From that, it may be best to let “makeup” of the world denote the substance of its constituency, and if so, and by the same token, if ideas have no substance, then it follows ideas cannot partake in the constituency of material things, such as worlds. — Mww
Unless someone considers themselves eliminitavists, which I think is just crazy. — Manuel
So your facts are real and QAnon’a
facts are fake? You might be surprised to discover what a vast web of interpretive plumbing your ‘facts’ sit on top of , and how subjective that deep foundation is. — Joshs
An idealist or skeptic can at least hold the materialist model as a useful if often unreliable tool, without falling into traps like claiming qualia isn't real, based solely on data received as qualia, while transmitting said argument to others solely through means that they will experience as qualia. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Well, you don't, that's why they're not materialists. Principally, you don't get magical humans. Lots of people don't like being described as a the same sort of thing as rocks, rivers, or even trees, apes, and computers. They find that quite offensive. Bear in mind we're coming from a world that was taught that God made us bespoke, with His divine breath, and made the universe just for us: being ever so special is important to many.
An idealist or skeptic can at least hold the materialist model as a useful if often unreliable tool, without falling into traps like claiming qualia isn't real, based solely on data received as qualia, while transmitting said argument to others solely through means that they will experience as qualia. — Count Timothy von Icarus
t sounds to me like qualia is serving a function for the idealist much like materialism is for the empiricist. In both cases we have the the claIm for an intrinsically real object whose pure self -identity can be located independently of its interactions with an outside. — Joshs
From Rorty:
“ Dennett wants to say that it is as silly to ask whether beliefs are real as to ask whether his lost sock center is real. I quite agree, but not for Dennett's reasons. My reason is that it is silly to ask whether anything is real - as opposed to asking whether it is useful to talk about, spatially locatable, spatially divisible, tangible, visible, easily identified, made out of atoms, good to eat, and so on. — Joshs
I feel like a similar level of critique works against the materialist though. They want to think they are special. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem with this is that the same people reject any evidence that there are some animals that would do something remotely similar, — Kenosha Kid
what the Empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients, -- sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. A confusion which comes about all the more easily as, on the one hand, the senses are, in actual fact, more or less permeated with reason in man, and, on the other, the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. — Jacques Maritain
As Magee says in his book on Schopenhauer, humans are generally born with an instinctive sense of realism, the problems with which only become clear after considerable intellectual effort. — Wayfarer
In short - the world is not simply given. — Wayfarer
I feel like a similar level of critique works against the materialist though. They want to think they are special. They want to be in the know. They are not like a toddler stumbling around a dinner party with only faint concepts of what is going on. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Ultimately, we are not apart from, or outside of, reality. That is why the purported division of subjective and objective has no absolute foundation. That principle is made explicit in Kant and Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and I don’t accept has been superseded by anything that science has discovered since their day.
But, it’s exceedingly hard to grasp what exactly this means. As Magee says in his book on Schopenhauer, humans are generally born with an instinctive sense of realism, the problems with which only become clear after considerable intellectual effort. Understanding the way the mind constructs the experience of the world from the elements of experience combined with the faculty of reason does not come naturally. That is why so few people, even philosophers, are inclined to accept it. On the whole, they don't see it, and since idealism fell out of favour they're not open to it. (It's one of the main reasons I discontinued undergraduate philosophy.)
In short - the world is not simply given. It is in some fundamental sense projected by the observing mind. The sense in which it exists outside of or apart from that mind is an empty question, because nothing we can know is ever outside of or apart from the act of knowing by which we are concious of the existence of the world in the first place. This doesn't mean the world is all in my mind, but that the mind - yours, mine, the species and cultural mind of h. sapiens - is an inextricable foundation of the world we know, but we can't see it, because it is what we're looking through, and with. — Wayfarer
Fascinating but very nebulous and how would you ever establish what is the case? There are so many theories about how human beings construct their 'reality' you almost need to choose one on faith... It's almost competing with postmodernism in the multifactorial construction of 'reality' stakes, except, presumably idealism has a foundation... is a foundation. If you can establish which version. — Tom Storm
I am not even sure what counts as 'the world'. — Tom Storm
some version of realism might be the case instead? — Tom Storm
'A physicist', said Neils Bohr, 'is an atom's way of looking at itself'.
Ultimately, we are not apart from, or outside of, reality. That is why the purported division of subjective and objective has no absolute foundation. That principle is made explicit in Kant and Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and I don’t accept has been superseded by anything that science has discovered since their day. — Wayfarer
toward tying reality innately to the mind rather than trying the mind innately to (physical) reality. — Kenosha Kid
So it is that ideas are not part of the groundwork of empirical knowledge, for ideas are not a product of sensibility. Ideas are not phenomena, which gives us the extension that ideas do not have objects that belong to them as intuitions, but only as conceptions. — Mww
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