It wouldn't affect me in the slightest if I didn't exist; but look at all the pearls of wisdom the forum would be lacking! A tragedy to contemplate and thank providence we have avoided. — unenlightened

Well, it wouldn't affect you because there'd be no you to affect, so there's that.

While I know you're being sarcastic, I will say that your not being here would profoundly matter.

I once remarked to a female friend about the lack of females on a philosophy forum. — Jack Cummins

It's because men and women are different beyond simple anatomical differences.

Who sees it differently? Please correct me. — Roke

Hate I suppose is in the eye of the beholder, to a point. I mean "I hate you" is pretty clear, and you could substitute "you" for all sorts of ethnicities, religions and whatever else and that'd be hate speech.

The question isn't so much what we call certain speech, but what we do about it. The line you cross in illegalizing certain types of speech is in suppressing free speech, so I would tend to defer to allowing more sorts of speech than others. That doesn't mean I can't otherwise be socially punished by my speech because speech has consequences.

So, whether you think anti-trans talk is hate speech or you think anti-Kirk talk is hate speech is up to you, and I don't think in either instance should someone be criminally punished for either of them. But, I do expect you might lose your job or social standing if you engage in certain types of speech (call it hate speech or not), but we can all choose which people we want to hate us by what we choose to say.

Maybe if you're really wondering what might be hate speech, instead of asking yourself whether you are hateful in saying it, ask yourself whether you expect others to hate you for saying it and then you can decide whether you want to be hated. Some people do, especially if they can get the people they already hate to hate them back even more. That's a fairly common game.

They stress that language is not primarily a system of communication, but a system of thought. Communication is a secondary use of an internal capacity for structuring and manipulating concepts. Animal communication systems (e.g., vervet alarm calls) are qualitatively different, not primitive stages of language. — Wayfarer

So if I seperate out propositions from sentences, where a proposition is knowledge of an event (e.g. the cat is on the mat) and a sentence is the linguistic representation of that knowledege "The cat is on the mat," it seems reasonable a dog would know the cat is on the mat (i.e. possess the propositional knowlege), but not be able to linguistically form it into a sentence (or utterance). My question then is if the dog had propositional knowledge, then he is engaging in thought, and the dog might also know that if he tries to sit on the mat next to the cat he will be swatted. Is this then the distinction you're drawing between humans and animals just that humans are unusual in that they use sentences to express their thoughts where animals do not?

Or, does my problem rest in the assumption made by cognitive scientists that a proposition can exist without a sentence? If that is my error, how is it best argued do you think? It does seem propositional knowledge can exist without a sentence.

People do not think in English or Chinese or Apache; they think in a language of thought.

Pinker's (and Fodor's) theory of mentalese, which is that there is a primordial language pre-existing the creation of utterances or symbols is controversial and not well accepted. It's generally accepted though that an experience can exist without language and that experience might precede reduction to language, but that doesn't suggest the pre-existing experience was some sort of primordial language, but only suggests there are experiences that pre-exist language.

My point is that your quote is of a position that is generally challenged and not widely held.

Collingwood says the purpose of art is to express the artist’s experience. Our goal in looking at art is to try to share that same experience with them. — T Clark

My view of art is that it is a form of language, and the expression through painting is just another way of speaking, writing, or grunting.

The above comment therefore is a work of art, hopefully acheiving the goal of your sharing the experience I had of thinking it.

Each person has some significant role in history and the development of ideas. — Jack Cummins

But there are those who live and die in anonymity and some live even less than a day, and I'd still be as committed to their significance. This just means we needn't search for what they've done to make themselves worthy, but that their worth is inherent, part of their being. That each person is infinitely valuable requires that you offer them room to live out their lives, not placing yourself in front of them and so it demands respect of others.

You can either accept what I'm saying just as part of your worldview or faith, or you can ask yourself the pragmatic question as to what would be gained to evaluate each of us as but an interesting conclusion to billions of years of evolution, no more or less significant than any other random assortment of stuff.

