It's an a priori argument, based on the observation that there's no light inside the skull. — Wayfarer
So I take it you’re not an Everettian?
— Wayfarer
I'm not, but same goes there. In MWI, the universe is described by a single wavefunction containing all of the branching through its history. This is still physics. — Kenosha Kid
The opposition between realism and idealism is one of the many ways in which philosophical myth building leas on astray.
There's just the world, and included in it are our reactions to it. — Banno
But that observation, according to your own argument, is derived from what is empirically given and hence must be (according to you) unreliable as a guide to what is real. — Janus
In that case, you misunderstand my position, as often, but with the amount of incoming flak, I can't really deal with it right now. — Wayfarer
You always claim I misunderstand your position and yet always fail to explain how I am misunderstanding it. — Janus
What would be the problem with having our reality depend on our perception of the objective domain AND have us be part of the objective domain, no different from the other things in it. Why cut us off? — khaled
Having no inherent reality or real being; their nature is imputed to them, not intrinsic to them, in accordance with their causes, context and the intentions of the observer (per the madhyamika dialectic of Mahāyāna Buddhists.)
In the context of physics, that manifested as the inability to discern an absolute point-particle - an atom, in fact. It was found that sub-atomic entities have a kind of ambiguous or indeterminate nature rather than being indivisible atoms. — Wayfarer
You set up this world picture, here the subject with his ideas, there the world with it things, and think that it's all settled. — Wayfarer
SO it is easy to believe that a configuration 'stands for' or 'represents' an experience — Wayfarer
but we're not ever really in a position of comparing the object of the experience with the neural data — Wayfarer
You've lost me. A lot of terms and distinctions that make no discernible differences. "The inability to discern an absolute point particle" ... so what? "Imputed, not intrinsic" ... wtf difference does that make?Having no inherent reality or real being; their nature is imputed to them, not intrinsic to them, in accordance with their causes, context and the intentions of the observer (per the madhyamika dialectic of Mahāyāna Buddhists.)
In the context of physics, that manifested as the inability to discern an absolute point-particle - an atom, in fact. It was found that sub-atomic entities have a kind of ambiguous or indeterminate nature rather than being indivisible atoms. — Wayfarer
I wouldn’t say he worked his way past it so much as pushed it to its limit. It took phenomenology to get past dualism. — Joshs
What would be the problem with having our reality depend on our perception of the objective domain AND have us be part of the objective domain, no different from the other things in it. Why cut us off?
— khaled
That's really the bit I care about. — khaled
You've lost me. A lot of terms and distinctions that make no discernible differences. "The inability to discern an absolute point particle" ... so what? "Imputed, not intrinsic" ... wtf difference does that make? — 180 Proof
And you're an idealist of some flavor, right? Well then, how can you use physical sciences and (interpretations of) physical theories to support without self-inconsistency your purportedly non-physicalist (idealist) philosophical positions? — 180 Proof
Let me have another go. I've already said, in this thread, that I'm an empical realist. As I understand it, Kant also says that whilst he is a transcendental idealist, he's an empirical realist also. I don't see a conflict. But almost everyone here immediately assumes, well, if you're an idealist, 'you think the world is all in your mind'. People said the same of Kant after the first edition of CPR! That's why in the second edition he included the critique of Berkeley. — Wayfarer
What do you mean 'cut off'? — Wayfarer
We ourselves are not objects to ourselves — Wayfarer
I mean, isn't that self-evident? — Wayfarer
well, the body is, in a way. But ourselves, as knowing subjects — Wayfarer
And you're an idealist of some flavor, right? Well then, how can you use physical sciences and (interpretations of) physical theories to support without self-inconsistency your purportedly non-physicalist (idealist) philosophical positions? — 180 Proof
The thing doing the knowing is not a different type of thing to the thing getting known. — khaled
I just made the same point, and have done in the past, but that is an objection Wayfarer simply refuses to address. I wonder why? — Janus
Kant understood that both everyday life and scientific knowledge rests on, and is made orderly, by some very basic assumptions that aren't self-evident but can't be entirely justified by empirical observations. For instance, we assume that the physical world will conform to mathematical principles. Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that our belief that every event has a cause is such an assumption; perhaps, also, our belief that effects follow necessarily from their causes; but many today reject his classification of such claims as “synthetic a priori.” Regardless of whether one agrees with Kant's account of what these assumptions are, his justification of them is thoroughly modern since it is essentially pragmatic. They make science possible. More generally, they make the world knowable. Kant in fact argues that in their absence our experience from one moment to the next would not be the coherent and intelligible stream that it is.
Kant never lost sight of the fact that while modern science is one of humanity's most impressive achievements, we are not just knowers: we are also agents who make choices and hold ourselves responsible for our actions. In addition, we have a peculiar capacity to be affected by beauty, and a strange inextinguishable sense of wonder about the world we find ourselves in. Feelings of awe, an appreciation of beauty, and an ability to make moral choices on the basis of rational deliberation do not constitute knowledge, but this doesn't mean they lack value. On the contrary. But a danger carried by the scientific understanding of the world is that its power and elegance may lead us to undervalue those things that don't count as science.
According to Kant, the very nature of science means that it is limited to certain kinds of understanding and explanation, and these will never satisfy us completely. For as he says in the first sentence of the Critique, human reason has this peculiarity: it is driven by its very nature to pose questions that it is incapable of answering. Now hardheaded types may dismiss out of hand as not worth asking any questions that don't admit of scientific answers. This, one imagines, is Mr. Spock's position, and possibly such an attitude will one day take over completely. But I suspect Kant is right on this matter for two reasons.
One reason is that in our search for explanations we find it hard to be content with brute contingency. If we ask, “Why did this happen?” we will not be satisfied with the answer, “It just did.” If we ask, “Why are things this way?” we expect more than, “That's just the way things are.” Yet however deep science penetrates into the origin of things or the nature of things, it never seems to eliminate that element of contingency, and it is hard to see how it ever can. Leibniz's question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” will always be waiting.
A second reason, which I suspect is related to the first, is that some questions we pose probably can't be answered, yet we ask them anyway because they express an abiding sense of wonder, mystery, concern, gratitude or despair over the conditions of our existence. Why am I this particular subject of experience? Why am I alive now and not at some other time? What should I do with my life? Why do I love this person, and why is our love so important? Such thoughts may take the form of questions, but they are really expressions of amazement and perplexity. The feelings expressed fuel religion, poetry, music, and the other arts. They also often accompany experiences we think of as especially valuable or profound: for instance, being present at a birth or a death, feeling great love, witnessing heroism, or encountering overwhelming natural beauty. — Emarys Westacott, The Continuing Relevance of Immanuel Kant
I refer you to the answers I've given you many previous times, which you say are a dodge, or are not answering your question, or failing to see the point. I might address it, and others might fail to understand what I've said. There's really nothing further I can do about that, either. — Wayfarer
I have never seen anything from you that I would count as a satisfactory answer to the question — Janus
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