My concern is with P8, which strikes me as an out of place assumption but I can't quite articulate the problem. Does anyone have any insight and/or solutions? Does that premise render the argument circular or is it ok to have an assumption like that in the argument for the purposes of validity? I'm not invested in the argument, I drew it up quickly just as an interesting exercise.
P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known , it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering.
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.*
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, we know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 We know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if a vegan diet is adopted.*
P7 If a vegan diet is adopted, gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable.
P8 A vegan diet is adopted.* — Soylent
The first premise is necessarily false:
∃x: ¬(G ↔ C(x) ∧ ¬x) — Michael
Seems to me there are two arguments here:
1.) God does not exist, and therefore life is absurd.
2.) Life is absurd without god, therefore god exists.
The first argument is a reaction to the apparent non existence of a deity, while the second is a proof for a deity.
Absurdity here is meaning not only the metaphor of the actor without a stage, but also the complete uncanniness, or peculiarity, of existence as a whole if god does not exist.
Or is this just an appeal to emotions and ignorance? — darthbarracuda
No, again, that's the goverment, rather than the people. None of the examples that you've provided are typically directed against the people, with the possible exception of terrorism. — Sapientia
I'm coming to this thread rather late, but it intrigues me as to why TGW thinks that consciousness must be defined in terms of qualia. I wonder whether he has an argument to support that contention? I'm also wondering what TGW's descriptive account of qualia is. — John