EDIT: I am not saying America is Nazi Germany etc etc, only that it being a murder is not the end of the argument but the beginning. — Baden

This is, candidly, absurd. Nazis systematically herded 6 million Jews to death camps, gassed them, and set their remains on fire with the aim of bringing about thei extinction of their race. Kirk talked on campuses and held views inconsistent with yours.

The question of self defense, with its well developed jurisprudence related to reasonable force, protection from imminent harm, etc offers an easy enough way to distinguish taking a sniper shot at Kirk versus Hitler, ,assuming you were otherwise blind to the other glaring differences.

As an aside, since it matters so little to me exactly where he fell on the political spectrum in terms of his simple expression of his views as not grounds to murder him, I do not agree with the casual villification of Kirk. I saw him as a kind hearted sort with a sincere Christian faith, with views obviously inconsistent with my own on a variety of topics, but not the evil incarnate he's being painted as.

I respect the unhappiness it brings to have questioned the ethical propriety of one's sexual or gender preference, which is hardly distinct from those telling me Jews like me are destined to hell for my beliefs, but that doesn't justify my declaration of victimhood and my right to lash out. The world is full of disagreement and the anti-social way a murderer handles that isn't cause to reassess whether the anti-social psychopaths might have it right.

What this strikes me then is not a legitimate philosophical question as to whether Kirk's murder constituted self-defense, but instead in his opponents searching for some possible mitigation in the evil iof his murder. As in, a hateful bastard who is killed for his hate can't be just like this murder of Mother Thersa. Well it is. The rule is not to do unto others as you think they would have done unto you.

Are you suggesting that conscious beings actually turn the pages of time? or would it be just one conscious being who does this, God? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know. The book is a confusing way to look at it, differing from the movie analogy, but it seems just as valid. The movie moves by itself, but not the book, which makes the movie comparison reflective of a mind independent reality that reveals seen or not. The book though requires a page turner. I guess if you pick the book comparison you impose a greater role of consciousness dictating reality than the movie.

For myself, at least, when I reflect from a position that wants pacifism I end up here: So the world hates this idea because it's (EDIT: "violence is") justified sometimes. — Moliere

The OP would not be at all provocative if it were presented this abstractly, simply asking the question of when violence is permitted and when it is not. The OP, however, presented the question of whether the assassination of Charlie Kirk was justified under the logic employed during the Civil Rights Movement, suggesting that the plight of today’s left is much like the plight of African Americans in the 1960s, and so now is the time to take up arms.

One must wonder if anyone so repulsed by Charlie Kirk actually watched his videos. He was a Christian conservative to be sure, but not a firebrand. His shtick was to debate college students who would approach the mic.

One must also wonder if anyone who finds consistency between Kirk’s assassin and Malcolm X has actually read Malcolm X.

The comment, for example, by Malcolm X: “If they don’t want you and me to get violent, then stop the racists from being violent. Don’t teach us nonviolence while those crackers are violent. Those days are over” is an appeal to self-defense, alluding to instances where MLK’s strategy of nonviolence is suicidal. It is, of course, philosophically reasonable to want to parse out those moments when the violence against someone is great enough to justify lashing out with additional violence, but not by citing an instance that is nowhere near a close call.

If you actually think it’s a hard one to noodle through whether someone who holds political views on abortion, homosexuality, transsexualism, guns, and the climate should be executed by a rifle in a public arena at the will of any random citizen, then this is not a conversation about pacifism versus violence generally. It is a conversation with someone who doesn’t know basic right from wrong.

Spare us the lecture, Hanover. — RogueAI

It's not a lecture. All I've said is screamingly obvious.

Yes, let's be very careful not to denigrate our murderous sniper too hastily at the risk of disrespecting his true nature.

