and higher for a whole cell.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=probability+of+life+from+non-life