I take great comfort in knowing the naval gazing opinions on our odd board carry no sway

I don't see how you could disagree to the possibility of my alternate suggestion. — Outlander

Sure, we'll have to wait and see if a schizophrenic climbed a roof to take down someone who just happened to be politically divisive and who now hides himself away, or we'll have to see if maybe the shooter was just mistaken, thinking he was engaging in some sort of innocuous behavior that turned to look suspiciously like 1st degree murder, or whatever else we might concoct.

Your approach is to ignore the OP"s concerns (might the shooting be the "by and means necessary" of Malcolm X), but just to say "guys, let's not rush to judgment:." But I'll go out on a limb here and judge the video I saw of a guy shot in the neck while sitting in chair talking on a college campus answering questions and doing whatever social media people do.

But if you're right, and alien abduction or whatnot brought us here, I'll eat crow.

I'll go on record with what ought be an obvious sentiment, which is that the capital murderer who assassinated a young father of two from a rooftop with likely a hunting rifle was not an anti-hero who meted out any sort of just dessert, but a useless coward who is in desperate need of .justice from those hunting him down as he hides among innocent students.

His was an act of pure evil, worthy of nothing but unequivocal condemnation, unnuanced, with no hidden irony, intelligence or purpose that could possibly give us reason to think it had an ounce of good within it.

As noted, the problems of the world are complex and varied, but the most glaring problem is that every post in this thread doesn't read like mine.

It stops everything happening at once.

Imagine a movie, but every frame projected simultaneously ... the divine white light of god-consciousness. Even the darkest soul, from the view of eternity, is nothing but a flash of white light. — unenlightened

But use a book instead of a film for your example. The entirety of the book is happening at once. All the pages are there at all times, as opposed to the film that requires movement across the light. This would suggest that "happening" references conscious perception of the thing as opposed to anything to do with the thing.

But I also realize that's not always the case because the sun comes and down regardless of who's watching.

Can you control not being hungry? No. Can you control not thinking about being hungry when you are starving? It's possible. Arguably, up to a point. — Outlander

There are obvioulsy some thoughts not within your control, like hunger, disgust, fear, etc., which is consistent with there being some physical actions that are not within your control, like your heartbeat, your breathing, and flinching if an object is thrown at you, etc.

But, consider Descartes' comment here:

“But when I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but assent to it. Even if I will to the contrary, I am nevertheless drawn into assent by the great light in the intellect; and in this consists the greatest and most evident mark of human error.”

This goes beyond as you were saying, arguing that choice is not part of the deliberative process, but conclusions as to all sorts of matter are determined by clear and distinct perceptions.

Compare that to William James:

“Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”

This allows for choice of the will (under particular circumstances, particularly when the intellect is indeterminate).

As with Descartes, he'd argue that a belief in God (for example) is clear and distinct and not subject to doubt, which means he must believe in God. Choice isn't part of his equation. As to James, he'd argue that a belief in God is a matter of choice.

having a surprisingly hard time locating any discussions in the literature of mental-to-mental causation -- that is, the idea that one thought or image could cause another thought or image. I've looked through the usual suspects on causation but haven't nailed it yet. Can anyone on TPF help?

Much appreciated! — J

Not sure if this touches on your question: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxastic-voluntarism/

This is a discussion of whether you have control over any of your thoughts, which addresses the issue of what causes thoughts.

Who gets the wife — noAxioms

I suspect, in any event, the wife chooses.

I feel like this conversation bounces all over the place. You can be individualistic and egalitarian simultaneously. You can also be hyper competitive and consumerist by adopting a collectivist position, as you see, for example, in immigrant communities in the US where pooling of recorces is common. You can also be individualistic and not be competitive, but instead just prefer self sufficiency.

You can also be religious and be capitalistic or very much not (not just Eastern religions, but also priests monks, and the like).

The point being that these laments about the value of humanity and our ethical reatment of one another doesn't track so nicely to general societal attitudes, religious orientations, or competitive spirits as it does just to old fashion adherence to morality.

The culture of individualism gave rise to an inflated sense of the worth of the self, even grandiosity. — Jack Cummins

A high sense of self worth does not equate to feelings of grandiosity. It's a Wonderful Life did not portray George Bailey as someone who thought highly of himself or someone who felt entitled to more than others. Mr. Potter portrayed the Grinch like character, concerned only with money and power. You might decipher anti-capitalistic or anti-consumerist themes in the movie (as well as in A Christmas Carol), but that doesn't equate to an acceptance that human life is of less than infinite value. I'd argue that it shows just the opposite - that the quantification of life's value to dollar and cents is what is truly dehumanizing precisely because it reduces the worth of the self to numbers..

It's a wonderful life..

It's common for folk with idealist tendencies to confuse what they believe, understand, think etc. with what is true. — Banno

What you're saying perchance isn't just that pseudo idealists (those with idealist tendencies) confuse the mental as the only real, but it's that's true idealists are confused because they think the mental is the only real.

In other words, true idealists are being true to their worldview. It's not as if they're realists but have illogically assessed the consequences of representationalism to mean there is no ontological truth (as a pseudo idealist might).

As in, Berkeley is logically consistent and Kant allows a distinction between the unknowable noumena (the ontologically real) and the phenomena (the mentally known). Those folks aren't muddling epistemology with ontology.

Again, in the Nature survey, the data is as follows:

Does a measurement require an observer?
Yes, and they must be conscious: 9%
Yes, but consciousness is not relevant (and an 'observer' can include
interaction with a macroscopic environment): 56%
No: 28%
Not sure: 8%

The supposition that there is a consensus amongst physicists that consciousness is an inherent feature of the physical universe is a fabrication. 84% of physicists reject the idea that consciousness is necessary for measurement. — Banno

Consciousness isn't an inherent feature of the physical universe, but a description of the physical universe without reference to consciousness is incoherent. The measurement (meaning the measuring devices' reaction to the physical event) occurs without consciousness, but what are we even talking about when we talk about events that exist in a universe that have never been provided attributes described by the senses?

So: "If a tree falls in the woods...", basically — Outlander

No. That suggests Jung was some sort of Berkelian idealist. He was not making any metaphysical claim at all. He was only indicating our psyche is mediated by our perceptions and so our consciousness of reality defines who we are.

The world existed before this hypothetical observer was even born, and would have existed if that never happened, and continues still to exist long after we're gone. I can have an idea about anything that exists, — Outlander

He's not suggesting otherwise. To the extent the external world is mediated and not directly knowable, that would evoke Kantian references of the noumenal, but not suggestions of reality blipping in and out of existence as we blink.

C.G. Jung once said that the world only exists when you consciously perceive it. In that theory, only what I see truly exists. What I do not see, or what I am not aware of, therefore does not exist. — Jan

Substitute "the world" with "your world."

Actual quote from Jung is:

“Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists for us only in so far as it is consciously reflected by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being.”

Schrödinger had ideas along similar lines. — Jan

I can't agree with this assessment.

Jung was a psychologist, not a physicist. He meant only that our world, what we know, live, and breathe, what it is to be, is rooted in our consciousness.

This is not a statement about reality generally. It is a statement about what constitutes our personal reality. The "practically speaking" qualification makes it all the more difficult to suggest he was making any claim about the world generally.

Just finished The Magician of Lublin. The metaphor of self-imprisonment as an obstacle for atonement was truly brilliant.

Is it metaphysics or is it sociology? — T Clark

Metaphysica of sociology. As in, what is a society (or subpart) composed of. The "ant trap" (name of his book) is the error (his thesis) of falling into the trap (as he says many social theorists do) of thinking of society as an aggregate of its individuals (i.e. a bunch of ants making a colony).

The SEP was written by this same author.

Why would I choose to die so that my replica can live? I don't understand that. You've not cured my illness. You've just created a new person just like me without my illness. Why can't we both live? Why do we need another of me without arthritis? Why not make a whole team of people like me, all with different qualities (like one can cook really good, one cuts the grass really well, one is a good plumber, one is airline pilot, etc.) and send them to my family and job and I can get all sorts of stuff done while old arthritic me bitches in the recliner looking for the remote?

I do like me a questionaire.

​Ethics in Action: How do you personally resolve ethical contradictions that arise in your everyday life? — Astorre

I don't resort to philosophical analysis for determining what is ethical. I find ethical theories post hoc attempts to describe why you act in instinctively ethical ways. To the extent a contradiction arises, I just weigh the two and try to figure out what is best.

​Coping with Life's Challenges: Does your knowledge of philosophy help you deal with life's difficulties, losses, or existential anxiety? — Astorre

I don't. That's the purpose of religion.

​Balancing Depth and Superficiality: How do you find a balance between your philosophical mindset and the superficiality you encounter in others? — Astorre

We can learn from everyone. I think it's a mistake to assume the philosophically minded offer more than those not so.

Does philosophical thinking change your approach to relationships, friendships, and love? If so, how? — Astorre

To the extent being philosophical is synonymous with being even tempered, then I suppose it makes me not tempermental, but I don't think philosophy made me that way. I think that's just the way I am.

Beyond that, we have to be satisfied that we don't have any linguistic fingers that can't touch consciousness? — frank

Wittgenstein discusses how language is used, not the mystery in your head. So it's not that he's denying your inner world. He's just saying it can't be spoken about directly. That's not to say you can't say "I feel pain" and be understood, but our understanding is based upon how we as a community use words, not based upon me knowing whether your inner referent (your beetle) is the same as my inner referent (my beetle). We don't speak of beetles, except as words, not as beetles.

It left me pondering how I know what it's like to be conscious if I can't know what it's like for other people. Wouldn't I need something to compare or contrast it with? I wasn't thinking about the ineffability issue. It would be closer to a private language problem, where I wouldn't be able to speak confidently about continuity of consciousness. I wouldn't be able to say it's this and not that. Maybe I have to assume other people experience things differently so I can say pinpoint something unique about me? Is it my POV that's unique? — frank

You can't know what the other person's beetle is like. You can speak about your experiences, but ultimately the words you use are defined by how you use them, not by your internal state. So when you say "I feel pain," the word "pain" just means how people use it, but because the word only means how it is used and it does not have a referent of your internal pain does not suggest you don't actually have pain.

Where I've used "pain," the same holds for the word "consciousness." That is, "I am conscious," or "I am aware," or whatever you wish to convey is definable by the words as they're used, not by the internal state.

When you seek to discuss the actual internal state as to what it is, the private sensation, you are outside what Wittgenstein would allow language to do. You're discussing metaphysics. Language isn't for that sort of discussion because meaning is use, not meaning is internal referent.

So, as to how you know that you are conscious? You experience it. You are therefore conscious. "Knowing" is a loaded term because it requires a justification, so it's more consistent just to say you are in pain without saying "I know I am in pain because I feel pain" which might implicate a metaphysical conversation about homonculi. The consistency of your word usage is controlled by public correction, not by consistency of the internal referent.

I think.

Might it be that the physicalist worldview is deficient in some respect. — Wayfarer

I've not argued a physicalist worldview. I've only argued that paranormal experience doesn't offer proof of substance dualism. My basis isn't just that physical monism offers a possible explanation, but it's that it's contradictory to use physical evidence to prove the non-physical.

That is, you can claim souls, gods, and ghosts exist, but you can't show me pictures of anything other than their physical attributes. If I can see it, it's physical.

Empirical proof for the existence of the non physical simply makes no sense.

Brassica napobrassica — Banno

This makes the H2O - water point, right? The scientific term means something different from the common one, but they collapse under the same set, losing that distinction.

So are swedes and rutabegas and purple top turnips extensionally identical? — Banno

At my grocery store, a rutebega is a large round root with purple on all parts, for some reason with a very waxy exterior. A turnip is smaller, shown in the picture you provided. A Swede is a tall blonde specimen from up north.

Are they extensionally identical? Is water and H2O?

Why would being infinite make it uncertain? There are infinite odd numbers, but no uncertainty here. Infinity does not lead automatically to vagueness. — Banno

That's an interesting point, but doesn't this reference a distinction in categories between analytically defined and empirically defined?

If sorting infinite root vegetables, some will be rutabegas, some we're not sure, and some will be Swedes.

But every other integer after 1 is odd no matter how high we count.

So, the rutebega set is infinite across all possible worlds as is the not-sure-if-rutebega set, but we have zero not-sure-if-odd set.

That is, I feel your odd number counter example was not applicable. It's of a different sort.

I also think my rutebega/Swede distinction raises another sort of problem along the lines of your kidney talk.

If redness is all things that are red in all possible worlds, then that set is infinite as is the set of of all things we're not sure are red. If there is infinitely uncertainty as to redness, then what value is our redness set in telling us what is red?

Mine might just be a vagueness objection that implicates infinite vagueness, but isn't the purpose of the extensionalism exercise to eliminate just that?

It depends on how "car" is specified. — litewave

Maybe replace "specified" with "used." Otherwise, you just have a purely prescriptive language, and not one that really exists.

Is it possible (logically consistent) for the property of being the king of France to be instantiated? If yes, then it is instantiated in some possible world. If not, then it would be self-contradictory. — litewave

So when you say everything must have a referent, you're speaking modally, meaning it has a hypothetical referent in a possible world? I didn't get that from your OP.

It depends on how "car" is specified. Usually it is specified as "self-propelled vehicle on four wheels". In that case, the property of being a car is the set of all self-propelled vehicles on four wheels. — litewave

Why can't a car have 3 wheels and why wouldn't a broken car still be a car?

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. This set would be the property, and the elements of this set would be the instances of the property. For example, the property of redness would be identified with the set of all red things, or the property of being a car would be identified with the set of all cars. — litewave

There are properties that exist that are not of a referent, like the property of being the King of France attaches to no object, yet being the King of France is a property nontheless. There are also no essences of objects that would dictate which set all examples belong, like whether a particular car belongs in the set of cars is contextually dependent.

Searle, Wittgenstein.

In modern western societies, a testimony that appeals to clairvoyance falls under misrepresentation of evidence, an inevitable outcome under witness cross examination in relation to critical norms of rational enquiry and expert testimony, possibly resulting in accusations of perjury against the witness. I would hazard a guess that the last time an American court accepted 'spectral' evidence was during the Salem witch trials. — sime

I agree with this generally, but I don't think it's a fair criticism of @Sam's position. That is, in court, if the physical evidence contradicts the testimonial evidence or if the testimonial evidence is not possible under the laws of physics as we know them to be, then then testimonial evidence fails. If it doesn't fit, you must acquit so to speak.

If we accept the priority of the laws of physics over testimony as a given, then it would become impossible to ever challenge the laws of physics as we know them to be by testimony.

To give two differing examples to make this point: If I say I saw Bigfoot, you might challenge that because you don't believe there to be a Bigfoot, but it's not based upon the fact that our laws of physics deny the possibility of there being a Bigfoot. You will listen to my testimony and others and you may or may not believe Bigfoot was seen, but it stands as a possibility that there is a Bigfoot. As a juror, you would be weighing the credibility of the testimony.

If I say I had an NDE and you say that me saying it can never overcome the fact that disembodied spirits are physically impossible, and no matter how convincing I might be, you reject it based upon your belief in the priority of physics over testimony, then you are creating a situation where I can never prove the NDEs exist. As a juror, you would not be weighing the credibility of the testimony. You would be rejecting it as impossible.